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Abstract 
 
A universal human dignity, conceived as an inherent and inalienable value or 
worth in all human beings, which ought to be recognised, respected and 
protected by others, has become one of the most prominent and widely 
promoted interpretations of human dignity, especially in international human 
rights law.  Yet, it is also one of the most difficult interpretations of human 
dignity to justify and ground.  The fundamental problem rests on how one can 
justify bestowing an equal high worth to all human lives, whilst also attributing to 
all human life a worth that is superior to all non-human animal life.  To avoid the 
speciesist charge it seems necessary to provide further reasons, over and 
above species membership, for why all humans have a unique worth and 
dignity.  However, intrinsic capacities, such as autonomy, intelligence or 
language use, are too demanding for many humans (including foetuses or the 
severely cognitively disabled) to meet the required minimum standard, whilst 
also being obtainable by some non-human animals, regardless of where the 
level is set.   
This thesis offers a solution to this problem by turning instead to the significance 
of the relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend individual 
capacities and abilities, and consequently does not require that all individuals in 
the group need meet the minimum required capacity for full moral status.  
Rather, it is argued that a universal human dignity could be grounded in our 
social nature, the interconnectedness and interdependence of human life and 
the morally considerable relationships that can and do arise from it, especially in 
regards to our shared vulnerability and dependence, and our ability to engage in 
caring relationships.  Care represents the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects 
of humiliation, and other degrading and dehumanizing acts, and as a relational 
concept, human dignity is often best realised through our caring relationships.  
The way that individuals and groups treat each other has a fundamental role in 
determining both an individual’s sense of self-worth and well-being, as well as 
their perceived public value and worth.  Thus, whilst species membership is not 
in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often shapes the nature of our social 
and moral relations.  These relational ties between humans, it is argued, 
distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals and accord human 
relationships a special moral significance or dignity. 
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The Population Reference Bureau predicts that the world’s total population will 
double to 7,000,000,000 before the year 2000. 
‘I suppose they will all want dignity,’ I said. 
‘I suppose,’ said O’Hare. 
 
Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5  
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Introduction 
 
Universal Human Dignity 
 
As with all moral concepts, there is rarely such a thing as one accepted 
definition.  Dignity is no different, and accompanying the ever expanding 
literature on human dignity is an ever increasing number of accounts, definitions 
and taxonomies offered by commentators to distinguish between the different 
forms dignity is thought to take (see for instance, Düwell 2014, 25-7; Rosen 
2013, 153-4; Henry 2010; Schroeder 2010; Debes 2009; Ashcroft 2005; 
Nordenfelt 2004; Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 1-47; and Johnson 1998).  
Some of these formulations present dignity as an inherent and inalienable value 
or feature in all (or most) humans, whilst others suggest that dignity is present in 
some individuals only, and can be stripped, lost or even enhanced.  
Furthermore, the reasons given for why an individual or group has a dignity 
varies considerably. This dignity might be due to a range of features, from 
virtuous conduct and behaviour, holding a high social office or rank, belonging 
to the human species, or possessing some relevant properties or capacities.  
For some, this multitude of different meanings and justifications is indicative of 
the emptiness of the concept, whilst others consider it to be demonstrative of its 
richness and complexity.1 In either case, it is clear that dignity is a particularly 
                                                          
1
 See for instance: ‘It is true that human dignity is never clearly defined in international law.  
Such a thing would be as difficult as trying to define freedom, welfare, solidarity, or any other 
key social value.  In any case, this lack of definition does not entail that dignity is a merely 
formal or empty concept or a purely rhetorical notion.  It is not because it is too poor but 
because it is too rich that it cannot be encapsulated into a very precise definition’ (Andorno 
2013, 130).  Similarly, Dworkin argues that dignity acts as an organizing idea, ‘...because it 
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slippery concept to understand and analyze. Explaining what precisely dignity 
is, and why an individual is thought to have it, is notoriously difficult to answer.2   
Dignity carries with it both a gravitas, and a vagueness, which has often allowed 
parties from opposing sides to use it, without in the process clearly defining or 
analyzing their terms.3  It is not unknown for the concept to be invoked by 
different sides discussing the same issue.4 
Whilst there are numerous formulations of what human dignity is, the type of 
dignity focused on throughout this thesis is what will be termed a ‘universal 
human dignity’.  This is commonly conceived as an equal inherent and 
inalienable high value or worth in all human beings, which ought to be 
recognised, respected and protected by others.  A universal human dignity then 
is a particularly demanding moral concept which requires that we accept that all 
(or most) humans have an equally high moral worth, which cannot be stripped 
or lost, regardless of the individual’s, or indeed anyone else’s, actions or 
behaviour.  This egalitarian concept is then quite different to the idea of an 
individual acting with or without dignity.  As Alan Gewirth explains: ‘[t]he sense 
of “dignity” in which all humans are said to have equal dignity is not the same as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
facilitates our interpretive project to collect widely shared ethical principles under one 
portmanteau description’ (Dworkin 2011, 205). 
2
 As Dupré highlights, ‘Human dignity is a notoriously difficult concept to grasp and to define, 
indeed understanding it is arguably such a scholarly challenge that the best we can hope for 
might be a fragmented and partial picture’ (Dupré 2015, 4). 
3 
Mattson and Clark rather disparagingly claim that ‘…the concept of human dignity is in such 
disarray that it does not provide even a minimally stable frame for global discourse and action’ 
(Mattson and Clark, 2011). 
4
 Whilst an abundance of examples exist, one of the most often cited and infamous cases 
involved the game of dwarf tossing, in which legislators in both France and the USA have 
prohibited the activity of throwing dwarfs, due to finding it offensive to human dignity.  This is 
despite the individuals with dwarfism themselves insisting that banning the practice was itself an 
affront to their own dignity, not least because they were consenting adults who relied on the 
practice for their livelihood, and the implication that their disability is in some way undignified 
(after all it was not considered an affront to dignity to throw an adult of normal size) (see Leget 
et al. 2009).  Whilst both perspectives carry with them a strong sense of respect for human life 
and personal autonomy, as can be appreciated, both positions lead to quite different 
conclusions as to the role and nature of dignity.  Often, it seems, a variety of strong convictions 
can be derived from powerful but conflicting intuitions about what human dignity is, and what it 
demands of us. 
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that in which it may be said of some person that he lacks dignity or that he 
behaves without dignity...This kind of dignity is one that humans may 
occurrently [sic] exhibit, lack, or lose, whereas the dignity in which all humans 
are said to be equal is a characteristic that belongs permanently and inherently 
to every human as such’ (Gewirth 1982, 27-28).  However, as we will see, quite 
how universal human dignity is depends on how far we are able and willing to 
widen the circle of moral concern.  Hence, so-called ‘marginal cases’, that is 
individuals traditionally left on the border of moral considerability (including 
embryos, foetuses, non-human animals, the irreversibly comatose, the severely 
cognitively disabled, as well as future beings, such as transhumans and human-
animal chimeras), become crucial test cases.  
There are quite clear reasons for focussing on this formulation, as a universal 
human dignity has become one of the most prominent and widely promoted 
interpretations of human dignity.  It forms the foundation for much of 
international human rights law (UNESCO 2005; European Convention 2000; 
United Nations 1976a, 1948; Council of Europe 1950; and Basic Law 1949), as 
well as more recently in healthcare policy and standards of practice 
(Department of Health 2015; Nursing and Midwifery Council 2015; General 
Medical Council 2013; International Council of Nurses 2012; and Royal College 
of Nursing 2008).  Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, there have 
been an ever increasing number of constitutions and international declarations 
which appeal to the idea of a form of universal human dignity.  In the The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for instance, recognition, ‘of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family’ is said to be ‘the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the 
world’.  As Adam Schulman highlights in his excellent introduction to the 
14 
 
otherwise widely maligned5 Human Dignity and Bioethics (2008), by the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, ‘at least thirty-seven national constitutions 
ratified since 1945 refer explicitly to human dignity’ (Schulman 2008, 12). 
Talk of dignity now pervades many walks of life, and academic discourse, from 
our fundamental human rights, to our healthcare and protection from the 
encroachment of biotechnology, and other related fields.  This ubiquity has led 
Catherine Dupré to label the twenty-first century as ‘the century of human 
dignity’ (Dupré 2015, 1-2).  Increasingly dignity has been invoked within the field 
of bioethics to cover a huge range of areas, from debates about stem cell 
research (Caulfield and Chapman 2005; Pichler 2005; and Oduncu 2003) to 
euthanasia and care of the elderly (Nordenfelt 2003a, 2003b; and Loewy 1999), 
and in debates on human cloning and genetic engineering (Birnbacher 2005; 
Balzer et al. 2000; and Heeger 2000), as well as the ethics of human 
enhancement (O’Mathúna 2013; Bostrom 2008).  But why is it that dignity has 
now become such a touchstone within the bioethical arena?  One reason, 
offered by several commentators, is the fact that advances and future promises 
of biotechnology and bioscience have begun to challenge like never before 
what it means to be human, and where the boundaries of our humanity lie (see 
Dupré 2015, 1-2; Brownsword 2013, 347-8; McCrudden 2013, 1-3; and Andorno 
2009, 9).  Advances in biotechnology, including within genetic engineering, 
reproductive technologies, and human enhancement strike close to what we 
consider central elements of our humanity.  For instance, if technology and 
improved medicine can continue to push back the human lifespan and increase 
human longevity, then ageing and even death no longer appear to be a 
necessary or accepted part of human life, but something which can, and 
                                                          
5 
For example, see Pinker (2008), as well as Meltzer (2008). 
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perhaps ought, to be alleviated and prevented.  Similarly, advances in new 
reproductive technology, from genetic testing to artificial reproductive 
techniques, start to challenge our traditional conceptions of parenthood, species 
membership, and the inescapability of our genetic makeup (see for instance 
Chapman 2013).  As pointed out by Dupré, dignity is often now used as a legal 
and ethical tool to ‘protect a concept of humanity going much beyond the 
existing individual human beings, to include the whole of mankind, future 
generations, as well as a form of humanity that for now we cannot even 
imagine’ (Dupré 2015, 81).  The idea of a universal human dignity then is used 
not only as a device to protect and respect the individual or group, but the 
integrity of the human species, and the idea of humanity itself. 
This is not to say that the introduction of dignity in bioethical discussions has 
been universally welcomed.  Rather dignity is a highly contentious moral 
concept, and one which several commentators have argued we should do away 
with in bioethics altogether, to be replaced with a less ambiguous, more precise 
notion (see for instance Cochrane 2010; Pinker 2008; Bagaric and Allan 2006; 
and Macklin 2003a).  This perspective has even been suggested to be the 
mainstream of current English speaking bioethics (Ashcroft 2005, 679).6 Ruth 
Macklin, for instance, advocates banishing the term from medical ethics entirely, 
arguing that ‘dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be 
eliminated without any loss of content’ (Macklin 2003a, 1420).  Rather, for 
Macklin, respect for persons and autonomy are sufficient principles to replace 
the use of dignity in ethics; dignity adds nothing, and often confuses the issue.  
However, linking dignity with the capacity for autonomy seems to immediately 
                                                          
6
 As McCrudden explains: ‘For many of its detractors...human dignity acts as more of a 
complete limit than other ethical viewpoints, a “conversation stopper”.  The relative 
effectiveness of human dignity in that regard has led to considerable resistance to the use of 
dignity by some scientists working in these areas’ (McCrudden 2013, 3). 
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lock out some humans (as well as non-human animals) without this capacity, or 
who at least do not possess it to any meaningful degree.7  This is then contrary 
to the sentiment of a universal conception of human dignity, in which the vast 
majority of (if not all) humans are thought to have dignity. 
For many, human dignity, contrary to Macklin, does command special moral 
attention; something over and above respect for persons or autonomy, and 
neither principle fully exhausts the meaning of human dignity.  This is not least 
because many of the most vulnerable individuals, in which protection of their 
dignity becomes most pressing, have the most impaired capacity for autonomy.  
To explain why an act is morally wrong, such as failing to wash or dress a 
patient with advanced dementia, by appealing to the fact that it violates the 
individual’s capacity for autonomy, fails to capture what we mean when we say 
that their dignity has been violated.  Similarly, when a refugee escaping the 
ravages of conflict is not given sanctuary, and so claims their human dignity has 
been violated, they are most likely not referring merely to a violation of their 
capacity for autonomy.  Instead they are more likely appealing to a sense that 
something fundamental to what it is to be human has been challenged or 
denied them.  There are certain forms of treatment which are, and are not, 
befitting for a human.  Autonomy and dignity then seem distinct concepts, which 
do quite different moral work.  
As suggested by Paolo G. Carozza, the relationship between dignity and 
autonomy is a complicated one.  In one sense ‘human dignity clearly demands 
                                                          
7
 Although some writers accept that some humans will be excluded from this formulation of 
dignity: ‘it is only those humans who have a developed capacity for autonomy who have 
dignity...If follows that this version of human dignity as empowerment is not universal in applying 
to all human beings; strictly speaking, it applies contingently only to those humans who have the 
capacity for autonomy...strictly speaking, human dignity, and, concomitantly, human rights are 
not enjoyed universally by all members of the human species’ (Beyleveld and Brownsword 
2001, 23). 
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protection of individual autonomy.  For instance, many jurisdictions ground the 
autonomy of patients to make free and informed choices about their medical 
care in human dignity, and a government that does not respect people’s choices 
to shape their identities can thereby violate their dignity’.  However, as Carozza 
highlights, there are also many cases in which personal autonomy has been 
restricted in the name of protecting the same individual’s dignity.  As he notes: 
‘...a prohibition on peep shows has been found to be a valid protection of the 
human dignity of the (consenting) women being exhibited, while the South 
African Constitutional Court upheld a ban on prostitution because the 
commoditisation of one’s body necessarily diminished the human dignity of the 
prostitutes...’ (Carozza 2013, 618-9).  Indeed, dignity often acts as a form of 
restraint, and notably has been utilized to ensure that scientific advances are 
kept in check and so used to place limits on what research we would find 
acceptable.  Within the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of 
Biology and Medicine (Council of Europe 1997), for instance, appeals to dignity 
play a central part in limiting certain controversial areas of scientific research.  
Similarly, UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
(UNESCO 2005) repeatedly mentions the dignity and intrinsic worth of the 
human being, and that the ‘interests and welfare of the individual should have 
priority over the sole interest of science or society’ (UNESCO 2005, 76).   
What then is the proper place of human dignity in bioethics?  To begin to 
answer such a question will require an exploration of what a universal human 
dignity is, and why humans are thought to have it.  Without a clear and thorough 
understanding of these concepts, appeals to human dignity in the literature will 
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remain vague, inarticulate, and unjustified, which are of little use to bioethicists 
and future policy makers. 
The Ground of Dignity 
 
Despite the ubiquity of the term and the ever increasing appeal to it in a wide 
range of areas of public life, a universal human dignity is also one of the most 
difficult interpretations of human dignity to justify and ground.  In other words, 
why is it that all, and perhaps only, humans are said to have a dignity?  What 
could justify such a special value or status?8  The difficulty in answering such 
questions is probably the reason why we often find the belief that humans have 
an inherent and inalienable high worth or value is put forward with little 
justification or explanation.9  It has been reported that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, for instance, used the concept of ‘human dignity’, at least in 
part, because the drafters required a placeholder term as they were worried that 
the different nation states would not be able to agree on a more precise 
definition.  Similarly, it has been noted that UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights refers to ‘human dignity’ or ‘the dignity of the 
                                                          
8
 This uncertainty has been picked up by Marcus Düwell, writing that ‘The adjective ‘human’ 
seems to suggest an answer to the question to whom we should attribute human dignity, and 
that answer is: to all human beings and only to human beings.  This answer, however, gave rise 
to a variety of other questions: what does ‘all human beings’ precisely mean?  When does a 
human being start to have dignity (with conception, at birth etc.)?  And when does it cease to be 
a being with dignity?  Should we see human beings who will never develop rational capacities 
as beings with dignity?  And why should we ascribe this status only to humans?  Are not at least 
some animals worthy of the same respect we owe to human beings?  It would be necessary to 
explain the criteria we use to determine who has human dignity and how these criteria can be 
justified’ (Düwell 2014, 33). 
9
 As Beyleveld and Brownsword note, ‘...the foundational premiss itself (that humans have 
intrinsic worth) is put forward without any supporting reasons.  We (humans) may well be 
disposed to accept that human beings have intrinsic value, but is there any reason why we 
should accept this proposition?  If we have no reason, there is a serious (epistemological) 
contingency at the base of this conception...The problem with this version of human dignity as 
empowerment, therefore, is that its universal attribution of protective rights to humans rests 
entirely on contingent acceptance – it depends on humans having the right attitude, namely a 
human rights attitude’ (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 22). 
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human person’ eleven times, but does not spell out what that dignity is, or why 
human beings have it (Schulman 2008, 13n).  Whilst this approach of treating 
human dignity as a vague, often inarticulate concept, has allowed for 
international cross-party consensus, the fundamental question still remains as 
to whether human dignity is a useful concept in bioethics.  In the words of 
Schulman:  ‘is it one that sheds important light on the whole range of bioethical 
issues, from enhancement to care of the disabled, or is it a useless concept – at 
best a vague substitute for other, more precise notions, at worst a mere slogan 
that camouflages unconvincing arguments and un-articulated biases?’ 
(Schulman 2008, 3).  The meaning, content, and theoretical foundations or 
ground of human dignity in these documents are never explicitly challenged or 
defined.10  As Schulman notes, ‘in effect, “human dignity” serves here as a 
placeholder for whatever it is about human beings that entitles them to basic 
human rights and freedoms’ (Schulman 2008, 13). 
One of the key problems, as summarised by Peter Singer, is whether or not we 
can ‘justify attributing equal value to all human lives, while at the same time 
attributing to human life a value that is superior to all animal life’ (Singer 2009, 
571).  Human dignity, as far as it is seen as a status conferring concept, seems 
to need to hinge on some conception of the significance of being human, 
specifically on something that non-humans lack.  If there was nothing of import 
to being a human, then it would seem to be entirely baseless to claim that 
humans have a special worth or dignity.  As we will see in Chapter 6, in light of 
recent developments in animal ethics, to avoid the charge that we are being 
                                                          
10
 Instead, as noted by Schachter, ‘its [dignity’s] intrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive 
understanding, conditioned in large measure by cultural factors.  When it has been invoked in 
concrete situations, it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can be 
recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined. “I know it when I see it even if I cannot 
tell you what it is”’ (Schachter 1983, 849).   
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arbitrary and prejudiced (as we find in cases of racism or sexism) it seems 
necessary to provide further reasons, over and above species membership, for 
why all humans have a unique worth and dignity.  Critics argue that a mere 
biological category cannot do any moral work.  The distinguishing feature in 
question ought to also be of moral value and commendable; it has to be 
demonstrated that humans are unique or distinctive to the rest of the natural 
world in the right way.  As Helga Kuhse notes, ‘...it would not be enough to say 
that human life has dignity because it takes the form of a featherless biped or 
because humans have opposing thumbs’ (Kuhse 2000, 69-7).  Not all attributes 
which are unique or distinctive to humans would also necessarily lend 
themselves well to grounding a universal human dignity.  There are numerous, 
seemingly unique, human capacities, such as playing sports or the cooking of 
food, which seem irrelevant to justifying human dignity.  Conversely, there are 
other uniquely human capacities, such as the ability to undertake such 
abhorrent acts as genocide, war or torture, which are entirely counter to the 
idea that humans have a dignity that is worth preserving. 
In this way, as Christopher McCrudden explains, ‘there appear to be two levels 
in the debates around dignity. One level of debate, the foundational level, 
concerns the grounding of the concept of dignity...’ however, ‘another level of 
debate concerns whether, and if so how, dignity provides a guide for action, and 
this frequently involves the role that dignity plays in the legal sphere: the way in 
which declarations, conventions, and legislation on rights appeal to dignity' 
(McCrudden 2013, 47).  This thesis focuses, for the most part, on the first, 
foundational or justificatory level.  The main purpose of this study, therefore, is 
to provide a critical examination of the ethics of a universal human dignity, 
focusing particularly on how it can be justified or grounded, as well as its 
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conceptual limitations.  Whilst the literature on human dignity has grown 
exponentially in recent years, and the concept continues to pervade a broad 
range of areas (including in discussions of human rights, biotechnological 
enhancement, as well as healthcare), there remains little consensus on what 
dignity in fact is, or how it can be justified.11 
However, one may step back first and question why it is that human dignity has 
to be grounded – why is it that we have to justify the inherent high moral worth 
of all humans?  Why cannot we adopt the approach taken by the drafters of The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and just accept that all humans have an 
inherent worth that ought to be respected and protected by others?  After all, on 
the face of it, it seems to be a good thing for all humans to be treated as if they 
had a high moral worth (even if this is grounded on nothing more than this).  
Whilst it has its roots much further back, the belief in a universal human dignity 
was borne out of the horrors and atrocities committed during the Second World 
War, and the vow to never repeat such events again.  If the belief in the 
inherent worth of all humans is necessary to ensure this, then perhaps it is 
unnecessary (or even dangerous) to seek a deeper level of justification – after 
all, unless we allow for an infinite regress, all justification needs to stop 
somewhere.  As George Kateb argues:  
I am afraid that we may jeopardize human dignity by laboring to defend 
it...Is a long and elaborate theory needed to establish the point that 
people should not be treated by the state as if they were masses, or 
obstacles or instruments to higher purposes, or subjects for experiments, 
                                                          
11
 Düwell, for instance, notes that ‘a comprehensive investigation into the possibilities of a 
philosophical conceptualization and justification of human dignity’ is lacking in the current 
literature, and requires further research and investigation’ (Düwell 2014, 47); this thesis goes 
someway to addressing this theoretical gap. 
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or pieces in a game, or wayward children in need of protection against 
themselves, or patients in need of perpetual care, or beasts in need of 
the stick? (Kateb 1992, 5). 
On one level it is perhaps just philosophical curiosity, and the nature of the 
discipline which encourages the challenging of accepted norms and principles.  
However, as we will see, the concept of human dignity is far from accepted, and 
increasingly unwelcome as it continues to encroach into bioethical discourse 
(Cochrane 2010; Pinker 2008; Bagaric & Allan 2006; and Macklin 2003a).  
Moreover, as will be shown in Chapter 6, advances in animal ethics over the 
last few decades have thrown up fresh challenges to the idea that being human 
is to have an inherent worth, and a consequent privileging of interests over 
other non-human animals.  There is thus a burden of proof on the proponent of 
a universal human dignity.  What is it about being human (if anything), then, 
which bestows this high moral worth?  Whilst a universal human dignity may be 
one of the most common forms of dignity, it is also one of the most difficult to 
establish the foundations of.   
Relational Dignity 
 
Traditionally, attempts to justify why all humans have a dignity have followed the 
same reasoning which grounds full moral status and personhood, which 
involves looking to the superiority of human cognitive capacities and abilities 
(such as, intelligence, language use or moral reasoning).  However, this has 
always fallen short as to explaining why all (or at least most) humans should 
have a dignity (and why this should be shared equally), as many of these 
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cognitive capacities are also possessed by non-human animals, and appear in 
varying degrees amongst humans themselves. 
This thesis offers a solution to the problem of grounding a universal human 
dignity by turning instead to the significance of the relational ties between 
individuals or groups that transcend individual capacities and abilities.  There 
are certain relational ties between humans that, it is argued, distinguish us from 
other non-human animals, and accord humans a special moral significance or 
dignity.  On this account, to be human is something over and above that of 
simply belonging to the human species, but is rather a product of our complex 
social relations with others.  To date, little work has been attempted to develop 
and justify a concept of human dignity which is based on the significance of 
these relational or community ties.12   
In particular, it is argued that a universal human dignity could be grounded on 
the interconnectedness and interdependence of human life and the morally 
considerable relationships that can and do arise from it, especially in regards to 
our shared vulnerability and dependence (MacIntyre 1999; Goodin 1985), and 
                                                          
12
 One notable exception is Francis and Norman (1978). A similar idea has recently been put 
forward by Dupré: ‘...considering dignity as res publica means including all human beings within 
its protective scope, regardless of the degree of self-awareness of their humanity or their ability 
to take rational decisions affecting their life and death. As a result, in the dignity paradigm 
human beings deprived of autonomy, because they are, for instance, too young or too old, 
severely disabled or in a persistent vegetative state, are not treated as an exception when it 
comes to determining the scope of their human rights and to protecting them. As res publica, 
human dignity is not designed just for the strong, healthy, assertive and competent, it is 
designed to bring into the centre of constitutionalism those who are on the margins of human 
rights, and whose protection (particularly perhaps in adjudication) often depends largely on a 
judge’s sensitivity and humanity, rather than on a known and transparent set of rules. Similarly, 
as res publica, human dignity is not meant only to protect citizens, leaving the level of human 
rights protection of the noncitizens, such as refugees and asylum-seekers, to be decided by 
distinction and exception. Above all, as res publica, human dignity protects humanity, 
understood as the humanity that we equally share as human beings; it is also increasingly used 
to acknowledge through the prism of human rights the importance of mankind and of future 
generations, the protection of which can be addressed, and hopefully achieved, with the tools 
and in the framework of European constitutionalism’ (Dupré 2015, 22). 
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our ability to engage in caring relationships (Held 2005; Kittay 1999).  Indeed, 
care represents the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects of humiliation, and 
other degrading and dehumanizing acts, and as a relational concept, human 
dignity is often best realised through our caring relationships.  The way that 
individuals and groups treat each other has a fundamental role in determining 
both an individual’s sense of self-worth and well-being, as well as their 
perceived public value and worth.  In this way, whilst species membership is not 
in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often shapes the nature of our social 
and moral relations.  Consequently, the relational approach does not require 
that all individuals in the group must meet a minimum required capacity in order 
to be accorded full human dignity.   
In this way, it is argued that human dignity ought to be refocused as, at heart, a 
relational concept (rather than one which is tied to our intrinsic cognitive 
capacities), which is rooted in our complex social relations and practices.  The 
moral significance of these relational ties between humans, it is argued, 
distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals, and are much better 
suited to serve as the foundations or ground of a universal human dignity. 
One may question whether this is creating a false or exaggerated dichotomy 
between a capacities and relational based approach – is it really the case that 
accounts can fall cleanly into one of two camps?  As will be demonstrated, there 
are, in actual fact, a wide range of different combinations that the relationship 
between a capacities and relational based approach can take, in order to 
demonstrate why all human beings have a high moral status and dignity.  This 
thesis will go some way to unpicking those various permutations.  In regards to 
capacity centred approaches we have, on the one hand, demanding accounts 
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that require the individual themselves to be in possession of (or at least have 
the capacity or potential for) the relevant status conferring capacity (be that 
intelligence, autonomy, moral reasoning and so on), in order to be accorded a 
high moral status.  Still other capacity based accounts seek to identify moral 
status grounding capacities that are less demanding and applicable to a much 
wider group of beings (such as sentience, or the ability to feel pain and pleasure 
– see Chapter 6).   
However, other capacity accounts accept that not all beings can meet these 
criteria (be that because of disability or being too young or old), but may be 
accorded a similar high moral status if it is in the nature of the group to have 
such capacities (see Chapter 7).  These individuals have a high moral status, 
therefore, by virtue of their relationship or proxy to the group norm.  For 
example, rationality is said to be in the nature of human beings, and so all 
human beings have the same high moral status, even if not all human beings 
are rational; as Wasserman et al. explains: ‘...the norm captures what is natural 
to, or characteristic of the species.  A normal attribute is not, however, an 
essence that each member must possess.  Rather, it is a relational property: 
each individual has moral status as the member of a group for which that 
attribute is the norm’ (Wasserman et al. 2013a).  Similarly, some accounts 
argue that there are duties of partiality between certain groups (such as 
between mother and child or even partiality due to belonging to the same 
species), which warrant bestowing all a high moral status, despite not all 
members possessing the requisite capacities.   
Other, more relational or group based accounts reject the notion that moral 
status need be based on higher level cognitive capacities.  These accounts 
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often take issue with a reliance on identifying any one type of capacity to 
determine moral status and, consequently, shift the focus to identifying morally 
worthy features of our moral communities and other key aspects of our 
humanity (see Chapter 8).  Nevertheless, these accounts can still acknowledge 
the importance that certain capacities play in our morally significant 
relationships.  Indeed, even those accounts which downplay the importance of 
the role of capacities for determining moral status still often incorporate some 
form of capacity into their account (be that the capacity to give or receive care, 
language and communication, or a minimum level of consciousness).  Whilst 
acknowledging the role that capacities do play in grounding moral 
considerability, this thesis follows these relational-centred approaches, and 
pushes for a relaxing of the significance of intrinsic cognitive capacities for 
grounding a universal human dignity.  
Structure, Content and Methodology of the Thesis 
 
The concept of dignity can be a particularly problematic and demanding topic to 
research, not least because of the exponential growth in reference to the idea in 
the contemporary literature, as well as the increasing and ubiquitous use of the 
term in a wide variety of disciplines.  Moreover, whilst the idea of dignity has a 
long (albeit chequered) pedigree, study of the concept appears to still be very 
much in its infancy with, as yet, few established schools of thought surrounding 
it (in contrast to other key concepts within ethics, such as freedom, justice or 
virtue).  Dignity, instead, often functions more as a placeholder term or ‘non-
interpreted’ thesis, in which its meaning can be left to intuitive understanding.13  
                                                          
13
 As McCrudden points out: ‘…dignity can often function as a placeholder, accepting that there 
is no actual or possible agreed articulation of its content. Indeed, some may wish to avoid any 
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For instance, we can find reference to dignity as referring variously to a high 
value, worth, right, respect or status of the individual, and these terms are often 
used interchangeably.  This thesis will not attempt to disentangle these related 
but subtly different variations (or claim that only one of these forms of dignity is 
correct), but will instead refer to dignity variously as either a high value or worth 
throughout.  In either sense, such a description is designed merely to convey 
the idea that human dignity is indicative of a high significance that requires 
respect and protection. 
Consequently, this philosophical enquiry into the nature and justification of 
human dignity does not attempt to work within any one predefined ethical theory 
(save for a general Western analytic tradition) nor focus on any particular 
philosophical work.  It consequently avoids, where possible, a preconceived 
metatheory of what dignity is, or should be.  Rather, taking as its starting point 
the conception of universal human dignity that we find within the United Nation’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and related human rights 
documents after the Second World War (see Chapter 5), this thesis utilizes 
developments from a range of ethical sub disciplines, including animal and care 
ethics, as well as theories of personhood and moral status, in order to critically 
analyse the arguments and justifications put for and against why all human 
beings have a dignity. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
too-critical analysis of the concept…’, for instance, dignity has recently been argued to be ‘...a 
vehicle for attempting to secure consensus in the face of disagreement about comprehensive 
positions or starting points. Rather than regarding dignity as a conversation stopper, dignity 
becomes an occasion for dialogue, partly because it is a ‘non-interpreted’ thesis that 
nevertheless appeals to some undefined set of yearnings. Thus, in the scholarly literature and, 
indeed, in some of the jurisprudence and constitutional doctrine, it is sometimes said that one of 
the functional values that the concept of dignity fulfils is to provide a language in which 
conflicting values, and even conflicting rights, can be brought into relationship with each other...’ 
(McCrudden 2013, 11; 13-14). 
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As a result, this thesis is split into three main sections.  The first part undertakes 
a brief historical survey of the concept of human dignity, and highlights how the 
concept has changed and evolved over time.  The concept has a long historical 
tradition and its study can provide invaluable insights into our own modern 
conceptions, as well as ensure that theories of human dignity are not 
duplicated. However, the history of the concept is also an uneven one, which 
crops up at certain historical points and then fades away again.  This is no 
doubt, at least in part, due to the fact that the history of the concept is 
understudied and there are no extensive historical studies on it.  The final 
chapter in the first section covers the development and influential rise of the 
concept of dignity in the modern period, and its close relationship to human 
rights in legal charters and declarations which appeared after the Second World 
War. 
The second section examines in detail the nature and ground of a universal 
human dignity.  In particular, this section focuses on the arguments that have 
been proposed to separate all humans (if anything) from other animals, beyond 
merely belonging to the species Homo sapiens.  Chapter 6 looks first at the 
relationship between human dignity and speciesism, and the charge that human 
dignity is an unjustified prejudice.  Human dignity is based on the premise that 
humans occupy a privileged position in the moral universe, yet over the last few 
decades there have been growing calls for the circle of moral concern to be 
widened, and for a greater moral considerability of other animals to be 
acknowledged.  Such calls are of particular significance as they have the 
potential to challenge the foundations on which the unique status of humanity is 
said to rest, for if we cannot present a valid reason (over and above simply 
asserting that humans deserve special consideration because they are human), 
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why then should there be a sharp dividing line between all humans and other 
animals?  For these critics, the use of ‘human dignity’ seems to be little more 
than a thinly veiled, unjustified prejudice.  The next chapter looks at the 
opposite viewpoint – why humans are said to have a special significance and 
dignity.  In particular, this chapter looks at attempts to reconcile the fact that 
many of the traditional capacities thought to ground human dignity, such as 
language use, intelligence, or practical reason, are too demanding for many 
humans to meet the required minimum level, and are also possessed (albeit in 
varying degrees) by many non-human animals.  The final chapter in this section 
focuses on the significance of the relational and social ties between individuals, 
looking specifically at the conceptual connections between dignity, vulnerability, 
humiliation and an ethics of care. 
The third and final section, on the limits of human dignity, examines how far the 
concept of a universal human dignity can stretch, in light of current, and future, 
promises of biotechnology.  This section utilizes recent developments in the 
literature on the ethics of human enhancement as a useful prism to examine the 
concept of human dignity, and the possibility of enhancing full moral status.  As 
noted by Buchanan, the ethics of human enhancement is a useful lens through 
which to examine and bring into sharper focus our understanding of many 
ethical components, including ‘what moral status is and of the relationship 
between moral status, rights, personhood, and human nature’ (Buchanan 
2009a, 350).  In particular, this section looks at what separates humans from 
potential radically enhanced humans, or ‘posthumans’, as well as human-animal 
chimeras, and how this would affect our current conceptions of human dignity.  
The challenges of future human enhancement brings to light, and teases out 
key issues - from the conceptual relationship between the dignity of humans 
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and other beings (animal, posthuman or otherwise), to whether dignity is 
something basic and fundamental to all, or a quality possessed by only a select 
few.  As it stands, there is little consensus over many of these issues.  Appeals 
to human dignity have both been used to criticise current and future biomedical 
and biotechnological developments, as well as being adopted by some 
proponents to insist that human dignity requires that we pursue these ends.   
This is not to overstate the current impact that dignity has had in the 
enhancement debate.  As highlighted by Richard E. Ashcroft, ‘…none of the 
contemporary authors give much weight to thinking about the achievements or 
indeed enhancements of human powers that increase dignity or respect for 
dignity’ (Ashcroft 2005, 681).  Where arguments from human dignity are 
invoked in bioethics, it tends to be in relation to reproductive technologies, such 
as human embryo and embryonic stem cell research, as well as human cloning.  
However, the frequency and passion with which dignity is invoked and 
challenged in other areas ensures that there is potential for extending it into 
discussions of the enhancement realm. 
Nevertheless, as will be shown in Chapter 9, the concept of ‘posthuman’ dignity 
– a dignity-like-state over and above that currently experienced or held by 
current humans, achieved through biomedical and technological intervention – 
was first proposed seriously by Nick Bostrom in his 2005 article, ‘In Defense of 
Posthuman Dignity’, and later developed in his contribution towards the 
President’s Council on Bioethics (Bostrom 2008).  In particular, for Bostrom it is 
entirely feasible that the moral sphere could and should be extended to 
encompass future ‘posthumans’.  As he notes, the fact that ‘the set of 
individuals accorded full moral status by Western societies has actually 
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increased, to include men without property or noble decent, women, and non-
white peoples’, it seems reasonable then that we can ‘extend this set further to 
include future posthumans, or, for that matter, some of the higher primates or 
human-animal chimaeras, should such be created – and to do so without 
causing any compensating shrinkage in another direction’ (Bostrom 2005, 210).  
This idea of a ‘posthuman’ form of dignity, appears as an explicit move away 
from those who wish to accord dignity only to those belonging to the species 
Homo sapiens.  As Bostrom argues: ‘By defending posthuman dignity we 
promote a more inclusive and humane ethics, one that will embrace future 
technologically modified people as well as humans of the contemporary kind’ 
(Bostrom 2005, 213).  However, at present, it remains unclear how wide this net 
can be cast.   
One of the more controversial elements of Bostrom’s conception of ‘posthuman 
dignity’ is the idea of dignity being ‘...a kind of excellence admitting of degrees 
and applicable to entities both within and without the human realm’ (Bostrom 
2008, 173).  For Bostrom, dignity should also be perceived as a quality which 
differs in degree, if not also in kind, and bestowed to those who demonstrate or 
possess a particular quality or excellence.  Specifically, it is through 
technological enhancement that individuals may seek to increase their dignity.  
It has been argued that Bostrom’s approach is incompatible with a conception 
of universal dignity, as put forward by such international instruments as The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948) and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO 2005) (Chapman 2010; 
Jotterand 2010a).  This interpretation of dignity runs contrary to how it is 
conceived in much of the contemporary literature, which has presented dignity 
as universal, inherent and inalienable, and so not dependent on excellence or 
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merit.  It does not admit of degrees, nor can it be enhanced, diminished or 
destroyed, but is instead a threshold concept.   
Following on from this, Chapter 10 examines the relationship between dignity 
and the possibility of enhancing moral status.  Those with a dignity, especially in 
the Kantian sense of an absolute worth, are commonly thought to also have a 
high (if not the highest) moral status – to be ‘beyond price’ in Kant’s words.  
However, the possibility of a moral status above that currently enjoyed by 
humans has started to receive serious attention.  The proponents of this idea 
are, unsurprisingly, often also involved in the human enhancement debate.  
This is quite a natural step to make for those who argue that moral status is tied 
to intrinsic capacities, such as intelligence, language use or ethical reasoning, 
as we might ask if beings with greater capacities than us would have a 
correspondingly higher moral status or dignity.  As Thomas Douglas (one of the 
more prolific writers on the subject) has noted: ‘...it would be a surprising good 
fortune for humanity if the threshold for maximal moral status lay just below the 
level of mental capacity typical of ordinary adult humans' (Douglas 2013, 480-
1).  These writers, therefore, have offered multi-tiered accounts of moral status, 
with non-persons occupying one rung, persons the next highest, and 
posthumans a higher level still.   
The final chapter focuses on human-animal chimera and hybrid research, and 
how the potential to instil, through biotechnological intervention, certain human-
like qualities into non-human animals may challenge or confirm our pre-existing 
conceptions of a universal human dignity.  Indeed, an examination of the 
creation of human-animal chimeras and hybrids acts as a useful prism to draw 
together many of the key themes discussed throughout this thesis, from the 
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moral significance of our relationships, to the role species membership and the 
concept of the ‘human’ should play in our ethical deliberations.  As Isabel Karpin 
highlights, ‘…one would assume that one of the questions being asked in the 
context of these new biotechnologies is whether human dignity is an expanding 
idea, capable of accommodating new hyphenated forms of the human—the 
post, the trans, and the hybrid, to name but a few’ (Karpin 2004, 327).  The 
great challenge for a universal human dignity then, which at its heart is an 
inclusive concept, is delineating where the boundaries of moral concern should 
rest.   
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Section 1 – The Changing Face of Human Dignity: A Brief Historical Survey   
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Introduction 
 
‘There are certain sects...founded on the different sentiments with regard to the 
dignity of human nature; which is a point that seems to have divided 
philosophers and poets, as well as divines, from the beginning of the world to 
this day. Some exalt our species to the skies, and represent man as a kind of 
human demigod, who derives his origin from heaven, and retains evident marks 
of his lineage and descent. Others insist upon the blind sides of human nature, 
and can discover nothing, except vanity, in which man surpasses the other 
animals, whom he affects so much to despise. If an author possess the talent of 
rhetoric and declamation, he commonly takes part with the former: If his turn lie 
towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws himself into the other extreme’ – 
David Hume, Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature (Hume 1985, 80-
86). 
 
Hume’s brief essay on the nature of human dignity came at the end of a much 
wider Western tradition which treated the human condition as situated between 
the throws of dignitas and miseria (Bayertz 1996, 74).  However, this section will 
look, for the most part, at those writers and thinkers who considered humankind 
in the former light – in its ascendency.14  Of course, there is great scope to turn 
to those writers who focused on the fallen, sinful nature of man, yet, such an 
enterprise would itself take another volume to fill.  For the exponents of the 
former, all beings are ranked vertically, with humanity occupying a distinct and 
privileged position in the universe, which can be understood either 
                                                          
14
 As noted by Kurt Bayertz, ‘the dignitas literature sprang from the polemic against Mediaeval 
ideology of the Earth as a vale of tears.  Human dignity acquired the role of a concept to counter 
the traditional Christian view of human existence as miseria’ (Bayertz 1996, 74) 
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metaphorically, or like the Psalmist, literally: 'For Thou has made him a little 
lower than the Angels and hast crowned him with glory and honour' (The Bible 
1997, Psalm 8).  This so-called ‘Great Chain of Being’ which, according to 
Arthur Lovejoy’s seminal work (Lovejoy 1936), is at base ‘…the idea of the 
organic constitution of the universe as a series of links or gradations ordered in 
a hierarchy of creatures, from the lowest and most insignificant to the 
highest...to the ens perfectissimum...’ (Formigari 1973, 325).15  The duty to 
aspire to the highest levels became central tenants of both Renaissance 
Humanism and the Enlightenment (Arieli 2002, 10). 
Where precisely Man is placed on this ladder varies with each historical period, 
but in virtue of certain capacities (particularly reason and freedom), as well as 
the belief in having been created in the image and likeness of God, Mankind is 
placed on a rung above the rest of the animal kingdom. It is also important to 
emphasise at the outset that, whilst the history of dignity has often been 
conveyed as an ‘expanding circle’ narrative, with the concept gradually 
encompassing a wider sphere of individuals (tracing the development of 
universal human rights) it was, for a large part, a concept which was still 
restricted and reserved for the few,16 be that the male citizen in Ancient Rome, 
or the nobility in Medieval Europe. As highlighted by van der Graaf and Delden: 
‘It is important to bear in mind that only since the end of the 18th century is the 
adjective human frequently placed before dignity’ (van der Graaf and Delden 
                                                          
15
 This idea was encapsulated in Alexander Pope’s poem the Essay on Man (1710): 'Vast chain 
of being! which from God began,/Natures æthereal, human, angel, man/Beast, bird, fish, insect, 
what no eye can see,/No glass can reach; from infinite to thee,/From thee to nothing’ (Pope 
1994, 51). 
16
 ‘One very common way in which writers present the history of dignity is as part of what I call 
an “expanding circle” narrative.  From this perspective, the quality of dignity, once the property 
of a social elite, has, like the idea of rights, been extended outward and downward until it has 
come to apply to all human beings. This is all part of that great, long process by which the 
fundamental equality of human beings has come to be generally accepted’ (Rosen 2012a, 8).  
37 
 
2009, 153). Indeed, there is a seam of contention which runs throughout the 
history of human dignity between those, on the one hand, who consider dignity 
to be a quality befitting of humanity as a whole, and on the other, only to the 
worthy few. 
Importantly for our discussion, the Great Chain of Being also has significant 
moral implications.  Indeed, whilst the hierarchy of being has been supplanted 
by the theory of evolution and modern species taxonomy, the ontological and 
moral sense of humankind’s privileged position remains.  This study will trace 
dignity as a moral concept (although of course, it has not always been invoked 
as one).  In particular, being human is often thought to carry a high moral status 
which often limits what is, and is not, permissible to do to others. To have 
human dignity, therefore, carries with it a strong moral force. When we invoke 
human dignity, we are speaking, as Josef Seifert’s argues ‘...of a morally 
relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a moral call and an 
obligation to respect it’ (Seifert 1997, 97).  Indeed, the Medieval and 
Renaissance writers who stressed the image and likeness of God in Man 
required that we treat human life with particular reverence.  Similarly, claims in 
contemporary legal charters and declarations of the inherent and inalienable 
dignity in all humans is said to underpin universal human rights.  Moreover, 
current debates surrounding the effects of biotechnologies on crossing species 
boundaries and threatening ‘species integrity’ have focused particularly on their 
potential dehumanizing and de-moralizing effects (see Chapter 11). As outlined 
by Eric T. Juengst, ‘in situations that involve the integrity of the human species, 
like xenotransplantation, or the creation of man-machine ‘cyborgs’, this moral 
hazard can be explained as the danger of dehumanization: that polluting the 
constellation of traits that humans have inherited from our ancestors – our given 
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‘human nature’ – with nonhuman attributes we will inevitably degrade the 
elements of human identity we find morally important, like human dignity, 
autonomy, and vulnerability’ (Juengst 2009, 54). The hierarchy of being is 
certainly a conceptual device that could be extended into contemporary 
discussions of human enhancement, and the possibility of enhancing human 
dignity will be discussed in great length in section three. 
As Kurt Bayertz notes in his excellent short study of the history of dignity, the 
concept of human dignity was not created ex nihilo; it has a rich cultural history, 
rooted in centuries of tradition (Bayertz 1996, 73).  However, herein lies one of 
the main conceptual problems with attempting to pin down its major strands. 
Whilst the concept of dignity and its etymologically related kin (respect, worth, 
regard and honour) has a long, varied history, it is also a potted and uneven 
one.  Dignity crops up and fades away. This is no doubt in large measure due to 
the current state of the historical literature on the concept, for at present there 
exists no comprehensive study of the idea in the contemporary literature, as we 
might find in the history of death or medicine (nor does this section pretend to 
be one).17 In a similar vein to how the historian Steven Shapin introduces his 
exploration on the Scientific Revolution, ‘this is a work of critical synthesis, not 
one of original scholarship’ (Shapin 1996, xiii), likewise, the aim of this section is 
to give an up-to-date account of the history of dignity, drawing on the available 
historical literature so far. 
                                                          
17
 As highlighted by McCrudden,‘...a separate history of human dignity has yet to be written’ 
(McCrudden 2013, 4).  
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This study will not attempt, nor pretend there is, a continuous, unbroken history 
of Dignity.18 However, as is common in contemporary studies of the concept so 
far, if we treat this history with broad brush strokes, we find that dignity (but not 
specifically the formula ‘human dignity’) becomes most developed during five 
distinct phases: (1) the Roman Republic and later Roman Empire (2) the 
Church Fathers of the Middle Ages (3) the Humanist movement of the 
Renaissance (4) the Early Modern period, culminating in the thought of Kant 
during the Enlightenment and (5) the Modern period and the rise to prominence 
of human dignity (alongside human rights) in legal instruments, charters, and 
declarations.  This study divides into the same periods, as they are commonly 
identified in other works on the history of dignity.   
Such an approach is not without its critics. Remy Debes provides a scathing 
broadside against the majority (if not all) of recent historical accounts of dignity: 
What this approach tends towards, then, is a hodgepodge of starting 
points.  Almost every author begins by leveraging her historical-
etymological notes into the observation that dignity has been 
conceptualized in a multifaceted way. It is, she will say, dominated by the 
Kantian and Judeo-Christian traditions that make dignity a function of, 
respectively, rational autonomy or spiritual identity with God (imago Dei). 
But, she will hasten to add, despite those traditions, dignity has also 
been pervasively conceived as honor, rank, station, inherent worth, 
inalienable worth, equal worth, supreme worth, uniqueness, beauty, 
poise, gravitas, personality, integrity, bodily integrity, self-respect, self-
esteem, a sacred place in the order of things, simply brute and 
                                                          
18
 This is not peculiar to the concept of human dignity, but is in fact a feature of all moral 
concepts.  As pointed out by Alistair MacIntyre, ‘there are continuities as well as breaks in the 
history of moral concepts.  Just here lies the complexity of the history’ (MacIntyre 1998, 2) 
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unquestionable “specialness,”...in short, pick any work on human dignity 
and you’re apt to find the claim that “dignity” is beset by ambiguity in use 
(Debes 2009, 46). 
Debes may protest at the apparent unsystematic nature of most contemporary 
studies of dignity, yet there is an obvious reason for this, because dignity does 
indeed have a hodgepodge of starting points. It is by tracing these separate 
strands that we can better understand the nature of the concept; as the German 
Classicist Hubert Cancik highlights, ‘the various stages of this history are not 
strongly interconnected. There is no 'evolution' from Pico to Pufendorf, nor from 
Pufendorf to Kant. Up until the middle of this [twentieth] century, it is mainly the 
text of Cicero and a general Ciceronian tradition which bestows a certain 
coherence on the history of the formula 'dignity of man'’ (Cancik 2002, 36-7). 
Debes argues that we need to approach the history of dignity with a 
preconceived ‘metatheory’.19 However, if we run into the fray with a 
preconceived notion of what human dignity is and how it functions, then we also 
run the distinct risk of begging the question. Indeed, Alasdair MacIntyre in his 
work on the history of ethics emphasises the importance of not missing out 
areas we don’t consider important: ‘this is why it would be dangerous, and not 
just pointless, to begin these studies with a definition which would carefully 
delimit the field of inquiry...it is important that we should, as far as possible, 
allow the history of philosophy to break down our present-day preconceptions, 
so that our too narrow views of what can and cannot be thought, said, and done 
                                                          
19
 ‘In the best of cases the author will wonder whether and how explaining the way “dignity” was 
or is used tells us anything about what dignity is. Unfortunately, such musing is generally of 
marginal value because the author has no critical apparatus against which to frame the 
questions. As there is no metatheory about what is being sought – nothing to guide or unify the 
seeking – such questions can be historically intriguing, even theoretically tantalizing, but are 
ultimately philosophically idle’ (Debes 2009, 45). 
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are discarded in face of the record of what has been thought, said, and done’ 
(MacIntyre 1998, 4).  Indeed, appeals to dignity were often made by those 
marginalized and vulnerable groups that were often ignored by history.  Such a 
focus is of particular pertinence considering the emphasis in contemporary 
discussion of the inherent dignity of all.  As noted by Matthias Mahlmann, ‘we 
would not understand much about dignity without reflecting closely about these 
contributions, because it is the fight for the freedom of slaves, for justice for the 
working class or the poor, for equality for women, and the everyday 
manifestations of what human life is about, that fill the concept with thick 
meaning...For historical studies, this requires broadening perspectives, studying 
not only texts but also social practices...’ (Mahlmann 2013, 597).  This is why it 
is important to study the history of the concept, for it can shed invaluable new 
insight on how to deal with and interpret our modern conceptions of human 
dignity. 
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Chapter 1 Dignity and the Ancient World 
 
Dignitas and the Social Sphere 
 
It was in the Roman world that dignity or dignitas was first given its influential 
dual meaning. In the first instance, to have dignitas was to have an elevated 
position of respect, denoting high social or political status, be that a senator, 
politician or emperor.  As Hubert Cancik suggests, ‘the word dignitas has a 
specifically Roman ring. It calls to mind the majesty of the Republic and the 
magistrate or Caesar. Dignitas denotes rank, authority, splendor’ (Cancik 2002, 
27).  To have dignitas then made one worthy of respect as it implied one had 
control over one’s own affairs, and that one’s claims ought to be recognised by 
others (Ober 2014, 53).  It was also restricted to men who belonged to a certain 
strata of Roman society. That such a concept existed in the Roman world is to 
be expected in what was a deeply hierarchical, patriarchal system. Dignitas, in 
the first instance, has both a tangible quality20 and a distinct social aspect, 
which is reserved for those of sufficient rank. 
In the first sense, it is the position or office itself which confers dignity onto the 
individual, rather than the other way around. Thus, in the Roman world, social 
standing was a necessary condition to have dignitas.  This idea of the dignified 
few, elevated because of their social rank has resonated throughout the ages,21 
and arguably still continues to this day (we still use the term ‘dignitaries’ to refer 
                                                          
20
 'Roman dignity can be seen, it has splendor; it shines; it is an ornament (decus, decorum).  It 
is a quality of the body as is health, strength or swiftness.  What charm (venustas) is in the 
female, dignity is in the male.  The opposite is 'obscure, dirty, ugly, contemptible' (Cancik 2002, 
23). 
21
 The Venerable Bede, for instance, in his celebrated The Ecclesiastical History of the English 
People (AD 731) refers to the ‘royal dignity’ of King Oswine, who was ‘pleasant of speech, 
courteous in manner’ and ‘which showed itself in his character, his appearance, and his actions 
(Bede 1999, 132). 
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to those who hold a particular high office). Therefore, dignity was not seen by 
the Romans as an inherent or inviolable property enjoyed universally, but as 
something which could be gained or lost, diminished or enhanced.  
Consequently, we have a strong sense in the ancient world of the indignity of 
public humiliation or being subjugated to the will of others.  To have a dignity 
then was to not succumb or be susceptible to such a demeaning and 
dishonourable fate (Ober 2014, 53-4).   
Moreover, dignitas could also be conferred on institutions themselves, as well 
as the Roman people and the state as a whole.22 As Cancik notes, ‘to diminish 
this collective dignity…is a grave crime’ (Cancik 2002, 23-4). Dignity in this first 
case, therefore, is a relational property, dependent on specific societal factors, 
what can be termed an aristocratic or elevated form of dignity. As emphasised 
by Oliver Sensen, ‘the essential component is that dignity expresses a relation, 
an elevated standing of something over something else’ (Sensen 2011, 76).  
However, social rank alone was not always a sufficient condition, and having a 
position of power did not necessarily mean one had dignitas. To have it one 
must possess and demonstrate characteristics of worthiness, excellence and 
honour, and this most often had to also be recognised by one’s fellow citizens 
(van der Graaf and Delden 2009, 154).  In this way, dignity was something that 
Roman men had to strive for.  Cicero, for example, states that the ‘particular 
function of the magistrate is to be aware that as the personification of the state 
he must maintain its dignity and glory...’ (Cicero 2000, 1.124).  Caesar, similarly, 
disclosed in his work Civil War that he was prepared to go to war in defence of 
                                                          
22
 This is a common feature throughout the ages, as noted by McCrudden, ‘this concept of 
dignity has long been incorporated in some legal systems in the private law context as the basis 
for providing protection for dignity in the sense of ‘status’, ‘reputation’, and ‘privileges’.  The 
English Bill of Rights of 1689, for instance, referred to ‘the Crown and royal dignity’ (McCrudden 
2008, 657). 
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his own dignitas (Caesar 1997, xxi).  Josiah Ober also highlights that something 
similar to this idea of ‘meritocratic dignity’ was fundamental in Homeric society, 
in which one’s social standing is dependent upon one’s social relations and the 
opinions and respect of others (be that via one’s family, friendship, enemies or 
patrons).  One’s dignity then is vulnerable and easily lost, with limited room at 
the top of the social hierarchy (Ober 2014).  As becomes clear therefore, in the 
first instance, dignitas was not evenly distributed but was instead a deeply 
ingrained societal concept to denote an individual’s worth, restricted to the few 
who managed to obtain both a position of suitable rank, and demonstrate a 
sufficient amount of excellence. 
Aristotle 
 
In contrast to this prevalence of dignitas in the Roman World, save for the 
Homeric tradition, we find no corresponding word or expression in Ancient 
Greece.  As Daniel P. Sulmasy highlights, ‘...dignity was not an important word 
for Plato or Aristotle.  The first Western philosophers for whom dignity was an 
important philosophical term were the Roman Stoics’ (Sulmasy 2008, 471).  
Nevertheless, this is not to dismiss the idea that the Greeks may have had a 
similar understanding of human dignity to the Romans.  Aristotle, in his 
Nichomachean Ethics, for instance, does explore at length a related concept of 
one’s worth (if we are allowed, for now at least, to equate dignity loosely with 
worth), particularly the virtue of pride or excellence, what Aristotle terms 
megalopsychia  (literally 'greatness of soul') or what we now refer to as 
magnanimity.  True pride is, for Aristotle, possessed by one who is, and knows 
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himself to be, worthy of great honour.23  In short, megalopsychia may be 
defined as the virtue of greatness, mixed with a form of self-knowledge that one 
possesses this greatness.  There is, therefore, a criterion of objectivity – one not 
only has to act with pride, but one has to be worthy of that pride.  But how can 
we know that one has true pride?  To give a sense of its essence, Aristotle goes 
on to explain at length some of the main characteristics of the truly 
magnanimous man: 
He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger...but he will 
face great dangers, and when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life… 
It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for nothing or scarcely anything, 
but to give help readily, and to be dignified towards people who enjoy 
high position and good fortune, but unassuming towards those of the 
middle class. 
Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not part of a proud man to have a 
long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather to overlook them.  Nor is 
he a gossip; for he will speak neither about himself nor about another, 
since he cares not to be praised nor for others to be blamed; nor again is 
he given to praise; and for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, 
even about his enemies, except from haughtiness. 
                                                          
23
 Interestingly, Curzer argues that Aristotle’s concept of megalopsychia attempts to marry the 
‘…Homeric values of greatness and grandeur…with the newer value of moderation and the 
mean. Aristotle tries to reconcile these two apparently incompatible values by formally defining 
megalopsychia as a combination of greatness and self-knowledge. The megalopsychos, 
Aristotle says, is a mean between two extremes. He or she claims just what he or she deserves, 
unlike the humble person who claims too little and the vain person who claims too much’ 
(Curzer 2012, 518). 
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Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep voice, 
and a level utterance. 
(Aristole 2009, 1124b – 1125a) 
We can certainly recognise characteristics of megalopsychia that we would now 
associate with dignified behaviour.  The person who acts with true pride is 
considered to act with considered moderation and restraint.  Furthermore, for 
Aristotle, there is a distinct public aspect to this virtue, megalopsychia is a social 
phenomenon, and although the pride of Aristotle’s virtuous man does not 
depend on the opinions of others for his sense of worth (as he knows his own 
worth), it is certainly shaped by it.  As Christopher Cordner explains, 
megalopsychia ‘involves his sense of his position, his standing, in his 
community. It requires that he define for himself a place within a structured 
social and political context. Aristotelian pride is therefore not the issue of a 
measuring of self against an absolute and wholly impersonal standard, like 
Kantian proper pride. It is...essentially worldly’ (Cordner 1994, 305).  Moreover, 
similar to the Roman concept of dignitas, it is also unashamedly elitist and 
reserved for the few who are worthy of it.  Megalopsychia was often closely 
related to having great wealth and power, although it appears that Aristotle did 
not believe these necessary to achieve true excellence (Curzer 2012, 123-4).  
Indeed, equality of human worth does not appear in Aristotle’s ethics (nor does 
it in most ancient texts), which as a result, has become an area of contention 
amongst modern virtue ethicists.   
Cicero 
 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 - 43 BC) was, in many ways, no different in his 
usage of dignitas to denote an elevated position amongst others, and he used it 
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throughout his writings in this form (Rosen 2012a, 12).  However, it was due to 
the Stoics, and specifically Cicero in his work On Obligations (De officiis 44BC), 
that a second meaning was first articulated.  This second sense still conceived 
of dignitas as an elevated position, but instead of referring to the superiority of 
some individuals over others, it referred to humanity as a whole elevated above 
the rest of nature.  As Cicero argues: 
...between man and beast there is this crucial difference: the beast under 
sense-impulses applies itself only to what lies immediately before it, with 
quite minimal awareness of past and future, whereas man is endowed 
with reason, which enables him to visualize consequences, and to detect 
the causes of things (Cicero 2000, 6 [I.11]). 
And again: 
It is relevant to every aspect of obligation always to focus on the degree 
to which the nature of man transcends that of cattle and of other beasts.  
Whereas animals have no feeling except pleasure, and their every 
inclination is directed towards it, human minds are nurtured by learning 
and reflection; and enticed by delight in seeing and hearing, they are 
constantly investigating something or performing some action...base 
pleasure of the body is insufficiently worthy of man’s superior status, and 
that it should be despised and rejected...Moreover if we are willing to 
reflect on the high worth and dignity of our nature, we shall realise how 
degrading it is to wallow in decadence and to live a soft and effeminate 
life, and how honourable is a life of thrift, self-control, austerity and 
sobriety (Cicero 2000, 36-7 [I.105-6]).  
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By all intents, this represents one of the first formulations of the dignity of 
humanity as a whole (rather than of a particular individual or group).  One does 
not have to display heroics on the battlefield, or be a great leader of men to 
have dignity.  Instead, for Cicero, Man’s dignity is based on the capacity to learn 
and reflect, and to prioritise reason over passion and pleasure.   Where once 
dignitas was restricted to determining an individual’s standing within the Roman 
socio-political system, it was now used to address the wider ontological 
question of Man’s place in the universe.  For Cicero, dignity resides in human 
nature and, as he makes clear, humans are distinguished from the rest of 
nature in virtue of certain capacities.  In particular, human dignity is grounded in 
our capacity for reason and freedom.  It is this connotation that would prove so 
influential in the Renaissance (Trinkaus 1973), and later discussions of the 
moral status and worth of humans.  Whilst other animals, according to Cicero, 
are bound to follow their immediate inclinations, it is humans alone who can 
direct their minds towards certain ends that transcend immediate pleasure.  An 
inquisitive mind, which may be ‘nurtured by learning and reflection’, the feeling 
of shame, and even Man’s upright posture (similar to the slow step and deep 
voice of Aristotle’s proud man) are all indicative of his superiority over the 
beasts.  This belief in the fundamental difference between humankind and the 
rest of nature was itself adapted from Aristotle’s claim in his Politics that, ‘...the 
real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have 
perception of good and evil, right and wrong, just and unjust’ (Aristotle 2009, 28-
9 [Bk 1.2]).   
More than this, in Cicero’s account, we have dignity tempered by the 
paradigmatic Stoic virtues of moderation – ‘thrift, self-control, austerity and 
sobriety’ – which is itself markedly similar to the outline of Aristotle’s level-
49 
 
headed proud man.  Echoing Plato as well, for Cicero it is reason which can 
steer and guide us away from the animal passions to a life of moderation and 
self-control, which is the most fitting state for our dignity.  In other words, it is 
because of our dignity (which is grounded in our rational natures) that we must 
act with self-control, and this is what distinguishes humanity most clearly from 
brutality and animality.  This sentiment would, of course, continue throughout 
the Christian tradition.  We can distinguish here then between the idea of the 
dignity of humanity, and the dignity of the individual, in which one may or may 
not (or be unable to) live up to the standards of reason and freedom that are the 
hallmarks of the former.  
Obligations (as the title of On Obligations suggests) are central to Cicero’s 
account of what one is expected to do.  One has a duty to behave in a manner 
fitting of dignity, and for Cicero this must involve mastering one’s passions, 
which as Mette Lebech highlights, is ‘necessary for moral life as such...Without 
temperance we could not do what is fitting (decus), and thus behave with dignity 
in all the spheres of life’ (Lebech 2009, 51; see also Cancik 2002, 20).  Indeed, 
we have an obligation or duty to control our temperaments, otherwise we will 
remain slaves to our immediate inclinations and will not be able to act freely, 
and so morally.  We thus appear, according to Cicero, to have a moral duty to 
realize our dignity.   
Cicero’s account also represents, in many ways, a move away from dignity as 
largely defined in relation to the public sphere.  Instead, if anything, dignity 
becomes used as a protection from society and a safeguard of individual 
liberties and freedoms, as we find it used most commonly today (frequently in 
close correlation with human rights).  Ober refers to this as a form of ‘civic 
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dignity’, which developed in tandem with democracy and the expansion of 
citizenship to a wider community of men in Athens.  Civic dignity was based on 
‘...a shared status of political equality among a body of citizens – a defined set 
of people who are jointly committed to the preservation of a public domain 
(Greek: politeria; Latin: res publica), but who are not social peers and who may 
have no personal ties with one another.  Civic dignity is available to and 
protected by free citizens who have an equal opportunity to participate in a 
public domain of decision and action’ (Ober 2014, 55).  Whilst the Stoic tradition 
did not have a conception of universal human rights based on this inherent 
dignity, it still had a conception of dignity which extended well beyond the 
immediate civic sphere, to include and protect previously marginalized groups 
(Ober 2014, 61-7).24 
We also witness in Cicero’s account the seeds of a debate which, as we will see 
in Chapter 6, plays out throughout discussions of human dignity.  This concerns 
the issue of whether or not appeals to human dignity fall foul of an unfounded 
bias towards the human species; what has in recent decades been labelled as 
speciesism, and commonly defined as ‘a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour 
of the interests of members of one’s own species’ (Singer 1995, 6).  The 
concern is that appeals to a human dignity are little more than a thinly veiled 
assumption that the human species is inherently superior to other species, 
which in turn entitles it to a high worth, as well as special privileges and rights.  
Of course, it does not necessarily follow from the belief that all (or most) 
                                                          
24
 As highlighted by Ober, whilst ‘the Athenian regime of democratic law and culture was 
focused, in the first instance, on civic dignity for citizens and defended by citizens’, dignity, at 
least in principle, was ‘defended well beyond the ranks of citizens.  In the same speech in which 
he reminded jurors of the meaning of their secure possession of civic dignity, Demosthenes 
noted that Athenian law protected ‘any person, either child or woman or man, free or slave’, 
against intentional disrespect (hubris) and other unlawful (paranomon) treatment’ (Ober 2014, 
61). 
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humans have a dignity that non-human animals cannot also have a dignity.  
However, it appears that the Stoic tradition (nor many other historical periods) 
leaves little room for this idea.  As Martha Nussbaum highlights: 
Why should we think that all human life has it [dignity]?  The minute the 
Stoic tradition tries to answer such questions, problems arise.  In 
particular, the answer almost always takes the form of saying, Look at 
how far we are above the beasts.  Reason, language, moral capacity – 
all these are seen as worthy of respect and awe at least in part because 
the beasts, so-called, don’t have them...the claim that this dignity resides 
equally in all humanity all too often relies on the better-than-the-beasts 
idea...the idea seems to be, the weakest among us is light-years beyond 
those beasts down there...Dignity thus comes to look not like a scalar 
matter but like an all-or-nothing matter.  You either have it, or, bestially, 
you don’t (Nussbaum 2003, 18). 
As soon as we begin to question humanity’s alleged unique place within the 
universe, the foundations of a universal human dignity begin to look much less 
secure. 
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Chapter 2  The Age of God: Medieval Perspectives on Human Dignity 
 
Thus, while the Mute Creation downward bend 
Their Sight, and to their Earthy Mother tend, 
Man looks aloft; and with erected Eyes, 
Beholds his own Hereditary Skies. – Ovid’s Metamorphoses, translated by John 
Dryden, lines 107-110 
 
Whilst the use of dignity as a term to denote high status continued into the 
Middle Ages, it was met by a new theocentric current, in which it was Man’s 
relationship with God that, more than anything else, defined his dignity.  Whilst 
Cicero was the first to formulate the idea of the dignity of humankind as a 
whole, as opposed to the dignity attached to social rank, the theologians of the 
Middle Ages developed this account and attributed our dignity to the unique 
position which humans were thought to hold in the universe.  Specifically, it is 
because humans were thought to be created in the image and likeness of God, 
the imago dei, that they have a high worth.  As Kurt Bayertz explains, ‘human 
dignity is viewed here as reflecting the dignity of God’ (Bayertz 1996, 73), and in 
turn dignity is used to distinguish humanity from the rest of creation.  This 
reflected the medieval belief in a Great Chain of Being, in which humanity was 
placed above all animals but below the angels.  As Aquinas outlines in his 
Summa Theologica: ‘Free-will is part of man’s dignity.  But the angels’ dignity 
surpasses that of men’ (Aquinas 1912, 541).25 
                                                          
25
 Aquinas also had an idea of dignity as an intrinsic value of a person or object.  In his On the 
Sentences, he wrote that dignity ‘signifies goodness of account of itself’ (Gormally 2004, 7). 
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The dignity of Man was even seen in the shape and posture of the human body.  
Both St. Gregory of Nyssa (335-395 AD) and St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 
AD) believed that the erect form of the human body was indicative of his 
rationality, as it enabled contemplation of the heavens above, and so signified 
our superiority over the beasts that focused on the ground.  As Augustine 
states: 
Even our body has been made so that it reveals that we are better than 
the beasts and, for that reason, like God...This signifies that our mind 
ought to be raised up toward those things above it, that is, to eternal 
spiritual things.  It is especially by reason of the mind that we understand 
that man was made to the image and likeness of God, as even the erect 
form of the body testifies (Augustine 1991, 76). 
For these medieval writers, therefore, there seems to be an excellence or 
dignity, not only in the human mind, but the human body as well.26  Even the 
anatomy of the human body, whereby the freedom of the arms and hands 
enabled prayer, indicated an inherent dignity.  In contrast, the Neo-Platonist 
Macrobius (who significantly did not convert to Christianity) located human 
excellence exclusively within the soul, the body being but a prison until death’s 
eventual release.  Yet even he, as Richard C. Dales points out, spoke of the 
‘divinely spherical shape of the human head’ (Dales 1977, 559). 
It is worth noting that whilst the idea of dignity is invoked relatively frequently 
within the Middle Ages, as Charles Trinkaus highlights, ‘…it had not been 
                                                          
26
 ‘... man’s excellence exhibited in the beauty and function of his body as well as in his 
rationality.  It is a variation on the theme of man the microcosm, so common in pagan authors of 
Antiquity’ (Dales 1977, 558). 
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developed into either a clearly defined literary form or an internally consistent 
set of ideas’ (Trinkaus 1973, 141).  Indeed it would not be until the Renaissance 
that a specific genre of writing on human dignity would develop.  Nevertheless, 
many of the ideas first developed during the medieval era have survived and 
been revived in the contemporary theological literature on human dignity.27 The 
Catechism of the Catholic Church, for instance, echoing the Latin Church 
Fathers, states that ‘the dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in 
the image and likeness of God' (Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1993).  The role of 
human dignity in the Catholic Church has also played a significant role in 
regards to social justice and human rights (see for example Gormally 2004; 
Paul VI 1965). 
Yet, despite its prominence in the medieval (and contemporary Christian) 
literature, there are only three explicit references to Man’s creation in the image 
and likeness of God within the Old Testament (The Bible 1997):28 
1. And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing 
that creepeth upon the earth.  So God created man in his own image, in 
the image of God created he him; male and female created he them 
[Genesis 1.26-27] 
2. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made he him; 
Male and female created he them [Genesis 5.1-2] 
                                                          
27
 Witness, for example, the heavy emphasis on the Christian perspective in Meilaender (2009); 
The President's Council on Bioethics (2008); Colson and Cameron (2004); and Kraynak and 
Tinder (2003).  
28
 See also Psalm 8; Wisdom 2:23-24; and Ecclesiasticus 17:1-12. 
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3. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the 
image of God made he man [Genesis 9.6]. 
In the first instance, to say that Man is created in the image of God is to assert 
that there is some quality or essence that both share – man and God are 
somehow alike, if only in degree.  It is because Man shares certain 
characteristics with God that humankind is elevated above the rest of creation, 
thus affirming their dignity and special worth.  However, it was the precise 
definition of what this similarity was that vexed the theologians of the Middle 
Ages.  Following Cicero, the Jewish Philosopher Philo of Alexandria (15-10 BC 
– 45-50 AD), in his commentary on Genesis in The Mosaic Creation Story (De 
Opificio Mundi) argued that humans resembled God in their intellect; the divine 
image in humans is their mind, which likewise gives them the authority to 
dominate the rest of the animal kingdom.  As Philo explains: 
...for nothing earthly born bears a closer resemblance to God than the 
human being.  But no one should infer this likeness from the 
characteristics of the body, for God does not have a human shape and 
the human body is not God-like.  The term image has been used here 
with regard to the director of the soul, the intellect.  On that single 
intellect of the universe, as on an archetype, the intellect in each 
individual human being was modelled.  In a sense it is a god of the 
person who carries it and bears it around as a divine image (Philo 2001, 
64) [Chapter 12 §69]. 
Gregory of Nyssa (335-395 AD), who was heavily influenced by Philo’s 
anthropology, also saw in the spiritual essence or soul of Man a desire for and 
‘an indefinite capacity to grow closer to the divine’ (Maspero and Seco 2009, 
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38).  For Gregory, as for many Christians, the creation story of the imago dei, 
and the later reincarnation of God in Christ, emphasised the capacity of Man to 
aspire towards Godhead.  However, because of the deficiencies in our likeness 
to God (due to a combination of the weaknesses of the flesh and original sin), it 
is our duty to ‘strive for intellectual and moral perfection’ (Ross 2006).29   
Similarly, for Pope Leo I (391-400 – 461 AD), Christian dignity is inherited 
through the imago dei, or as he puts it in his Sermons, being made a ‘“partaker 
in the divine nature”’ (Leo I 1996, 79).  For Leo, as all humans are made in the 
image of God, and through the incarnation of Christ, all humans have dignity 
(Lewis 2007, 94).  Moreover, echoing Stoic moral anthropology, Leo considers 
the soul’s ability to resist bodily temptation under the direction of reason as that 
which separates humankind from the rest of the animal kingdom, and in turn 
elevates him beyond the limitations of the body (Sensen 2011, 78).30  Like 
Gregory, Leo argues that humanity was created by God with the express desire 
for His creation to aspire to transcend their current situation: 
If we reflect upon the beginning of our creation with faith and wisdom, 
dearly beloved, we shall come to the realization that human beings have 
been formed according to the image of God precisely with a view that 
they might imitate their Designer.  Our race has this dignity of nature, so 
                                                          
29
 Interestingly, Ross points out that ‘because he was committed to the idea that humans have a 
unique value that demands respect, Gregory was an early and vocal opponent of slavery and 
also of poverty….Both slavery and poverty sully the dignity of human beings by degrading them 
to a station below the purple [sic] to which they were rightfully born’.  Ross acknowledges the 
fact that ‘…although we may congratulate ourselves on having outlawed slavery, it is important 
to remember that for Gregory poverty is no different’ (Ross 2006). 
30
  ‘If...the desires of the body are stronger, the soul will shamefully lose dignity proper to it, and 
it will be calamitous for it to be a slave to what it ought to govern.  But if the mind, submissive to 
its Ruler and to heavenly gifts, tramples on the lures of earthly indulgence and does not allow 
‘sin to reign in its own body,’ reason will hold a well-ordered leadership’ (Leo I 1996, 167) 
[Sermon 39]. 
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long as the figure of divine goodness continues to be reflected in us as in 
a kind of mirror (Leo I 1996, 49) [Sermon 12]. 
In all of these accounts it becomes clear that Man’s similitude to God implies 
that there is something inherent in humanity which links it to the Divine, which 
elevates it above the rest of creation.31  There has (and continues) to be a great 
debate as to precisely what constitutes this similitude.  St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274 AD), for instance, believed there to be a technical distinction 
between things made in the ‘image’ and those made in the ‘likeness’ of God.  
Whilst ‘likeness’ suggested only a loose similarity, it was being made in the 
‘image’ of God that signified a stronger connection, such as a copy or replica.  
Aquinas believed that whilst all creation shared a likeness with God, it was Man 
alone who also shared in his image (Kraynak and Tinder 2003, 98).  As we 
have seen, there was an emphasis on the possibility of Man restoring the 
‘image’ of God, that had been corrupted after the Fall.  Of course, an image, 
even a mirror image of something, is not the same as the original and points 
ultimately to Man’s limited nature, and there is no shortage of accounts of Man’s 
fallen, sinful nature within the medieval period.  Nevertheless, D. J. A. Clines 
argues that this is to miss the main point of the creation story: ‘this limiting 
aspect of biblical anthropology is hardly to be recognized as an important 
element in the 'image' doctrine, which itself points unequivocally to the dignity 
and godlikeness of man’ (Clines 1968, 53). 
 
                                                          
31
  ‘For Augustine the notion of man’s creation in the “image” of God was far more crucial than 
his “similitude” to his Maker, which was a quality of an image.  Whereas creation according to 
an “image” was a directly purposive act that established a specific relationship between creator 
and creature, “similitude” signified a formal relationship only, which of course could increase 
with a man’s progress towards his ultimate fruition’ (Trinkaus 1973, 138). 
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Chapter 3  The Renaissance: The Rebirth of Dignity 
 
It was during the Renaissance that we find some of the most celebratory tracts 
on the dignity of Man which became, perhaps for the first time, a distinct literary 
and artistic movement in its own right.  As Kurt Bayertz argues, ‘parallel to the 
emergence of the portrait as an independent artistic genre within the field of 
painting and the autobiography as a new literary genre, a comprehensive series 
of writings on the dignitas hominis by Petrarca, Giannozzo Manetti and Pico 
della Mirandola grew to the dimensions of an independent literary genre’ 
(Bayertz 1996, 73).  In particular, the new Renaissance humanist writers were 
reacting against the miseria or misery genre which, following the medieval 
tradition, dwelled on the supposed lapsed state of humankind.  Several of the 
humanist thinkers were writing in direct reaction to Cardinal Lothario dei Conti’s 
(who would later become Pope Innocent III) treatise on the wretchedness of the 
human condition, De Miseria Humanae Conditionis (Sensen 2011; Englard 
2000; Bayertz 1996; and Kelley 1991), which was itself influenced by the 
pessimistic strands of the medieval vision of humanity.32  In contrast, the 
Renaissance humanists were inspired by the ancient texts promoting the virtues 
of humankind, and the works of the Stoics were particularly well known to 
them.33 For these thinkers, human dignity acted as a link between the Stoic 
tradition and Christian theology, and it was these two elements that shaped the 
Renaissance idea of the dignity of Man.  We continue to find, therefore, 
                                                          
32
 However, as noted by Izhak Englard, Pope Innocent III ‘planned to continue his work by 
adding a treatise on the dignity of human nature’ (Englard 2000, 1911). 
33
 As Charles Trinkaus explains, ‘...there was no lack of texts offering models of the Greek 
Fathers’ synthesis of Platonic and Stoic conceptions of the key position of man in the universe 
with the biblical and Christian visions of man’s dignity based on his Creation and on the 
Incarnation’ (Trinkaus 1973, 138). 
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accounts of human dignity grounded in the imago dei and the immortality of the 
soul, alongside artistic and intellectual creativity and freedom. 
A key aspect of Renaissance humanism then was its tendency to turn away 
from the medieval view of the world, and advance non-theologically based 
arguments for the dignity of Man.  Kurt Bayertz, in rather polemical terms, 
argues that during the Renaissance the concept of dignity was used ‘as a 
battering ram against a view of the world which aims to distract the human 
being from its existence within this world, presenting this world as a vale of 
tears, and every attempt to improve one’s existence within it as vain.  The 
concept of dignity is designed to give the human being a new self-awareness 
and the confidence necessary in order to improve this world and the human 
being’s Fate within it’ (Bayertz 1996, 74).  There was a growing emphasis 
throughout this period on individual achievement and self-worth, and it was 
again reason and freedom which were frequently held out as the defining 
characteristics of this new-found sense of the dignity of Man.  For our present 
study it will be sufficient to focus on perhaps the two most influential 
Renaissance thinkers to approach the dignity of Man: Giannozzo Manetti (1396-
1459) and Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494).  Both writers were typical of this 
new humanism by turning against the darker perception of man’s sinfulness, 
and, instead, capturing a new-found pride and enthusiasm in humanity. 
Manetti’s treatise On the Dignity and the Excellence of Man (1452) (De dignitate 
et excellentia hominis), was written at the bequest of King Alfonso I of Aragon, 
who was unsatisfied with an earlier attempt by Bartolomeo Facio to write a 
rebuttal to Pope Innocent III’s work on the misery of Man (Englard 2000).  
Composed of four parts, Manetti deals in turn with the excellence of the human 
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body, the greatness of the soul and human reason, humanity’s place in the 
world, and finally a detailed critique of both ancient and contemporary 
arguments put forward for the supposed misery of humanity’s position.  His 
work, representative of the new humanism, presents a newly found optimism in 
human nature, and in particular, identified ‘man’s dignity in his creative powers, 
as witnessed by his technical, artistic, and intellectual achievements’ (Englard 
2000, 1912-13).  However, the Christian perspective on the dignity of Man still 
very much pervades his treatise, albeit synthesised with a variety of classical 
sources, including Aristotle’s On the Soul (De anima) and Ethics, as well as 
Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum).   
Of particular significance is Manetti’s insistence on setting his account of human 
dignity apart from previous treatises.  For example, on the pleasures of external 
senses - in contrast to the Stoicism of Cicero - Manetti suggests that: 
We might venture to put forth the thought that we also enjoy various 
kinds of pleasure as well as afflictions in our ordinary and everyday 
life...Nay, he at all times takes such deep and intense pleasure from 
each and every one of his external senses—sight, hearing, taste, smell 
and touch—that other interests meanwhile appear superfluous, 
excessive and unnecessary. It would be hard, indeed impossible, to 
describe the intense pleasures that possess man: they derive partly from 
the untrammelled vision of beautiful bodies, partly from listening to 
sounds and symphonies and even more delightful things, partly from 
smelling the odours of flowers and such like, partly from tasting various 
sweet and succulent viands and, finally, partly from the touch of the 
softest substances (Murchland 1966, 77). 
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Manetti’s enthusiasm for the importance attached to such earthly pleasures is 
significant as it is shifts the traditional focus away from the heavens and Man’s 
transcendental nature, towards a re-examination of the importance of pleasure 
in our day-to-day lives.  However, in other instances, such as Man’s alleged 
superiority to other animals, Manetti displays the same sentiments as his 
predecessors: 
Man is more admirable than the fish and birds which were made of the 
air and the beasts which had been created along with him as living things 
from the earth. For this rational animal, possessing sagacity and 
foresight, has a body much more noble than the beasts and 
cattle...because it is much more suited for action, speech and 
understanding—aptitudes which beasts lack. It may be thought equally 
superior to the stars, bodies totally lacking in sensation... (Murchland 
1966, 79). 
Once more, Man’s dignity is argued to be due to his privileged position within 
the Great Chain of Being, as well as his inherent rationality and the capacity for 
‘action, speech and understanding’.  As succinctly summarised by Hubert 
Cancik, ‘the dignity of man resides in the wonderful fabric of his body (dignitas 
corporis), the incredible gifts of his mind, and his position over all animals and 
things' (Cancik 2002, 29). 
Pico della Mirandola 
 
The most famous and influential Renaissance treatise on the dignity of Man was 
delivered by Pico della Mirandola in his On the Dignity of Man (De hominis 
dignitate), composed in 1486.  However, ironically, his speech was not actually 
delivered by him, as it had been banned by the Inquisition, and he had originally 
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simply entitled it Oratio (oration), as it was designed as an introductory speech 
to a defence of nine hundred theses.  It was only named Oratio de hominis 
dignitate on its first posthumous printing, by his nephew Gian Francesco Pico.  
Thus, it appears that the significance of Pico’s work on the development of 
human dignity is due to the importance attached to it by later writers.  Indeed, 
the formula ‘human dignity’ is never used within the Oration and, furthermore, 
the only mention of the term ‘dignity’ is a single passage, wherein Pico, 
speaking of the higher position of angels exclaims, with characteristic optimism, 
that Man should:  
...aspire to the highest things and strive with all our forces to attain them: 
for if we will to, we can.  Let us spurn earthly things; let us struggle 
toward the heavenly...let us fly beyond the chambers of the world to the 
chamber nearest the most lofty divinity...let us compete with the angels in 
dignity and glory.  When we have willed it, we shall be not at all below 
them (Mirandola 1998, 7). 
In the first instance, it is clear that the excellence of Man is something that must 
be strived for, it is not something bestowed without question. There is of course 
also a deeply theological, almost mystical, element to Pico’s conception of 
dignity; our dignity is judged in relation to that of the angels and the other 
celestial elements.  Pico goes on to explain by what method we may achieve 
the greatness of the angels, and he lists the virtues of charity (characteristic of 
the Seraphim) and intelligence (characteristic of the Cherubim).  Yet, more than 
the bodily excellence of man, domination over the animal kingdom, or reason, it 
is the freedom of human nature which, according to Pico, is the essence of our 
dignity.  Our dignity comes from having no fixed place in the Great Chain of 
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Being, and our ability to choose our own place on that chain.  Whilst the angels 
are ‘forced’, as it were, to occupy the higher sphere, it is mankind alone which 
has the freedom and ability to choose his own position (both upward and 
downward) within this pre-ordained hierarchy (see Lebech 2009, 86-90). 
In perhaps the best known passage of the Oration, Pico makes explicit this 
connection between the excellence of Man and the freedom to be what he wills.  
God, speaking to Adam, who was made of ‘indeterminate form’ proclaims that: 
We have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy very own, no 
gift peculiarly thine, that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine 
own, possess as thine own the seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself 
shalt desire...In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have 
placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of 
nature for thyself.  I have placed thee at the center of the world, that from 
there thou mayest more conveniently look around and see whatsoever is 
in the world.  Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal 
have We made thee.  Thou, like a judge appointed for being honorable, 
art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into 
whatever shape thou dost prefer.  Thou canst grow downward into the 
lower natures which are brutes.  Thou canst again grow upward from thy 
soul’s reason into the higher natures which are divine (Mirandola 1998, 
4-5). 
One may object to the seeming absurdity of the claim that choosing to debase 
one’s self can itself be indicative of dignity.  If we witness someone willing to 
humiliate themselves we would be more inclined to suggest that, rather than a 
sign of their dignity, if anything they have demeaned or even lost it.  Yet, for 
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Pico, it is not necessarily the act itself which is reflective of their dignity, but 
merely the freedom to be able to act in such a way.  To clarify, there is a 
difference between the capacity for dignity and the exercise of those capacities.  
Human beings, therefore, are as Oliver Sensen explains, ‘...superior to animals 
in the capacities they possess, though not necessarily in how they choose to 
exercise those capacities’ (Sensen 2011, 80).  As human beings it is our duty, 
therefore, to act freely, and fully realize this dignity (Sensen 2011, 79; van der 
Graaf and Delden 2009, 156).  Indeed, as pointed out by Piet Steenbakkers, 
throughout the Oration Pico makes clear God’s intention for humans, as 
‘...those who develop the intellect will be rewarded by peace of mind’, whereas 
‘those who degenerate into a sensual or vegetative existence will be punished 
by transforming themselves into lower beings’ (Steenbakkers 2014, 91-2).  In 
this sense, because dignity and excellence have to be actively pursued and 
strived for, this necessarily leaves some individuals behind.  Pico, therefore, did 
not have a conception of universal human dignity shared equally amongst all 
(Steenbakkers 2014, 92). 
It would seem to follow for Pico that the real attack on human dignity would be 
to deny an individual their capacity to act autonomously; as Milton Lewis puts it: 
‘...where Manetti sees dignity arising from human excellence, Pico sees it in the 
freedom to attain such excellence’ (Lewis 2007, 94).  Whilst Man has the 
freedom to act how he pleases, it seems clear that Pico regards the pursuit and 
cultivation of reason and intellect to be something that we should strive for.  It is 
this idea which has proved so powerful amongst contemporary discussions 
about the possibility of transcending the current limitations of the human body 
and mind through technological means. 
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Chapter 4  Dignity in the Early Modern Period 
 
In many respects, the Early Modern Period continued the main themes of 
dignity as we have witnessed from previous eras.  However, as we will see, in 
the influential work of Kant we find the seeds for the modern understanding of 
human dignity.  In particular, it is the idea of dignity as an unconditional and 
incomparable worth, and so not dependent upon the will or opinion of others 
(nor indeed on a host of other contextual factors), that has had such a profound 
influence.  Nevertheless, as we will discover, Kant’s formulation of dignity is still, 
in many respects, quite different to contemporary conceptions of a universal 
human dignity. 
Hobbes   
 
Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) conception of the dignity of the individual is 
markedly different to what we are accustomed to reading within contemporary 
accounts, which tend to define dignity in terms of an inherent and inalienable 
worth in all humans.  In contrast, for Hobbes, dignity refers solely to the public 
worth or value of an individual, as determined by the inter-subjective judgement 
of society.  In the Leviathan (1651) he writes: 
The value or worth of a man, is as of other things, his price; that is to say, 
so much as would be given for the use of his power: and therefore is not 
absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of 
another...let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest 
value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by 
others...The publique worth of a man, which is the value set on him by 
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the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call dignity (Hobbes 
1968, 151-2) 
Significantly, on this account, one’s value or dignity is not based on the 
possession of certain capacities, but is solely determined by the opinion and will 
of others, which is itself guided by how useful one is.  For Hobbes then, there is 
no such thing as a human’s absolute worth, but only a market value; as he 
notes, ‘an able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or 
imminent; but in peace not so’ (Hobbes 1968, 152).  It is, therefore, a relational 
account of dignity in the sense that an individual’s dignity is not inherent, nor 
inviolable, nor unconditional, but entirely dependent on the will and opinion of 
others.  One’s dignity (or ‘public worth’) can be enhanced or even lost, and so 
there are no ‘objective’ perspectives on the worth or value of a person, but 
instead ‘…only conflicting opinions about value, and the opinions of others are 
the ones that count’ (Dillon 1995, 9).  It bears close resemblance then with the 
Roman concept of dignitas.  Hobbes’ concept of a human’s worth stands in 
stark contrast to Aristotle’s idea of megalopsychia, in which the truly virtuous 
man does not depend on the opinions of others for his sense of worth, but 
instead knows himself to be worthy of great honour. 
This is not to say that Hobbes did not have a theory of human equality.  As 
noted by Kari Saastamoinen, the idea that human beings are naturally equal 
has a long history, but in particular became an important topic during the 
seventeenth century amongst philosophers, including Hobbes, Pufendorf and 
Locke.  In particular, it is widely agreed that Pufendorf established Man’s natural 
equality from human dignity (Saastamoinen 2010, 39-40).  However, for 
Hobbes, this equality cannot be found within society, but ‘in the natural 
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condition of mankind’ (Hobbes 1968, 183-188).  This is the Hobbesian term for 
a ‘state of nature’ (a state prior to the creation of a society or commonwealth).    
It is only in this pre-societal condition that all humans stand equal to one 
another,34 despite any differences in physical and mental capacity, Hobbes 
argues, due to our equal potential to dominate and kill one other (although one 
may question that some would still naturally be better endowed than others at 
this).  It is only once we move to a society governed by laws – a shared 
commonwealth – that some humans become more valuable than others.  
In contrast to Hobbes’ contention that the worth or dignity of Man is determined 
solely in the public sphere, other seventeenth century writers insisted that 
human dignity was grounded in the possession of certain cognitive capacities.  
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), for instance, wrote in his Pensées that: 
A human being is only a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking 
reed. To crush him, the whole universe does not have to arm itself.  A 
mist, a drop of water, is enough to kill him.  But if the universe were to 
crush the reed, the man would be nobler than his killer, since he knows 
that he is dying, and that the universe has the advantage over him.  The 
universe knows nothing about this.  All our dignity consists therefore of 
thought (Pascal 1995, 72-3). 
                                                          
34
 As noted by Lloyd and Sreedhar, ‘Hobbes was one of the earliest western philosophers to 
count women as persons when devising a social contract among persons. He insists on the 
equality of all people, very explicitly including women. People are equal because they are all 
subject to domination, and all potentially capable of dominating others. No person is so strong 
as to be invulnerable to attack while sleeping by the concerted efforts of others, nor is any so 
strong as to be assured of dominating all others.  In this relevant sense, women are naturally 
equal to men. They are equally naturally free, meaning that their consent is required before they 
will be under the authority of anyone else. In this, Hobbes's claims stand in stark contrast to 
many prevailing views of the time, according to which women were born inferior to and 
subordinate to men’ (Lloyd and Sreedhar 2014). 
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For Pascal, human dignity rests solely on Man’s intelligence, which acts as a 
separator between us and the rest of the natural world.  In a similar vein, 
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) outlines in his On the Law of Nature and of 
Nations (1672) (which frequently refers to Cicero’s De officiis) how, in contrast 
to animals, humans have been blessed with an eternal soul by God, which is 
characterised by intelligence and the capacity for autonomy.  He writes that: 
The greatest dignity for man derives from this, that he has an immortal 
soul which is distinguished by the light of intelligence, the capacity of 
deciding and choosing...Because of his soul man is called an animal 
more holy than the other, capable of a deep mind, and able to rule over 
the other animals (as quoted in Cancik 2002, 31). 
As we will see in section two, it is this focus on the possession of certain morally 
relevant capacities which forms the backbone of the contemporary literature for 
the special worth or significance of humans over the rest of the natural world. 
Immanuel Kant  
 
Whilst Kant (1724-1804) does not mention Hobbes in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785), his formulation of dignity appears to be written in 
direct contrast to the Leviathan.  Rather than a status determined by the will of 
others, for Kant, dignity is ‘an unconditional incomparable worth’ (Kant 2005, 94 
[436]).  In the Groundwork, Kant writes that: 
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or dignity.  Whatever 
has a price can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; 
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whatever, on the other hand, is above all price, and therefore admits of 
no equivalent, has a dignity (Kant 2005, 93 [434]).35 
In contrast to Hobbes, therefore, one’s dignity is not determined solely by one’s 
usefulness or market value, or dependent upon the will and opinion of others, 
but instead is a form of unconditional and incomparable worth, which has value 
in and of itself.  As noted by Thomas E. Hill, one consequence of this is, ‘...that 
dignity is a worth not dependent on a person’s talents, accomplishments, class, 
race, gender, sexual orientations, or even moral record’ (Hill 2013, 316).  As 
dignity is unconditional, it is good in all contexts, and cannot be diminished or 
lost (or enhanced) by one’s own or by another’s actions (although Kant does 
seem to think that some actions are not befitting or appropriate for someone 
with dignity).  This is a radical departure from conceptions of dignity which 
would argue that one’s dignity was largely dependent upon one’s conduct, 
social status, or the actions of others.  Moreover, as dignity is incomparable, it 
has no equivalent for which it can be exchanged or traded.  Significantly then, 
an individual with dignity cannot be sacrificed for even a number of other 
persons (Hill 2013, 316).  It is this twofold interpretation of what dignity is that 
has had such a profound impact on contemporary understandings of human 
dignity.   
What then for Kant has this incomparable worth, and why does it possess it?  It 
is important to point out that Kant’s conception of dignity is not free standing, 
but hangs upon his wider systematic moral theory which we will have to touch 
upon in order to understand his conception of dignity.  To begin with, Kant 
                                                          
35
 A similar sentiment is found in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology: ‘The fact that the human 
being can have the representation “I” raises him infinitely above all the other beings on earth. By 
this he is a person....that is, a being altogether different in rank and dignity from things, such as 
irrational animals, with which one may deal and dispose at one's discretion’ (cited in Wood and 
O’Neill 1998, 190 [7: 127]).  
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states in the Groundwork that it is ‘...morality, and humanity, insofar as it is 
capable of morality...which alone has dignity’ (Kant 2005, 93 [435]).  By 
‘humanity’, Kant does not mean this in the sense that it is normally taken in 
contemporary usage (that is to demonstrate a humane or benevolent 
disposition), but as having a rational and autonomous nature, and the capacity 
to set and pursue one’s own ends.  As he explains, the ground for ‘the dignity of 
human nature and of every rational nature’ is autonomy (Kant 2005, 94 [436]).  
Thus, only those individuals (human or otherwise) with the requisite 
autonomous and rational nature have a dignity.  Although it is debatable 
whether Kant means that it is the capacities themselves, rather than the 
individuals who possess them, which have a dignity.  
Moreover, as highlighted by Samuel J. Kerstein, for Kant dignity is a threshold 
concept and does not admit of degrees; ‘if one has the set of capacities that are 
constitutive of it [dignity], one has it, no matter how well- or ill-developed those 
capacities may be', thus, 'any being who has the capacities requisite for 
possessing dignity has no less (and no more) dignity than anyone else' 
(Kerstein 2011, 232-3).  One then cannot have a bit of dignity, or have more 
dignity than another person.  This idea again has been highly influential in 
contemporary formulations of human dignity (see Chapter 10 for a detailed 
discussion of threshold accounts of moral status). 
Kant’s focus on the importance of autonomy and reason as the ground of 
dignity appears, on first glance at least, to follow a similar line to previous 
writers, including Aristotle, Cicero, Manetti, or Pico della Mirandola, who argued 
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that it is these two capacities which most clearly separates humans from the 
rest of nature.36    
Kant’s conception of moral autonomy, in particular, is radically different from 
what we (or indeed writers such as Pico) would understand by the term (which 
is, in essence, a personal autonomy to have the freedom to do as one 
chooses).  As pointed out by Rosen, whilst Kant does explicitly state that 
autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature, ‘...he just as clearly 
prohibits a whole range of actions to which human beings may plausibly give 
informed consent’, including suicide, drunkenness, gluttony, lying, premarital 
relations, or any activities which would fail to respect our rational and 
autonomous natures (Rosen 2013, 150; see also Hill 2013, 317).  Instead, for 
Kant, autonomy refers to the ability to participate ‘in the giving of universal laws’ 
which, as an autonomous agent, one can self-legislate or give oneself to follow 
(Kant 2005, 94 [435]).37  By universal laws, Kant is referring to the Categorical 
Imperative (what he refers to as the ‘supreme principle of morality’ (Kant 2005, 
53 [392])), the first formulation of which is that in our moral judgements we 
should ‘act always on such a maxim as you can at the same time will to be a 
universal law’ (Kant 2005, 95 [437]).  In other words, an action is only moral if it 
would be the correct action in all similar instances.  Such a rule, Kant thought, 
would rule out such actions as lying or stealing.  Moral autonomy for Kant, then, 
                                                          
36
 As highlighted by Bayertz, for instance, in an article within his Encyclopédie (1751–66) 
Diderot made a connection between autonomy, rationality and human dignity, and Man’s 
separateness from the rest of nature when he writes that: ‘If animals belonged to a genus which 
was more or less the same as our own; if there was a sure method of communication between 
them and us; if they could tell us their feelings and thoughts very clearly, and could be party to 
our thoughts and feelings just as clearly; briefly, if they could all come together with us and vote, 
then we would have to include them, and then the matter of natural law would no longer be 
negotiated before humanity but before animality.  But animals are separated from us by 
unchangeable and eternal barriers, and we are dealing here with an ordering of knowledge and 
ideas which are specific to the human genus, which result from the dignity of humanity and 
which are constitutive to it’ (Bayertz 1996, 77). 
37
 As Kant emphatically states later in the Groundwork: ‘...the dignity of humanity consists just in 
this capacity of being universally legislative’ (Kant 2005, 98, [440]).   
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is a self-imposed adherence to universal moral laws, rather than simply the 
freedom to do as one pleases. 
This then leads to the second, and most well-known, formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative: the maxim that one ought to always treat a ‘rational 
being’ or the ‘humanity’ of each person never merely as a means, but also as 
an end in themselves (Kant 2005, 96 [438]).  Thus, in contrast to other beings or 
objects with only a relative value or price, persons with dignity are ends-in-
themselves, and so have a special high status which ought to be respected.  
One should never treat another person merely as an instrument of your own 
will, nor treat them as if they had only a price, rather than a dignity, no matter 
how disliked they are.  This tenet has a clear affinity with contemporary 
accounts, which consider acts such as torture, false imprisonment, or rape to be 
gross examples of the instrumentalization of individuals, and a failure to respect 
their dignity. 
Hill draws attention to the fact that whilst dignity for Kant should always be 
respected, in practice, it is not always possible to fulfil this obligation, 
particularly in tragic instances.  In other words, Kant’s moral theory is found to 
be particularly rigid and unforgiving when applied to the complexities of ‘real 
world’ hard cases.  For instance, Hill notes, ‘it seemed impossible during the 
Second World War to rescue oppressed people from the indignities inflicted on 
Jews and others without bombing raids that burned to death innocent children.  
Mothers submitted to debasing prostitution to keep their families from starving...’ 
(Hill 2013, 319-20). 
Such a criticism itself has a long pedigree with Schopenhauer writing in 1840 
that Kant’s formulation of dignity is content-less.  Whilst it may sound grand and 
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of utmost importance, in reality, Schopenhauer found Kant’s account of dignity 
wanting: 38 
That expression, dignity of man, once uttered by Kant, afterward became 
the shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists who 
concealed behind that imposing expression their lack of any real basis of 
morals, or, at any rate, of one that had any meaning.  They cunningly 
counted on the fact that their readers would be glad to see themselves 
invested with such a dignity and would accordingly be quite satisfied with 
it (Schopenhauer 1965, 100). 
Interestingly, we find echoes of this criticism amongst contemporary critics of 
the use of dignity in modern ethics (see Pinker 2008 and Macklin 2003a).  In 
face of such criticism, Hill suggests the most appropriate way to follow Kant is to 
approach each ethical dilemma on a case-by-case basis, in order to judge ‘what 
best respects the more specific values (and their priorities) that the dignity 
principle aspires to protect—the values; for example, of life, freedom, non-
degradation, mutual respect, and happiness (insofar as it can be achieved by 
permissible means)’ (Hill 2013, 319-20).  This is certainly one way of dealing 
with the objection, although it involves reading further into Kant’s work then 
some scholars may think appropriate.  Nevertheless, if we leave matters of 
exegesis to one side, we may agree with Hill that, ‘the central point is that as 
human beings with the capacity to be moral we must treat ourselves and all 
others with the respect, restraint, and positive concern that for Kant is 
encapsulated in the idea of human dignity...because, on due reflection, we can 
see that respecting human dignity represents (abstractly) a deeply embedded 
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 Similarly, as pointed out by McCrudden, ‘in 1847, Karl Marx denounced the use of dignity by 
a fellow socialist as a ‘refuge from history in morality’ (McCrudden 2008, 661). 
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core presupposition of the common morality that we share, despite our 
legitimate disagreements regarding many particular issues...Our task is to live 
up to our implicit commitment to human dignity, which too easily we find 
excuses to ignore’ (Hill 2013, 325). 
Persons, Non-human Animals and Marginal Cases 
 
As we have seen, Kant attributed dignity to our rational and autonomous 
natures (in particular, to self-legislate and obey the moral law).  It is these 
natures alone which have an unconditional and incomparable worth.  As noted 
by William J. FitzPatrick, ‘...for Kant, respect for persons is ultimately reducible 
to respect for the rational nature in persons’ (FitzPatrick 2013).  In this respect, 
the Groundwork seems less of an account of human dignity and more to do with 
the dignity of rationality and autonomy.  Kant, in effect, puts the worth of rational 
nature itself above the worth of the person.  Indeed, the reason Kant gives for 
rejecting actions such as suicide, drunkenness or gluttony, is because one 
would be subordinating one’s rational nature to one’s baser ‘irrational’ 
inclinations.  This puts Kant’s account at odds with most contemporary 
understandings of dignity, which focus instead on the worth and dignity of the 
individual themselves (rather than on their capacities).  Moreover, this shift in 
focus on what actually has a dignity has important implications for our moral 
decisions.  As FitzPatrick explains, for those who take the person themselves to 
be the possessor of a dignity, ‘...it is hardly obvious that such respect must 
always privilege the continuation of rational agency over the ending of 
irremediable misery, or that we best respect the person by giving absolute and 
unconditional priority to the preservation of one of her capacities over all other 
aspects of her life and experience’ (FitzPatrick 2013).  Thus, in contrast to Kant, 
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if we are to prioritise the worth of the individual over that of their rational 
natures, then acts including suicide, euthanasia, or drunkenness may instead 
be entirely permissible. 
A further serious issue then for Kant’s formulation of dignity, especially in light of 
contemporary accounts of a universal human dignity, is the role (or rather lack 
of) those individuals without a rational nature.  Any being, human or otherwise, 
which does not have the requisite level of rationality and autonomy, according 
to Kant, does not have a corresponding dignity, but instead falls into the 
secondary category of value, and has merely a price.39  Moreover, it is not clear 
if this includes individuals with the potential for a rational nature (for example, 
young infants) or those who once had the capacities, but no longer do so 
(including those with dementia or in a comatose state) (FitzPatrick 2013).  
Some commentators have, consequently, argued that Kant’s account of dignity 
in the Groundwork seemingly leaves out a large swath of humanity, including 
infants and the severely cognitively disabled (as well as all non-human animals) 
from moral consideration (Gruen 2010; Warren 1997, 101-4).   
Rather, Kant seemed to suggest that non-persons (both those animals and 
humans without the requisite capacities) are only morally considerable 
indirectly.  Thus our duty to not mistreat animals Kant argues in the Lectures on 
Ethics, is not due to the welfare of the animal themselves, but because 
mistreating them would affect our ability to deal compassionately with our fellow 
persons:   
                                                          
39
 However, as pointed out by Kerstein, some scholars argue that Kant did not even believe that 
all those with a rational nature have a dignity, but only those who have a good will as well.  A 
good will is the idea that a person ‘…has a disposition to conform her actions to the moral law 
and to do so on the ground that this law is authoritative for her will’ (Kerstein 2014, 222n). 
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...if a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living for 
him, he is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter 
is incapable of judgement, but he thereby damages the kindly and 
humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his 
duties to mankind.  Lest he extinguish such qualities, he must already 
practise a similar kindliness towards animals; for a person who already 
displays such cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards men' 
(Kant 1997, 212 [27:459]). 
Whilst Kant clearly has a developed sensitivity to the plight of animals, as 
highlighted by Gruen this indirect view (at least to modern ears) seems deeply 
unsatisfying, as it ‘fails to capture the independent wrong that is being done to 
the non-person. When someone rapes a woman in a coma, or whips a severely 
brain damaged child, or sets a cat on fire, they are not simply disrespecting 
humanity or themselves as representatives of it, they are wronging these non-
persons’ (Gruen 2010).   
Conversely, some more forgiving interpretations do argue that Kant ascribed a 
moral status to all humans, or attempt to lessen the severity of Kant’s 
conclusion (see for example, Wood 2008, 97; Korsgaard 2004; Denis 2000; and 
O’Neill 1998).  Indeed, as noted by Patrick Kain, ‘there is substantial textual 
evidence indicating Kant’s judgment...[that] all human beings possess moral 
status’ (Kain 2009, 62).40  There certainly seems to be a tension within Kant’s 
writing as to whether or not all humans have a high moral worth.  As we will see 
in the following two sections, this theme of marginal cases, and the distinction 
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 See for example: ‘Now I say: the human being and in general every rational being exists as 
an end in itself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his 
actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the 
same time as an end’ (Kant 2005, 87 [428]). 
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between humans and persons, is a persistent issue for any discussion of the 
nature and ground of human dignity (as well as ethics more broadly). 
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Chapter 5 Dignity in the Modern Era 
 
Introduction 
 
The modern era continued the identification of dignity with a high moral worth 
that demands respect.  However, as we will see, what sets the most recent past 
apart most clearly from previous periods is the equal allocation of this dignity to 
previously marginalized groups (at least in theory, if not also always in practice).  
On a broad brush stroke approach, the circle of moral concern has been 
gradually widened to include some of the most vulnerable groups, including 
former slaves, women, children, and in more recent times, the elderly, disabled, 
homosexual, transgendered, as well as non-human animals.41 It is this 
universality of dignity – the idea that all human beings have an inherent, 
unconditional, and inviolable dignity or high moral worth, that should be 
respected, does not admit of degrees, and is not dependent upon individual 
merit or circumstance – that has had such a resonance amongst contemporary 
writers and law makers.  As we will see, it is from this core meaning of human 
dignity that a consensus of how one should, and should not, treat other humans 
has been steadily built up through successive human rights instruments (which 
have had to traverse quite different legal and cultural systems). 
Indeed, one of the most pronounced developments of our understanding of 
dignity during the modern era is the perceived close relationship between 
universal human dignity and universal human rights, and the broadening of 
these privileges from the few to the many.  Dignity is often closely linked with a 
variety of other important rights to protect, including freedom from slavery, 
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 The Swiss Constitution, for instance, refers to the ‘dignity of living beings...’ (Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1999, 39). 
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torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as the right to life, and 
bodily integrity.  More than this, however, human dignity is also commonly 
thought to be the fundamental ground of human rights.  In other words, human 
beings have rights because they have a dignity.42  Tellingly, the idea of the 
dignity of every person was adopted most readily into the constitutions of those 
countries which had escaped the brutalities under Fascist, Communist and 
other totalitarian rule.  The importance and frequency with which dignity is now 
referred to in both ethical as well as legal contexts only seems to continue to 
grow.  Human dignity is now an important component in both national and 
transnational law, including as a foundational principle in EU law for all human 
rights, and mention of dignity is found in the national constitutions of many 
countries around the globe (Dupré 2013, 113-4; McCrudden 2008).43   
Moreover, rather than focus primarily on what bestows humankind a dignity (be 
that through the exercise of rationality, or being created in the image of God), 
the modern era places a greater emphasis on violations of dignity and 
dehumanization; that is actions and events that are characterized by treating an 
individual without dignity or respect.  As highlighted by Oliver Sensen, the 
modern conception of dignity focuses primarily on the dignity of the other, rather 
than of the self:44 
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 As noted by Beyleveld and Brownsword, ‘...human dignity is the rock on which the 
superstructure of human rights is built’ (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 13). 
43
 These are: Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, Israel, South Africa, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Italy, Greece, 
Argentina, Turkey, Egypt, and Ireland.  Interestingly, as noted by Cohn and Grimm, 'no formal 
recognition of human dignity can be found in the constitutions of the United States, Canada, and 
France' (Cohn and Grimm 2013, 195). 
44
 This is not to say that self-respect is still not considered an important aspect of dignity in 
contemporary discourse.  Ronald Dworkin, for instance, writes that '...dignity requires self-
respect and authenticity'.  The former refers to the claim that 'each person must take his own life 
seriously: he must accept that it is a matter of importance that his life be a successful 
performance rather than a wasted opportunity’.  Authenticity for Dworkin refers to the principle 
that 'each person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success in 
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When Cicero, Leo, Pico and Kant talk about human dignity, they 
emphasize that the agent should realize his or her own initial dignity. In 
talking about human dignity, they highlight a privilege or capacity human 
beings have been given, and their emphasis is on how one should use 
that capacity. This emphasis stems from an underlying perfectionism. 
The main concern of these four thinkers in questions of moral philosophy 
is how one should perfect oneself, not how one should treat others’ 
(Sensen 2011, 84-5). 
In contrast, we witness in the various declarations and charters examined 
below, that there is a distinct concern with the rights of others, as well as an 
emphasis on the interrelated and interdependence of our moral communities. 
Nevertheless, despite the ubiquity of the idea, the concept of human dignity is 
still often ill defined and understood, and appears in a variety of different forms.  
As noted by Cohn and Grimm, ‘human dignity’ is not defined in any of these 
constitutions, beyond occasional mention of it being inherent, inviolable or 
inalienable (Cohn and Grimm 2013, 195).  Dignity is used in a variety of ways, 
from the basis for human rights, to being understood as a right in itself which 
needs to be protected.  This uncertainty of what dignity is, and the inconsistency 
of its application in human rights adjudication has, in the words of Catherine 
Dupré, ‘....triggered a substantial amount of controversy and confusion owing to 
their apparent lack of logic and predictability’ (Dupré 2013, 119-20). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
his own life; he has a personal responsibility to create that life through a coherent narrative or 
style that he himself endorses' (Dworkin 2011, 203-4). 
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Dignity and the French Revolution 
 
With its celebrated cry of equality, liberty and fraternity, the ideals of the French 
Revolution of 1789, which saw the overthrow of the aristocratic statuses or 
‘dignities’ of the Ancien régime, are often considered to be the genesis and 
catalyst for universal human dignity and rights, as we understand them today.45   
The principles of the French Revolution were themselves inspired by the ideas 
of the American Revolution of Independence (1765-83) and the growth of 
republicanism and democracy (see Meyer and Parent (1992) for an extended 
discussion of the role of human dignity and the US Constitution), as well as the 
emphasis on reason and autonomy from the Enlightenment period.   
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) 
 
These ideals found voice in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen (1789).  Breaking away from the old order of strict social and hereditary 
hierarchy, the opening article states that: ‘Men are born and remain free and 
equal in rights’ (Marquis de Lafayette, 1789).  Article 6 of the Declaration follows 
logically from this opening statement, by extending the former aristocratic 
statuses to all men so that, in principle, no social position should be closed to 
any individual:  ‘All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally 
eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to 
their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents’ 
(Marquis de Lafayette, 1789).  In particular, Article 6 of the Declaration 
highlights the transitional nature of dignity during this period, from a traditional 
                                                          
45
 Although as highlighted by Dupré, there was in fact an earlier reference to dignity made 
during the English Civil War in 1646, by the Leveller John Lilburne (1614-57), in which he 
argued that: ‘“all men by nature are the children of Adam, and regardless of religious 
differences, they are all equal and alike in power, dignity, authority and majesty”’ (Dupré 2015, 
37). 
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hierarchy based conception, to the modern universal conception recognised 
today. 
Nevertheless, whilst the Revolution brought down the aristocratic statuses of 
the previous regime, and the Declaration declared these statuses spread evenly 
for all Men, the Declaration itself only made this one reference to ‘dignities’ 
within Article 6.  Rather, as pointed out by Dupré, the Declaration instead 
created the conditions for dignity to become an important legal device within our 
modern conception of universal human rights (Dupré 2013, 117).  Instead, as 
noted by several commentators, it is some six decades later, in the Preamble of 
the French Decree, which abolished slavery in all her colonies in 1848, that 
dignity is first mentioned in a legal text.  The Decree stated that: ‘...slavery is an 
assault upon human dignity; that in destroying man’s free will, it destroys the 
natural source of law and duty; that it is a flagrant violation of the republican 
creed: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’ (Scott 2013, 61).  This not only demonstrates 
the importance, in some quarters, with which the idea of dignity was used in 
upholding the ideals of the French Revolution of social equality, individual 
freedom, and a sense of universal human community, but also links dignity with 
work and a protection against humiliating and dehumanizing working conditions.  
Rebecca J. Scott, for instance, has demonstrated the influence the French 
decree had on the French speaking Afro-Creole community in New Orleans, 
who took it as their model for emancipation from slavery.  This community 
argued that, ‘slavery was by its nature a direct affront to human dignity, and 
could not be allowed to continue in a self-respecting republic’ (Scott 2013, 65).  
We have here then a clear example of the idea of dignity being used to defend 
and protect previously marginalized and vulnerable groups. 
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We also witness in the writings of Thomas Paine the influence the ideals of the 
Declaration had when he refers in his The Rights of Man (1791) to ‘the natural 
dignity of man’ (Paine 1996, 35).  For Paine, this natural dignity is a status 
shared amongst all people, and not just the privileged few.  Conscious of this 
transition from the Ancien régime to the new social order, Paine wrote that 'the 
patriots of France have discovered in good time that rank and dignity in society 
must take a new ground.  The old one has fallen through.  It must now take the 
substantial ground of character, instead of chimerical ground of titles; and they 
have brought their titles to the altar, and made of them a burnt-offering to 
Reason' (Paine 1996, 46).  Paine was writing in direct opposition to Edmund 
Burke, who in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) had attacked 
the French Revolution.  For Burke, ‘men of dignity’ are only those of noble birth 
and of the requisite social rank; there is no such thing as the dignity of the 
common people.  Indeed, he satirises this new egalitarian social order when he 
mockingly suggests that ‘I should have thought that the hangman of Paris...[is 
now] full of his sense of his new dignity’ (Burke 1973, 83).46  Writing at the same 
time as Paine, in both her Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) and 
Vindication of the Rights of Man (1790) Mary Wollstonecraft also used repeated 
reference to dignity to colour her appeal for greater equality between both 
genders (Dupré 2015, 40; McCrudden 2008, 660). 
  
                                                          
46
 This is not to say that the increasing frequency of the use of dignity was not met with any 
other resistance.  Friedrich Nietzsche, for instance, criticized the alleged link between human 
dignity and the dignity of labour in his essay ‘The Greek State’ (1872): ‘“every human 
being...only has dignity in so far as he is a tool of the genius, consciously or unconsciously; from 
this we may immediately deduce the ethical conclusion, that “man in himself”, the absolute man 
possesses neither dignity, not rights, nor duties; only as a wholly determined being serving 
unconscious purposes can man excuse his existence”’ (cited in McCrudden 2008, 661; see also 
Rosen 2012a, 42).  
84 
 
Human Dignity and Human Rights 
 
Whilst the aftermath of the Second World War, and the creation of legally 
binding universal human rights, is generally thought to be the pivotal moment 
for human dignity in the Twentieth Century, there was in fact pre-war legal 
usage of the term within the Weimar Constitution (1919), which mentions dignity 
in terms of the working life and social justice,47 and the third constitution of 
Brazil (1934) which closely mirrored the Weimar Constitution in this respect.  
Dignity was also included in the Preamble of the Irish Constitution (1937) as a 
foundational religious tenet (see Moyn 2013, 96-7).48   
The Charter of the United Nations 
 
Nevertheless, it was after the traumatic upheaval and atrocities in the wake of 
the Second World War that the concept of dignity had one of its most influential 
turns, and heralded the use of dignity in international human rights law. The 
Charter of the United Nations (or UN Charter) (1945) put forth the idea that the 
‘human person’ has a dignity and worth, and all humans share an equality of 
rights.  The opening of the Charter begins: 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small... (United 
Nations 1945). 
                                                          
47
 Article 151: 'The organisation of the economic life must conform to the principles of social 
justice with a view to guaranteeing a dignified existence (menschenwürdiges Dasein) to all’ 
(cited in Dupré 2015, 49). 
48
 Which refers to the '…dignity and freedom of the individual…' (Constitution of Ireland 1937, 
2). 
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The Charter vividly explains the necessity for affirming the equality, dignity and 
worth of all humans, in order to ensure justice, social progress and freedom.  
The opening of the Charter presents a ‘never again’ tone to ensure that the 
atrocities witnessed during the war are never to be repeated again.  
Consequently the Charter is suggestive of what happens when the dignity of the 
individual is not upheld (Hollenbach 2013, 126-7; Bayertz 1996, 80).   
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
Three years later, the Charter was developed into its best known form as The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948).  The opening two 
Articles act as the foundation blocks with which the rest of the Declaration 
builds.  The first article states: 
Article I All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.  
The concept of dignity and rights became the foundational principle for the 
UDHR.  Notably, as we have witnessed in previous eras, there is a close link 
set up between dignity and the capacity for rationality.  These foundational 
articles are preceded by a similar Preamble to the one witnessed in the Charter, 
which begins: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas disregard and 
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
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human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom 
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people... 
Between the Preamble and opening Articles of the Declaration, therefore, the 
role and significance of dignity is presented on several fronts:  First, it sets up 
recognition of the dignity and rights of all humans as essential to ensure 
freedom, justice and peace (with dignity notably listed before rights).  Again, as 
we have seen in the French Decree and the UN Charter, there is a particular 
emphasis on violations of dignity, and the ‘barbarous acts’ which result when 
the dignity of the person is not respected or upheld.  In a similar vein, the 
Geneva Convention (1949) made an explicit connection between humiliation, 
degradation, and human dignity, in regards to the treatment of prisoners of war, 
in which it refers to ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment’ (The Geneva Conventions 1949, 36).   
Second, the UDHR describes dignity as being inherent in all humans, rather 
than its existence being merely a matter of ‘faith’, as it is characterized in the 
Charter.49  As pointed out by Roberto Andorno, by referring to dignity as 
inherent in humans, the UDHR implies that ‘…dignity is inseparable from the 
human condition...something that all human beings possess by the mere fact of 
being human' (Andorno 2014, 50).50 The great problem, as we will see in the 
following section, is understanding what is so significant about our humanity or 
belonging to the human species, which would justifiably bestow a high moral 
                                                          
49
 Dignity also appears in Protocol 13 of The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) in 
regards to the death penalty, in which dignity is described as 'inherent' in all human beings. 
50
 See also: ‘...the core idea behind the term [dignity] for the human rights context is, it seems, 
that human beings, irrespective of other characteristics, possess an inalienable, supreme, 
intrinsic worth because of their humanity alone, and for no other reason than that’ (Mahlmann 
2013, 598). 
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worth or dignity.  Indeed, if all humans have a dignity, as the UDHR contends, 
this is suggestive of the fact that dignity cannot then be based on any one 
characteristic or capacity shared by all, from the simple fact that, save for 
species membership, it is difficult to identify a capacity which all humans share, 
but no non-humans possess. 
Conversely, human rights, rather than dignity, are said in the Declaration to be 
inalienable, suggesting perhaps that the drafters considered dignity could still 
be diminished, or even lost or stripped from the individual.  In contrast, the 
opening line of the first Article in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1949) states that ‘Human dignity shall be inviolable.51 To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority’ (Basic Law 1949, 15).  There is 
some controversy over how this is to be interpreted (Goos 2013, 87-8).  It is 
unclear how something can be protected, or in fact if it needs protection, if by 
definition it cannot be lost or taken from the individual. On one interpretation, 
this claim should be understood normatively, in the sense that one ought not to 
violate another’s dignity, rather then it being impossible to do so.52  
Furthermore, the idea of a ‘human family’ is introduced into the Declaration.53 
As a transnational document, drawn up by the United Nations, it is little surprise 
that the drafters sought a universal tone.  However, the UDHR is also one of the 
first legal documents to voice the idea that individuals are part of a global 
community, one that is interconnected and interdependent on one another.  We 
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 This has also been translated as ‘Human dignity is inviolable’. 
52
 ‘...there is still a dispute in the literature as to whether the first sentence of Article 1 (‘The 
dignity of man is inviolable’) is to be understood descriptively or prescriptively.  ‘It should be 
inviolable!’, declared Luwig Bergsträsser when this question arose in the debates of the 
Parliamentary Council’ (Goos 2013, 87-8). 
53
 On Dworkin's (2011) work: 'Justice in general demands that a government respect the dignity 
of all its members–their fundamental right to equal concern and respect.  Dignity, so construed, 
has two components.  First, a community must treat its members' fates as equally objectively 
important; second, it must respect their personal responsibility for defining what counts as 
success in their own lives' (Tasioulas 2012, 354). 
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have seen the seeds of such an idea in the dignity of citizenship of Ancient 
Greece and Rome, and again later in Hobbes’ idea of a Commonwealth.  The 
UDHR extends the scope of dignity to include the human species in its entirety, 
regardless of age, race, religion, gender or disability (Hollenbach 2013, 128; 
Letsas 2013, 2706-2715; Glendon 2001, 174; Bayertz 1996, 80-1; and Meyer 
1992, 8-9). 
As noted by Oliver Sensen, whilst  ‘...the members to the Declaration present 
dignity as an “inherent” fact or property that can be “recognized”’, they 
nevertheless fail to ‘...give an account of what this “inherent” (value) property is, 
nor of how one is able to know or “recognize” it’ (Sensen 2011, 74).  This has 
been a familiar criticism levied against the human rights project, and the 
usefulness of the concept of dignity in particular.  Despite the prevalence of the 
concept in national and supranational constitutions, it remains an ill-defined and 
understood concept, which is difficult to use as a normative guide.  Moreover, 
following Schopenhauer’s original criticism of Kant’s account, there have been 
accusations of dignity being ‘empty’ of content. 
However, the vague characterisation of dignity in the UDHR was in fact a 
conscious decision by the drafters.  As noted by several commentators, human 
dignity was given such prominence in the Declaration precisely because of its 
vagueness.  In this way it was able to act as a placeholder term to allow for a 
consensus between such a diverse (both culturally, as well as geographically) 
range of countries as to why universal human rights should be established and 
protected (Düwell 2014, 23; Carozza 2013, 621; and McCrudden 2013, 2).54  
                                                          
54
 ‘Whenever he was asked how it was possible that adherents of such radically opposed 
philosophies could reach agreement on a declaration of fundamental rights, Jacques 
Maritain...likes to say, “Yes, we agree about the rights, but on condition that no one asks us 
why.  It is with the “why” that all the disagreements begin.”’.  However, Carozza notes that 
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However, despite the practical use of dignity in this regard, by not explicitly 
defining or explaining what is meant by the concept beyond its obvious 
violations, has left the meaning, content, and theoretical foundations of human 
dignity precariously open to challenge, and arguably threatens the entire human 
rights project itself. 
The International Bill of Human Rights 
 
The International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) is comprised of the UDHR (which 
was non-binding), along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) (1976), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1976) (which protects dignity in terms of 
education), which were both drafted some 20 years later in 1966.  It took a 
further decade for the IBHR to be ratified, and entered into force for participating 
countries in 1976 (Letsas 2013, 2706-2715).55 
Whilst dignity and rights are both mentioned in the Charter and the Declaration, 
there is no indication of the relationship between the two.  In both documents 
dignity and rights are listed side by side, with neither being suggested as the 
basis for the other.  The IBHR significantly was the first set of legal documents 
in which human dignity was identified explicitly as the ground or justificatory 
principle for human rights, stating that ‘these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person' (United Nations 1976a, 173). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘Maritain and his colleagues did not regard this lack of consensus on foundations as fatal to the 
project.  The fact that an agreement could be achieved across cultures on several practical 
principles was ‘enough’...’ (Carozza 2013, 621). 
55
 The United Nations itself has argued that the International Bill of Human Rights ‘represents a 
milestone in the history of human rights, a veritable Magna Carta marking mankind's arrival at a 
vitally important phase: the conscious acquisition of human dignity and worth’ (OHCHR 1996, 
9). 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  
 
The Charter of the European Union (European Convention 2000) came into 
force with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and became legally binding for all 
member states and institutions of the EU.  The Charter is divided into seven 
distinct chapters.  The first is entitled ‘Dignity’, and Article 1 simply states: 
‘Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected’ (European 
Convention 2000, C 364/9).  Under this Charter dignity becomes the European 
Union’s foundational principle, as it begins and underpins the entire document.  
However, no further definition of dignity is offered by the Charter.  We also have 
the potential issue of reconciling the idea that dignity is both inviolable, with the 
claim that it also needs protection.  The solution to this depends on whether we 
interpret it as a statement of fact, that dignity cannot be violated, or as a 
normative statement, that dignity ought or should not be violated.  Moreover, 
interestingly it does not refer to the dignity of the person, but seemingly the idea 
of principle of dignity itself as inviolable and in need of protection and respect. 
The Charter goes on to link human dignity with the right to life (Article 2); the 
integrity of the person (Article 3), which includes prohibitions on reproductive 
cloning of human beings; prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Article 4); and the prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour (Article 5).  The remaining chapters (entitled respectively, Freedoms, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizens' Rights, Justice, and General Provisions) cover 49 
further articles, ranging from the right to education (Article 14), to the rights of 
the elderly (Article 25),56 and the right to fair and just working conditions (Article 
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 'Article 25: The rights of the elderly: The Union recognises and respects the rights of the 
elderly to lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life' 
(European Convention 2000, C 364/14). 
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31)57, the latter two of which are the only other articles to refer to dignity.  
Notably, there is a real drive to acknowledge and protect some of the 
traditionally most marginalized and vulnerable groups, which had previously 
been excluded (or at least not explicitly protected) in previous national or 
international constitutions.  Unlike in previous centuries, dignity does not appear 
in the EU Charter to be grounded on any particular type of characteristic or 
capacity, but offers instead what Dupré refers to as a ‘complex multi-layered 
definition of humanity’ (Dupré 2015, 30).  
Significantly, Article 3 (on the integrity of the person) extends the sense and 
protection of humanity at the genetic level.  Such a reference appears to be 
directed at the huge advances in biological and technological science in recent 
decades, and the increased possibility for ‘violations’ of the human genome 
itself.  Indeed, it has been suggested that the driver for the frequency with which 
the concept of dignity is used today is due specifically to the development and 
potential of new biotechnology (Brownsword 2013).  As pointed out by Dupré, 
this new focus, rather than looking at violations of dignity in the past or present, 
uses the legal and ethical concept of dignity as a tool to ‘protect a concept of 
humanity going much beyond the existing individual human beings, to include 
the whole of mankind, future generations, as well as a form of humanity that for 
now we cannot even imagine’ (Dupré 2015, 81).  The idea of human dignity 
then is used not only as a device to protect and respect the individual or group, 
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 'Article 31: Fair and just working conditions: 1. Every worker has the right to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity' (European Convention 2000, C 
364/15). 
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but the integrity of the species, and the idea of humanity itself (both in its 
present and future sense).58 
Human Dignity and Bioethics and Biolaw 
 
Indeed, increasingly contemporary bioethics and biolaw has incorporated the 
idea of ‘human dignity’ into its discussions, with an explosion in the literature to 
references and appeals to the term.  Within the legal sphere this can be 
observed in documents such as the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine (1997), in which dignity plays a central part 
in limiting certain controversial areas of scientific research, as well as 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO 
2005), in which dignity is mentioned twelve times, although again it is not 
defined beyond reference to the intrinsic worth of the human being (see also 
United Nations 2005; UNESCO 1997). 
Appeals to human dignity, on both sides of the debate, have also been used in 
a huge range of bioethical areas, including in regards to informed consent in 
medical research (Burns 2008), invoked in debates about stem cell research 
(Caulfield and Chapman 2005; Pichler 2005; and Oduncu 2003), end-of-life 
decisions, assisted euthanasia and care of the elderly (Nordenfelt 2003a, 
2003b; Loewy 1999), and in debates on human cloning and genetic engineering 
(Balzer et al. 2000; Heeger 2000; Birnbacher 2005).  Most recently, mention of 
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 Andorno argues the reason for this is due to the deficiencies of human rights to protect 
against future dangers brought about by biotechnology: 'a purely human rights approach is 
powerless to face these new challenges because rights are only enjoyed by existing individuals, 
not by humankind as a whole or by future generations. This is why the new instruments relating 
to bioethics directly appeal to the notion of human dignity, and not to human rights, when they 
condemn practices such as human reproductive cloning or human genetic’ (Andorno 2014, 52-
3). 
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human dignity has arisen within discussions of the ethics of human 
enhancement, as theorists have debated the significance of the term (see 
section three for an extended discussion of this). 
At present, there exists a divide between those who believe that the pursuit of 
enhancement technologies affirms, or even increases our dignity (Bostrom 
2005a), and those who insist that it may hinder, or even pose a threat 
(Jotterand 2010a; UNESCO 2005; Fukuyama 2002; Kass 2002; and Council of 
Europe 1997).  A third strand proposes that we do away with the idea of human 
dignity in bioethical discussion altogether (Cochrane 2010; Pinker 2008; Bagaric 
& Allan 2006;59 and Macklin 2003a). This perspective has even been suggested 
to be the mainstream of current English speaking bioethics (Ashcroft 2005, 
679).  As will become apparent, the conclusions drawn depend fundamentally 
on how we characterize the concept in the first place.  As it stands, the concept 
of dignity, and its role within the ethical realm, remains a highly contentious 
issue – derided and lauded in equal measure. 
  
                                                          
59 ‘Dignity is a vacuous concept.  The notion of dignity should be discarded as a potential 
foundation for rights claims unless, and until, its source, nature, relevance and meaning are 
determined’ (Bagaric and Allan 2006, 269). 
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Section 2 – The Nature and Ground of Human Dignity 
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Chapter 6  Human Dignity and Speciesism 
 
Human and Animal Dignity 
 
Human dignity is, by nature as well as by definition, a concept weighted towards 
the worth of humans over other beings.  Explicit within the phrase ‘human 
dignity’ is the contention that it is a dignity that only members of the species 
Homo sapiens may partake of and belong to; that there is something peculiar to 
humans that non-human beings lack.  If animals do have a dignity, then this is 
of quite a different sort to human dignity.  Moreover, this position is often said to 
entitle human interests a priority over non-human interests.  Indeed, taken in its 
contemporary universal sense, human dignity encapsulates the idea that all 
humans occupy a privileged position, and elevated moral status, over and 
above that of all other non-human animals.  In our political, ethical and social 
life, there is an explicit assumption, for many, that human life has a value over 
and above that of other non-human life.  When we eat meat, use animal 
products for clothing, cosmetics, labour, or when we experiment upon and use 
them for other industrial processes, we acknowledge that animals can serve a 
purpose which we wouldn’t find acceptable if humans were used in their place.  
When attempts have been made to exclude or restrict the moral status of 
particular kinds of humans, as was the case with Alberto Giubilini and 
Francesca Minerva’s infamous article on the permissibility of killing new born 
infants in instances where it is too burdensome to raise them (Giubilini and 
Minerva 2012), they are greeted with public disgust and outcry (see Hauskeller 
2012a). 
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At the heart of the matter is the extent to which we take the interests and lives 
of non-human animals to be equivalent to that of humans, and where we 
consider the boundaries of moral concern (the same ground which dignity is 
traditionally seen to occupy) to lie. The fundamental point, upon which much of 
the debate revolves, concerns the morally relevant characteristics, capacities or 
features for a being’s interests to be given moral consideration.  Humans, it is 
argued, are different in the morally relevant respects, and therefore, deserve 
special consideration. In the ethical sphere this is often couched in terms of 
moral considerability with the greater the moral considerability, the higher the 
moral status; as Lori Gruen explains: ‘to say that a being deserves moral 
consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being has on those 
who can recognize such claims.  A morally considerable being is a being who 
can be wronged in a morally relevant sense’ (Gruen 2010).  On this definition 
there are two fundamental elements for a being to be considered morally 
considerable: (1) to have certain claims recognised (by those who can 
recognise) as worthy of moral consideration, and (2) to be able to be morally 
wronged.  Whilst many would argue that non-humans fulfil these criteria, and so 
are worthy of moral consideration, human moral claims are often prioritised over 
that of non-human animals.  This is often explained in terms of levels of moral 
status, with humans occupying a high (if not the highest) rung (see Chapter 10 
for an extended discussion of the role of moral status and human dignity).  One 
reason for this higher moral status is the fact that only humans can recognise 
and respond to these moral claims.  Yet, many others have pointed out that, 
even if a non-human animal cannot recognise or respond to a moral claim, they 
can still be morally wronged and we can recognise this fact.  As will be 
highlighted, sentience and, in particular, the capacity to feel pain has been 
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argued to be sufficient for moral considerability.  As is clear, the lines of moral 
considerability will be drawn differently, depending on the criteria that are 
invoked (be that sentience, the capacity to suffer, intelligence or autonomy).   
Human dignity is based on the premise that humans occupy a privileged 
position in the universe, yet notably over the last few decades, there have been 
growing calls for the circle of moral concern to be widened and the greater 
moral considerability of animals to be acknowledged.  Such calls are of 
particular significance as they have also ultimately challenged the foundations 
on which the unique status of humanity is said to rest.  If it can be demonstrated 
that animals too have a moral status or dignity that deserves attention, the 
purpose of a universal human dignity (to promote the elevated status of all 
humans) is seemingly made redundant.  Nevertheless, at present, to speak of 
animal or non-human dignity is often, at best, met with accusations of 
conceptual confusion and, at worse, ridicule.  Indeed the novel inclusion of the 
‘dignity of living beings’ within both the Swiss Constitution (1999) and the Swiss 
‘Gene Technology Act’ (The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation 
2004) has not been universally welcomed, especially by Swiss plant scientists 
who had to consequently consider the dignity of plants in their research (see 
Abbott 2008).   
However, neither conceptual confusion nor ridicule necessitates that an idea is 
wrong headed or mistaken.  As Martha Nussbaum makes clear, whilst defining 
what animal dignity is may be difficult (as it is with human dignity), knowing 
when animals are treated without dignity is immediately clear:  ‘We humans 
share a world and its scarce resources with other intelligent creatures...those 
creatures are capable of dignified existence.  It is difficult to know precisely what 
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that means, but it is clear what it does not mean: the conditions of the circus 
animals beaten and housed in filthy cramped cages, the even more horrific 
conditions endured by chickens, calves, and pigs raised for food in factory 
farming, and many other comparable conditions of deprivation, suffering, and 
indignity’ (Nussbaum 2006a).  For Nussbaum, animal dignity, as it is with her 
capabilities account of human dignity, is intertwined with the species-specific 
characteristics or functioning that are considered typical for that species, and 
the exercise of which is necessary for the creature’s flourishing. Consequently, 
to deny or restrict such flourishing is an indignity to the animal (Nussbaum 
2006b; 2004).  When an animal is not allowed to exercise those natural 
characteristics, for example a bird kept in a cage and unable to fly, it is said that 
the dignity of the animal is affronted, and is not a life worthy of (animal) dignity.  
Although, as noted by Lori Gruen, it is both difficult to identify what might be 
considered a natural or innate characteristic of an animal (as it is to do for a 
human), and even if we can, that does not necessarily mean that we should 
promote it, or think that it is of value or moral worth (Gruen 2011, 153-4). 
But, if animals do have a dignity, would this be the same kind of dignity as 
human dignity or something quite different?  Nussbaum, for instance, 
acknowledges that whilst it is a compelling idea, the concept of an ‘equal cross-
species dignity’ is far from certain (Nussbaum 2006b, 384).60 Furthermore, does 
this entitle them to an equivalent moral status to humans, or would this result in 
a Zero-Sum world, in which the promotion of one group comes at the cost of the 
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 See also Balzer et al. for an account that separates human and animal dignity, in which the 
former refers to the ‘moral right not to be humiliated’, whereas the latter is defined in terms of 
‘the inherent value of non-human living beings’ (Balzer et al. 2000, 25; 32).  In the first definition, 
dignity is discussed as a right, whereas in the second, it is identified as a value.  In contrast, 
responding to this article, both Dunja Jaber and Frans W. A. Brom in separate articles have 
insisted that animal dignity is not separate to human dignity.  For Jaber, for instance, both 
variations can be subsumed under the umbrella of ‘the dignity of living beings’ (Jaber 2000; see 
also Brom 2000). 
99 
 
demotion of another?  If we hold that human dignity denotes a special moral 
worth, then we might be inclined to conclude with the latter.  Indeed, Peter 
Singer seems to agree on similar lines when he writes that ‘...we may realize 
that in elevating our own species we are at the same time lowering the relative 
status of all other species’ (Singer 1995, 238-9).  We have already seen how 
this may play out amongst comparisons between the mentally disabled and the 
Great Apes (for example Anstötz 1993) and the growing calls for them to be 
considered to have, at least, an equivalent high moral status to severely 
cognitively disabled humans.  There is a distinct tension as to whether dignity is 
an exclusively human concept, or one that might have wider application, and a 
growing pressure for the animal kingdom, or at least some of it, to be included 
within the fold, as well as perhaps even future beings (be they human-animal 
chimeras or posthumans).  As is evident, how we draw the moral border would 
affect the kind of concept that dignity is.  
The idea of a universal dignity, whereby a much broader class of beings are 
said to enjoy this special status, has a certain appeal both on egalitarian 
grounds, as well as for simplicity’s sake.  But it also has significant conceptual 
difficulties, for example, dignity is often used as a shorthand for denoting special 
(moral) status.  Yet, as soon becomes apparent, the more one widens the net 
and increases the inclusivity of the term, the less the concept is able to fulfil its 
original purpose of conferring special status.  Nevertheless, it is clear that to 
bestow all life with dignity is to recommend that we treat all living beings with a 
minimal level of respect, although how this would play out in practice is far from 
clear.  It really depends on what kind of concept we want dignity to be.  Is it a 
concept to denote special moral privilege or status, or one that is to be rolled 
out universally (either amongst all humans or other living beings as well)?  This 
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tension was picked up by James Rachels, when he wrote that ‘...we are pulled 
in one way by the thought that we are kin to the animals, but we are pulled in a 
different direction by the conviction that, when all is said and done, we remain 
quite different from them’ (Rachels 1990, 173).  Dignity is, in essence, a status 
conferring device – to be the possessor of dignity is to be worthy of special 
consideration and value, and, consequently, it is important that we are able to 
justify why a given individual is entitled to it, whilst another is not. 
Yet it is notoriously difficult to identify what are the relevant differences which 
distinguish the privileging of human interests over the interests of non-human 
animals.  This difficultly becomes clear when we realize that we need to find a 
characteristic that all humans share, but no other animals.  For some, merely 
the fact of being a human being, of belonging to the species Homo sapiens, 
entitles one to a higher moral status.61  The justification should stop, it is 
argued, at this point: a human is entitled to a special respect because they are 
human, and although this is a clear case of circular reasoning, it is insisted that 
justification need go no further than this.  After all, unless we are to carry on ad 
infinitum, we must have to rest our justification somewhere.  However, for many 
others, this is an unsatisfactory way of answering the question.  To avoid 
promoting an unjustified prejudice, we must be able to give further reasons in 
support of the claim that humans deserve a unique status, be that due to 
rationality, language, or some other characteristic considered unique to 
humanity and deserving of a special dignity.   
As opposed to the species essentialism that we find right up to the time of 
Darwin, which posited that species are fixed and immutable, evolutionary theory 
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 Chapter 10 will examine in greater depth the extent to which dignity can be said to track or 
‘map onto’ the conceptual categories of personhood and moral status. 
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suggests that there are no sharp divides between species but only similarities 
and dissimilarities of degree, and not of kind.  If we are descended from 
common ancestors, then it would seem to follow that there are no absolute 
differences between species but instead a pool of shared characteristics – 
species boundaries are fluid, vague and changeable (see Ereshefsky 2010).  
Indeed, phenomena such as parallel evolution, and evolutionary mechanisms, 
including mutation, natural selection, genetic drift, and gene migration ensure 
that similar biological traits are often found shared across different species, 
rather than isolated to a single one.  Ironically, therefore, the increase in 
empirical information gathered about biodiversity and the mechanisms of 
evolution, has led to greater difficulty and uncertainty in our understanding of 
the nature of species.  As a result, as noted by Richards, there are currently 
‘multiple species concepts with little consensus about which is best, or even 
whether a single concept will ever be adequate’ (Richards 2008, 161).  Indeed, 
Richards notes that Darwin himself doubted whether there were such things as 
species essences, or even species at all, given that evolutionary change and 
speciation are gradual processes (and so there are no clear or obvious points 
with which to draw a distinct line between two species), often with the 
characteristics of one species seemingly to blend into another (Richards 2008, 
176).  As is clear, therefore, the term ‘species’ is a highly contested notion by 
both biologists and philosophers.  Whilst the fact that the usefulness of the 
concept of species is debated should not be reason enough to discard it from 
our moral deliberation (indeed all moral concepts, from justice to virtue or 
freedom, are highly contested), to attempt to base or demarcate a clear moral 
distinction between humans and other animals along purely species 
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membership, when these terms are so uncertain, appears to be on particularly 
shaky ground. 
Is human dignity likewise an outdated form of species essentialism?  In recent 
decades, there has been a growing body of literature which has questioned the 
justification behind the claim that only humans are entitled to special moral 
consideration, and challenged the wisdom of an ethical theory which elevates 
the status of an individual, merely because they belong to a certain species.  
The traditional idea of human dignity has come under fire for promoting and 
sustaining this sharp separation between human and non-human interests.  As 
Peter Singer, one of the most notable critics of the concept of human dignity, 
argues:  
Faced with a situation in which they saw a need for some basis for the 
moral gulf that is still commonly thought to separate human beings and 
animals, but unable to find any concrete difference between human 
beings and animals that would do this without undermining the equality of 
human beings, philosophers tended to waffle.  They resorted to high-
sounding phrases like “the intrinsic dignity of the human individual”.  
They talked of “the intrinsic worth of all men”...as if all men (humans?) 
had some unspecified worth that other beings do not have.  Or they 
would say that human beings, and only human beings, are “ends in 
themselves” while “everything other than a person can only have value 
for a person.”... To introduce ideas of dignity and worth as a substitute for 
other reasons for distinguishing humans and animals is not good 
enough.  Fine phrases are the last resource of those who have run out of 
arguments (Singer 1995, 238-9). 
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Singer’s challenge to the idea of human dignity is significant, and attacks the 
very heart of the matter.  To object to the idea that humans stand separate to all 
other animals is to attack the whole foundation on which human dignity rests 
upon, for if we cannot present a valid reason (over and above simply asserting 
that humans deserve special consideration because they are human) why there 
should be a sharp dividing line between all humans and other animals, then the 
use of ‘human dignity’ seems to be little more than a thinly veiled, unjustified 
prejudice.  However, as Bonnie Steinbock cautions, whilst ‘Singer is right to be 
sceptical of terms like ‘intrinsic dignity’ and ‘intrinsic worth’.  These phrases are 
no substitute for a moral argument.  But they may point to one’ (Steinbock 1978, 
252).  
What is Speciesism? 
 
The term speciesism was first coined by the writer, psychologist and animal 
activist Richard D. Ryder in the 1970s to describe the unjustified bias, as he 
saw it, of human interests at the expense of the interests of other animals.  For 
Ryder, speciesism was a logical extension of the reaction against other 
prejudices, including racism and sexism, that the liberation movements of the 
era were rallying against – as he recounted: ‘The 1960s revolution against 
racism, sexism and classism nearly missed out the animals. This worried me.  
Ethics and politics at the time simply overlooked the non-humans entirely.  
Everyone seems to be just preoccupied with reducing the prejudices against 
humans...We needed to draw the parallel between the plight of the other 
species and our own' (Ryder 2010, 1).  In Animals, Men and Morals (1971), an 
edited collection which grew out of the so-called Oxford Group (a small group of 
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intellectuals in favour of animal rights and liberation), he developed his position 
further by stating that:  
In as much as both "race" and "species" are vague terms used in the 
classification of living creatures according, largely, to physical 
appearance, an analogy can be made between them. Discrimination on 
grounds of race, although most universally condoned two centuries ago, 
is now widely condemned. Similarly, it may come to pass that 
enlightened minds may one day abhor "speciesism" as much as they 
now detest "racism". The illogicality in both forms of prejudice is of an 
identical sort. If it is accepted as morally wrong to deliberately inflict 
suffering upon innocent human creatures, then it is only logical to also 
regard it as wrong to inflict suffering on innocent individuals of other 
species (as cited in Godlovitch et al. 1972, 81). 
The concept was soon adopted by Peter Singer, who popularised the term in 
his formative work Animal Liberation (1975), and which, like Ryder’s account, 
linked the capacity to suffer with the principle of equality.  Singer set out his 
definition of the term as follows: 
S1 Speciesism...is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of 
members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species 
(Singer 1995, 6). 
On this account it is not difficult to see why human dignity is considered by 
Singer to be speciesist, for the idea of human dignity is in essence a bias or 
prejudice in favour of the species Homo sapiens.  Of course, a bias or prejudice 
is not necessarily an incorrect belief.  One may have a preconceived idea, say 
about the character of a person, without it turning out to be false.  But the entire 
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debate hinges on whether it is a justified or warranted bias.  For Singer, it is 
speciesist behaviour specifically when we prioritise the interests of our own 
species’ interests over that of other species’ interests for arbitrary reasons.  If it 
is wrong to allow a sentient human to needlessly suffer, then unless we’re 
speciesist, it is also wrong to allow a sentient animal to suffer needlessly.  Like 
its suggested analogies with both sexism and racism, speciesism treats what 
are considered equivalent cases in disparate ways because of arbitrary reasons 
(be that the colour of skin, gender, or species membership). On this account, it 
is an unjustified prejudice to promote the interests of a human being over that of 
a chimpanzee, rat or dog merely because of their species membership.  We 
must, at the least, provide further reasons why one should receive preferential 
treatment over another.  
Despite (or perhaps because of) its seeming simplicity this initial definition has 
been broken down further within the literature to clarify the position.  In 
particular, speciesism has commonly been separated into two further sets of 
distinctions, which can be labelled as: (1) Radical and Mild speciesism, and (2) 
Qualified and Unqualified speciesism.  The first set deals with the role of 
interests or preferences of the individual, the second set is concerned with the 
justification itself:   
S2  Radical speciesism: All, or at least most, relatively trivial interests of 
humans take priority over the interests of non-humans.   
S3  Mild speciesism: Some non-human interests take priority over human 
interests (including non-trivial human interests).   
In the case of radical speciesism, it follows that it is okay to allow the painful 
suffering of an animal, if it would satisfy or address a trivial human interest.  It is 
106 
 
not always clear what is meant by trivial, but taken at its most extreme, it would 
seem to imply that any human preference should be taken into account before 
that of any animal’s interests.  In contrast, mild speciesism allows some types of 
animal interest to override human interests; for example, an animal’s suffering 
would take precedent over a more trivial human interest.  As is clear, the latter 
is generally considered to be a more plausible position than the former: When 
the choice is between a relatively trivial human interest and a more substantial 
interest of a non-human, we may side with the non-human.  Nevertheless, in the 
case of the production of food or cosmetics, and some medical experimentation, 
it is apparent that we often adopt a form closer to that of radical speciesism. 
The same distinction was offered by Mary Midgley in her book Animals and 
Why They Matter (1984), in which she distinguished between ‘absolute 
dismissal’ from ‘relative dismissal’.  In the former,  animal interests count for 
nothing, whereas, in the latter, animal interests may be taken into consideration, 
so long as any (or most) human interests are addressed first.   As she outlines: 
‘Humanitarians occupied with human problems do not usually dismiss animal 
claims as just nonsensical, like claims on behalf of stones.  Instead, they merely 
give them a very low priority.  The suggestion is now that animals, since they 
are conscious, are entitled to some consideration, but must come at the end of 
the queue, after all human needs have been met. I shall call this idea relative 
dismissal or low priority, to distinguish it from absolute dismissal’ (Midgley 1984, 
13).  Whilst both accounts are speciest, as they ensure that any significant 
human interests are addressed first, the milder form concedes that animals can, 
and do, have interests.  These interests just have a lower priority to human 
interests.   
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In regards to Unqualified and Qualified speciesism, these can be defined as: 
S4  Unqualified speciesism: species membership itself is morally relevant. 
S5  Qualified speciesism: species membership by itself is not morally 
relevant, but is correlated or associated with other characteristics which are. 
In the case of justifying the reason why we do not experiment on humans, for 
instance, an unqualified speciest account would argue that we should not 
because they are human.  We do not need any further reasons, other than this 
fact, to justify not experimenting on other humans.  The biological taxonomic 
category of ‘species’ is said then to also be a moral category. 
This position has been widely challenged on the often cited Humean problem of 
deriving an Ought from an Is: One cannot derive a normative or moral premise 
from a statement of fact, although, of course, it may still give a good reason why 
one ought to do it.  The biological fact of species membership is said, therefore, 
to be morally neutral: ‘To say we are humans (rather than dogs or ducks) is just 
to say that we [are] members of “[a] group or population of animals potentially 
capable of interbreeding”.  But a bare biological divide cannot be morally 
relevant.  That is exactly why racism and sexism are morally indefensible: they 
assume a mere biological divide marks an important moral divide’ (LaFollette 
and Shanks 1996, 43).  This view is shared by Jeff McMahan who rejects the 
species membership argument because, ‘...“species” is a purely biological 
category and that because the biological properties essential for membership in 
the human species – for example, a distinctive genome or the capacity for 
interbreeding with other human beings – are not themselves morally significant, 
the fact that all human beings are related by virtue of sharing these properties is 
also not morally significant’ (McMahan 2005, 362). 
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A qualified species account, in contrast, seeks to find differences in 
characteristic between humans and non-human animals that are considered to 
be morally relevant. Whilst the mere fact that an individual is of the species 
Homo sapiens may not be reason enough, a qualified speciesist approach 
would argue that it is wrong to experiment on humans because of a property, or 
collection of properties, that humans possess but other animals do not, such as 
highly developed cognitive faculties or the ability for autonomy.  Whilst racism 
and sexism are unjustified prejudices because they rest on morally irrelevant 
characteristics (skin colour or being female), a defender of qualified speciesism 
would argue that being human does carry with it certain important moral 
characteristics. As was demonstrated in the first section, many writers have 
pointed to the clear gulf that separates many humans from other animals – 
namely, in regards to the faculties of autonomy, reason, emotion, creativity, 
abstract thought, critical reasoning, and so on and so forth.  Speciesism, at 
least in its milder form, is considered a justified prejudice. 
Whilst this does not account for all the possible variations that speciesism can 
adopt, figure 1 summarises the four main positions that speciesism often does 
take: 
 
  Qualified Unqualified 
Radical RQ RU 
Mild MQ MU 
 
Figure 1.1 Summary of the four most common speciesist positions 
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The second figure below orders these four positions in order of the severity of 
their preference for human interests over that of animal interests.  As can be 
noted, it is clear that RU is the most extreme form of speciesism, as all human 
interests, regardless of significance, are given priority over non-human interests 
merely because of species membership.  In contrast, the position presented by 
MQ appears the mildest as it recognises that some non-human interests should 
be given priority over human interests.  Moreover, the justification given is not 
because of mere species membership but because of further characteristics 
that are seen to be unique to being human.  Furthermore, MQ would seem to be 
a plausible position for those who wish to defend the view that humans deserve 
special moral consideration, but still accept that non-human animals have 
interests that deserve consideration. 
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Figure 1.2. Rankings of the degree of severity of the most common speciesist 
positions. 
 
Where, we might ask, does human dignity fit into this continuum?  It cannot side 
up to either RU or MU because no reason other than species membership is 
needed to justify our special position.  If we are to defend human dignity, then 
perhaps it would be wise to pursue a course which attempts to align human 
dignity with a position similar to MQ.  However, the difficulty with this account 
arises when we try to make the move from claiming that some humans have 
morally relevant characteristics, to the conclusion that, therefore, all humans 
should be treated as if they had a moral status over and above that of all other 
animals.  Indeed, for some philosophers, including James Rachels and Jeff 
McMahan, the premise that some individuals have morally relevant 
characteristics should instead lead to a morally individualistic position, whereby 
only the individuals with the relevant faculties should be considered to have a 
Radical Unqualified (RU) – All, or at least most, trivial interests of humans take 
priority over the interests of non-humans because being human is itself morally 
relevant. 
Radical Qualified (RQ) – All, or at least most, trivial interests of humans take 
priority over the interests of non-humans because being human is correlated or 
associated with other characteristics which are considered morally relevant. 
Mild Unqualified (MU) – Some non-human interests take priority over human 
interests because being human is itself morally relevant. 
Mild Qualified (MQ) – Some non-human interests take priority over human 
interests because being human is correlated or associated with other 
characteristics which are morally relevant. 
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high moral status (McMahan 2005; Rachels 1990).  This would, therefore, not 
be a speciesist account, but one based on an individual’s capacities.62 
Indeed, the most pressing problem for the Mild Qualified Speciesism (MQ) 
account is to defend it against the problems thrown up by so-called ‘marginal 
cases’.  Whilst many human beings possess these supposed status conferring 
capacities, there are many others that do not.  Some of these individuals, such 
as foetuses or infants, do not currently have status conferring capabilities 
(rationality or autonomy, for instance), but most likely have the capacity to 
develop them.  Others, by contrast, such as the profoundly mentally disabled 
neither have the requisite faculties now, or the future capacity to develop them.  
Still others, such as those suffering from dementia, may have previously had 
the requisite faculties but unfortunately no longer do.   Moreover, as is pointed 
out with growing frequency, there are certain non-human animals, especially 
primates, cetaceans, elephants, dogs, cats, and rodents, as well as other 
vertebrates, such as birds (especially the Corvidae family, which includes rooks, 
magpies, jays, and crows), that possess a level of intelligence at least 
equivalent to some humans (see for example Pepperberg 1999). 
Marginal Cases 
 
Evelyn B. Pluhar outlines a common problem for those who wish to elevate the 
status of those humans who do not have the required status conferring 
capacities (for example a severely mentally handicapped child), over and above 
those non-human animals who already do (for instance, a healthy adult 
chimpanzee): 
                                                          
62
 One may argue that this position (which we can label as ‘personism’) could itself also be an 
example of an unjustified bias similar to speciesism, sexism or racism, whereby the focus is not 
on the individual, but on a group which have certain properties in common, which in this case 
are capacities relevant for personhood. 
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1. Beings who are similar in all important morally relevant respects are 
equally morally significant. 
2. Nonhumans exist who are similar in all important morally relevant 
respects to “marginal” humans (i.e., to the very young and to those 
humans who will never achieve full personhood). 
3. Therefore, those nonhumans who are similar in all important morally 
relevant respects to marginal humans are maximally morally significant if 
and only if marginal humans are maximally morally significant (Pluhar 
1995, 124). 
The argument goes that, if we are to be consistent and treat like cases alike, 
then two individuals who do not differ in the morally relevant respects, should be 
accorded the same moral status.  What we do to one side, for moral 
consistency, we should do to the other.  Therefore, when a non-human’s 
morally important characteristics (say intelligence or autonomy) are equal to 
that of a human, we have two options: (1) We raise the moral status of the non-
human animal to that of the human (2) We lower the moral status of the human 
to that of the non-human.  If a chimpanzee is said to have as much cognitive 
ability as a human child, then for moral consistency, we should be willing to 
accord the chimpanzee the same moral status.  To treat both cases dissimilarly 
when all the morally relevant aspects are the same is said to be speciesist.   As 
David DeGrazia explains, in regards to the hard case presented by medical 
research: ‘If we may harm animals in this way, then either (1) we may likewise 
harm humans who are similar to animals in relevant ways, or (2) we must 
explain why no humans are similar in relevant ways to the animals we are 
justified in harming’ (DeGrazia 1991, 59).  Whilst proponents of the argument 
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from marginal cases have tended to use it to widen the circle of moral concern, 
and promote the interests of those who fall outside the species boundary, as is 
clear, it can also be used to shut out those humans who are the most 
vulnerable, and in need of protection (as we have seen in Giubilini and Minerva 
2012). 
A common solution to this problem is the so-called species norm account.  On 
this view, all human beings, regardless of individual capacities, have a higher 
moral status than other animals because of certain status conferring 
characteristics (for example intelligence, autonomy or moral reasoning) which 
are said to be typical or representative of that species.  The issue, in Carl 
Cohen’s words, ‘is one of kind’ (Cohen 1986, 866).  As Jeff McMahan explains: 
The way the nature-of-the-kind [species norm] argument is usually 
presented is that certain recognizably morally significant properties are 
identified and asserted to be in the nature of the species – not in the 
sense of being necessarily present in all members but only in the sense 
of being present in or characteristic of normal or paradigm members.  
Those individuals who lack the recognizably significant properties but are 
nevertheless members of the species because they possess the 
properties that are essential to membership are then said to have the 
same status as those who actually possess the recognizably significant 
properties (McMahan 2005, 357). 
The basic idea is that moral status is not determined by individual ability but by 
what is normal for the species.  Species membership, therefore, acts as the 
deciding factor as to whether an individual should be accorded moral 
considerability.  The superior intelligence, language ability, capacity to act 
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autonomously and make and act on moral imperatives (amongst other things), 
that is typical of many humans, is said to accord the entire species a privileged 
status.  However, the same objection that met unqualified speciesism is raised 
again in this case.  Species is said to be a purely biological taxonomy and, 
therefore, not suitable for immediate extrapolation to the moral sphere.  To draw 
boundaries of moral consideration by it is to act unjustly to those other animals 
which meet or exceed the requirements for moral considerability in every other 
respect. 
Equal Consideration, Equal Treatment, and the Relevance of Suffering 
 
The argument from marginal cases rests on the premise that we should treat 
like cases alike, and give both equal consideration.  If we do not, then a 
proponent of the argument from marginal cases will claim that we are acting 
from an unjustified bias or prejudice.  In short, that we are acting unethically.  
Indeed, the idea of equal consideration or ‘universability’ is often thought to be a 
foundational concept or formal requirement of correct ethical thinking.  To have 
an unjustified bias in favour of one individual over another, to favour those with 
blue eyes over those with brown, is an example of unethical treatment.  A 
principle is often said to become a moral principle if one can universalise it: 
‘Morality requires that we treat like cases alike’ (LaFollette and Shanks 1996, 
42).63  For the critics of speciesism this is a requirement that we should also 
extend to species other than our own (Singer 1995, 6-7). 
                                                          
63
 Although ultimately perhaps this principle does not tell us much because there is always 
some difference, so we need to assume some agreement about which properties are morally 
relevant and which not. One can always insist that two cases are not alike because “she is not 
one of us”, and so it is not obvious whether or not one belongs to a certain group, and if that is 
morally relevant. 
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However, we must be careful to distinguish between equal consideration from 
equal treatment.  Whilst we should strive to give similar cases equal 
consideration, this does not imply that we need give both cases equal treatment 
(Singer 1995, 2).  There are many cases, from the right to vote to dietary 
requirement, where the equal treatment of individuals would be inappropriate.  
The needs of each species, as well as individuals within each species, are 
multitude, and dependent on the nature of the individual in question.  The 
principle of equal consideration does not necessarily also entail equal 
treatment, but may in fact demand quite different treatment. 
So far we have only explored the destructive side of the anti-speciesists’ 
argument.  What, if species from an ethical point of view is not relevant, should 
be considered to take its place?  One of the most basic, and universal criteria 
suggested for moral considerability is sentience and, in particular, the ability to 
suffer and feel pain.  Pain links us closely to our own animal nature, as well as 
providing a cross-species criteria for moral considerability.  As Singer explains: 
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take 
that suffering into consideration.  No matter what the nature of the being, 
the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with 
the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons can be made—of any 
other being.  If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing 
enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.  So 
the limit of sentience [i.e. the capacity to suffer and experience 
pleasure]...is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of 
others.  To mark this boundary by some other characteristic like 
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intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary manner 
(Singer 1995, 8-9). 
For Singer, following the work of Jeremy Bentham,64 the boundary of moral 
concern lies squarely on the ability to suffer and so the issue of pain 
necessitates that we consider all like cases alike.  As Singer elaborates: ‘...if we 
consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on a baby for no good reason then we 
must, unless we are speciesists, consider it equally wrong to inflict the same 
amount of pain on a horse for no good reason’ (Singer 1995, 15).  This is in fact 
quite a radical claim, for it demands that we take the interests of non-humans in 
not suffering as seriously as we do that of humans.  Moreover, as highlighted by 
David DeGrazia, in the case where there is an equal degree and duration of 
suffering between a human and a mouse ‘their suffering has the same moral 
weight’ (DeGrazia 1991, 51).  Animals and humans then both have moral 
considerability because they can feel pain and suffer.  Rationality or cognitive 
intelligence on this view is not the basis of being morally considerable, but 
consciousness,65 or more specifically the capacity to suffer.  This applies to all 
beings, so long as they have an interest in not suffering.  It follows, therefore, 
                                                          
64
 ‘The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which 
never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have 
already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be 
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be 
recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, 
are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is 
it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for 
discourse?...the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ 
(Bentham 1781). 
65
 As Mary Midgley explains: ‘A conscious being is one which can mind what happens to it, 
which prefers some things to others, which can be pleased or pained, can suffer or enjoy.  
Singer uses the word interest to sum up this range of capacities.  This seems natural enough, 
but if the word is thought unsuitable, others can be substituted’ (Midgley 1984, 92). 
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that any individuals who lack the capacity to suffer need not morally be taken 
into account.66 
But why, according to Singer, is marking the boundary of moral concern via 
rationality or intelligence arbitrary, whilst not with pain?  One answer is that 
whilst intelligence, the aptitude for mathematics, or use of syntax67 does have 
relevance, for instance, in regards to university admission, it has no bearing on 
an individual’s ability to suffer and experience pain (in so far as intelligence 
does not determine the extent of pain felt).  As both animals and humans feel 
pain, and have the same desire to avoid it; appeals to the higher faculties in this 
respect are irrelevant.  Furthermore, intelligence ranges wildly between 
individuals, including humans, whereas the ability to suffer does not.  Indeed, 
we do not think that a highly intelligent human deserves to have their interests, 
especially their interest in not suffering, taken into consideration before that of 
an individual with average intelligence.   
In contrast, Bonnie Steinbock has suggested that, ‘...what entitles us human 
beings to a privileged position in the moral community is a certain minimal level 
of intelligence, which is a prerequisite for morally relevant capacities’.  Whilst 
Steinbock acknowledges that ‘we would reject a hierarchical society based on 
degree of intelligence’, she argues that this does not rule out the possibility that 
                                                          
66
 Christine Korsgaard, a contemporary Kantian, also acknowledges the significance of pain in 
deciding moral considerability: ‘When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are 
perceiving a reason. An animal's cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a 
reason to change its conditions. And you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise 
than you can the words of a person. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way 
another person can…So of course we have obligations to animals’ (Korsgaard 1996, 153). 
67
 Richard Sorabji is particularly critical of proponents of the moral relevance of language use: ‘It 
all sounded rather grand, when Aristotle said that we have reason and they don't.  But under 
pressure, the Stoics retreated to the position that at least they don't have syntax.  The moral 
conclusion was meant to be 'They don't have a syntax, so we can eat them.'  My 
embarrassment increased when I noticed that the modern debate, among the followers of 
Chomsky and critics of the language abilities of chimpanzees, had reached exactly the same 
point.  It has become crucial whether animals have syntax.  This, of course, is a question of 
great scientific interest, but of no moral relevance whatsoever...' (Sorabji 1993, 1-2). 
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‘a minimal level of intelligence’ could still be used as a ‘cut-off point’ in order to 
justify giving greater consideration to the interests of those beings which meet 
this standard (Steinbock 1978, 254).  The difficulty is deciding upon what this 
minimal level is.  Moreover, such a principle would be self-defeating for those 
who wish to promote the interests of humans, as a minimum level criteria of 
intelligence would lead some humans’ interest in not suffering to come second 
to that of more intelligent animals.   
However, if we are not considering a case of pain or suffering, but of killing, 
then should we still give equal weight to both agents’ interests?  Singer himself 
differentiates between inflicting suffering and causing death, believing the latter 
to be more ‘complicated’ (Singer 1995, 17).  For Singer, there are certain 
intrinsic capacities which entail that certain lives are more valuable than others, 
it is, for example, ‘...worse to kill a normal adult human, with a capacity for self-
awareness and the ability to plan for the future and have meaningful relations 
with others, than it is to kill a mouse, which presumably does not share all of 
these characteristics’ (Singer 1995, 19).68  The individuals with the more 
‘valuable’ lives should, for Singer, be given priority in their interest in not dying 
(see also DeGrazia 1996; Rachels 1990, 186-194).  The basic point seems to 
be that characteristics such as self-consciousness, the capacity to project 
interests into the future, and to have meaningful relationships etc., are all 
relevant in the case of killing, but not so in the case of pain or suffering.  
                                                          
68
 Indeed, Singer makes a sharp distinction between the relevant traits in regards to suffering, 
and in regards to taking away life: ‘Whilst self-awareness, the capacity to think ahead and have 
hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity for meaningful relations with others and so on 
are not relevant to the question on inflicting pain—since pain is pain, whatever other capacities, 
beyond the capacity to feel pain, the being may have—these capacities are relevant to the 
question of taking life. It is not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of 
abstract thought, of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication, and so on, is 
more valuable than the life of a being without these capacities’ (Singer 1995, 20). 
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Therefore, whilst in the case of killing not all lives are of equal worth or value, 
they are in the case of pain and suffering.69 
However, if this is the case, it is not clear why those individuals with more 
valuable lives (i.e. those individuals with certain intrinsic capacities) should not 
also have their interests in not suffering given priority, as it is in the case of 
killing.  Indeed, if the value of life is determined by certain individual 
characteristics, why not also in the case of suffering?  Death is, after all, closely 
linked with suffering, often right up to the moment of death.  Moreover, pain, 
especially long term chronic pain, can disrupt many of the characteristics that 
Singer singles out as morally worthy, such as aspirations and planning for the 
future or enjoying meaningful relationships.  Whilst the interests that a mouse 
has in not suffering may certainly be the same as that of a human, when a 
human suffers there may also be additional interests that are thwarted, interests 
which a mouse could not have.  It is for this reason that Rachels argues that: ‘if 
the interests are comparable—say, if the choice is between causing the same 
amount of pain for a human or for a non-human—we should give preference to 
the human’s welfare’ (Rachels 1990, 182).  Of course, importantly, this point 
does not demonstrate that all humans have a greater interest in not suffering, 
but only those who have the requisite faculties. 
Species Loyalty and Social Bondedness 
 
Despite the best efforts of its critics, for many the intuitive belief remains that 
membership in a particular species, and the human species in particular, does 
count morally.  This by itself does not justify the premise, but it may suggest that 
there are other reasons why people believe it to be so.  As was shown, the 
                                                          
69
 Which arguably is just as much of an arbitrary claim, which perhaps shows that, in his heart, 
Singer remains a speciesist. 
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argument from marginal cases assumes that species membership is irrelevant 
to moral considerability, but is rather based on the explicit premise that we can 
compare the intrinsic properties (for example intelligence or the ability to feel 
pain) between individuals.  However, if we put to one side the focus on intrinsic 
properties between individuals (and so the arguments favoured by Singer, 
Rachels and McMahan, amongst others), and instead look to the relational ties 
that transcend individual characteristics and abilities, we have a possible way 
out from the problem thrown up by the argument from marginal cases.  As 
Elizabeth Anderson argues, ‘principles of justice cannot be derived simply from 
a consideration of the intrinsic capacities of moral patients.  Their shape also 
depends on the nature of moral agents, the natural and social relations they do 
and can have with moral patients, and the social meanings such relations have’ 
(Anderson 2004, 280).   
The proponents of the relational or social bondedness model of moral 
considerability argue that species presents a special loyalty between our fellow 
humans, with all the different obligations and responsibilities that this entails.  
This loyalty is not based on the intrinsic abilities of each individual, but rather 
the complex and interwoven nature of our social relationships, which are largely 
dictated by our species membership.  The appropriate analogy for species 
membership is not then with racism, nationalism or sexism, but with the family 
(see Kittay 2005 124, 151-2; Midgley 1984, 104-5). On this view, humankind is, 
by all intents and purpose, a large family.  In the same way that a parent would 
not be criticised for prioritising some of the needs and interests of their own 
children (regardless of the child’s intrinsic properties) so we have a special 
moral obligation to prioritise the needs and interests of another human over that 
of a non-human.  In this way, species loyalty is more of an emotional, rather 
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than a rational preference for our own species.  Moreover, it is a preference 
which, unlike racism or sexism, its proponents claim is not only justified but 
often morally required.   
There is certainly some sense in this view, as we do not always rely on an 
individual’s intrinsic properties when we determine their moral considerability.  
We rely on the care and support of our families, friends as well as strangers 
throughout our lives, from our childhood to when we are old, ill or infirm.  If we 
determined an individual’s moral considerability purely on the basis of their 
faculties of cognition, for instance, than we would not bother to take into 
account the interests of those with dementia, the mentally handicapped or the 
very young.  As highlighted by Stephen Mulhall:  
We do not strive (when we do strive) to treat human infants and children, 
the senile and the severely disabled as fully human because we 
mistakenly attribute capacities to them that they lack, or because we are 
blind to the merely biological significance of a species boundary.  We do 
it (when we do) because they are fellow human beings, embodied 
creatures who will come to share, or have already shared, in our 
common life, or whose inability to do so is a result of the shocks and ills 
to which all human flesh and blood is heir – because there but for the 
grace of God go I (Mulhall 2002, 18).  
An individual’s membership in the human species necessitates that they give 
special moral consideration to other members in that group, regardless of 
individual characteristics or abilities.  It also demands that perhaps they should 
look more favourably on a human with either comparable or a lower level of 
intrinsic properties than that possessed by a non-human, because they are part 
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of what Mulhall refers to as ‘our common life’.  McMahan is critical of this point, 
arguing that the radically cognitively impaired, for instance, cannot consciously 
partake in this common life anymore than animals can (McMahan 2005, 363).70 
However, this seems to entirely miss the point, for it does not matter if they 
cannot actually know or understand that they share in this common life, the 
point is that they are recognised by their fellow humans as part of this common 
humanity, with all the complex social and emotional practices and meaning that 
comes with it.  Indeed, as Eva Kitty points out, a social relation ‘...need not be 
dependent on ongoing interpersonal relationships between conscious 
individuals.  A parent who has died and with whom one can no longer have any 
interchange still stands in the social relation of parent to us, calling forth 
emotions and moral attitudes that are appropriate or inappropriate’ (Kittay 2005, 
111).  It is immaterial that the deceased parent, disabled child or elderly relative 
with dementia cannot actively participate in this common life for it to have a 
special, very human, significance. 
Rather than treating cases in isolation, the relational approach looks at both our 
social and emotional nature, and so has the advantage of addressing moral 
issues closer to how they are often found.  We do not, as a general rule, judge a 
moral case in complete isolation from its context, but rather appreciate the 
complexity of the social situation that it is located in.  Of course, for some, 
dealing with the complexities and nuances of our social and emotional lives is 
precisely the disadvantage of such an approach, as it muddies the moral 
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 As McMahan reasons: ‘...the obvious reply that the forms of common life they describe do not 
include the radically cognitively impaired.  Those human beings do not, and cannot, share our 
language, culture, ways of knowing, and so on, any more than animals can.  If, therefore, “to 
see another as a human being is to see her as a fellow-creature” who shares our common life, it 
follows that we cannot see the radically cognitively impaired as human beings.  But since we do 
see them as human beings, it is false that we recognize as human beings only those who share 
in our common life’ (McMahan 2005, 363).  
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waters.  As Lori Gruen argues, ‘...partiality to family looks more like a contingent 
feature of our social relations and not a principle for organizing our ethical 
obligations’ (Gruen 2011, 71).  A comparison of people on individual merits (be 
that intelligence, autonomy or whatever) is clearer cut and easier to judge.  
Nevertheless, whilst it may often be easier to judge in principle, it may not in 
practice.  If the situations we find in reality are complex, then it seems to be 
wise to acknowledge this as we work towards ‘organizing our ethical 
obligations’. 
A further criticism levied against this position falls back to the distinction 
between is and ought; just because a tendency exists for humans to favour their 
own kind, it does not follow that morality should promote or encourage it.  
Indeed, if there are many natural impulses (be they sexual, violent etc.) that we 
actively condemn, why then should we promote species loyalty?  If we roundly 
condemn both racism and sexism, which are also natural groupings, then why 
should speciesism be saved?  In response, it may be argued that if we can 
successfully defend the moral importance of giving special focus to our own 
families, then it is clear that, at the least, some social bonds may be morally 
justified.71 If a preference for our own species is acceptable within limits, what 
are those limits?  McMahan argues that species is not like the close, personal 
ties of the ‘parent—child relation’ but instead ‘like co-membership in a racial 
group in being a purely biological relation: a matter of genealogy, genetics, or 
capacity for interbreeding’, it is he contends, therefore, ‘hard to see how this 
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 Mark Bernstein takes a similar approach when he argues that, ‘I believe that we can account 
for the powerful moral intuition that family membership does carry legitimate influence in 
decision-making without discarding the view that loyalty appeals, in and of themselves, are 
instances of prejudice which should not have moral force.  The key to resolving this paradoxical 
situation is the realization that family membership incurs a presumption of indebtedness based 
on the customary social roles absorbed by the family’s members.  So, for example, John being 
the father of Jack presupposes that John acts kindly, generously, and lovingly toward Jack.  
That is, our society assumes that John has Jack’s best interests in heart and mind, and that 
John acts in ways he takes to be consonant with that belief’ (Bernstein 1991, 56). 
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could be intrinsically significant’ (McMahan 2005, 360-1).  Certainly there is little 
to dispute that species is treated as a biological category, albeit a contentious 
one.  Yet, it seems unlikely that species membership can be nothing more than 
a biological category; indeed, contrary to McMahan’s contention, other 
biological categories, including gender and race, also have a rich cultural 
heritage.  They are far from mere biological relations.  There are certainly 
countless instances when Man has shown his fellow Man extreme callousness, 
inhumanity and indifference (see for example Glover 1999), but of course there 
are countless other instances where we have witnessed extraordinary acts of 
benevolence and altruism.  To say that species loyalty cannot be close or 
personal seems to fly in the face of common experience. 
As is clear, it is in the relational account of moral considerability that we find one 
of the most promising voices for promoting the idea of a dignity for all humans.  
Building on the idea presented by Martha Nussbaum that humans possess a 
form of dignity that links to their ‘animal bodies’, as opposed to their rationality, 
Elizabeth Anderson writes:  
For humans have this “animal” dignity of the body even if they lack 
reason and self-understanding.  Even a profoundly demented 
Alzheimer’s patient, unable anymore to recognize herself or others, or to 
care about or for herself, has a dignity that demands that others care for 
her body.  It is an indignity to her if she is not properly toileted and 
decently dressed in clean clothes, her hair combed, her face and nose 
wiped, and so forth...They are, more fundamentally, matters of making 
the body fit for human society, for presentation to others.  Human beings 
need to live with other humans, but cannot do so if those others cannot 
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relate to them as human.  And this specifically human relationship 
requires that the human body by dignified, protected from the realm of 
disgust, and placed in a cultural space of decency (Anderson 2004, 282). 
We live in a complex world or ‘cultural space’ of meaning and Anderson argues 
that our morality should acknowledge and reflect this.  It is from this social world 
that the idea of human dignity springs.  For her, our dignity is intrinsically linked 
with our membership to the human species, and importantly independent of our 
intrinsic capacities.   
A similar point is made by David Luban when he writes that, ‘human dignity is 
not a metaphysical property of individual human beings, but rather a property of 
relations between human beings – between, so to speak, the dignifier and the 
dignified’ (Luban 2009, 214).  On this view, rather than being an intrinsic 
property, dignity arises from the active involvement between individuals, 
between what Luban refers to as the ‘dignifier’ and the ‘dignified’.  As is clear, in 
such a relationship, it is possible for a severely cognitively disabled human to 
have as much dignity as that of a typical functioning adult.  It is at this point that 
perhaps human dignity can act as a device to solve the impasse of the problem 
created by marginal cases: for if we wish to retain the idea of a dignity for all 
humans, then we may have to look for dignity-grounding capacities beyond the 
traditional areas of intelligence, autonomy and the like.  For those who do not 
meet the criteria for full moral status – such as the severely cognitively disabled 
– human dignity may act as a device to include them in the sphere of moral 
concern, whilst keeping out other animals who might have more developed 
faculties.  
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Anderson is clear that this system of meaning is purely a human system, in 
which ‘there is no way to place animals on an equal footing in this system of 
meanings’ (Anderson 2004, 282).  All humans, therefore, rank higher than any 
other animal.  On this view, then, there seem to be no absolute criteria for moral 
considerability, but instead it is largely dependent on what an individual’s social 
relations are with other humans.  Moral considerability and human dignity are 
both, therefore, subjective and culturally determined.72 Anderson proposes, 
therefore, that any sense of dignity that an animal might possess is entirely 
dependent on its relationship with human society.  As she explains:  
An animal’s interest in its dignity exists only in relation to human beings.  
The dignity of an animal, whether human or nonhuman, is what is 
required to make it decent for human society, for the particular, species-
specific ways in which humans relate to them...They do not flow 
immediately from a creature’s capacities, but make sure only within a 
complex system of social relations and meanings (Anderson 2004, 283). 
It is of course true that many animals do share in our common life, often in a 
profound, meaningful way.  The relationship between Man and dog can range 
from mere utility, in the case of a guard dog, to the deep emotional attachment 
towards a family pet, or the complete dependence upon a guide dog.  A 
common point is often made between the different emotional attachments that a 
research scientist may hold between animals that are experimented on at work, 
compared to the ones kept as pets, and so part of the family unit (Phillips 1994).   
Therefore, perhaps moral considerability does not have to run strictly down 
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 As Anderson explains: ‘...there is no single criterion of moral considerability, and that what 
rights should be extended to a creature depend not only on its individual intrinsic capacities, but 
on its species nature, its natural and social relations to the moral agents to whom rights claims 
are addressed, and the social and historical background conditions applicable to the moral 
agents themselves.  Different rights emerge in different social contexts’ (Anderson 2004, 290). 
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species lines, but along the more nuanced line of our social or common life.  
Although of course this is still a ‘speciesist’ account, as ultimately an individual’s 
moral considerability rests on its relationship with other humans. 
The difficulty, as Lori Gruen highlights, is that if ‘bonds of kinship extend beyond 
the species border, in our own culture and in others.  If other animals can be 
part of families, then the family does not serve as a model for identifying morally 
relevant distinctions between species’ (Gruen 2011, 72).  Whilst we can extend 
our definition of ‘family’ to include any beings who have a special significance, 
in the process, we also challenge the original point of using the analogy of the 
family unit: to demonstrate the moral considerability of all humans over and 
above that of all other animals.  If animals are allowed into the sphere of the 
family as well, then it seems the original analogy for why all humans deserve a 
privileged status collapses.   
A further problem for Anderson’s contention that any sense of animal dignity is 
entirely dependent on its relationship with human society is that, as mentioned 
at the beginning of this discussion, there are innumerable instances when an 
animal’s relationship with a human would be commonly said to diminish their 
dignity – from being used as a source of entertainment in a circus, to being 
abused, kept in cramped conditions, and so on.  Animals often require specific 
treatment that humans cannot provide, and to claim that an animal’s dignity can 
only arise within this context would appear to be a gross example of misplaced 
anthropomorphism.   
As we have seen, Martha Nussbaum offers quite a different perspective on 
animal dignity, linking it specifically with their species-specific properties or 
capabilities (Nussbaum 2006b, 2004).  When we force an animal to behave or 
128 
 
live in a way that is unnatural, we are impinging on their species functioning, 
and so diminishing the animal’s own dignity.  As she writes: ‘there is waste and 
tragedy when a living creature has the innate, or ‘basic,’ capability for some 
functions that are evaluated as important and good, but never gets the 
opportunity to perform those functions...it is not a life in keeping with the dignity 
of such creatures’ (Nussbaum 2004, 305).   
In a similar vein, whilst Lori Gruen argues that animal dignity is formed in the 
social sphere, in direct contrast to Anderson, she argues that it is precisely 
when we try to make an animal decent for human society, and when we try to 
think of the animal in anthropocentric terms, that we violate their dignity.  
Instead, Gruen prefers the term ‘wild dignity’ which, like David Luban’s 
conception of dignity, is a relational notion which ‘becomes a meaningful 
concept’ in the human context.  When a wild animal is held in captivity this, 
Gruen argues, is a prime example of a violation of the animal’s wild dignity.  
Instead, Gruen writes that ‘we dignify the wildness of other animals when we 
respect their behaviours as meaningful to them and recognize that their lives 
are theirs to live...’ (Gruen 2011, 154-5).  Whilst there is certainly truth to the 
awe which is often met when witnessing animals in their natural environments, it 
is unclear how far such wild dignity should impose or demand their moral 
considerability.  As has already been mentioned, there are many natural 
impulses or innate capacities that we rightly consider to be immoral.   
Interestingly, Gruen argues that companion and domesticated animals cannot 
have a similar wild dignity, as they have ‘been bred for hundreds of years to 
have traits that are particularly suited for living in human society’, and 
consequently, ‘they are so different from their wild ancestors that it would be 
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difficult to try to articulate what constitutes the Wild dignity of domesticated 
animals’ (Gruen 2011, 156).  In such a case, this seems much closer to what 
Anderson originally had in mind when she speaks of the dignity of animals 
being dependent upon the complexity of our social relations and meanings, and 
our need that an animal is made decent for human society. 
Conclusion 
 
There is a distinct tension in moral philosophy between vouching for the need 
for the universalibility of moral principles on the one hand, and the limitation of 
these principles to certain ‘morally worthy’ beings, on the other.  The difficulty, 
as has been demonstrated, is deciding upon which criteria delineate the 
boundary for something to be judged morally considerable.  In particular, is co-
membership in the human species purely a biological category, or something 
more than that?  On the cognitive capacity account, beings regardless of 
species membership may be allowed into the moral community, so long as they 
have the requisite faculties.  Yet, for many, this is an unacceptable way of 
drawing the moral boundaries, as it excludes those humans who lack the 
morally relevant capacities.  Consequently, the species loyalty account allows 
for the inclusion of those humans who would otherwise slip through the net on 
the cognitive capacity approach (such as the profoundly mentally disabled, 
foetuses, and even the dead).  Conversely, some non-humans (be they great 
apes, aliens or posthumans) might not be included in this moral community, 
despite their intrinsic properties.  The following chapter will examine many of the 
appeals made for and against this special privileging of human needs and 
interests. 
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Is human dignity then a flagrant example of speciesism, or instead, an 
acceptable way to solve the problem of marginal cases?  As is clear, the most 
obvious analogy that both Ryder and Singer wish to make with speciesism 
(hence its name) is with the unjustified prejudice of racism and sexism.73  Just 
as it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race or sex, as they are morally 
arbitrary traits, so it is argued that species is also, from an ethical point of view, 
morally insignificant.  This analogy, at least from an historical point of view, is a 
valid one.  Comparisons between animals and certain races, for example, are 
prevalent throughout history.  Yet, it is not as immediately clear, as it is in the 
cases of race or sex, that species is not also a morally relevant category.  
Indeed, gender and racial liberation movements have sometimes found the 
conflation with animal rights as insulting.  Moreover, the term ‘speciesism’ itself, 
coined specifically to chime with racism and sexism, the critics argue, does not 
allow for a level playing field, as anyone who attempts to defend the term is 
likely to be equated with racism and sexism.  It seems clear to many that a 
human, including a severely mentally disabled one, has a higher moral standing 
than a dog or a horse.   
Although, of course, what this ‘privileged position’ entails varies wildly between 
accounts.  On the one extreme is the belief that non-human animals have no 
moral standing.  A more moderate account may argue that some animals, 
particularly those considered to have so-called moral status grounding 
capacities, may also have moral considerability.  Nevertheless, in either case, 
both positions endorse the view that if we had to decide between the interests 
of a healthy human and healthy animal, all other things being equal, we would 
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 As LaFollette and Shanks point out, 'Animal liberationists compare speciesism with racism to 
focus our attention on the human tendency to unreflectively accept contemporary moral 
standards.  We are fallible.  Even our deeply held view[s] may be wrong’ (LaFollette and Shanks 
1996, 41). 
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be justified in choosing the human over the animal.  As Rachels explains: ‘The 
idea of human dignity is the moral doctrine which says that humans and other 
animals are in different moral categories; that the lives and interests of human 
beings are of supreme moral importance, while the lives and interests of other 
animals are relatively unimportant...’ (Rachels 1990, 171).  Indeed, morality or 
the moral sphere, as commonly understood, is based upon the premise that 
human life has a worth over and above that of other species – Homo sapiens 
serves as a sharp dividing line between those who are entitled to special moral 
protection, and those who do not.  For some, morality should be a human 
construction for serving human needs and human ends. 
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Chapter 7  The Significance of Being Human 
 
Wonders are many, yet of all 
Things is Man the most wonderful 
– Sophocles, Antigone (332-364) 
 
Introduction 
 
The significance of being human is a theme that has pervaded and persisted 
throughout the ages and, perhaps surprisingly, the reasons given for this 
importance have remained markedly unchanged.  In particular, it is the 
possession of certain capacities or abilities which are often said to distinguish 
humankind from the animals, and ground or underpin our human dignity. In the 
tragic play Antigone (c. 441 BC) the Ancient Greek writer Sophocles, for 
instance, cites features which separate humans from the beasts: human 
inventiveness, and resourcefulness, his dominion and domination of all other 
animals, the ability to overcome the challenges presented by nature, the 
capacity for literature, and superior intelligence (Sophocles 1994, 331-364).  
These characteristics are still often cited in the contemporary literature as the 
foundations for the special significance of the human species, offered as 
reasons for our greater moral considerability, and as grounds for our human 
dignity.  Indeed, the phrase ‘human dignity’ is often used as a shorthand for 
denoting our special worth or value, and for justifying the privileging of human 
interests over that of other non-human animals.  In the words of George Kateb: 
‘The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of 
beings...’ (Kateb 2011, 3-4), and we certainly do often behave as if being 
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human does have special significance – especially when we prioritise our needs 
and interests (sometimes even quite trivial ones) over that of the needs and 
interests of non-human animals.   
As we highlighted in the previous chapter, sentience and, in particular, a 
capacity to experience pain and suffer has been proposed as a fundamental 
cross-species criterion for moral consideration.  On this account, the boundary 
of moral concern lies squarely on the ability to suffer and feel pain, and 
consequently all like cases, regardless of species, should be considered 
equally.  We should, as a consequence, take the interests of non-humans in not 
suffering as seriously as we do that of humans, in so far as the suffering of a 
non-human is equivalent to the suffering of a human.  In the words of Singer 
again: ‘...if we consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on a baby for no good 
reason then we must, unless we are speciesists, consider it equally wrong to 
inflict the same amount of pain on a horse for no good reason’ (Singer 1995, 15. 
emphasis added).  Conversely, for the proponents of the importance of being 
human, whilst there might be a prima facie reason to take the moral 
considerability of animals into account, and to not inflict pain or suffering on 
them, there is nevertheless a difference – and for many a considerable 
difference – between the suffering of a human and of an animal, even if both 
cases of pain are experienced in equal duration and intensity.74  For these 
thinkers, sentience alone should not be considered sufficient for prioritising 
moral considerability, but instead it should be grounded on a host of other 
capacities, often seen as unique to human beings, which should entitle their 
bearer to a privileged position in the moral community (see Steinbock 1978, 
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 For instance, Rachels writes that, ‘if the interests are comparable—say, if the choice is 
between causing the same amount of pain for a human or for a non-human—we should give 
preference to the human’s welfare’ (Rachels 1990, 182; see also Kateb 2011, 22-3). 
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254).  Interestingly, as was previously noted, even Singer has acknowledged 
that, in the case of killing, there are distinct differences between humans and 
animals that warrant privileging the life of the former over the latter.  Human life 
(or at least healthy adult human life), because of certain characteristics, is 
considered to be richer and more valuable than that of an animal’s life,75 and so 
should be given priority (Singer 1995, 19; see also Frey 1988).  
Human dignity, as far as it is seen as a status conferring concept, seems to 
need to hinge on some conception of the significance of being human, 
specifically on something that non-humans lack.  If there was nothing of import 
to being a human, then it would seem to be entirely baseless to claim that 
humans have a special worth or dignity.  Roger Wertheimer termed this the 
Standard Belief, which is the commonly held belief amongst most people that 
‘being human has moral cachet: viz., a human being has human status in virtue 
of being a human being’ (Wertheimer 1974, 107-8). This was later picked up by 
Dan Egonsson who refashioned it as The Standard Attitude (SA), which is an 
intuitive belief of the ‘direct moral importance of being human’ (Egonsson 1998, 
47), and in particular the importance of a human life.76  What this precisely 
means, as Egonsson admits, is far from clear.  Nevertheless, at the outset, the 
SA can be interpreted in both a weak and strong form.  On the latter account, 
humans have a fundamental importance simply because they are members of 
the species Homo sapiens.  As David DeGrazia explains: ‘...being human – that 
is, homo sapiens – just is, sui generis, a morally relevant characteristic that 
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 Although, as noted by Korsgaard, ‘perhaps it is true that a human being who loses her life 
loses something more complex, rich, and connected than another animal who loses his life 
does.  But, on the other hand, a human being and a non-human animal who lose their lives both 
lose everything that they have.  There is something imponderable about the compassion’ 
(Korsgaard 2009, 6). 
76
 Likewise, Egonsson argues that it is belonging to the species Homo sapiens that is the one 
common property that ties humans together, and so it is this that acts as the basis for our 
dignity. 
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grounds special moral status.  The argument for the relevance of being human 
goes no farther than that’ (DeGrazia 1996, 57).  The fact that a human being 
belongs to the species Homo sapiens makes her morally significant (what we 
have previously termed unqualified speciesism).77  The weaker interpretation, in 
contrast, suggests that whilst species itself is not morally relevant, members of 
the species Homo sapiens typically have certain properties or capacities that 
are worthy of special consideration (qualified speciesism).  It is this 
interpretation of the SA which will concern the rest of this chapter, as it suffers 
less from an explanatory gap as to how merely being a member of a biological 
species confers moral status, for it provides further reasons (namely certain 
morally significant capacities), which are said to justify this special status. 
However, as we will see, there are also serious conceptual difficulties with this 
capacity grounded account of the significance of being human, not least 
because the capacities which are traditionally said to ground human dignity are 
too demanding, especially for a universal sense of human dignity. 
It is important to note that this interpretation of the SA is also different to the 
idea of the importance of personhood for moral considerability (see Chapter 10 
for a further discussion of this).  Significantly, personhood is not species 
specific, for anyone or anything with the requisite faculties will be, or at least 
should be, granted the status of personhood.  Although, of course, there is clear 
overlap between the capacities considered to signify the importance of being 
human, and the capacities required for personhood (most often a combination 
of autonomy and intelligence or reason).  Finally, personhood does not accept, 
or at least does not generally allow, for the possibility of so-called marginal 
cases to be accorded equivalent moral status to those with full personhood.  In 
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 See Michael Tooley (Tooley 1983, 61-86) for an extended critique of this position. 
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contrast, arguments for the significance of being human have often, particularly 
in their modern incarnations, tried to accord equal moral status for all humans. 
Human Distinctiveness versus Human Uniqueness 
 
There is an acute difference between what may be termed the distinctiveness, 
as opposed to the uniqueness, of being human.  The former stresses the 
similarities and continuities of humans with the rest of the animal kingdom.  This 
is an approach often taken by proponents of animal rights and welfare, who 
argue that there are only differences of degree, and not of kind, between 
humans and other animals (or at least that there are no big differences which 
warrant radically different consideration and treatment).  Both humans and other 
animals are part of the natural world, evolved from common ancestors and, 
therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that there are continuities of 
behaviour, rather than sharp divides.78 The latter, in contrast, insists that as a 
species, we are sui generis, entirely unique and separate to the animal 
kingdom.  In the hyperbolic words of Willard Gaylin: ‘...human beings are 
special—a glorious discontinuity in the animal kingdom.  Sui generis, we are as 
different from the apes in many ways as the apes are from the amoebas’ 
(Gaylin 1984, 18).  As can be seen, the uniqueness position is a much more 
demanding claim for the significance of being human, for it implies that there is 
some absolute or fundamental point at which humans differ entirely from the 
non-human.  We are then left with the question of whether or not dignity needs 
to rest on a conception of humans as unique or sui generis to the rest of the 
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 Korsgaard has labelled this a ‘gradualist’ position, which is often held by proponents of animal 
rights and welfare (Korsgaard 2009, 4).  See also Muray: ‘humans and non-humans alike are 
part of the natural world.  The difference between humans and non-humans is a matter of 
degree and not of kind’ (Muray 2007, 306). 
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natural world, or if human dignity can be justified by merely appealing to just the 
distinctiveness of the species. 
Both the uniqueness and distinctive claim rest on the idea that humans are 
unique or distinctive in the right way.  Hairless skin or walking on two feet, for 
instance, would not in themselves normally be considered suitable grounds to 
claim special moral considerability.  The feature(s) in question would have to be 
commendable, and so worthy of special consideration or respect.  Similarly, not 
all attributes which are unique or distinctive to humans would also necessarily 
lend themselves well to grounding human dignity.  There are numerous, 
seemingly unique, human capacities, such as playing sports or the cooking of 
food, which seem irrelevant to justifying human dignity.  Similarly, the human 
capacity for genocide, war or torture, are entirely counter to the idea that 
humans have a dignity that is worth preserving.  An interesting case in point is 
the complexity of human language, and its superiority to animal forms of 
communication.  Should linguistic ability be considered a possible grounding 
capacity for human dignity?  Language is often posited as a sign of deeper 
intelligence, for it enables thought processes that would otherwise be 
impossible, and consequently offers a richer and more complex life.  
Nevertheless, as James Rachels has argued:  ‘...there are many forms of 
treatment to which the question of linguistic ability is not relevant—torture, for 
example. (The reason why it is wrong to torture has nothing to do with the 
victim’s ability to speak.) Therefore, the most that can be said about this 
‘marvellous endowment’ is that most humans have it, and that it is relevant to 
some decisions about how they should be treated’ (Rachels 1990, 188).  If 
Rachel’s contention is correct and language is not relevant to suffering, then we 
can also question why it should be considered a grounding capacity of dignity. 
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Humans as a Break from Nature 
 
An intriguing idea for the uniqueness of humankind rests on the thought that we 
are, in some way, separate to the rest of the natural world; that there is some 
significant distinction between biological or natural kinds and human kinds.  In 
other words, there is something unnatural, or perhaps even supernatural, about 
humanity.  This idea has been pursued by George Kateb who, despite 
conflating the two, appears to push for the idea of the superiority of being 
human, as compared to the less contentious issue of humankind’s 
distinctiveness to the rest of nature: 
I wish to go to the extent of saying that the human species is indeed 
something special, that it possesses valuable, commendable uniqueness 
or distinctiveness that is unlike the uniqueness of any other species.  It 
has higher dignity than all other species, or a qualitatively different dignity 
from all of them.  The higher dignity is theoretically founded on 
humanity’s partial discontinuity with nature.  Humanity is not only natural, 
whereas all other species are only natural (Kateb 2011, 5). 
For Kateb this discontinuity with the rest of nature is based, at least partially, on 
three central capacities which are unique to humankind: to ‘keep the record of 
nature, understand nature, and appreciate it’ (Kateb 2011, 114).  This account 
certainly encapsulates a sizeable proportion of the features that we consider to 
separate humans from the rest of nature, namely scientific investigation and 
understanding, as well as the capacity to step back and appreciate the beauty 
and sublimity (as well as the horrors) of the natural world.  These three 
functions form our service to nature, or what Kateb describes as our 
stewardship of the natural world:   
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The stewardship of nature is a contribution that only humanity can make, 
and would exemplify human stature most gloriously...the human species 
is irreplaceable because its stewardship depends on commendably 
unique traits and attributes that help to make human beings partly not 
natural...Only the partly not natural can serve nature in certain ways that 
it deserves and cannot provide for itself (Kateb 2011, 24).   
As can be seen, Kateb states that humanity’s duty of stewardship or service to 
nature underwrites our importance to the natural world, and hence, our 
irreplaceability and dignity.  However, a duty of stewardship does not seem to 
follow from the three essential functions that Kateb lists – to keep the record of 
nature, understand nature, and appreciate it – for these three capacities are 
relatively passive, whilst stewardship implies a stronger sense of intervention.  It 
is not clear that humans are required, or even ought to intervene on behalf of 
nature.  To claim, as Kateb does, that this makes the human species 
‘irreplaceable’ seems to be particularly farfetched.  Indeed, human intervention 
in the natural world, even when performed for benevolent reasons, often does 
more harm than good, as we have witnessed all too often in cases of 
anthropogenic environmental devastation.  Moreover, the danger with such an 
approach, as Leslie A. Muray has pointed out, is if humans are considered to be 
unique and separate to the rest of nature, then this could equally lead to a 
‘...sense of alienation from the non-human natural world’.  In contrast, Muray 
argues that we need a ‘...creative transformation of that alienation into a sense 
of belonging, of not being alone in the universe, of being distinct yet also being 
kin with all living things, is what we need if we are to save our planet’ (Muray 
2007, 309). Kateb’s account does seem to be an attempt to reconcile this 
problem, nevertheless, so long as humans consider themselves somehow 
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separate to the natural world, then the danger of feeling estranged or isolated 
from the natural world will remain. 
The Argument from Great Achievements 
 
One of the most vivid, and tangible, examples of humankind’s supposed 
uniqueness from the rest of the natural world is the argument from great 
achievements.  It is not difficult to list a range of exceptional human feats, be 
they scientific, artistic or mechanical that can be found nowhere else in nature, 
or for that matter, as far as we know, in the universe.  When Mankind walked on 
the moon, painted the Sistine Chapel or unlocked the secret to the double helix 
structure of DNA, not only were these endeavours great achievements in 
themselves, but, so the argument goes, reflective of the superiority of the 
human species itself.  In the words of George Kateb, ‘great achievements are 
the central manifestation of the partway separation of the human species from 
nature and thus help to substantiate the special kind of human uniqueness and 
hence human dignity’ (Kateb 2011, 115).  The argument from great 
achievements not only looks back at what has already been achieved, but also 
looks forward to what might be possible, to the potentiality of humanity: ‘The 
human species is an indefinite species in a qualitatively different manner from 
all other species.  So, too, every human individual is an indefinite being, 
possessing “infinitude”, in Emerson’s term’ (Kateb 2011, 125).  The idea of 
potentiality, and the complete freedom to actualise this potential, is a central 
tenant of Kateb’s account of human dignity.  As was highlighted in the first 
section, this theme has a long and rich historical traditional, with the duty to 
aspire to the highest levels, and the creativity and freedom necessary to enable 
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this duty, central tenants of both Renaissance Humanism and the 
Enlightenment.   
One of the overarching problems with attempting to use the argument from 
great achievements to demonstrate the significance of being human is that, by 
definition, a great achievement is a rare act, achieved by either an individual or 
a relatively small group of people.  The sad truth is that the majority of humans 
will never achieve what could be considered a ‘great’ achievement in their 
lifetimes, and, therefore, it is difficult to see how the great achievements of a 
few can therefore lead to a conclusion that the whole of humankind is of 
significance. We would not say, for instance, that if one student achieves top 
marks then her fellow class mates should do also.  Similarly, it is unclear how 
the scientific achievements of Newton, for example, are reflective of the 
significance of oneself or, for that matter, anyone else except Newton.  
Moreover, in some cases, other individuals have actively sought to hold back 
those striving for greatness.  One possible explanation, which Kateb 
acknowledges, is that whilst only a few can obtain greatness, their work would 
not have been possible without the work of countless others, however menial or 
seemingly insignificant that work might be (Kateb 2011, 130).  Yet, in that case, 
it is unclear why a laboratory animal, for instance, which by all intents and 
purposes has sacrificed more for a medical breakthrough than most other 
humans, should not also be able to partake in the glory of a great medical 
breakthrough.   
There is, furthermore, a justificatory problem with the argument from great 
achievements for we are left with the issue of what are the criteria for judging an 
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achievement to be considered great.79  If the judges of great achievements are 
themselves human, then there is an inherent circularity in ascribing special 
significance to humans.  Kateb acknowledges this problem, and that ideally a 
‘more-than-human or other-than-human entity or entities could set the 
standards and judge’ (Kateb 2011, 127), but ultimately the only judges available 
and capable of providing such opinions are humans themselves.  In other 
words, a human-centred or anthropocentric viewpoint in these matters, however 
regrettable, is unavoidable.  To an extent this is true, for humans cannot help 
but be human-centred, and to see matters from a human perspective often 
seems unavoidable.  Yet, there is also a sense in which we can seemingly 
transcend our own limited perspectives and see our lives from a universal or 
objective point of view. The realm of the physical sciences, for instance, whilst 
performed exclusively by humans is not dependent on the human perspective.  
The laws of physics or of natural selection will hold, regardless of whether or not 
humans think they do.   
Furthermore, there is a sense in which we can view our own lives from an 
external perspective, in the words of Thomas Nagel: 
...humans have the special capacity to step back and survey themselves, 
and the lives to which they are committed, with that detached 
amazement which comes from watching an ant struggle up a heap of 
sand.  Without developing the illusion that they are able to escape from 
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 Satre alludes to the same problem when he writes: ‘By “humanism” we might mean a theory 
that takes man as an end and as the supreme value.  For example, in his story Around the 
World in 80 Hours, Cocteau gives expression to this idea when one of his characters, flying over 
some mountains in a plane, proclaims: “Man is amazing!”  This means: even though I myself 
may never have built a plane, I nevertheless still benefit from the plane’s intervention and, as a 
man, I should consider myself responsible for, and honoured by, what certain other men have 
achieved.  This presupposes that we can assign a value to man based on the most admirable 
deeds of certain men.  But that kind of humanism is absurd, for only a dog or a horse would be 
in a position to form an overall judgement about man and declare that he is amazing, which 
animals scarcely seem likely to do – at least, as far as I know’ (Sartre 2007, 51-2). 
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their highly specific and idiosyncratic position, they can view it sub specie 
aeternitatis80 – and the view is at once sobering and comical (Nagel 
1979, 15). 
Is it possible then that humans may have significance from an objective point of 
view – the view from ‘nowhere in particular’?  The problem is that, unlike 
scientific phenomena, there doesn’t seem to be a corresponding objective 
reality for the significance of being human, at least from a non-theological 
perspective.  As Mark Bernstein makes clear, ‘there seems no persuasive 
reason to believe that there is such a God’s-eye view...Thus an unbiased ideal 
viewpoint, a requirement for an absolute criterion to be useful for us to justify 
the saving of one of our species, is a fiction’ (Bernstein 1991, 53).  An 
alternative approach is to just accept that the significance of being human must 
ultimately derive from the human perspective, yet, unlike racism or sexism, this 
is not an unjustified prejudice.  Bernard Williams follows along these lines, 
denying that favouring humanity is necessarily a speciesist point of view:  
To see the world from a human point of view is not an absurd thing for 
human beings to do.  It is sometimes said that such a view implies that 
we regard human beings as the most important or valuable creatures in 
the universe.  This would be an absurd thing to do, but it is not implied.  
To suppose that it is, is to make the mistake of identifying the point of 
view of the universe and the human point of view.  No one should make 
any claims about the importance of human beings to the universe: the 
point is about the importance of human beings to human beings. 
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 From the Latin, literally translated as ‘under the aspect of eternity.’ 
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A concern for nonhuman animals is indeed a proper part of human life, 
but we can acquire it, cultivate it, and teach it only in terms of our 
understanding of ourselves.  Human beings both have that 
understanding and are the objects of it, and this is one of the basic 
respects in which our ethical relations to each other must always be 
different from our relations to other animals.   
Our arguments have to be grounded in a human point of view; they 
cannot be derived from a point of view that is no one's point of view at all.  
It is not, as the strongest forms of ethical theory would have it, that 
reason drives us to get beyond humanity.  The most urgent requirements 
of humanity are, as they always have been, that we should assemble as 
many resources as we can to help us to respect it (Williams 2011, 131-
132).81 
For Williams, therefore, it is impossible to avoid an anthropocentric viewpoint in 
our ethical dealings, and this is something that we should not only accept, but 
actively embrace.  It is a mistake to act as if we can assess the significance of 
being human from an ‘Ideal Observer’s’ point of view (Williams 2006).  For 
Williams, this is a justified bias which has little in common with racism and 
sexism, but is rather more akin to the affinity and loyalty people experience in a 
shared culture.  We can use our own sense of this humanity to guide our ethical 
thought and actions.  This is inevitably a circular argument, as the line of 
reasoning concludes that we are important, because we judge or consider 
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 See also: ‘...all of our attributions of moral status are, in reality, based on human intentions 
and decisions, though sometimes cloaked in the guise of objectively assessable qualities.  More 
generally, it is human beings who assign membership (particularly to those who belong to the 
species Homo sapiens) along with the meanings that accompany such membership, including 
being identified as a participant or representatives of the group.  Our intentions and social 
conventions both within science and more broadly in everyday life serve to impose categories 
on human and nonhuman animals, be they the categories of domestic companion, pest, worker, 
or research subject/material...’ (Ankeny 2003, 32). 
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ourselves to be important (at least from our own perspective).  Presumably 
Williams would have thought this an acceptable circularity, for our justification 
must inevitably end in the human point of view.82 
However, it may be objected that this line of argument would equally commit us 
to not just a human perspective, but also an egocentric position, as we can no 
more hope to escape our human point of view, as we can avoid our own 
personal viewpoint.  This has led Bernstein to complain that if ‘the ineliminability 
of the human way of understanding the world provides a defense of 
speciesism’, then, consequently, ‘the ineliminability of one’s egoistic view of the 
world should provide a defense of egoism. But surely this is the height of 
absurdity; one would be hard-pressed to adopt a more prejudicial theory than 
one that picks out an individual’s welfare as most deserving simply because it is 
the agent’s own’ (Bernstein 1991, 54).   
Culture 
 
The existence of culture has often been presented as an exclusively human 
trait, and offered as a further example of humanity’s break from nature.  In 
particular, culture has been cited as an example of the ‘superorganic’, a 
phenomenon first coined by Alfred Kroeber (1917) to describe the way that 
culture can transcend the limitations of our evolutionary biology, for example, its 
ability to transmit information to any individual, regardless of biological 
parentage.83  Similarly, Michael Tomasello (1999) has proposed that human 
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 Peter Singer takes particular issue with Williams’ stance, arguing that it is no different from a 
white supremacist from saying, when it comes to a question about how one should treat people 
of different races, “Well, whose side are you on?  We’re the ones doing the judging here, why 
don’t we simply prefer our kind because it is our kind?”’ (Singer 2009, 572). 
83
 As explained by Willard Gaylin: ‘Culture is not just another mechanism of adaption; it is vastly 
superior to the biological mechanisms which spawned it.  It is more rapid and efficient.  When 
genes are changed through mutation, the change is transmitted solely to the specific offspring—
and only with generations of time enters into the species at large.  Changed culture, on the 
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culture has fundamentally altered human cognition, including its effect on the 
use of language, the ability to create complex technologies, and the existence 
of complex social organisations and institutions.  In particular, it is through a 
process of cumulative cultural evolution – the so-called ‘ratchet effect’ – that 
enabled humans to both pool their cognitive resources together, and to build 
upon each other’s work.  This led, in turn, Tomasello argues to ‘...new social 
and cultural processes that...with no further genetic events, created many, if not 
all, of the most interesting and distinctive characteristics of human cognition’ 
(Tomasello 1999, 526). 
Nevertheless, the answer to the question of whether or not culture is a uniquely 
human trait is, in the first instance, one of definition, for we must first outline 
what we mean by ‘culture’.  Otherwise, we run the risk of excluding non-humans 
at the outset through an overly strict definition as we find, for example, in the 
following nineteenth century definition of culture: ‘...that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society’ (as cited in McGrew 1998, 
304).  If we define culture as a product of human society, then of course we beg 
the question as to whether animals may have cultures, and automatically 
exclude them from the debate.  In contrast, there has been, in recent years, a 
growing awareness of the possibility that there may exist some forms of animal 
culture, particularly in regards to transmission of knowledge and learning to 
individuals and subsequent generations through social interaction, with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
other hand, may be transmitted to anybody regardless of biological parentage, or borrowed 
ready-made from other people.  In producing the genetic basis of culture, biological evolution 
has transcended itself—it has produced the superorganic.  In other words, the kind of brain 
capable of conceptual reasoning is not only the product of a certain development but is capable 
of dictating a future development’ (Gaylin 1984, 21). 
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imitation, teaching, and language being the most common methods observed in 
animal behaviour.84   
For this reason, more inclusive definitions of culture have been put forward in 
recent decades in an attempt to include animals within this once exclusively 
human realm.85 The Primatologist W. C. McGrew, for instance, has proposed 
the following, more open, definition of culture: ‘Culture is considered to be 
group-specific behaviour that is acquired, at least in part, from social influences’ 
(McGrew 1998, 305).  One of the most cited examples of this form of cultural 
transmission of knowledge witnessed in the natural world is the case of a 
species of macaque monkey on the Japanese island of Koshima.  In 1953 a 
young female macaque named Imo spontaneously washed a muddy sweet 
potato (provided by the researchers) in a river and, consequently, ‘this food-
processing technique first spread horizontally to peers and then vertically 
upward to older kin; in less than 10 years it became the norm for the group, and 
over generations, it assumed predominance, being shown by 46 of 57 monkeys 
by 1983’ (McGrew 1998, 312). Nevertheless, human culture remains decidedly 
more complex and rich, and in areas such as literature, art or religion seems to 
have no animal parallel, and the existence of animal cultures continues to be a 
source of contention (see Laland and Galef 2009).  Although, even art, it has 
been argued, is evident in the work of Homo sapiens’ ancestor Homo erectus, 
which has been suggested whilst it might put ‘a dent in human pride’ does 
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 Interestingly, as noted by Laland and Bennett, this observation has a long history which: 
‘…dates back to Aristotle, who provided the first evidence of social learning of song in birds.  
Charles Darwin was aware of animal traditions, noting in The Descent of Man (1871) that “apes 
are much given to imitation...and the simple fact previously referred to, that after a time no 
animal can be caught in the same place by the same sort of trap, shews [sic] that animals learn 
by experience, and imitate each other's caution”’ (Laland and Galef 2009, 2). 
85
 Muray, for instance, argues that ‘…birdsong, for example, is a rather sophisticated form of 
non-human art, performed not just for the sake of attracting mates but for the sheer enjoyment 
of singing.  I would contend that while language may be distinctive, it is a distinctive and highly 
complex form of communication, something that is common to humans and non-humans alike’ 
(Muray 2007, 307).   
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ultimately still further ‘extend uniqueness to the human lineage’ (Sharpe and 
Van Gelder et al. 2007, 343). 
In his work Life’s Dominion (1993), Ronald Dworkin put forward a secular 
version of the sacredness of human life, and it is the human capacity for culture 
that he turns to anchor this.  In particular, human life is considered to be a 
product of this rich cultural tradition: 
The role of the other tradition of the sacred in supporting the sanctity of 
life is less evident but equally crucial: each developed human being is 
the product not just of natural creation, but also of the kind of deliberative 
human creative force that we honor in honouring art.  A mature woman, 
for example, is in her personality, training, capacity, interests, ambitions, 
and emotions, something like a work of art because in those respects 
she is the product of human creative intelligence, partly that of her 
parents and other people, partly that of her culture, and also, through the 
choices she has made, her own creation (Dworkin 1993, 82). 
In this way, all human life, regardless of individual capacities is sacred because 
it is a representation of the human creative and cultural tradition, and so 
Dworkin insists, a work of art.  As a product and representation of this cultural 
tradition, human life deserves both respect and protection from destruction.86  
There is a certain appeal to this idea, for it does seem to encapsulate, at least in 
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 As Dworkin further explains: ‘The life of a single human organism commands respect and 
protection, then, no matter in what form or shape, because of the complex creative investment it 
represents and because of our wonder at the divine or evolutionary processes that produce new 
lives from old ones, at the processes of nation and community and language through which a 
human being will come to absorb and continue hundreds of generations of cultures and forms of 
life and values, and, finally, when mental life has begun and flourishes, at the process of internal 
personal creation and judgment by which a person will make and remake himself, a mysterious, 
inescapable process in which we each participate, and which is therefore the most powerful and 
inevitable source of empathy and communion we have with every other creature who faces the 
same frightening challenge.  The horror we feel in the wilful destruction of a human life reflects 
our shared inarticulate sense of the intrinsic importance of each of these dimensions of 
investment’ (Dworkin 1993, 84). 
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part, the sense in which we value human life.  One of its stumbling blocks, 
however, is its implicit assumption that all cultural life is valuable and something 
worth preserving.  Yet some cultures are not, or at least, should not be 
examples of the sacredness of human life, be that female genital mutilation, 
corporal punishment, or apartheid. 
The Grounding Capacities of Human Dignity 
 
The claim for human uniqueness is traditionally rooted not just in merely 
belonging to the species Homo sapiens, but in the possession of certain 
distinctively human traits and capacities that are traditionally seen as uniquely 
human.  This is what we have previously termed ‘qualified speciesism’: species 
membership by itself is not morally important, but is correlated or associated 
with other characteristics which are.  In particular, these attributes are 
considered to appear in a greater degree or quality in humans; if not also 
entirely unique to them.  These traits cannot be any arbitrary attributes, but 
must be something which might be considered relevant to moral considerability; 
they must be commendable.  As has already been alluded to, if humans are 
characterised, at least partially, by their potentiality then we can only hope to 
cover a limited range of human traits and attributes.  However, only a much 
narrower range of capacities are commonly considered commendable enough 
to be able to ground human dignity, and typically include intelligence or reason, 
autonomy, (complex) language use, and (complex) social relations, amongst 
others. 
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Autonomy 
 
Of all the proposed dignity grounding capacities, it is perhaps the role of 
autonomy that has stirred the most amount of debate and literature on human 
dignity.  It is a central value in the Kantian definition of Dignity, with our worth or 
special value residing in our autonomy (see Chapter 4).87  In more recent years, 
dignity was infamously labelled by Ruth Macklin as nothing more than respect 
for autonomy and, as such, discussion of dignity should be banished from 
bioethics altogether (Macklin 2003a).  Nevertheless, in either case, it is agreed 
that autonomy is both an important capacity for moral considerability and a 
capacity that is distinctive of the human species.  However, this is not to imply 
there is a consensus on what autonomy actually means; more precise 
conditions for what constitute an autonomous action are inevitably controversial.  
For instance, as John Christman highlights, there is a clear distinction between 
an individual’s general freedom, and their autonomy in individual cases: 
‘...autonomy can be used to refer both to the global condition (autonomous 
personhood) and as a more local notion (autonomous relative to a particular 
trait, motive, value, or social condition). Addicted smokers for example are 
autonomous persons in a general sense but (for some) helplessly unable to 
control their behavior regarding this one activity’ (Christman 1989, 13–14).  
There are, thus, multiple meanings of autonomy, and what amounts to an 
autonomous action is unclear.  Some people seem to be entirely driven by their 
instincts, whereas others appear to have complete self-control.   
At the extreme end of autonomy is the idea that humans have complete 
freedom.  Unlike other animals, we are capable of overcoming our instinctual 
                                                          
87
 For example, see (Barilan 2012 129-140) for five meanings of freedom and how they are 
linked to dignity: 1) Liberty from Interference 2) Basic Needs and Empowerment of Capabilities 
3) Independence 4) Freedom from Surveillance 5) Existential Freedom. 
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urges, and our dignity resides in our powers of autonomy and self-creation.  As 
we have seen in the first section, Pico della Mirandola in his On the Dignity of 
Man claimed that it was the freedom of human nature, more than any other 
capacity which represents the essence of our dignity.  Our dignity, for Pico, 
comes from having no fixed place in the order of creation, and our ability to 
choose our own place within that order.   We can find striking parallels (albeit 
from an atheistic standpoint) between this form of human dignity and that 
proposed by the Existentialists of the first half of the twentieth century.  Jean-
Paul Sartre in his seminal but brief work Existentialism is a Humanism (1946), 
declared that: 
...man first exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and 
only afterward defines himself…Man is not only that which he conceives 
himself to be, but that which he wills himself to be, and since he 
conceives of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be 
after being thrown into existence, man is nothing other than what he 
makes of himself. This is the first principle of existentialism (Sartre 2007, 
22). 
The form of existentialism promoted by Sartre, in many ways, represents the 
most optimistic interpretation of the autonomy and freedom of humankind; for 
we are considered entirely free to determine our own natures.  Using the 
analogy of a paper knife, Sartre explains that the knife has been designed and 
created with a particular purpose and preordained plan in mind, its essence has 
already been defined before its creation – its ‘essence precedes its existence’, 
in Sartre’s famous formulation.  In contrast, for Sartre, humankind finds itself 
first existing or ‘thrown into the world’ with no fixed purpose, and only then does 
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she decide how to define herself.  This encompasses the universal human 
condition – to be condemned to be free.  In contrast to the knife, humankind’s 
existence precedes its essence which, as Sartre highlights, entails that there ‘is 
no determinism – man is free, man is freedom’ (Sartre 2007, 29).88 
Sartre’s form of atheistic existentialism is founded on the idea that there is no 
God, and so no possibility of a preordained plan for humankind.  However, if 
there is no God or original creator of nature, it’s unclear why it should follow that 
only Man has this unlimited potential, for it would follow that all of the natural 
world exists without a preordained plan in mind. Sartre gives us no reason to 
presuppose that other animals may also be condemned to be free, and so it is 
unclear how this fate is unique to the human condition.  Moreover, we are all 
constrained by biological, socio-economic and geographic factors, amongst 
others. Perhaps both Pico and Sartre then exaggerate the extent to which 
humankind is free to do as it pleases?  One may retort that it is only humans 
who are capable (even if they do not always succeed) of rising above their 
instinctual urges.89  Yet, as we have mentioned, many humans seem also 
incapable of controlling these urges. 
This idea of human dignity residing in human autonomy has been picked up by 
Beyleveld and Brownsword’s account of human dignity, in which: 
The right to choose is a basic expression of one’s dignity; and there is no 
more fundamental expression of one’s dignity than the right to make life-
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 Sartre acknowledges that this freedom also leads to a strong sense of responsibility, both to 
the individual and to all others as well: ‘If, however, existence truly does precede essence, man 
is responsible for what he is.  Thus, the first effect of existentialism is to make every man 
conscious of what he is, and to make him solely responsible for his own existence.  And when 
we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his 
own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men’ (Sartre 2007, 23). 
89
 This is the position Gaylin takes when he writes: ‘If we are not truly autonomous agents, 
freedom from instinctual fixation is as close to autonomy as is necessary to ensure our dignity’ 
(Gaylin 1984, 21). 
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saving or life-terminating choices.  Dignity, in other words, is embedded 
in the right to choose itself, irrespective of the particular choice that one 
makes (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 242). 
In the case of euthanasia, for instance, there are those who vouch for the quiet 
dignity of the individual who faces their terminal illness with stoicism, and 
endures it until the bitter end.  There are others, by contrast, who admire the 
dignity of the patient who bravely decides to hasten their death, before their 
long and painful decline.  Whilst both perspectives carry with them a strong 
sense of respect for human life and personal autonomy, both premises also 
seemingly lead to quite different conclusions as to the role and nature of dignity.  
This has led some commentators to conclude that dignity is a concept entirely 
empty of content, and can be invoked freely by all sides (Bagaric and Allan 
2006, 267).  Yet, the answer of Beyleveld and Brownsword is, in essence, that 
they are in a way both right – both decisions, if taken autonomously (and so not 
through coercion, or under the influence of drugs etc.) are representative of 
human dignity.  It is the ability to make a choice, rather than the decision itself, 
which is reflective of our dignity.  However, of course not all humans are 
capable of autonomous choice, for example, new born babies or the severely 
cognitively impaired.  Yet, if we are to sustain the idea of a universal sense of 
human dignity, then we seemingly must look to other features of humanity other 
than autonomy.  Dignity, contrary to Macklin then, cannot just be another word 
for respect for autonomy. 
The Problem of Normativity 
 
Christine Korsgaard has acknowledged her sympathies with the idea that, in 
regards to many capacities, there are differences of degree rather than of kind 
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between humans and non-human animals; as she explains: ‘...I do think a 
gradualist story is plausible about intelligence, emotion, and complex social 
capacities such as sympathy and altruism and the ability to find one’s place in a 
social order’ (Korsgaard 2009, 4).  Korsgaard, therefore, agrees that animals do 
have moral considerability, and should have their interests taken into account, 
especially their interests in not suffering. However, Korsgaard identifies what 
she believes to remain one major difference that separates humans from the 
rest of the natural world – the reflective nature of human consciousness: 
But there is no question that we human beings are aware of our location 
in mental space in a very important way – we are, or can be, aware of 
the grounds of our beliefs and choices, of our reasons for thinking and 
acting as we do.  When I am aware, not just that I have a certain desire 
or fear, then it becomes open to me to step back from that connection 
and evaluate it: to ask whether my desire or fear provides me with a 
good reason to perform the action in question.  And this enables me to 
take responsibility for what I do.  This form of self-consciousness, I think, 
is what makes human beings rational and moral animals, and this is the 
one big difference that I have in mind.  The other animals lead lives that 
are governed, I believe, by their instincts, desires, emotions, and 
attachments.  Because we have the capacity to evaluate the influence of 
our instincts, desires, emotions and attachments on our actions, we are 
not completely governed by them.  We have the capacity to be governed 
instead by normative standards and values, by a conception of what we 
ought to do.  We are moral animals (Korsgaard 2009, 5). 
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The big difference, for Korsgaard, between human mental states and animal 
mental states is that the human mind is capable of detaching itself or stepping 
back from its immediate inclinations, beliefs and desires, and reflecting on and 
evaluating them.  We can decide whether to undertake a particular action or 
treat a belief as a reason for action.  These judgements are normative – they 
are decisions and evaluations of what we should or ought to do.  Morality, in 
particular, requires normative claims of what we should or should not do.  
Humans, unlike other animals, can act on reasons and so are sources of 
normativity.   
The so-called problem of normativity arises because of the reflective nature of 
human consciousness.  As reflective agents, we are able to, and often do, 
reflect on and about our thoughts and desires, and have to decide which 
attitudes to adopt toward these beliefs.90 The main problem with this account, 
so far as it is presented as a reason for the uniqueness of the human species, is 
that again we are confronted with the fact that some human beings lack this 
self-reflective capacity.  Indeed, even some seemingly ‘normal’ functioning adult 
humans sometimes struggle to overcome their instinctual urges and seem to 
have an inability to reflect on their beliefs and attitudes.  This is a common 
theme for any cognitively worthy characteristic said to characterise the 
significance of humanity, be it autonomy, rationality, the capacity for cultural 
learning, language use or the ability to reflect on one’s own mental states, and 
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 Darwin seems to have thought something similar when he wrote: ‘Why does man regret, even 
though he may endeavour to banish any such regret, that he has followed the one natural 
impulse, rather than the other; and why does he further feel that he ought to regret his conduct?  
Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, see 
with some degree of clearness the reason of this difference.  Man, from the activity of his mental 
faculties, cannot avoid reflection: past impressions and images are incessantly and clearly 
passing through his mind’ (Darwin 1872, 85). 
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appears to be the main stumbling block for any theory of universal human 
dignity which attempts to ground it on certain intrinsic capacities. 
Universal Human Dignity 
 
It is undeniable that the modern conception of human dignity, particularly as 
presented through international human rights bills and legal instruments, has 
sided with a universal human dignity, that is, a dignity shared equally between 
all humans.  As we have seen in the first section, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, for instance, recognizes the ‘inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ which are said to be 
‘the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world’ (United Nations 
1948).  Indeed, the idea of the equal dignity, value or worth of all people is 
fundamental to many cultures, and is often formulated in terms of an inherent 
dignity which Alan Gewirth describes as ‘...a kind of intrinsic worth that belongs 
equally to all human beings as such, constituted by certain intrinsically valuable 
aspects of being human.  This is a necessary, not a contingent, feature of all 
humans; it is permanent and unchanging, not transitory or changeable; and...it 
sets certain limits to how humans may justifiably be treated’ (Gewirth 1992, 
12).91  Human dignity is not then commonly linked to only the species as a 
whole or to the elite members of the species, but is an absolute presence in all 
members of the species, and based on certain intrinsically valuable aspects of 
being human.  This idea of the equal worth or value of people is, of course, not 
                                                          
91
 See also: ‘Human dignity is expressed in this view in terms of equal standing in the 
community and in equal respect for rights and interests…First is the idea of counting equally – if 
one person counts for one, then two count for two, and so on.  This idea shows us why we 
always have a moral reason to save more lives rather than fewer; because each life matters 
equally.  [The]…second idea contains the thought that people not only matter numerically, but 
that they also count in a more absolute and existential sense – they count for something!  In 
short, they matter; they count because they have equal dignity and standing’ (Harris and 
Sulston 2004, 800). 
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often borne out by common experience, for we do often treat individuals as 
having more value than others, for example, family members or close friends or 
those who make greater social, cultural or economic impact to our lives.92  
Similarly, nations, organisations and institutions will commonly prioritise the 
interests of their own members.   
A universal human dignity must, therefore, somehow be a more basic or 
fundamental form of value; it must have to transcend these factors.  There are 
important reasons for this, as highlighted by Dónal P. O’Mathúna, ‘a ballast is 
required to counterbalance such pressures [from social Darwinist type theories].  
The inherent dignity of all humans, no matter how disabled or at what stage of 
development, provides such a ballast.  Any sliding scale of human dignity 
inevitably leads to undignified treatment of those humans who don’t meet the 
standard of the day’ (O’Mathúna 2006).  Human dignity is often presented as a 
device to protect those who are most vulnerable, and the concern is that a 
failure to accord equal dignity to all humans will inevitably lead to a prioritisation 
of the interests of some humans over others.  As O’Mathúna warns: ‘without a 
robust adherence to the notion that all human life is dignified, and that human 
dignity is inherent and endowed, destruction of human life will increasingly be 
seen as the ethical answer to moral quandaries in medicine, nursing and 
biotechnology’ (O’Mathúna 2006).  The problem then is reconciling the idea that 
all humans are worthy of dignity with the idea that individual dignity rests on 
inherent capacities which merit this special status. 
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 As noted by Roger Fjellstrom, ‘even though most of us consent to equal human value, we 
typically think of people as good or bad, better or worse.  To many it would be revolting to say 
that, for instance, Mother Teresa and Adolf Hitler have the same basic ethical value’ (Fjellstrom 
2007, 98-9). 
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One of the most fundamental problems for an account of universal human 
dignity grounded on the possession of certain intrinsically valuable capacities, 
is, of course, that every human individual possesses these to varying degrees, 
and in some cases, do not possess them at all.  For instance, the severely 
cognitively impaired do not have the requisite faculties, and do not have the 
capacity to develop them in the future.  In contrast, foetuses and the very young 
lack many of the morally relevant characteristics now, but do have the potential 
to develop them at a later date.   Moreover, some individuals who may have 
previously had these capacities no longer do, perhaps due to a misfortune, such 
as the severely demented or those in a permanent vegetative state.  As we 
have seen in regards to great achievements, the problem is that not all humans 
are capable of such feats.  Humans are unequal in their possession of these 
dignity grounding capacities, with some not holding them to any degree.  
George Kateb asserts that nevertheless all humans are equal in worth and 
dignity, yet, he appears to assert this more than provide reasons why this can 
be the case.93 Moreover, as we have seen, there is growing awareness that 
many animals possess aspects of these capacities as well, including language 
use, self-consciousness, moral action, culture and rationality (Gruen 2010).  
They are not then entirely unique to the human species, which is perhaps to be 
expected given the evolutionary origin of so much of human behaviour and 
cognition. 
                                                          
93
  See, for instance: ‘There are people who are so disabled that they cannot function.  Does the 
idea of dignity apply to them?  Yes, they remain human beings in the most important respect.  If 
they cannot actively exercise many or any of their rights they nevertheless retain a right to life, 
whatever their incapacities (short of the most extreme failures of functioning).  They must be 
treated as human beings, not as subhuman or as animals or lumps of matter.  Clearly, however, 
the idea I explore puts functioning human beings at the center.  Nor do I wish to deny that the 
obvious differences between adults and children (potential adults) remain crucial’ (Kateb 2011, 
18-9), and also: ‘Yes, human beings are unequally endowed in their ability to initiate great 
deeds or create great works of mind and art, but they sustain what they cannot initiate or create.  
Their dignity, their equal individual status, is undamaged by their innate inequality in talent...’ 
(Kateb 2011, 185). 
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Persistent Problem of Marginal Cases 
 
As was noted in the previous chapter, the argument from marginal cases states 
that, if we are to be consistent and treat like cases alike, then two individuals 
who do not differ in the morally relevant aspects, should be accorded the same 
moral status.  What we do to one side, for moral consistency, we should do to 
the other.  Therefore, when a non-human’s morally important characteristics (for 
example, the capacity for self-consciousness, rationality, autonomy or language 
use) are equal to that of a human, we have two options:  (1) We raise the moral 
status of the non-human animal to that of the human (2) We lower the moral 
status of the human to that of the non-human.  If a chimpanzee is said to have 
as much cognitive ability as a human child then, for moral consistency, we 
should be willing to accord the chimpanzee the same moral status.  To treat 
both cases dissimilarly, when all the morally relevant aspects are the same, is 
said to be speciesist.  As is clear, this has serious implications for how we justify 
the treatment of animals and these ‘marginal cases’ of human life.   
The grounding capacities of moral status, and especially of personhood, are 
often seen as threshold or categorical concepts, with individuals either falling 
below or above meeting and exceeding the required line to have the requisite 
status.94  Interestingly, all those above the threshold level, and so worthy of 
personhood, are often considered to have the same status, regardless of how 
far they exceed that threshold (see Chapter 10 for a further discussion of this).  
We do not, as a general rule, think that we should rank people’s moral worth in 
order of intelligence (so long as they have the required minimum level).  This 
itself may be an area of concern, as it is not clear why capacities above the 
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 Although see, for instance, DeGrazia (2008) for a view of moral status as one of degree. 
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threshold level should be irrelevant.95  Similarly, human dignity, as used in its 
modern universal sense, is normally considered an all-or-nothing category; it is 
not something which comes in degrees.  All humans are said to have equal 
dignity.   However, the grounding capacities of dignity, if we are to preserve the 
idea of a universal human dignity, seemingly cannot work like this as some 
humans will inevitably fall below a certain criterion.   
A further difficulty, as noted by Tim Mulgan, is that not only do these individual 
capacities come in degrees (one can have more or less intelligence or 
autonomy) but what they are said to ground (personhood, moral status or 
dignity) are absolute or categorical (Mulgan 2004, 458-9).96  Indeed, it is unclear 
how precisely a categorical idea like universal human dignity can map onto or 
supervene on an entire spectrum of different individual abilities and capacities.  
This is not to say that a universal human dignity must be incorrect, but that it is 
difficult to see how it can be grounded on certain higher cognitive capacities. 
As Jeff McMahan highlights, there appears to be two main problems that need 
to be addressed before we can accord equal and universal moral status to all 
humans: ‘One is to defend the common sense view that all human beings are 
owed a form of consideration that is different from and higher than that which is 
owed to other animals.  The other is to show how that form of consideration can 
be owed equally to all human beings.  I will call these the “separation problem” 
and the “equality problem,” respectively’ (McMahan 2008, 84).  McMahan 
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 This is a point picked up by McMahan, amongst others: ‘How can it be that variations in the 
degree to which those capacities are developed in those above the threshold do not matter at 
all to the degree to which it is wrong to kill them?  If the possession of these capacities, or their 
possession above a certain level, is what is necessary for inclusion within the scope of the 
equal wrongness thesis, how could it be that the degree to which these capacities are 
developed above the threshold is entirely irrelevant?’ (McMahan 2008, 95). 
96
 McMahan also acknowledges this problem: ‘This is, in fact, an instance of a problem that has 
always plagued theories of human equality – namely that we are held to be normatively equal 
and our moral status is held to supervene upon facts about our nature, yet there are really no 
relevant respects in which we are by nature equal’ (McMahan 2008, 94-5). 
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consequently argues that a being’s moral status should be determined by 
certain higher level psychological capacities, which ultimately entails that it is 
impossible to clearly separate the consideration we should show to all humans 
compared to that of other animals, as there will always be some humans below 
the threshold, and some animals above it, however low we try to set it. 
The Species Norm 
 
Rather than look to an individual’s intrinsic capacities to determine their 
significance, an alternative is to turn to a group account – that is, one based on 
capacities or abilities typical of an individual’s membership in a particular group 
(biological or social), as well as their relationship with other individuals within 
that group. 
As was highlighted in the previous chapter, the species norm account proposes 
that there are certain morally significant attributes that are in the nature, 
characteristic or typical of a species, although they are not necessarily present 
in each individual member (see for instance Byrne 2000, 57-8).  Such an idea 
harks back to the Aristotelian essentialist idea of species being prime examples 
of natural kinds with essences.  In other words, species have some fundamental 
nature that constitutes them and, therefore, we can examine how close each 
individual is to its species ideal (Ereshefsky 2010). 
On the species norm account, moral considerability is a relational property, with 
each individual entitled to an equivalent moral status, in virtue of the fact that it 
is in the nature of the species to have the requisite capacities.  In this way, 
membership in the human species is of significance, regardless of whether or 
not the human individual in question actually has the relevant intrinsic 
properties.  Significantly, this entails that any human with a set of status-
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conferring capacities lower than that of a non-human animal (for example, 
intelligence or autonomy) will still have a higher moral status and significance.  
Thomas Scanlon, for example, puts forward a species norm position when he 
writes that: ‘the class of beings whom it is possible to wrong will include at least 
all those beings who are of a kind that is normally capable of judgement-
sensitive attitudes’ (Scanlon 1998, 186). 
However, as has been highlighted in regards to unqualified speciesism, it is not 
clear how the conclusion of the species norm account (that all humans ought to 
be accorded equal moral status) follows from its premise (that certain 
characteristics are typical of a biological species).  If species is a purely 
biological taxonomy, then it is not capable of being extrapolated to the moral 
sphere.  In the words of McMahan, ‘somehow membership in the same 
biological kind is supposed to produce the requisite moral alchemy...’ 
(McMahan 2008, 85).  In support of this concern, McMahan presents a thought 
experiment of a genetically altered ‘superchimp’, which comes to have the 
equivalent cognitive and emotional capacities to those of a ten year old human 
child (McMahan 2002, 147). According to the species norm account, because 
chimpanzees normally have a cognitive range below that of a ten year old child, 
it would be appropriate to treat this chimp like any other chimpanzee, in spite of 
its greater cognitive capacities.  Conversely, if we imagine that the population of 
superchimps continues to grow to the point where they outnumber the normal 
chimpanzees, the species norm account would demand that we should 
consequently treat the minority non-superchimpanzees as we would those 
chimpanzees with the higher cognitive abilities.  The intuition which McMahan is 
pulling at is that we should not base judgements about how an individual should 
be treated merely because of what is considered normal for its biological 
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grouping.  Instead, we should judge the moral status of each individual on their 
own intrinsic capacities. 
In response, Rahul Kumar has suggested that McMahan’s criticisms rely on an 
interpretation of the species norm account that focuses on what is merely 
statistical normal for a species.  Instead, Kumar argues that the species norm 
account may instead represent, ‘the essential nature of a living kind, revealing 
facts about the normal life-cycle of that kind of living thing.  The use of “normal” 
here is unashamedly normative.  Claims about the life-cycle of a particular kind 
of living thing, or species, are just constitutive of what it is to be a member of 
that species’ (Kumar 2008, 73).  If follows, therefore, ‘that what respect for the 
value of a living thing requires will depend on the characteristic lifecycle, or 
nature, of members of that species’ (Kumar 2008, 73).  Kumar offers the 
example of a seed, which we would normally consider to be the first stages in 
the life-cycle of a plant, and to understand this is to realise that it is in the nature 
of seeds to grow into plants, even if this particular seed fails to do so.  Kumar’s 
rebuttal to McMahan harks back to Aristotle’s argument in his Metaphysics, in 
which he argued that an acorn's intrinsic telos or ultimate purpose is to become 
an oak tree (see Cohen 2016).  In this way, each species has a certain nature 
or essence, and the telos or final cause of an individual living organism is to 
achieve this way of being.  
Similarly, certain capacities are normatively characteristic of the human species 
(such as autonomy, rationality or moral reasoning), which ought to be present in 
each individual member, as they are part of the natural human life-cycle, even if 
they sometimes fail to appear.  On the species norm account, those humans 
who lack these capacities are thus still entitled to the same respect and 
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consideration due to human individuals with fully functioning capacities.  A 
similar appeal has been made by Nussbaum who, on her capabilities approach, 
argues that 'we should bear in mind that any child born into a species has the 
dignity relevant to that species, whether or not it seems to have the "basic 
capabilities" relevant to that species...The species norm is evaluative...it does 
not simply read off norms from the way nature actually is. But once we have 
judged that a capability is essential for a life with human dignity, we have a very 
strong moral reason for promoting its flourishing and removing obstacles to it...' 
(Nussbaum 2006b, 347).   This species norm account shifts the emphasis away 
from Aristotelian species essentialism, and argues instead that the species 
norm account should be considered normative or evaluative, rather than strictly 
speaking a matter of statistical frequency or biological fact.  For Nussbaum, it 
seems it is ultimately a matter of judgement to decide which capabilities are 
necessary to live a life with dignity. 
However, contrary to Nussbaum, we may argue that the species norm account 
still seems to fail to fully address the reasons why, in the cases where there is 
clearly no potential to develop the characteristics or capabilities normal for the 
species, we should still accord them the same treatment as if they still did.  If we 
knew in advance that a seed would not develop into a plant and, despite our 
best efforts, we could not remedy that situation, we would have no reason to 
continue to treat it as if it did.97  For Aristotle, as noted by Hauskeller, if an 
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 Although there is little room to discuss the issue here, there is a large body of work around 
the role of misfortune and marginal cases, and how disability in humans requires a very different 
affinity to disability in other animals (see for instance Byrne 2000, 61; MacIntyre 1999, 100-1; 
McMahan 1996; and Steinbeck 1978; 255-6).  As Byrne explains: 'it would make no sense to 
say of a dog, which can do the things dogs typically do, that it was afflicted because it cannot do 
the things a human typically does...These thoughts fit in with the picture of something which has 
a nature damaged and hindered from flourishing..The structure and background to our thought 
involve us in thinking of this human being as one with us, not as a different creature.  As one of 
our kind, s/he deserves the respect due to beings of our kind and, despite the differences 
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organism loses or is prevented ‘from performing those actions which it is natural 
for it perform [it] is robbed of its identity or defining form, and this means nothing 
less than that it has been destroyed as this particular organism’ (Hauskeller 
2005, 68).  If a particular acorn failed to grow into an oak tree, then it would 
have also failed in its final purpose or telos for being and would, in effect, be a 
non-acorn.  This policy seemingly was also extended by Aristotle to human 
beings.  Indeed, he infamously proclaimed in his Politics that ‘as to the 
exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall 
live’ (Aristotle 1988, 182).  It has consequently been argued that, for Aristotle, 
human beings who are not able to attain virtue or excellence in accordance with 
reason (a trait Aristotle argued was unique and central to human nature) were 
closer in moral concern to nonhuman animals, than they were to humans who 
engaged successfully in reason (see Keith and Keith 2013 61-2).  Some writers, 
therefore, have argued that such individuals who fail to fulfil their telos have 
suffered an Aristotelian loss or misfortune (see Wilson 2005 for a discussion of 
this).  Aristotle’s account, therefore, does not seem to be a good candidate to 
help support a species norm account for moral status.98 
                                                                                                                                                                          
between us and him or her, we share a natural equality, possession of humanity, which is the 
basis of a moral equality’ (Byrne 2000, 61). 
98
 This is not to say that some writers have attempted to adapt Aristotle’s original theory to make 
it more palatable to marginal cases.  Garret Merriam, for instance, argues that to save Aristotle's 
account, one must both divest 'him of his mistaken biology' but also give 'him a dose of Stoic 
fortitude', so that 'once we have removed the species-standard as a barometer for judging 
human flourishing we are left with nothing other than individual circumstances. When assessing 
those circumstances we must take into account the biological facts of the individual, as well as 
the cognitive, psychological, social and esoteric factors that come together to compose their life.  
This vision of eudemonia still adheres to the Aristotelian notion that "anything that lives can live 
well or live poorly" while also avoiding the species essentialism that plagues Aristotle's literal 
theory' (Merriam 2010, 136).  A similar adapted Aristotelian approach has been proposed by 
Michael Hauskeller: ‘whether we should grant all living organisms a telos and whether we 
should respect this telos, is less a matter of fact than a matter of value. It is part of a certain way 
of looking at the world. And looking at the world through the eyes of Aristotelian biology may, 
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This impasse seems to be due to the fact that we have two different, and 
competing, accounts of how we are to judge the significance of being human: 
(1) an individualistic account, based on the premise that we can compare the 
intrinsic properties between individuals to determine their moral status, versus 
(2) a group account, whereby it is the relational ties between individuals that 
determines their moral significance, rather than each individual’s own intrinsic 
characteristics or abilities.  As we highlighted in the previous chapter, 
proponents of the social bondedness model, for example, base moral 
considerability on the complex and interwoven nature of our social relationships 
(which are often, but not necessarily, dictated by our species membership).  
McMahan’s thought experiment of the superchimp fails, on this account, 
because the chimpanzee is in ‘tragic…isolation from his fellow creatures and his 
ill-suited embodiment—a high price to pay for its cognitive upgrade’ 
(Wasserman et al. 2013a; see also Kittay 2005). 
Conclusion 
 
In many ways, the cognitive capacities which have so often been thought to 
demonstrate the significance of being human, such as language use, rationality 
or reflective self-consciousness, appear ill-suited to ground, and to continue to 
promote, a universal sense of human dignity, which applies equally to all 
humans, including those on the margins of life.  As we have seen, humans 
possess these dignity grounding capacities to varying degrees, with some not at 
all, whilst many non-human animals do possess them, sometimes to a 
remarkable degree.  This has led some philosophers to reject the idea that 
dignity could be a property possessed by all human beings (Cochrane 2010, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
after all, be itself a moral decision, something which we feel we owe the living beings which 
happen to cross our human ways’ (Hauskeller 2005, 73). 
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237). This goes some way in explaining the contortions that Kateb undergoes in 
trying to link up inherent capacities with a universal sense of human dignity: 
‘...human beings are unequal in their possession of those uniquely human 
characteristics that conduce to great achievements, even though all people 
possess these characteristics to some degree’ (Kateb 2011, 175).  As we have 
seen, this is clearly not the case as not all humans do possess these 
characteristics.  Such accounts of universal dignity, their critics argue, gloss 
over the problems that we encounter on the so-called ‘margins of life’, and for 
some thinkers, such as Rachels and McMahan, this should lead us instead to a 
moral individualistic account, whereby moral status is based on an individual’s 
intrinsic properties, and not on group membership (especially not species 
membership).  
However, perhaps this insistence on the need to identify significant capacities 
possessed by all human beings to justify a universal human dignity is entirely 
wrongheaded.  An alternative is to move beyond this narrow range of capacities 
traditionally offered to ground the significance of being human, and look instead 
to a broader spectrum of categories that may be said to be representative of 
what we mean when we speak of the significance of being human – as Mary 
Midgley points out, after all we are ‘bond-forming creatures, not abstract 
intellects’ (Midgley 1984, 101-2).  These alternative accounts of the significance 
of being human are most often socially constructed concepts, rooted in our 
language and social practices, and seem to be more closely allied to what we 
mean when we speak of our shared humanity (see for instance Luban 2009; 
Anderson 2004; Gaita 2004; Mulhall 2002; Kittay 1999; Benson 1978; and 
Diamond 1978).  Such an account of the significance of being human seems a 
more natural home for a concept such as dignity.  In the next section we will 
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look at other, less demanding and more inclusive capacities and attributes, such 
as vulnerability, communication, the ability to value and care, and the potential 
to be humiliated, which may in fact be better placed for grounding a universal 
human dignity. 
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Chapter 8  Vulnerability, Humiliation and Care: A Relational Account of 
Human Dignity 
 
When I say you can’t just wave your hand and say “and so on,” it’s 
because there is so much to being human.  There’s the touch, there’s the 
feel, there’s the hug, there’s the smile,...there are so many ways of 
interacting.  I don’t think you need philosophy for this.  You need a very 
good writer...[T]his is why I just reject...[the]...idea that you base moral 
standing on a list of cognitive capacities, or psychological capacities, or 
any kind of capacities.  Because what it is to be human is not a bundle of 
capacities. It’s a way that you are, a way you are in the world, a way you 
are with another (Kittay 2009, 621). 
 
Introduction 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, at base, there are two types of 
account for grounding the significance and, by extension, dignity of being 
human.  The first deals in certain individually-based, morally worthy capacities 
which are necessary for full moral status (FMS).  At one extreme is the concept 
of moral individualism and the idea that each individual is only as morally 
significant as the capacities that they possess.  In contrast, a more commonly 
cited and moderate account argues that an individual’s capacities have only to 
meet a certain minimum level or threshold to be accorded FMS.  What precisely 
these capacities should be, and where this level is set, remains highly 
contentious.  Nevertheless, on this account, it is clear that some humans (and 
perhaps all animals), will always fail to reach the requisite level for FMS.   
For this reason, some have insisted that merely belonging to the species Homo 
sapiens is sufficient reason to accord a special status, and justification need go 
no further than that (Egonsson 1998; Wertheimer 1974).  There is then a dignity 
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possessed by all human beings qua human beings.  However, as has been 
highlighted by Singer and others, this seems a particularly arbitrary or 
‘speciesist’ place to rest our justification.  What is it about a purely biological 
category that accords such a special privileging of human interests?  On this 
view, ‘species’ is purely a biological term, and so morally neutral, and one 
cannot, therefore, derive any normative or moral statement from this fact.  To 
avoid such an unjustified prejudice we must be able to give further reasons in 
support of the claim that humans deserve a unique status (Singer 2009, 573).99  
For, as suggested, if we cannot provide a valid reason why there is a sharp 
dividing line between all humans and other animals, then the use of ‘human 
dignity’ seems to be little more than a thinly veiled, unjustified prejudice (a form 
of ‘unqualified speciesism’, as we have seen in Chapter 6).  On the other hand, 
if we are to continue to promote the idea of a universal human dignity, shared 
by all humans, than we seem to need to also look beyond individual capacities 
and abilities, as there seem to be no morally commendable capacities that are 
shared by all humans, but no other animals.  As was demonstrated in the 
previous chapters, the capacities often cited as grounding human dignity, for 
example autonomy, rationality, complex language use, or moral reflection are 
too demanding to ground a universal human dignity.  
  
                                                          
99
 As Singer argues: ‘There is another claim that one often hears: that humans and no others 
have intrinsic worth and dignity, and this is why humans have superior status.  This is really just 
a piece of rhetoric unless it is given some support.  What is it about human beings that gives 
them moral worth and dignity?  If there is no good answer forthcoming, this talk of intrinsic worth 
and dignity is just speciesism in nicer terms.  I do not see any argument in the claim that merely 
being a member of the species Homo sapiens gives you moral worth and dignity, whereas 
being a member of the species Pan troglodytes (chimpanzees) does not give you worth and 
dignity.  Something more would need to be said’ (Singer 2009, 573). 
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The Relational Account 
 
The second account of how human dignity is justified looks instead at the 
relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend individual capacities 
and abilities.  This approach consequently does not require that all individuals in 
the group need meet a minimum required capacity for FMS.  Significantly then, 
those humans who, on the traditional approach, are placed on the so-called 
‘margins of life,’ are brought back into the centre of the moral community.  
However, this is not to say that human dignity is derived merely from being 
related biologically to other members of the human species.  As Helga Kuhse 
has pointed out, such claims are ‘near-tautological’ and something more would 
have to be said to justify this special status (Kuhse 2000, 69-7).  The relational 
account, rather, looks at the significance of certain social factors and 
relationships, including features such as communication (Bérubé 1996), 
vulnerability and dependence (MacIntyre 1999; Goodin 1985), as well as the 
ability to engage in caring relationships (Held 2005; Kittay 1999).  It is these 
relational ties between humans, it is argued, which distinguish us most clearly 
from other non-human animals, and accords humans a special moral worth and 
dignity (see for instance Francis and Norman 1978).100   
Dignity, on this view, is both made and challenged in the social realm.101  For 
Elizabeth Anderson, as was highlighted in Chapter 6, dignity is largely to do with 
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 According to these authors: ‘...what are important are the relations in which human beings 
stand to one another, and that with few exceptions they do not stand in the same relations to 
animals...The combined effect of these relations is to bind all human beings together into a 
single overall community of a morally significant kind.  And this explains why being biologically 
human has seemed on the surface to be a more morally plausible differentiating property than 
being of a particular race’ (Francis and Norman 1978, 518).  
101
 Schachter, for example, suggests that, ‘...human dignity involves a complex notion of the 
individual. It includes recognition of a distinct personal identity, reflecting individual autonomy 
and responsibility. It also embraces a recognition that the individual self is a part of larger 
collectivities and that they, too, must be considered in the meaning of the inherent dignity of the 
person’ (Schachter 1983, 851). 
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making both other humans, as well as animals, decent for human society, so 
that we are able to live with and relate to one another within our common life 
(Anderson 2004, 283).  Anderson uses the example of a patient suffering from 
severe dementia, who despite not having possession of her mental faculties, 
dignity nevertheless requires that she is toileted, cleaned, dressed and cared for 
appropriately, so that her body is 'dignified, protected from the realm of disgust, 
and placed in a cultural space of decency’ (Anderson 2004, 282).  Human 
dignity, on this account then, is both tied to our membership of the human 
species, and independent of an individual’s intrinsic capacities. 
As highlighted by John Benson, there are certain relationships we have with 
other individuals which result from being members of the same species, and so 
marginal humans are members of the moral community in ways that animals 
with similar capacities cannot be: 
...to think of oneself as human is not to think of the biological 
classification one falls into, but to think of oneself as a point in a network 
of overlapping relations, actual and possible, with other individuals. My 
concern for other people begins with natural affection towards kin, 
friends, colleagues and so on, and is extended by recognizing other 
human beings as potential reciprocating objects of the same affections 
(Benson 1978, 536). 
On Benson’s account, to be human is something over and above simply 
belonging to the human species, but is rather a product of our complex social 
relations with others.  It is from our ‘natural affections’ towards our immediate 
social networks that our concern for other human beings springs (or should 
spring).  This relational account, therefore, takes a more holistic approach to 
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establishing the proposed special significance of being human, by embracing a 
wider and more diverse range of human experiences to justify this claim, and so 
offers a far richer account of both what makes us human, and why that is of 
special significance.  Moreover, this approach acknowledges the role that 
others can and often do have in treating someone with respect and as worthy of 
special consideration and dignity.   
This is not to say that relational factors are the only important features for moral 
status, although some ethicists have argued that they are (Callicott 1989; 
Noddings 1984).  Intrinsic properties can still play a role, albeit one which is 
tempered by an acknowledgement of the significance of our relations.102 Mary 
Anne Warren, for instance, argues that to have any meaningful part in a social 
community the individual must at least have the capacity for sentience. Those 
humans who will never be capable of consciousness, such as anencephalic 
infants, and those who have permanently and irretrievably lost this capacity, are 
members in little more than name only (Warren 1997, 166).  This is an example 
of perhaps how a universal human dignity isn’t entirely universal, and might 
allow for the possibility of including non-humans as well.  Nevertheless, this 
relational perspective of the significance of being human encompasses a far 
broader range of potentially morally worthy features than is offered by the 
traditional class of higher cognitive capacitates, and so has the potential to bring 
into the fold many of the ‘marginal cases’, which are left out by the traditional 
accounts of moral considerability.  The group account, therefore, acts to accord 
moral status to a wider group of individuals, although perhaps still not all.   
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 What has been called a ‘multi-criterial account’ of moral status in the words of Mary Anne 
Warren (Warren 1997, 148-178). 
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Significantly, this alternative approach appears more naturally aligned with the 
concept of human dignity, as it treats the idea of the ‘human being’ as not 
merely a biological category, but one which is rooted in a complex web of social 
practices and meaning.  The term ‘human’ then on this account is coextensive, 
but not necessarily tied, to the biological category Homo sapiens.  To use the 
word human, is not only to describe a member of the species Homo sapiens, 
but also encapsulates many of the aspects which make us what we are, and 
inherent within the concept itself are certain implicit ways of behaving and 
treating our fellow humans.103  The term ‘human being’, on this account, is a so-
called ‘thick evaluative concept’; that is, one which has both a descriptive 
content, and a rich evaluative element.  There are certain social practices which 
partially constitute what it means to be a human, what a human being is (and by 
extension is not).  When we say something is ‘human’ we are not only giving a 
biological description, but a normative account of how it should and should not 
be treated – there are then certain actions which should not be done to 
humans.104 
In the words of Stephen Mulhall, ‘to see another as a human being is to see her 
as a fellow-creature—another being whose embodiment embeds her in a 
distinctive form of common life with language and culture, and whose existence 
constitutes a particular kind of claim on us’ (Mulhall 2002). This common life 
also demands certain behaviours and prohibits others; human beings are to be 
named, and not eaten, for instance (Herrmann 2011; Diamond 1978).  Indeed, 
as pointed out by Nel Noddings, people who work with animals destined to be 
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 Darwall, for instance, writes that ‘respect is the fitting response to dignity...’ (Darwall 2006, 
120).  Although for Darwall, this is a respect due only to ‘free and rational’ persons or agents, 
and so not all humans.   
104
 ‘To be human, as those who have suffered the effects of dehumanization will testify, is first 
and foremost to be included within the community of human beings, to be recognized and 
accepted as part of this community and thus deserving of its protection’ (Oliver 2011, 96). 
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used for food are advised to not name the animal, as ‘naming a creature and 
eating it seem symptomatic of betrayal.  By naming it, we confer a special 
status upon it and, if we would be ethical, we must then honor that status’ 
(Noddings 1984, 157). Such acts are a form of respect for the human being.  
The concept of a ‘pet’ or companion animal, acknowledges the fact that, whilst 
we do have certain obligations to their care and well-being, the boundaries of 
what is considered necessary for our duties towards them is more limited in 
scope (see Chapter 11 for a discussion of this). 
Dignity and Humanity   
 
A key component or essence of dignity, on this view then, is its connection with 
the notion of humanity and humaneness (Nordenfelt 2003b, 104-107; Byrne 
2000, 154-6; and Johnson 1998, 342).  Virtues such as empathy, kindness, 
humility and charity are archetypical humane qualities, and to treat someone in 
such a manner is to show them a high level of respect.  Moreover, many of the 
cognitively disabled, for instance, who would struggle to meet the cognitive 
levels for full moral status on the traditional account, are highly responsive to 
such treatment, and capable of demonstrating these qualities themselves.105 
The relational account, therefore, acknowledges human weaknesses and 
fragility, as well as moments of strength and aptitude.   
There are, however, acute conceptual difficulties with grounding human dignity 
in this sense of ‘mere’ humanity, and an adequate account of human dignity 
grounded in this relational account must be able to address these concerns.  
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 As noted by Byrne: ‘There is nothing in the cognitively disabled which will suffice to establish 
their equal worth with typically functioning human beings other than their humanity.  It is in the 
light of the humanity they share with us that we must say they are our moral equals’ (Byrne 
2000, 50). 
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Humanity is often presented as an all encompassing term, much like dignity, in 
the sense that it expresses many of the most positive aspects of the human 
experience, yet the terms ‘humanity’ and ‘humaneness’ appear to be particularly 
vague notions.  Indeed, in contrast to the capacities cited by the traditional 
approach, which in some cases, such as intelligence, are capable of being 
quantified and measured, ‘humanity’ has no real defined limits or boundaries, 
and is open to continual challenge and revision.  Nevertheless, its supporters 
will insist that this is due to the inherent complexity and richness of what it 
means to be a human.   
A second related issue concerns the fact that this humanist account leaves 
open critical questions about who precisely is covered  and how far the 
boundaries of the thick concept of ‘human being’ extends (Wasserman et al. 
2013a).  Whilst the relational account of moral considerability is certainly more 
inclusive, it still does not necessarily encompass all members of the human 
species.  As we have seen in Warren’s account, for instance, those without the 
capacity for sentience are not full members of the social community, and so it 
excludes a range of humans, including anencephalic infants, and those in a 
Permanent Vegetative State (Warren 1997, 166).  Moreover, ‘humanness’ 
seems to encompass qualities which, although prevalent in the human sphere, 
are certainly not restricted to the human community.  Indeed, it seems entirely 
possible that other beings, including other animals, are capable of such humane 
acts as empathy, care and communication, and many do strive to treat non-
humans humanely, aware of the animal’s vulnerability and capacity to suffer.  
However, as Peter Byrne has flagged up, to claim that humans have a special 
status is to still leave the question open as to whether or not other beings may 
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also have a special status.  To be ‘human’, on this view, therefore, is a 
sufficient, but not necessary condition for moral status (Byrne 2000, 51). 
In an at least partial reply to these objections, one of the most fruitful methods 
for understanding the role and nature of dignity and its relationship to humanity 
is to look at its many violations, what has been termed a ‘negative approach to 
human dignity’ (Kaufmann et al. 2011, 2; see also Stoecker 2011, 11).   Indeed, 
by taking as our starting point instances, such as humiliation, slavery, torture, 
rape, and other so-called ‘crimes against humanity’, we often have the clearest 
indicators of what dignity in fact is.106 
Dehumanization 
 
The nature and role of humaneness can often be best seen when contrasted 
with its complete absence – dehumanization, that is to treat someone in such a 
way as to deprive them either partially or wholly of human qualities, or to treat 
them as if they do not have these qualities.  It is, in many respects, a form of 
social exclusion, and can take many forms, from the extreme to the more mild 
or everyday occurrence.107  Indeed, the act of denying the human status to an 
individual or group in cases of murder, rape, genocide and other atrocities are 
well documented, and it is frequently argued that such acts are often only 
possible when the perpetrator(s) perceive their victims as sub- or inhuman and 
outside the scope of moral responsibility (Oliver 2011, 93; see also Levi 
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 As Schachter noted, ‘...it has been generally assumed that a violation of human dignity can 
be recognized even if the abstract term cannot be defined. “I know it when I see it even if I 
cannot tell you what it is”’ (Schachter 1983, 849). 
107
 As noted by Oliver, ‘...even apparently minor violations of physical integrity – the shaving of 
the head – can be felt as humiliating and dehumanizing because of what they come to 
represent, namely, the loss of personal and public autonomy’ (Oliver 2011, 91).  See also, 
Primo Levi who describes the look he was given by one of the concentration camp doctors, 
‘...which came as if across the glass window of an aquarium between two beings who live in 
different worlds...’ (Levi 1987, 111). 
178 
 
1987).108  The act of dehumanization is, in Eva Feder Kittay’s words, ‘to reduce 
the human to the non-human, to strip away those aspects of human beings that 
connect these human beings more closely to other human animals than to 
nonhuman animals’ (Kittay 2009, 612).   
Herbert C. Kelman insightfully explained how acts of dehumanization work to 
deprive the individual of both their identity as an autonomous individual, as well 
as their place in a community, that is someone who, in Kelman’s words, is ‘part 
of an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other, who 
recognize each other’s individuality, and who respect each other’s rights’ 
(Kelman 1973, 49).  On Kelman’s view, the presence of these two qualities are 
necessary for others to perceive a person as fully human, and part of the wider 
human community.  Conversely, a lack of both these features ensures that 
humane qualities such as empathy, compassion or leniency become 
increasingly difficult to maintain towards them, and raises the risk that the 
individual or group in question will be treated severely and often fatally.  It 
seems clear, therefore, that one important way of promoting human dignity is in 
the act of reaffirming the perceived humanity of the individual or group, and to 
offer a base of resistance to threats against their human status.  If their 
humanity is not upheld, then this increased vulnerability ensures it is all too 
easy for their treatment by others to rapidly deteriorate.  This point is particularly 
salient for those human beings, such as the mentally handicapped, foetuses 
and the very young or old, whose moral status has been, rightly or wrongly, 
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  Indeed, as pointed out by Rosen, ‘one of the features that have characterized many of the 
most violent and destructive acts of the twentieth century has been the humiliation and symbolic 
degradation of the victims...It seems to be a fact about human nature that human beings are 
able more easily to engage in the most violent behaviour towards one another if at the same 
time they can expressively deny the humanity of their victims.  If this is so then the preservation 
of our fellow human beings from dignitary harm is also fundamental to the defense of their 
humanity’ (Rosen 2012b, 97). 
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debated so intensely within contemporary ethics.  Although, as noted by Sophie 
Oliver, the limits of what is considered dehumanizing behaviour are sometimes 
both historically and culturally dependent, and often controversial in less clear 
cut cases (Oliver 2011, 87). 
Moreover, Kelman noted that it is not only the victim who becomes 
dehumanized, but the victimizer themselves, as they can also lose both their 
sense of identity (particularly those who act on the orders of a higher authority) 
and community, and consequently begin to find it increasingly difficult to ‘act as 
a moral being’ (Kelman 1973, 51).  Conversely, one can point out that some 
victimizers might also strengthen their embeddedness in a certain community 
by committing these acts, in which failure to do so would lose their place in that 
community. 
The Minimum Core of Human Dignity 
 
From these preliminary insights into the nature of dehumanization, it is possible, 
consequently, to draw some positive claims as to what human dignity is, and 
what it means to treat someone as if they have a dignity.  In particular, to 
propose that someone has a dignity is often said to make certain claims about 
the worth or value of an individual and how they should be treated (with respect, 
attention and care, amongst others), and the prohibition of other actions (such 
as torture, humiliation or rape).  Christopher McCrudden has identified this 
sentiment as the minimum core of human dignity.  The first ‘ontological’ element 
of which is that ‘...every human being possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by 
being human’, and the second ‘relational’ claim ‘is that this intrinsic worth should 
be recognized and respected by others, and some forms of treatment by others 
are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for this intrinsic worth’ (McCrudden 
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2008, 679).  As can be seen, at the most fundamental level, dignity not only 
bestows a particular significance to the individual, but this significance is also 
partially dependent on, or at least affected by, the relational context that the 
individual finds themselves in. 
Interestingly, McCrudden himself argues that this minimum core ends up an 
‘empty shell’ once one attempts to apply the concept to specific examples: 
‘when the concept comes to be applied the appearance of commonality 
disappears, and human dignity (and with it human rights) is exposed as 
culturally relative, deeply contingent on local politics and values, resulting in 
significantly diverging, even conflicting, conceptions’ (McCrudden 2008, 298).  
However, as Carozza has pointed out, even if the application of this minimum 
core may be unhelpful in more contested areas, within say abortion, gene 
therapy or euthanasia, the role of the minimum core still has a fundamental 
importance in clearer cut cases of inhuman or degrading treatment, such as 
torture, extrajudicial killings, genocide, arbitrary detentions, and so on (Carozza 
2008, 936).  Indeed, this minimum core is often the most fundamental and 
important aspect of the concept for many of the most vulnerable members of 
society who rely on it for both their protection and promotion of their interests. 
Universal Human Dignity 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, the idea of a dignity shared by all humans 
(encapsulated by the German word Menschenwürde) has been the cornerstone 
of international human rights since the drafting of the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, echoing Cicero’s original conception of dignitas as 
representative of humanity’s elevated position in relation to the rest of the 
natural world.  However, unlike Cicero, the contemporary perspective has 
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conceived of dignity as representative of the special worth and value of all 
humans (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 15).  As Roberto Andorno highlights, 
‘...respect for human dignity and human rights rests upon the belief in the 
existence of a truly universal moral community comprising all human beings’ 
(Andorno 2013, 137).  This modern account has often conceived of dignity as 
both inherent (United Nations 1976a, 1948) and inviolable (European 
Convention 2000; Basic Law 1949), that is, whilst it can be challenged, it cannot 
be taken away or completely lost.  Moreover, it is an attribute or quality that is 
shared in equal measure (United Nations 1948).  In this way, dignity is said to 
not be determined by individual merit or social rank, nor is it something which 
comes in degrees, but is shared equally between all (Nordenfelt 2004, 78).109 
A similar approach has been adopted by Jeremy Waldron, who has attempted 
to link both the Ancient model of human dignity as a noble social rank with 
dignity in the modern universal sense, by arguing that the modern conception is 
merely a refocusing of the ancient conception so that every human is now said 
to have a ‘high and equal rank’ (Waldron 2012a, 33).  Waldron’s account is 
useful in the way it captures this dual sense of dignity as both bestowing its 
possessor a high degree of respect or worth, whilst also having an equalising 
effect between each individual.  In other words, dignity has become a form of 
‘universal nobility’ that not only raises the human species over the rest of nature 
but also equalises each human (Waldron 2012a, 22).  Thus, whilst acts of 
dehumanization lower the status of the individual, dignity raises it.   
One may question whether there is a real difference between a rank equally 
distributed to everyone, and having no rank at all.  After all, there are many 
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 Mattson and Clark have rather disparagingly suggested that ‘in virtually all the international 
declarations, policy makers have cut the Gordian knot simply by declaring that all humans have 
dignity, or by asserting the ultimate “value” of dignity’ (Mattson and Clark 2011, 307). 
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things, be they attractiveness, shoe size or sporting prowess that, if everyone 
has them to the same degree, seem to lose their worth, or at least, add nothing 
more to the claim that the individual has a unique value.  Their value seems to 
be mostly positional.  However, universal dignity, like universal human rights, 
does seem to behave differently, as it accords each one a minimum level of 
respect and protection.  As Waldron outlines: ‘High status can be universalized 
and still remain high, as each of an array of millions of people regards him- or 
herself (and all of the others) as a locus of respect, as a self-originating source 
of legal and moral claims...and—if I may be permitted a paradox—we all look up 
to each other from a position of upright equality...that is the shape of the 
principle of dignity that we’re committed to’ (Waldron 2012b, 60).110  In this way, 
the value of dignity is not thought to be merely positional but, like intelligence, is 
of value in itself. 
A further criticism concerns how we can justify a universal sense of human 
dignity, when there are individuals who do not seem to merit it, and if we really 
believe that all humans are of equal worth.  To claim that a mass murderer or 
war criminal has an equal worth or value to a law abiding citizen seems both 
unfair and absurd.  Moreover, problems still exist on the so-called ‘margins of 
life’ and to whom precisely human dignity applies (see McCrudden 2008, 711).  
For these reasons, Singer has labelled the idea that all human life is absolutely 
equal to each other as ‘a kind of “official morality” that is often applied in 
statements about people with cognitive disabilities.  Most people pay lip service 
to it, though I’m not sure how many really hold it when it comes to the crunch’ 
(Singer 2009, 571).  Indeed, although universal human dignity is a noble 
                                                          
110
 Although McCrudden is cautious of how successful Waldron’s rebuttal is: ‘the idea that we 
can generalize high status privileges may misunderstand the nature of the privilege in question; 
at least some privileges require there to be inequality...Finally, equal status is seldom presented 
as a comprehensive theory of dignity, even by its supporters...' (McCrudden 2013, 42-43). 
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principle, and is a useful ideal as to how we ought to behave and treat our 
fellow humans, when pressed, many people would find it difficult to accept its 
conclusions.  Similarly, many of the problems we have encountered in analysing 
human dignity, especially in relation to marginal cases, could be avoided if we 
abandoned the notion of a universal human dignity.  The question remains then 
why should we continue to hold on to it?  As we will see, there are significant 
conceptual hurdles to overcome in defending a conception of human dignity 
which is said to be both inviolable and universal in nature. 
Vulnerability 
 
Along with autonomy, integrity, and dignity, in the last few decades the concept 
of vulnerability has become one of the key principles within bioethics, especially 
within the European context (see Rendtorff 2002).111 In particular, there have 
been a number of European legal documents that have flagged up the 
importance of giving special protection to vulnerable individuals in research.112  
Clause 19 of the current World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 
(2013), for instance, states that: ‘some groups and individuals are particularly 
vulnerable and may have an increased likelihood of being wronged or of 
incurring additional harm. All vulnerable groups and individuals should receive 
specifically considered protection’ (WMA 2013, 4).  This emphasis on 
vulnerability in terms of the degree of autonomy of the subject, and an inability 
to protect one’s own interests has been widely supported (WHO 2011, 43; 
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 Indeed, as pointed out by Ruof, this classification of vulnerability can have significant 
ramifications: ‘In medical research and health policy, vulnerability is an abstract concept that 
has concrete effects both for those labeled vulnerable and for those not. Clinical researchers, 
healthcare workers, ethical reviewers, and policymakers must be able to identify vulnerable 
subjects to establish how healthcare resources will be allocated and who will qualify for special 
protections and socialized benefits’ (Ruof 2004, 412). 
112
 See for instance: WHO (2011); Council of Europe (2005); UNESCO (2005); Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics (2002); Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (2002); and 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2001). 
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Macklin 2003b, 474; and CIOMS 2002, 11-12),113 and it is a common concern in 
clinical research, whereby vulnerable test subjects are those that are unable to 
‘...give informed consent or who are susceptible to coercion' (Ruof 2004, 411-2). 
This is no doubt true, as those with the least amount of autonomy are often 
consequently the most vulnerable.  However, this seems also especially true of 
animal test subjects who are both unable to give consent and are often easily 
coerced into actions, for example in medical research or farming practices, 
which would be considered to be against their best interests.  The difficulty with 
linking up vulnerability with a specific human dignity is that vulnerability seems 
to be a universal condition of all life, not just human.  Whilst vulnerability can be 
reduced, as we see suggested in the human enhancement debate (see Chapter 
9), it perhaps still cannot be eradicated entirely.  Why then should a specific 
human dignity result from it?  One reply concerns the specific types of 
vulnerability that humans alone are susceptible to.  In particular, it is argued that 
there are certain forms of vulnerability which can only arise within human 
societal relations and practices. 
On one level all humans are vulnerable – we are all susceptible to disease, 
disability, suffering, injury and a host of other weaknesses, and at certain stages 
of life, be they at infancy or old age, we are especially in need of care and 
protection.  Even those we would normally consider to be fully independent and 
less in need of help can become the most vulnerable due to sudden illness; 
becoming a refugee or homeless, for example.  In this sense, vulnerability 
appears to be a universal characteristic of the human condition (Ricoeur 2005, 
1992; Rendtorff 2002, 237; and MacIntyre 1999).  However, often when we 
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 Ruth Macklin, for instance, defines vulnerability as ‘...those who are relatively (or absolutely) 
incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient power, 
intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own 
interests’ (Macklin 2003b, 474). 
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speak of vulnerability we are referring to specific vulnerable groups or 
individuals and the special attention and protection that they require.  The most 
vulnerable populations are often in need of the most protection and support 
and, as Robert E. Goodin has pointed out, vulnerability plays an important role 
in generating special responsibilities to one another (Goodin 1985, 107).  That 
these individuals or groups require particular consideration is not due to any 
intrinsic capacity they may or may not have, but because of their vulnerability.  
Indeed, we often feel a greater disgust and horror at inhumane acts against 
highly vulnerable individuals (such as infants, the handicapped, as well as to 
other animals).  Interestingly, this goes against the grain of much philosophical 
discussion, which has often presupposed that moral considerability should 
increase in line with the individual’s level of autonomy or intelligence, for 
instance.  Michael H. Kottow, therefore, has distinguished between vulnerability 
(a universal human condition, whereby one is not currently at risk, but still 
fragile and capable of being damaged) and susceptibility (individuals already 
injured or handicapped in some way, and so with an increased predisposition 
for harm) (Kottow 2003, 464).114   
How then is human dignity related to vulnerability, especially if vulnerability is 
characterised by degree and dignity is not?  Only a few writers have explicitly 
linked the concept of vulnerability and dignity together (see for instance, 
Bergoffen 2012; Neal 2012; and Harris 1997).  Neal focuses on the first form of 
vulnerability, that is, a universal vulnerability that is part of the human condition.  
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 Gilson, similarly, distinguishes between two fundamental types of vulnerability, the first or 
ontological vulnerability, refers to the fact that it is a universal, unavoidable condition of all 
humankind (as well as for that matter, all life).  The second, is a situational vulnerability, which is 
the specific forms vulnerability ‘...takes in the social world...[including] psychological/emotional, 
corporeal, economic, political, and legal vulnerabilities...’ (Gilson 2014, 37).  Only the latter, 
Gilson argues, is unavoidable. 
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It is this universal vulnerability, Neal believes, that grounds human dignity and 
acts as its ‘organizing idea’.  Unlike other ethical principles, such as autonomy 
and integrity, she argues that only dignity gives vulnerability a ‘place of honour’.  
Universal vulnerability, for Neal, refers to our capacity and susceptibility to 
suffering.  In particular, we are all vulnerable because we both 1) depend upon 
the co-operation of others to pursue and achieve our needs and ends, and 2) 
we are all susceptible to harm.  In contrast to this fragile, restricted side of the 
human condition, Neal argues that we are also beings who ‘strive for—and 
achieve—the sublime, the awe-inspiring, and the transcendent’ (Neal 2012, 
194).  It is this dualism, she argues, that is central to our humanity and to our 
human dignity.  However, rather than attempt to maximize the transcendental 
part of human nature, and minimize the vulnerable aspect, Neal argues that one 
should hold both in equilibrium.  As she argues: ‘We do not magnify our dignity 
by fetishizing the transcendent at the expense of the material, or vice 
versa…say, to ignore immediate physical needs such as cleanliness or 
adequate nutrition…as it would be willingly to allow oneself to become so utterly 
dominated by concern for these material needs that “transcendent” pursuits 
such as work, friendship, love and art become impossible’ (Neal 2012, 194). 
One of the main problems of Neal’s account of vulnerability is the fact that it 
struggles to ground a universal human dignity.  If dignity is representative of the 
balancing between the finite and the transcendent, it is clear that many humans 
do not, and some cannot, display this equilibrium.  Indeed, it makes little sense 
to say that a patient with advanced dementia was treated without dignity 
because they failed to uphold an existential balance between the 
transcendental and finite aspects of their nature.  Neal suggests that the 
transcendental aspect could include performing the task of cleaning and 
187 
 
personal care of the patient with sensitivity, and ‘facilitating visits by family and 
friends’.  However, this seems far removed from the description of the 
transcendental as being sublime, or awe-inspiring, and instead seems closer to 
attending to the patient’s fragility, and finite needs.  The account, therefore, fails 
to fully explain the wrongness of many cases of dignity violation.  Neal 
acknowledges this difficulty with her account, however, she points out that ‘this 
is a problem only for those who insist on using dignity in this first sense, to 
signify universal, intrinsic worth of the kind necessary, for example, to ground 
universal human rights’ (Neal 2012, 195).  Surprisingly, despite acknowledging 
that a universal human dignity is one of the most widely used conceptions of 
dignity, including within human rights discourse, Neal suggests it might be best 
to drop the concept, and use a different ethical principle (such as sanctity-of-life) 
to justify the intrinsic worth of all human beings (rather than instead change her 
own account to better explain what dignity in fact is).  Rather, Neal’s account of 
dignity is closer to what we would consider dignified behaviour, or acting with 
dignity.115  
Despite having a so-called minimum ‘core’ (that every human being possesses 
an intrinsic worth, which should be recognized and respected), as pointed out 
by many commentators, an individual’s human dignity is not impervious to 
attack, and is always still at risk of being violated or challenged.  Even 
individuals who have a high degree of autonomy and can protect their own 
interests are capable of suffering from dehumanizing acts, and consequently 
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 Karpowicz et al. picks out the same distinction when they write that: ‘Having human dignity is 
conceptually distinct from behaving and bearing oneself in a dignified manner.  Dignified 
comportment is a contingent feature displayed by some humans who respond to untoward 
circumstance in a noble and uplifting manner.  Such individuals display what has been termed 
“personal dignity” or what Aristotle termed “arête”.  Having human dignity, in contrast, is, as 
Gewirth states, “a characteristic that belongs permanently and inherently to every human as 
such.”  A person can behave in ways that are boorish and selfish and thereby diminish her 
“personal dignity” and yet retain human dignity’ (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 120). 
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still require protection, respect and care.  From this perspective, dignity is not 
only a demonstration of worth or strength, but is also fragile and vulnerable to 
abuse.  For this reason Hannes Kuch has suggested that rather than consider 
dignity to be an impervious, unshakeable feature of humans, ‘...our picture of 
the moral notion of dignity should’ instead refer to something like a ‘…gracefully 
delicate, wafer-thin porcelain vase – the fragility of which is overtly visible’ (Kuch 
2011, 47).  Indeed, it is clear or intuitive to most when there is a clear violation 
of someone’s dignity – such as slavery, rape, humiliation, debasement or 
dehumanization.  Specific cases of vulnerability, therefore, are often indicative 
of when protection of an individual’s ‘minimum core’ of human dignity becomes 
most pressing. 
However, precisely how an individual’s dignity is challenged varies between 
writers, and there is a distinct tension between those who believe that dignity 
can be violated, but not lost, and those who argue that it is possible to lose 
one’s dignity, perhaps irrevocably; that one can be ‘stripped’ or ‘robbed’ of it.  
As noted by Nordenfelt, ‘the first locution suggests an inalienable property of a 
person that can be violated but not necessarily altered or annihilated. The 
second locution, on the other hand, suggests that dignity is a property that can 
be manipulated, altered and even annihilated’ (Nordenfelt 2003a, 100).  Aurel 
Kolnai, for instance, has explicitly stated that Dignity can in fact be lost, both 
through one’s own actions as well as those of others:  
Whereas the 'Rights of Man' can only be disregarded, negated, insulted, 
violated or 'suppressed', 'Human Dignity' can actually be impaired and 
destroyed, temporarily or irreversibly, like any real 'quality'. If tomorrow I 
fall into the hands of Communist torturers, they cannot 'eliminate' my 
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human rights but only prevent me from exercising them; whereas they 
can easily make short work of my 'Human Dignity'... (Kolnai 1976, 258-
9).116 
Such statements may seem to raise a significant challenge to the hope of a 
universal human dignity.  In particular, contemporary perspectives which have 
envisaged human dignity to be inherent, inviolable and shared equally between 
all humans, can have conceptual problems explaining how certain 
dehumanizing acts can come to represent challenges to dignity.  Cases such as 
torture, rape, humiliation or false imprisonment are all degrading and inhumane 
acts, which seem to be clear violations of human dignity, yet, if human dignity is 
intrinsic and inviolable, then it appears that ‘there is nothing that anyone can do 
to deprive a person of his or her dignity’ (Mattson and Clark 2011, 306; see also 
Pollmann 2011, 244-5; and Nordenfelt 2003b, 105).  Universal, inviolable 
human dignity by definition cannot be taken away, and consequently it is 
unclear why it would need protection and promotion through human rights.  The 
question then, as Arnd Pollmann highlights, is ‘how is it possible to deprive 
someone of something that is inborn or inalienable in principle?’  (Pollmann 
2011, 244-5).  
Much of this conflict stems from the fact that different conceptions or types of 
dignity are being invoked, and so parties are often talking at cross-purposes.  
On the one hand, we have the first part of the minimum core which conceives of 
dignity as an inherent and inalienable high worth or moral status in all humans.  
Consequently, this form of dignity is commonly used as a foundation for 
universal human rights, as it is thought that this form cannot be stripped from 
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 See also: ‘Dignity as a Quality can go to seed and be lost...though not, I suppose, to the 
point of leaving behind no vestige of it at all’ (Kolnai 1976, 271).  
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the individual.  In contrast, as we have seen with Neil’s account, there is also 
the idea of behaving and being treated in a dignified manner.  This is related to 
the second component of the minimum core – that this inherent worth is 
recognized and respected by others.117  This distinction helps to explain why we 
can speak, as Kolnai does, of degrading and abusive treatment taking or 
stripping away the victim’s dignity.118  It also explains how someone can be said 
to behave without dignity (without in the process losing their inherent worth or 
high moral status).  As William J. FitzPatrick explains:  
Patients experiencing irreversible loss of control over their bodies and 
minds may feel a sharp decline in their sense of dignity...None of this, 
however, implies any loss of dignity in the primary sense: people in this 
condition still matter and deserve the same respect and caring 
concern…Violations of dignity occur when beings who possess dignity in 
the primary sense are treated in ways incompatible with respecting that 
status, as through physical abuse, racist oppression, or sexist 
subordination. Such mistreatment does not “take away” the victim’s 
dignity (if it did, there would thereafter be no dignity to violate), though it 
typically offends against and may even damage a person’s sense of 
dignity, making her feel dehumanized. To affirm the inalienability of 
dignity is not to deny that a person’s sense of dignity can be damaged in 
this way, but only to insist that her basic worth and moral standing cannot 
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 See: ‘To be human, as those who have suffered the effects of dehumanization will testify, is 
first and foremost to be included within the community of human beings, to be recognized and 
accepted as part of this community and thus deserving of its protection’ (Oliver 2011, 96). 
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 This tension between the two conceptions is clear when Kolnai writes: ‘...my 'Human Dignity' 
may well suffer by drunkenness or more sinister drug habits, as well as by grave accidents 
independent of anybody's guilt. If I am a congenital moron or have my brain permanently 
crippled by meningitis or am today perhaps the victim of incipient senile dementia, do I really 
'possess' the same 'Human Dignity' as that 'possessed' by any other-normal, average, or even 
slightly sub-standard-'human being'? Thus, there still seems after all to be some rudiment of a 
'more or less' about 'Human Dignity', in a fashion closely similar to the possible 'degrees' of free-
will and responsibility’ (Kolnai 1976, 259). 
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be taken away (at least as long as the grounds of her dignity remain 
intact) (FitzPatrick 2013). 
In this way, the type of dignity that one can be stripped of is of a different sort to 
the type of dignity that makes it wrong to rob you of it in the first place. If the 
latter could be lost then, from the very moment when it is lost, it would no longer 
be wrong to abuse, torture or kill you.  That all humans have an inherent worth 
or dignity means that they all share something that forbids or makes it wrong to 
treat them in certain ways. 
Lennart Nordenfelt, for instance, distinguishes between a universal, inherent 
dignity or Menschenwürde on the one hand, and a form of dignity as self-worth, 
which he labels a ‘dignity of identity’ on the other.  This form of dignity is 
attached and grounded in the person’s own sense of autonomy, integrity, social 
relations with others and ‘identity as a human being’.  Unlike Menschenwürde, 
Nordenfelt argues that dignity as identity varies between individuals, and can 
also be stripped from the person by the dehumanizing acts of others, as well as 
through any negative sense of self-worth which often accompanies injury, 
disability and old age.  As Nordenfelt notes, ‘...when a person’s integrity and 
autonomy are tampered with this is typically associated with a feeling of 
humiliation or loss of self-respect on his or her part’ (Nordenfelt 2004, 74-6). 
However, this still does not account for the intuition that some individuals can 
still be humiliated, even though they may not be, or cannot be, aware that their 
worth has been questioned.119  My friends and family may ridicule me behind 
my back, without me ever knowing, yet by all intents and purposes, it would 
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  ‘What often happens is not just the occurrence of a subjective feeling of humiliation on the 
part of people who have been humiliated. There may also be a changed public perception of 
these people.’ (Nordenfelt 2003b, 105). 
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appear that I was still being humiliated, even though I remained completely 
unaware of it and, therefore, experienced no lack of self-respect.  Indeed, my 
lack of knowledge about it would most likely add to this sense of humiliation.  
This appears little qualitatively different to the case of a severely mentally 
handicapped adult human, who similarly is unaware that they are being taunted 
and ridiculed and, because of their condition, will never find out.  Most would 
still say that this individual is in fact being humiliated.  One may take this one 
step further and ask whether it makes a difference if the individual in question 
was a non-human animal.  Like the first two cases, it would both be unaware of 
the humiliation by others and, because of its limited condition, would never find 
out.  The difficulty is deciding if this case is in any way qualitatively different 
from the first two human cases.  If we accept that humiliation is a peculiarly 
human phenomenon, which is a product of specific human relations, then we 
might be inclined to agree that the animal case is in fact different and, as a 
consequence, should be treated differently. 
Humiliation 
 
Indeed, one of the clearest examples of the fragility of the human condition in 
general, and of the concept of human dignity in particular, are in cases of 
humiliation.  Humiliation is frequently proposed to have a close connection with 
dignity; as the lawyer Oscar Schachter argued, ‘nothing is so clearly violative of 
the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or humiliates them’ 
(Schachter 1983, 850).  The Geneva Convention, for instance, prohibits any act 
which ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment’ (The Geneva Conventions 1949, 37).  
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Humiliation seems to be a decidedly (if not exclusively) human phenomenon or 
emotion120 – it is, in the words of Margalit, a ‘mental cruelty’ (Margalit 1996, 
85).121 Humiliation is heavily dependent on the social sphere.  To humiliate 
another is often intended to lower or challenge their social or moral status and, 
in some extreme cases, it is an attempt to challenge their status as a human 
being – to dehumanize them (Neuhäuser 2011, 22).122 William Parent has 
proposed that the idea of dignity is designed specifically to protect individuals 
being arbitrarily harmed and humiliated by others and should, therefore, be 
constitutionally protected (Parent 1992).  This is the role ultimately, as Margalit 
argued, of the decent society. 
One important reason for the conceptual closeness of dignity and humiliation is 
that it is difficult to fully explain why certain acts are humiliating or degrading, by 
appealing to accounts that locate the wrongness in terms of violations of an 
individual’s autonomy or rationality, for instance.  To say certain reprehensible 
acts are wrong because they are violations of dignity, it is argued, is often a 
more adequate way to respond.123 A good example is that of mimicking a 
person’s stutter or failing to wash or clothe a patient with severe learning 
difficulties; to explain why such situations are reprehensible in terms of 
violations of dignity is often a more satisfactory and appropriate way of 
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 Although, even if animals cannot feel humiliated, it is debatable whether they may still be 
humiliated. 
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 Margalit went so far as to say that, ‘if there is no concept of human dignity, then there is no 
concept of humiliation either’ (Margalit 1996, 149).   
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 Interestingly, Shultziner and Rabinovici note that ‘the etymology of the word “humiliation” has 
a universal characteristic in the sense that in all languages the word involves “downward spatial 
orientation” in which “something or someone is pushed down and forcefully held there”.  For 
example, the word in Latin (humiliare) means to ‘bring low.’ In Hebrew humiliation (hashpala) 
comes from the verb-root and noun shafel which connotes “low” both physically and morally.  
Similarly in Arabic, the word humiliation (eihana) comes from a verb-root which connotes a low 
place as well as diminution of something or someone’ (Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012, 111).  
Indeed, Herrmann points out that,‘the key concept for humiliation is rejection from the human 
commonwealth’ (Herrmann 2011, 145). 
123
 Stoecker similarly argues that ‘...there are numerous instances of vile and reprehensible 
behaviour that could not be morally accounted for at all, or at least not adequately, except as 
violations of dignity’ (Stoecker 2011, 11). 
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explaining why certain degrading acts are so unsettling and abhorrent.   Ralf 
Stoecker, for instance, presents the case of an old man with dementia being 
washed head to toe with one wash cloth: 
...there is no evidence in the report that the treatment harmed the old 
man’s health.  Hence, from a consequentalist perspective there is little 
reason to complain.  And although the client certainly would never have 
consented to having been washed with just one washcloth, it sounds 
somewhat forced to maintain that what is morally at stake in the example 
is merely a violation of autonomy.  The young man’s deed was so bad 
not just because he treated his client in a way that he would not have 
agreed to but because the treatment was deeply humiliating; it violated 
the old man’s dignity (Stoecker 2011, 11). 
This is not to say that all commentators on human dignity have endorsed this 
close conceptual connection between humiliation and dignity.  Daniel Statman 
has argued that tying the concept of humiliation to dignity has made the former 
more conceptually confused than if they were kept distinct.  In particular, he 
raises a potential problem for accounts that try to link dignity with humiliation.  If 
dignity is an inherent, inviolable attribute or quality possessed by all humans, 
regardless of individual capacities but instead based on species membership, 
Statman argues, it is difficult to see how one can be stripped of this dignity 
through an act of humiliation.  As he explains: ‘...if mere belonging to the human 
race is sufficient for having dignity (whatever this term denotes), then, 
necessarily, no human beings can exist who have lost, or have been stripped 
of, their human dignity. So, paradoxically, if humiliation is injury to dignity, then 
precisely because dignity is a fixed feature of all human beings, humiliation is 
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impossible’ (Statman 2000, 525).  Statman’s criticism is based on two distinct 
but interrelated arguments.  The first claim is that if humans are said to have 
dignity, because they are human, then necessarily all humans have dignity, and 
the only way it would seem possible to take away an individual’s dignity is to 
remove them from the human species.  The second claim is that if humiliation is 
defined as an assault on human dignity, then following the first claim it leads to 
the absurd conclusion that no one can seemingly be humiliated, as dignity is a 
fixed feature of all humans.  However, again, as we saw earlier, much of this 
apparent problem can be appeased by distinguishing between two different 
(though certainly connected) types of dignity.  In this instance, Statman is 
referring to the second sense of dignity – that is one which can be violated, 
demeaned and even lost, both through one’s own actions, as well as the actions 
of others.124 
Furthermore, Statman’s position rests on the idea that humans have dignity 
simply through membership in the human species.   As we have seen in 
Chapter 6, this conception of human dignity is an unqualified speciesist 
account, in which species membership alone is thought sufficient to ground 
dignity.  However, a qualified speciesist account, by contrast, proposes that 
species by itself is not morally relevant, but is correlated or associated with 
relevant characteristics which are.  If we are to continue to promote a universal 
(or near universal) conception of human dignity, then we seemingly cannot base 
this on intrinsic capacities, as there will be many humans who would not qualify 
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 The distinction between the two forms of dignity is also brought out by Spiegelberg: ‘In 
talking about human dignity as “unassailable” and yet as “violated,” we really mean in the first 
case that in an ultimate sense human dignity itself cannot be destroyed by any attacks, 
specifically not by inflicting “indignities” upon people.  But this does not prevent such attempted 
violations from being actions which are in (“flagrant”) conflict with such dignity, inasmuch as they 
do not fulfil the claim to respect issuing from the inviolable dignity.  Thus we must distinguish the 
ultimate dignity in man and the claims issuing from it, which can be violated in the sense of not 
being fulfilled, though they can never be annihilated’ (Spiegelberg 1970, 54). 
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on this account.  An alternative, it has been argued, is to base it on certain 
morally significant types of relational ties between individuals.  In particular, 
there are certain qualities, rooted in our sense of humanity, such as kindness, 
care, compassion, empathy and so on, and the relations which they inspire, 
which are worthy of respect and value and indicative of our dignity.  It then 
remains an open question as to whether or not other animals are capable of 
similar qualities, or likewise, if their interactions with other humans can justify a 
special status or worth. 
Self-respect 
 
An important aspect of the second component of the minimum core of human 
dignity (that the inherent worth of all humans be recognised and respected by 
others) centres on the role of self-respect, and the importance of the contingent 
and subjective quality of dignity, and how it is experienced by the individual in 
question.  Indeed, the role of self-respect, self-worth and self-esteem are 
frequently cited as fundamental to understanding the nature of human dignity 
(see for instance Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012; Dworkin 2011, 203-4; 
Stoecker 2011, 13; Badcott 2003; Statman, 2000; Margalit 1996; and Dillon 
1995).125  This approach takes into account the fact that dignity is not merely 
predetermined by species membership, or the possession of certain capacities, 
but is heavily reliant on an individual’s own sense of worth.  If someone feels 
that they are not respected or recognised in the social domain, then it becomes 
increasingly difficult for them to believe that their dignity is being upheld and 
protected.  Furthermore, if I lose my own self-respect, then this increases the 
likelihood that other people will treat me without respect or regard.  Dignity, 
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 See also the Ethics of Recognition (for example: Iser 2013; McQueen 2011). 
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therefore, has a dual aspect, and is affected by both the treatment from others, 
as well as the state of mind and self-respect of the individual in question.  This 
subjective experience of dignity has been described by Mattson and Clark as 
the culmination of an entire spectrum of an individual’s experiences: ‘...dignity is 
not a principle, but rather a subjective integration of an individual’s experience 
of the many facets of human life, and it is a judgment made by each person for 
him or herself, informed by culture, social interactions, and physical 
experiences’ (Mattson and Clark 2011, 309). 
In a similar vein, humiliation has been explicitly equated with a challenge to 
one’s sense of self-respect.  Margalit, for instance, defined humiliation as ‘any 
sort of behaviour or condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to 
consider his or her self-respect injured’ (Margalit 1996, 9).  By ‘sound reason’ 
Margalit accounts for those cases where people unreasonably feel humiliated, 
that is, those who feel humiliated, but actually have no good reason to feel that 
way.  There is thus, for Margalit, a distinction between emotion and social fact, 
and not all humiliating and degrading acts are ‘victim-subjective’, and so not 
always dependent on the victim’s actual felt experience (Webster 2011, 75).  
Likewise, dignity, in Arnd Pollmann’s view, is not inherent but has to be 
acquired through one’s own conduct (as well, to an extent, through the actions 
of others) no matter how difficult the circumstances are.126 Whilst all humans 
may have the same right for its protection, they do not all currently possess it 
(Pollmann 2011, 244-5).  There is, therefore, a strong sense of a personal as 
                                                          
126
 Pollmann argues that we have a personal responsibility to preserve our dignity: ‘Being 
confronted with devastating life conditions, it might sometimes be hard to uphold our dignity, but 
however vigorous or serious these attacks might be, it is almost never strictly impossible to 
resist them.  Even under tyranny, torture or in Nazi concentration camps, some people have 
been able to withstand humiliation and to keep their embodied self-respect and, therefore, their 
dignity.  From this it follows: Whether we keep or lose our dignity is – at least also – due to our 
ability and power to preserve it’ (Pollmann 2011, 256). 
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well as societal responsibility to uphold one’s dignity, and so an attack on one’s 
dignity does not have to automatically lead to a corresponding loss of dignity.  
Optimistically Pollmann claims that ‘...no other person will be able to completely 
deprive us of our dignity as long as we do not give up our self-respect...’ 
(Pollmann 2011, 257).  However, this makes dignity largely dependent on 
contextual factors, including an individual’s psychological makeup. Sometimes it 
is not physically or mentally possible to resist in the face of sustained, 
systematic dehumanizing acts by others.  Moreover, in the cases of the most 
vulnerable, such as the severely cognitively disabled or very young, they may 
not be able to defend it, and consequently would, in Pollmann’s eyes, no longer 
have a dignity.  Pollmann, therefore, accepts the conclusion that ‘...not all 
human beings – and not even all persons – will have full dignity, but, as equal 
human beings, all participate in human dignity and will have corresponding 
interests in legal protection’ (Pollmann 2011, 258).  This conception of human 
dignity stands in direct tension with those who vouch for the universal dignity of 
humankind. 
Human Dignity and an Ethics of Care 
 
As opposed to our negative approach to human dignity thus far (dignity defined 
and explained by its absence), care ethics promotes a positive formulation and 
gives content to what dignity is and what we mean when we speak of respecting 
the dignity of others.  An ethics of care takes as its focus the role of 
dependence, and attending to the needs of others, and how this shapes morally 
important relationships.  It regards all humans as ultimately interdependent on a 
network of social relations, and recognises this vulnerability and the need for 
care as a feature throughout the life-course.  We all rely on care and are 
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dependent at certain stages of life, and those who receive little or deficient care 
are often at a severe disadvantage and can develop problems as a result (as 
the large body of work on attachment theory has demonstrated, for example 
see Howe 2011).127  The care ethicist Nel Noddings, for instance, has argued 
that it is in our nature to be in such caring relations, which she describes as 
‘ethically basic’ (Noddings 1984, 3).  These caring relationships are often found 
between family members, friends or people whose job it is to care such as 
health care staff, social or dependency workers, as well as the altruistic acts 
between strangers.  
Care ethics emphasises the interconnectedness and interdependence of human 
life, and challenges the notion that morality is a system set up between 
independent individuals who voluntarily step into relations with one another.  
We often do not choose to care for others, and caring relationships are not 
equally balanced, in that the cared-for are often entirely dependent on the carer 
(for example, between a child and a parent, or a comatose patient and an 
intensive care nurse).  Care ethics, moreover, often places a particular value on 
specific relationships between individuals, and the role they play in shaping our 
identities (Held 2005, 14).   
In this way, a care theory of ethics, proposes that at least some of our moral 
obligations derive from our relations with others, as well as from our own 
dependence on the help of others.  Each one of us has relied on the help of 
others at some stage (albeit in varying degrees) and, consequently, we can be 
expected to help others who are in need and require our assistance in the 
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 A similar point is made by Hugh Lafollette, who argues that: ‘…a person must have some 
exposure to personal relationships to be motivated to be moral or to know how to be moral.  Put 
differently, people cannot be just or moral in a vacuum they can become just only within an 
environment which countenances personal relationships’ (LaFollette 1993, 331). 
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future.128  Several care ethicists have maintained that we still have a duty of 
care to those humans who cannot and will not be able to reciprocate this caring 
relationship: 
It does not matter that mentally impaired infants cannot and perhaps 
never will be able to care for us or any other human beings. We are 
bound to care for other human beings not because they can or someday 
may care for us, but because they are dependent on us just like we are 
(or have been) dependent on other human beings. Mentally impaired 
infants make claims on us for care just as we have made claims (and will 
likely do again one day) on other capable humans, and thus can justify 
their claims in a way that animals cannot. In care ethics, the duty to care 
for mentally impaired or other disabled individuals is not a marginal case 
but paradigmatic of our duties of all human beings (Engster 2006, 528). 
This is a radical departure from an ethics which has the autonomous, rational 
individual person at its core.  The ethics of care flips around the traditional view, 
whereby those previously on the moral boundaries, for example, the severely 
intellectually disabled, are brought into the centre, and become paradigmatic 
cases (Byrne 2000, 72).   
The concept of ‘Dignity in care’ has gained increasing traction in recent years, 
particularly in the UK context, as failings in health care standards in the NHS 
have been exposed, and has consequently become a core principle within the 
Nursing profession (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2015; International Council 
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 As Kittay explains: ‘We human beings are the sorts of beings we are because we are cared 
for by other human beings, and the human being’s ontological status and corresponding moral 
status need to be acknowledged by the larger society that makes possible the work of those 
who do the caring required to sustain us.  This is what we each require if we are some mother’s 
child, and we are all some mother’s child’ (Kittay 2009, 625). 
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of Nurses 2012; and Royal College of Nursing 2008).129  Indeed, nursing staff in 
particular often have to deal with patients who are, ‘particularly vulnerable to 
embarrassment, shame and humiliation’, and consequently have a great deal of 
power to treat people with or without care and dignity (Wainwright and 
Gallagher 2008, 49).   
Yet, how precisely is human dignity related to an ethics of care?  First and 
foremost, to care for another is both to demonstrate a level of respect to the 
cared-for, and to acknowledge that they have a worth which ought to be 
acknowledged.  As highlighted by David Badcott, ‘in caring for others, we 
demonstrate our commitment to respect the dignity of fellow human beings, a 
dignity that extends from cradle to the grave’ (Badcott 2003, 128).  The elderly 
patient, for example, who is given help to wash and dress in a ‘dignified’ 
manner, is not only shown a personal level of dignity and respect, but is also 
kept decent for human society.  To treat someone with dignity is then also a 
form of social inclusion. 
Moreover, for those who require help from others, care enables them to uphold 
and maintain their self-respect, sense of self-worth and well-being.  For 
instance, it has been noted that increased disability, illness and infirmity and the 
resulting loss of independence, experienced especially by the elderly, are seen 
as significant factors which threaten this sense of dignity.  Thus, steps to 
counter this, such as assisted living and day centres, have been seen as 
‘...positive steps in promoting dignity as they facilitated independence’ (Tadd 
2010, 265).  In this way, care is the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects of 
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 See for example The Dignity in Care campaign (http://www.dignityincare.org.uk/), launched 
in 2006, which states its aim is putting 'dignity and respect at the heart of UK care services', and 
its core values are 'about having dignity in our hearts minds and actions, changing the culture of 
care services and placing a greater emphasis on improving the quality of care and the 
experience of citizens...'.  See also Commission on Dignity in Care for Older People (2012). 
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being humiliated, ignored, insulted or having one’s integrity violated.  It is, in 
other words, a demonstration of our humanity.  Indeed, it is all too easy to list 
cases of what would normally be considered undignified care, especially in 
regards to negligence which results in abusive, degrading or humiliating 
treatment.  In contrast, to treat someone, especially one with increased 
vulnerabilities, with kindness, empathy,130 and politeness are all humane 
methods of reaffirming their sense of self-esteem and self-worth.  In this way, 
‘good’ care can be defined loosely as the relationships, interactions and 
attitudes between the carer and the cared-for that upholds and affirms their 
dignity and worth.  Consequently, as argued by Win Tadd, ‘...the dignity of the 
human person can be considered as the ‘telos’ of care...’, and dignity is the 
measure by which to assess caring interactions (Tadd 2010, 271; 276).  In this 
way, human dignity is presented, at heart, as a relational concept, which is often 
realised most clearly through caring relationships. 
In spite of this, it may be asked why we should prioritise the care of humans 
over that of other animals?  If we should still show sympathy and compassion 
for other animals, especially as they share many of the same basic needs and 
capacities as us, then why do we not also have a duty of care towards them?  
For Daniel Engster, to prioritise the care needs of other humans is an 
acceptable form of speciesism, as ultimately it is to other humans that we rely 
and depend on to meet our needs, and for our survival and development.131 The 
argument goes that only other humans are capable of providing the care that 
we need.  Similarly, the interests and development of other non-human animals 
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 Although, see Smajdor et al. (2011), for a criticism of the idea that empathy is necessary for 
good medical practice. 
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 A similar point was made by Steinbeck: ‘But it is certainly not wrong of us to extend special 
care to members of our own species, motivated by feelings of sympathy, protectiveness, etc. If 
this is speciesism, it is stripped of its tone of moral condemnation’ (Steinbeck 1978, 256). 
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are often best met by members of their own species (Engster 2006, 526-9).  
This recognises the fact that species membership often shapes the needs of the 
individual in question.  As Engster argues, there is ‘...a morally relevant dividing 
line between human beings and animals quite different from the morally 
arbitrary distinctions of race or sex: we have special duties to care for human 
beings because we specially depend upon human care to help us survive, 
develop, and maintain basic well-being’ (Engster 2006, 529).132   
Nevertheless, Engster does acknowledge that whilst we do have duties of care, 
or moral obligations to animals, they only arise when they are under our care 
and protection or due to the relationships that we have with them (Engster 
2006, 522).  In particular, when we make them dependent on us ‘for their 
survival, functioning, and well-being’, we consequently have moral duties 
towards them (Engster 2006, 527).133 There are thus duties of care due to the 
relationships that we enter into with other animals.  A similar point is made by 
Warren, who claims that when humans and animals enter into ‘...relationships of 
mutual trust and affection, something akin to a promise is made’ (Warren 1997, 
169).  Engster insists that our duty to care for other humans in need takes moral 
priority over duties of care we have for animals because of a ‘natural duty of 
justice that cannot be overridden by selfassumed obligations to animals...This 
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 Although what precisely we mean by care and the limits that we have an obligation to care 
for others is still an open question in the literature.  Daniel Engster’s ‘basic needs’ approach, for 
instance, defines a caring relationship as ‘...everything we do to help individuals to meet their 
vital biological needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, and avoid or alleviate 
unnecessary or unwanted pain and suffering, so that they can survive, develop, and function in 
society’ (Engster 2007, 28).   An even broader definition (perhaps too broad) offered by Joan 
Tronto, positions care as something which can transcend our own local ties, and describes it as 
‘...a species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ 
so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our 
environment’ (Tronto 1994, 126). 
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 See also: ‘The Interspecific principle requires us to accord an enhanced moral status to 
some animals on the basis of their social relationships to human beings; but it does not require 
that all captive or domesticated animals be accorded such an enhanced status.  Nor does it 
require that the moral status of all domesticated or captive animals be the same...[there are] 
special obligations to animals that have social relationships with human beings’ (Warren 1997, 
168). 
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moral priority applies importantly even to the so-called marginal cases of 
mentally impaired infants’ (Engster 2006, 528).   
Conclusion 
 
A universal human dignity, conceived as an inherent and inalienable value or 
worth in all human beings, has become one of the most prominent and widely 
promoted interpretations of human dignity, especially in international law.  Yet it 
is also one of the most difficult interpretations of human dignity to justify and 
ground.  The problem, as summarised by Singer, is whether or not we can 
‘...justify attributing equal value to all human lives, while at the same time 
attributing to human life a value that is superior to all animal life?’ (Singer 2009, 
571).  To avoid the speciesist charge it seems necessary to provide further 
reasons, over and above species membership, for why humans have a unique 
worth and dignity.  Yet, as we have seen, intrinsic capacities, such as 
autonomy, intelligence or language use, are too demanding for many humans to 
meet the required minimum standard, regardless of where the level is set.   
Therefore, as an alternative to the traditional approach of citing morally 
considerable capacities, it has been argued instead that a universal human 
dignity could be grounded in our social nature, the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of human life and the morally considerable relationships that 
can and do arise from it, especially in regards to our shared vulnerability and 
dependence, and our ability to engage in caring relationships.  In this way, 
whilst species membership is not in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often 
shapes the nature of our social and moral relations.  Care is the antithesis to the 
dehumanizing effects of humiliation, and other degrading acts and, as a 
relational concept, human dignity is often best realised through our caring 
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relationships.  The way that individuals and groups treat each other has a 
fundamental role in determining both an individual’s sense of self-worth and 
well-being, as well as their perceived public value and worth.  As Jonathan 
Wolff acknowledges in regards to disability: ‘...if a society is able to think 
through and successfully confront issues of disability, doing so will make it more 
compassionate, more secure in its sense of community, and more 
understanding both of human vulnerability and dependence and of human 
nature and potential’ (Wolff 2009, 402).  Moreover, as has been highlighted 
through our negative approach, explaining why certain acts are degrading and 
dehumanizing are often more appropriately explained as violations of dignity, 
rather than in terms of violations of autonomy or rationality.   
This approach acknowledges that our concept of the human is not based on 
species membership alone, nor does it rest solely on a select bundle of intrinsic 
capacities, but is instead also heavily shaped and influenced by our, often 
complex, social relations with one another. As Eva Feder Kittay argues, what it 
means to be a human is also to do with the ‘...way you are in the world, a way 
you are with another’ (Kittay 2009, 621).  Our social relations help shape what it 
means to be human, and there are certain relationships with other individuals, 
be that between a mother and child or a nurse and patient, which are 
inseparable from belonging to the same species.  These relational ties between 
humans, it is argued, distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals 
and accord human relationships a special moral significance or dignity. 
A key aspect of dignity is in its connection with related notions of humanity and 
humaneness, and virtues such as humility, empathy, leniency, kindness and 
charity that result.  These qualities, which are rooted in our shared sense of 
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humanity, are worthy of respect and value and indicative of our dignity.  Thus, 
whilst intrinsic properties do still play a significant role (sentience, for instance, 
has been offered as a minimum criterion to be considered a full member of the 
human community (Warren 1997, 166)), they are tempered by the role of our 
social relations.  The advantage of the relational or group account, for many, is 
that it encompasses a much wider group of humans into the moral fold, who 
might otherwise be left out on the traditional capacities driven approach.  It, 
moreover, leaves as an open question as to whether or not other animals are 
capable of similar qualities, and the extent their interactions with other humans 
can justify a special status or worth. 
  
207 
 
Section 3 – The Limits of Human Dignity 
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Chapter 9  Posthuman Dignity 
 
Introduction 
 
As the boundaries of what is technologically and biomedically possible continue 
to be pushed back, so the interest in the ethics of human enhancement has 
grown markedly in recent years.  Where once human nature was seen as, 
more-or-less, static and unchangeable, recent advances in genetics, 
biotechnology and pharmacology (amongst others), have thrown fresh doubt 
and confusion on where the limits of ‘the human’ lie as well as, significantly for 
our purposes, the role and nature of human dignity.  Indeed, whilst we can 
agree, to a point, with Charles Rubin’s contention that human dignity ought to 
be grounded on ‘what we essentially are as human beings’ (Rubin 2008, 
168),134 the difficulty is outlining what this essence of being human amounts to.  
This chapter is concerned, therefore, with how conceptions of so-called 
‘posthuman dignity’ sit with contemporary theories of human dignity, especially 
conceptions which traditionally envisage dignity as a universal feature of all 
humanity.  If biotechnological enhancements did eventually produce 
posthumans, would they share a similar dignity to one currently enjoyed by 
‘ordinary’ humans, or would they have a special ‘enhanced’ dignity, or would 
they be so dehumanized as to have none at all?  Ultimately, it is argued that the 
extent to which posthuman dignity can be said to be compatible with human 
dignity depends on how comfortably it can sit with the key features which shape 
and ground a universal human dignity, especially in regards to our sense of 
                                                          
134
 Rubin suggests that human dignity resides ‘...in a realm between the best and worst that we 
can imagine of ourselves’ (Rubin 2008, 168).  Meilaender follows the same line of thought, in 
arguing that part of our human nature is as ‘strange, “in-between” sorts of creatures—lower than 
the gods, higher than the beasts’ (Meilaender 2009, 4). 
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human identity and community, as well as such features as our shared 
vulnerability and interdependence on others. 
What is meant by a ‘human enhancement’ is notoriously vague and prone to 
conceptual confusion.  On reflection, there seem to be a countless number of 
objects and methods, from reading glasses to improved nutrition and literacy, 
that could be considered a form of enhancement.  When viewed on this scale, it 
is not difficult to agree with the philosopher and prominent human enhancement 
enthusiast Nick Bostrom that, ‘in the eyes of a hunter-gatherer, we might 
already appear “posthuman”’ (Bostrom 2005a, 213).  Moreover, it is not always 
clear where we should draw a line between an acceptable and unacceptable 
type of enhancement.  Where, for instance, do we make a distinction between 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of life extension, health, strength or 
intelligence, and by what criteria do we judge this?   
On a general level an enhancement is designed to augment or improve, either 
an existing capacity, or to allow for the creation of an entirely new one.  
However, as pointed out by Bostrom, it is not entirely clear if we are referring to 
improvements from what is ‘normal’ for the individual in question, or whether it 
should instead be ‘...age-relative or indexed to the prime of life’, or instead 
whether the reference state should be ‘...defined as the “species-typical” level of 
functioning’ (Bostrom 2008, 6).  If it is the latter then, it is worth noting that, on 
this definition, an enhancement does not necessarily need to lead to an 
increase in overall individual wellbeing, nor is it clear if it has to be considered 
desirable by the individual in question (for example, we could envisage a 
scenario in which an individual is given superhuman levels of strength against 
their will, or an individual may decide to go ahead with a radical enhancement, 
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such as life extension, but this may prove unbearable years later).  In any case, 
it is obvious that the human enhancement enterprise is very much a capacities 
driven approach, and focuses upon the ability to manipulate individual 
characteristics and abilities. 
This chapter is concerned with current, and possible future, attempts to radically 
alter humans through biotechnological and biomedical means, not least 
because radical or extreme enhancement seems to be necessary for a possible 
posthuman state to be achieved.  As noted by John Danaher, what 
distinguishes these forms of biotechnological enhancement from our previously 
mentioned ordinary, everyday enhancements is, at least in part, down to their 
‘internal’ effect on the individual in question.  As Danaher explains, ‘...unlike 
farming, literacy or democracy, biomedical enhancement directly targets the 
constitutive properties of individual human beings, e.g. their memories, their 
moods, their ability to concentrate, their muscle strength, their stamina and so 
on’ (Danaher 2013, 228).  However, even here it is not entirely clear-cut, as 
research on the effects nutrition has on an individual’s cognitive development 
demonstrate (see for instance Gómez-Sanchiz 2004; Glewwe and King 2001).   
McNamee and Edwards trace similar lines to Danaher when they distinguish 
between radical and moderate forms of human enhancement.  The stronger 
form, they argue, is part of a wider enterprise to overcome and improve human 
nature, including our appearance, sensory capacities, intelligence, lifespan and 
vulnerability to harm.  The second, less radical project, by contrast has ‘...no 
necessary aspiration to shed human nature or human genetic constitution, just 
to augment it with technology where possible and where desired by the person' 
(McNamee and Edwards 2006, 514).  The proponents of these types of 
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individually chosen, moderate enhancements, they argue, tend to be either 
technologically focussed libertarians, who see the transhumanist project as 
simply a way to improve themselves and their standard of life, or enhancement 
enthusiasts, who see the potential of future technologies to improve the quality 
of life for people generally, rather than simply augmenting their own autonomy.  
However, one may suggest that a much wider range of individuals may also be 
proponents of moderate enhancement; many of us, for instance, appreciate the 
availability of reading glasses, caffeine, and pacemakers. 
In contrast, the proponents of radical human enhancement are commonly self-
styled in the literature as ‘transhumanists’ (although some do not recognise or 
support this label), and the movement has been described by Nick Bostrom as 
‘an outgrowth of secular humanism and the Enlightenment,’ which ‘holds that 
current human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and 
other rational methods, which may make it possible to increase human health-
span, extend our intellectual and physical capacities, and give us increased 
control over our own mental states and moods’ (Bostrom 2005a, 202-3).  
Ultimately, the pursuit of radical enhancement technologies may lead to a state 
of ‘posthumanity’.  There is, therefore, a paradoxical element at the heart of the 
transhumanist project, whereby they hold to many of the tenants of humanism, 
including the importance of reason, autonomy, and scientific progress, but at 
the same time wish to break free and supersede human nature.  The concept of 
a ‘posthuman’ is itself conceptually fraught, not least due to its inherent 
hypothetical nature, and the difficultly in envisaging what it would take for a 
human to become posthuman.  Bostrom has characterised the posthuman as a 
state in which an individual’s capacities are so radically different to present 
humans as to be ‘no longer unambiguously human by our current standards’ 
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(Bostrom 2003, 5).  However, what we would consider no longer 
‘unambiguously human’, is itself an ambiguous statement, and requires an 
imaginative leap by the reader.  The distinction between the human and non-
human is by no means clear cut and dependent upon the qualities we would 
consider to be human at heart; as we have seen, the waters of this continue to 
be muddied as medical and technological advances push back the limits of 
what is humanly possible.  
A further problem rears its head when we come to consider at which point a 
human would cease being human and would instead become a posthuman 
(presuming the creation of a ‘posthuman’ is possible).135  As pointed out by 
Allen Buchanan, the plasticity of human nature should be sufficient to allow for 
‘...mere increases in strength, longevity, cognitive or emotional functioning, or 
resistance to disease’ to not lead to a posthuman state (Buchanan 2009a, 354).  
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a hypothetical breaking point, after which 
we could claim that the individual is no longer human. Buchanan suggests, 
following Bostrom, that in order for this to happen, ‘...the changes that 
enhancements brought would have to be widespread and would also have to 
produce significant qualitative differences, not merely higher levels of existing 
traits’ (Buchanan 2009a, 354) – quite what this difference in kind would entail is 
unclear, and remains highly speculative. 
Posthuman Dignity 
 
The idea of a ‘posthuman dignity’ was first proposed by Nick Bostrom, in an 
article entitled ‘In Defense of Posthuman Dignity’ (2005).  The article itself 
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 George Annas, for instance, argues that ‘there are limits to how far we can go in changing 
our human nature without changing our humanity and our basic human values...altering our 
nature necessarily threatens to undermine both human dignity and human rights.  With their 
loss, the fundamental belief in human equality would also be lost’ (Annas 2000, 773). 
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seems to have grown out of a reaction to critics of the human enhancement 
enterprise (so-called ‘bioconservatives’) monopolising appeals to human dignity, 
in order to argue against enhancing human capacities and characteristics 
through medical and biotechnological means (see Kass 2003, 2002; Fukuyama 
2002).  As Bostrom puts it, their concern appears, at least in part, due to the 
possibility that ‘...these technologies might undermine our human dignity or 
inadvertently erode something that is deeply valuable about being human but 
that is difficult to put into words...’ (Bostrom 2005a, 203).  Indeed, Leon Kass (a 
prominent ‘bioconservative’) has admitted that explaining why a given 
enhancement is suspect can be difficult to convey.  For this reason, he 
suggests that it may be best to interpret disquiet over certain enhancement 
technologies by being ‘...respectful of what is naturally and dignifiedly human' 
(Kass 2003, 17).  The problem with this approach, however, is that it seems to 
swap one conceptually confused and ambiguous idea for another.  Whilst both 
writers seem to think dignity may play an important role within the human 
enhancement debate, this is perhaps the extent to which Bostrom and Kass can 
be said to agree.  Interestingly, few proponents of human enhancement have 
followed Bostrom’s lead in pursuing the concept of posthuman dignity.  This is 
no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that appeals to human dignity in the 
bioethical realm are still very much dominated by those critical of the 
enhancement project, especially those of a theological and religious persuasion 
(see Spaemann 2012; Meilaender 2009; The President’s Council on Bioethics 
2008, 2003; Colson and Cameron 2004; and Kraynak and Tinder 2003). 
Bostrom begins by identifying two forms of dignity: (1) ‘Dignity as moral status, 
in particular the inalienable right to be treated with a basic level of respect,’ and 
(2) ‘Dignity as the quality of being worthy or honourable; worthiness, worth, 
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nobleness, excellence’ (Bostrom 2005a, 209).  Bostrom argues that, on both 
accounts, posthumans could have dignity.  One of the most striking aspects of 
Bostrom’s taxonomy of dignity is that he presents two quite distinct, potentially 
contradictory, notions of what dignity is supposed to be.  The first, which links 
dignity with moral status, and the resulting demand for each individual to be a 
source of respect, is a common interpretation of dignity in the contemporary 
literature, as we have seen in the previous section.  To be treated with dignity is 
to be treated with a certain reverence or respect, and this places both limits on 
what is permissible, and not permissible, to do to an individual or group. 
Fundamentally, this first definition suggests the concept is non-scalar or 
threshold.  To have the right to be treated with a basic level of respect (provided 
one reaches the required high moral status to be accorded a dignity) is 
foundational, and does not admit of degrees, regardless of how superior the 
agent’s characteristics and capacities may be.  This is the Kantian notion of 
dignity as an absolute value which is beyond price or instrumental utility (see 
Chapter 4).  Indeed, moral status, particularly in the form of personhood, is 
commonly thought to be a threshold concept, whereby once an individual 
achieves the required criteria, they possess full moral status, regardless of how 
far they exceed the minimum level.  For instance, if intelligence is a determining 
factor of personhood, so long as the individual possesses the minimum level of 
cognition necessary then they are said to possess full moral status, regardless 
of how intelligent they are or will become.  This link between moral status and 
dignity will be examined in greater depth in the next chapter. 
In contrast, Bostrom’s second formulation – that dignity is the quality of being 
morally worthy, honourable, noble and excellent – sets up dignity as a scalar 
concept that varies from individual to individual.  Just as one can be more 
215 
 
excellent or honourable, so too can we have more or less dignity.  This 
formulation places dignity firmly in the historical tradition which began with the 
Roman conception of dignitas, relating to those of high office and honourable 
profession, whereby dignity is both a product of our own conduct, as well as 
being determined by the opinions of others.  It follows, therefore, that humans 
possess this form of dignity to varying degrees and amounts. Bostrom follows 
this line of reasoning to its inevitable conclusion and proposes that not only 
could posthumans have this type of dignity, but they may even be able to attain 
higher levels of moral excellence than current humans, which of course would 
lead to the possibility that posthumans could, in fact, possess a higher form or 
degree of dignity (Bostrom 2005a, 210).   
Bostrom puts forward a similar position in a later paper for the President’s 
Council on Bioethics in which dignity is defined as ‘...a quality, a kind of 
excellence admitting of degrees and applicable to entities both within and 
without the human realm’ (Bostrom 2008, 173).136  He cites virtues such as 
composure, self-control, remaining calm under pressure, empathy and 
compassion, as examples of a ‘Dignity as a Quality’.  Significantly, these are 
also all qualities which can conceivably be enhanced or diminished through 
biotechnological and pharmacological interventions and, consequently, would 
raise or lower our dignity as a quality.  In the case of radical self-transformation 
or enhancement, Bostrom proposes that this would only be dignity-increasing 
when it is not ‘driven by alien wants and interests that have not been organically 
and selectively endorsed by the individual being enhanced’, and when it is not 
simply ‘a surrender to mere convenience rather than the autonomous 
realizations of a content-full personal ideal’ (Bostrom 2008, 186).  For example, 
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 Interestingly, Bostrom states that ‘Dignity as a Quality can be attributed to entities other than 
persons, including populations, societies, cultures, and civilizations’ (Bostrom 2008, 193). 
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he argues that a cognition enhancing drug taken merely to conform to the latest 
fashion trend would be undignified and not representative of dignity as a quality.  
For Bostrom, therefore, enhancements become undignified, not when they 
replace or undermine our sense of being human, but insofar as they no longer 
result from the virtuous and autonomous choice of the individual.137  
Bostrom’s conception of posthuman dignity, therefore, appears to stand in stark 
relief to the idea of a universal human dignity or ‘Menschenwürde’ that has been 
focused on in the previous section.  The ‘minimum core’ of which is conceived 
as an inherent and invaluable worth shared equally between all human beings, 
which should be recognized and respected by others (European Convention 
2000; United Nations 1976a, 1948; and Basic Law 1949), be that because of a 
shared humanity or simply by being in the species Homo sapiens (Jotterand 
2010a; Egonsson 1998).  Moreover, conceptions of universal human dignity do 
not normally rely on individual abilities and capacities.  If they were, then we 
would be hard pressed to explain how a given capacity, which varies so much 
between individuals (be that intelligence, language use or physical strength), 
can be said to justify giving equal status to all.  In contrast, Bostrom’s 
conception of posthuman dignity is inegalitarian (although Bostrom may prefer 
to think of it as meritocratic), in the sense that it would differ in degree between 
individuals, depending upon the type and severity of enhancement undergone.  
A critic of this approach could argue that once we begin to introduce the idea of 
scales of dignity, based on individual merit, we push those who are so often on 
the margins of consideration even further away.  To this extent, Bostrom’s 
interpretation of posthuman dignity appears incompatible with contemporary 
theories of universal human dignity, at least as they are commonly conceived. 
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 Furthermore, whilst he recognises that the means (i.e. the process of enhancement) may be 
undignified, the end result may ultimately still be dignity increasing. 
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Bostrom’s formulation of dignity is closer aligned to our sense of acting with 
dignity or demonstrating dignified behaviour – what has been referred to 
variously as ‘circumstantial dignity’ (O’Mathúna 2013, 101), and ‘virtue as 
dignity’ (Henry 2010, 60).  We often say that a particular action or state, such as 
drunken behaviour or debilitating illness, can be undignified and, conversely, 
others can act in dignified ways.  Likewise, one can also be treated with or 
without dignity by others.  Acting without a sense of dignity is generally frowned 
upon, although, as pointed out by Steven Pinker in his brief critical essay on the 
concept of dignity, we still often choose to accept ‘undignified’ treatment, such 
as pelvic or rectal examinations, in the pursuit of healthier bodies (Pinker 2008).  
In this way, Bostrom’s posthuman dignity, especially on the second definition, 
seems closely related to a mixture of Nordenfelt’s conception of dignity as merit, 
which concerns the use of dignity when describing an individual who holds a 
high rank or office (in other words a dignitary), either through hereditary lines or 
by merit and dignity as moral stature, which is defined as a dignity tied to the 
virtues of the individual in question, including their thoughts and actions.  It is 
likewise similar to both conceptions in that it varies widely in degree, and can 
come and go (Nordenfelt 2004). 
This is not to say that Bostrom’s account is incorrect.  We could either abandon 
a universal conception of human dignity, and agree that Bostrom’s conception is 
a better fit for what dignity in fact is, or we can insist that post-human dignity is 
of a different kind or type to human dignity.  Bostrom appears to support the 
former option, referring dismissively to the idea of a universal human dignity as 
the ‘mass culture and egalitarian pretensions of modernity’ (Bostrom 2008, 
191).  This first option certainly has a meritocratic, individualistic appeal, that 
some would find merit in.  Moreover, in contrast to a universal human dignity, 
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the ground or justification for a dignity as quality is clearer and perhaps more 
intuitive to explain.  Indeed, as we have seen in the previous section, a 
universal human dignity is one of the most difficult interpretations of human 
dignity to justify and ground. 
Alternatively, we could follow de Melo-Martín’s suggestion that it is consistent to 
maintain that dignity as a quality and a universal human dignity could co-exist, 
although quite what relationship these two types of dignity would stand in 
remains unclear (de Melo-Martín 2010, 54).138  Whilst Bostrom does seem to 
think that human and posthuman dignity are of a different type, he argues that: 
‘Transhumanists...see human and posthuman dignity as compatible and 
complementary.  They insist that dignity, in its modern sense, consists in what 
we are and what we have the potential to become...What we are is not a 
function solely of our DNA but also of our technological and social context.  
Human nature in this broader sense is dynamic, partially human-made, and 
improvable’ (Bostrom 2005a, 213).  Yet, contrary to Bostrom, dignity in ‘its 
modern sense’ in fact appears less concerned with the potential to improve 
upon human nature, but instead to work within its limits.  
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 As de Melo-Martín explains: ‘...it is not obvious how the notion that things can have a status 
superior to human beings is incompatible with human dignity. If one is arguing that anthropo-
technological devices have more or less excellence or dignity as quality to the degree that they 
increase particular functions, i.e., they allow its possessor to run faster, think quicker, memorize 
more data, be kinder, etc., then it is unclear how this is inconsistent with also maintaining—as 
Bostrom seems to do—that there is a type of dignity that is inalienable. Of course, it would be 
better for everybody were we to simply agree to use different words—perhaps dignity when 
referring to the inalienable sense and excellence when referring to the quality sense—when 
talking about the multiple meanings of dignity. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that Bostrom is 
talking about dignity as quality and that such a sense of dignity is different from the sense of 
dignity as requiring respect, which he is also happy to embrace’ (de Melo-Martín 2010, 54).  
However, one may argue that it is precisely Bostrom’s attempt to define excellence as a type of 
dignity which makes it sit so uneasily with a universal human dignity, as the two concepts are so 
different. 
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An alternative to the capacities approach, therefore, is to turn instead to the 
significance of the relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend 
individual capacities and abilities and, consequently does not require that all 
individuals in the group need meet the minimum required capacity for full moral 
status.139 Rather, a universal human dignity could be grounded in the 
importance of our social nature, the interconnectedness and interdependence of 
human life and the morally considerable relationships that can and do arise 
from it, especially in regards to our shared vulnerability and dependence, and 
our ability to engage in caring relationships.  In other words, a universal dignity 
grounded on (for want of a better phrase) our ‘shared humanity’. 
However, as pointed out by Sandler and Basl, there seems no prima facie 
reason why posthumans could not also participate in these mutually caring 
relationships, unless being radically cognitively enhanced made such 
relationships impossible.  Moreover, as social traits such as care and 
cooperation rely or supervene on individual cognitive capacities, such as 
empathy, cooperation and compassion, a transhumanist may reply that a 
posthuman has the potential to engage in more complex social relations and 
caring behaviour (Sandler and Basl 2010, 66).140  So long as posthumans can 
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 As Francis and Norman explain: ‘We suggest that what are important are the relations in 
which human beings stand to one another, and that with few exceptions they do not stand in the 
same relations to animals...our proposed basis for distinguishing the moral status of human 
beings from that of animals is rough-edged...and in limited forms, obtain between human beings 
and animals.  They do not all obtain among all human beings.  But, taken together, they do 
enable us to give a sense to the notion of ‘the human community’,...The combined effect of 
these relations is to bind all human beings together into a single overall community of a morally 
significant kind.  And this explains why being biologically human has seemed on the surface to 
be a more morally plausible differentiating property than being of a particular race’ (Francis and 
Norman 1978, 518).  
140
 This is the position taken by O’Mathúna, who argues that ‘...dignity is not necessarily limited 
to humans.  It can be extended to those with a similar nature...Inherent dignity is based on 
being a certain type of being, not necessarily a human being.  As such, posthumans could very 
well have dignity and we humans would have an obligation to treat them with dignity.’ 
(O’Mathúna 2013, 101). 
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partake in these caring relationships with other humans, and human dignity is 
grounded on this shared humanity, there appears scope to extend dignity to the 
posthuman realm.  What then could prevent posthumans from participating in 
these morally considerable relationships?  The remainder of this chapter will 
look at the role of some key features, including our shared needs and 
vulnerabilities, which are cited as necessary for participating in this shared 
humanity.  
Posthumanism and Vulnerability 
 
In the previous chapter, we spoke of the significance of our vulnerability, and 
the increasing frequency with which the term is used in the contemporary 
bioethical literature, when referring to the importance of safeguarding the 
interests of certain high risk groups and individuals.  Yet, on a more 
fundamental level, vulnerability is an ontological condition we all share, for we 
are all ultimately fragile and susceptible to accident, injury and decay.141  One 
clear example of the transhumanist vision to break away from the human 
condition is in their rejection of the necessity of human vulnerability, and the 
desire to increase resilience and reduce susceptibility to injury, with the ultimate 
aim, for some, of transcending our limited human biology, and achieving a form 
of invulnerability or immortality, be that through uploading our minds, using 
nanotechnology, or becoming cyborgs (see for example, Bostrom 2005a; 
Kurzweil 2005). 
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 As Gilson explains: ‘...vulnerability is something fundamental, it is an unavoidable feature of 
human existence that is present from the start and never goes away...although we can modify 
our vulnerable state, we cannot do away with it entirely.  Vulnerability is inherent both in our 
physical being, our corporeality, and in our social being.  Second, the centrality of vulnerability 
to ethics demonstrates that vulnerability carries with it some normative force’ (Gilson 2014, 15). 
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However, Erinn C. Gilson in her recent work on the ethics of vulnerability, 
challenges the idea that vulnerability refers merely to a susceptibility to injury 
and should be something that should always be avoided, minimized, and 
prevented.142 Instead, Gilson attempts to recast the concept in more positive 
terms.  In particular, rather than being viewed as simply a susceptibility to 
weakness, incapacity, and a lack of autonomy, vulnerability is presented as the 
basis for enabling the development of such virtues as a sense of community, 
compassion and empathy (Gilson 2014, 8).  She outlines its direct contrast, 
invulnerability, as ‘...complete self-sufficiency, self-sovereignty and autonomy, 
independence from others, an imperviousness to be affected...’ (Gilson 2014, 
7).  Significantly, for this discussion, she argues it is our vulnerability that 
compels or motivates our ethical action and consequently, ‘if an individual is 
invulnerable, unaffected, there is no compulsion to care for, aid, or meet 
obligations to this person.  It is her vulnerability that is the basis for such 
compulsion; if our care, aid, or dutiful action had no effect on her or on us, then 
we would not feel obliged to provide it’ (Gilson 2014, 16).143 This then raises a 
fundamental challenge to the idea that posthumans could (or would even want 
to) fully participate in our caring relationships.  As McNamee and Edwards 
suggest, it is not clear why a posthuman, or even a transhuman, would be 
moved by appeals to human solidarity (McNamee and Edwards 2006, 515). 
                                                          
142
 To this extent, Gilson distinguishes her work from writers such as MacIntyre (1999) who, she 
suggests, views vulnerability as essentially about suffering. 
143
 See also: ‘When we are carried away by our benevolent desires to reduce the suffering of 
vulnerable people and, less benevolently, their cost to society, we forget that the vulnerability of 
others not only burdens us (though it surely does so), but also elicits from us the awesome 
capacity to care for others.  Although—and I cannot be too emphatic about this—it would be a 
profound mistake to romanticize the need to care for vulnerable others and the need of 
vulnerable others to be cared for, it would be equally mistaken to ignore the goodness that 
those relationships can possess’ (Parens 1995, 147). 
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For Gilson we should embrace and accept the interdependence of human life, 
and the significance of the care-giving relationships that arise from it.  For these 
writers, heavily influenced by advances in feminist theory, our shared 
vulnerability, including susceptibility to harm, disease, aging, and death (and the 
caring relationships which do and ought to arise from these) is a formative 
component of human nature, as well as morality itself.  Indeed, as noted by 
Gilson, ethical thinking is often guilty of casting the full moral agent or ‘person’ 
as a ‘mature, autonomous, capable, consenting adult’ (Gilson 2014, 34).  Sarah 
Clark Miller makes a similar point in her work on the ethics of need: 
‘Philosophers have often disregarded certain undesirable aspects of the human 
condition—such as our persistent vulnerability, abiding dependence, and 
inevitable neediness—touting instead those endeavours at which we excel such 
as reasoning, language use, and political engagement’ (Miller 2012, 2).  
Interestingly, it is this interdependence, Miller argues, which grounds ‘...our 
obligation toward fundamentally needy144 others...’, which, as she notes, ‘...goes 
against the grain of contemporary moral philosophy by deeming 
interdependence, rather than other characteristics (e.g., practical reason, well-
being, or emotion) to be a morally salient feature of humanity that plays an 
essential role in our moral deliberations’ (Miller 2012, 5). 
A similar objection, which unlike Gilson and Miller is specifically targeted to the 
human enhancement project, has been made by Erik Parens, who questions 
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 Miller defines ‘fundamental needs’ as ‘...needs that others must meet in order for a person 
(1) to avoid significant harm; (2) to be able to choose and carry out action in the world; and (3) 
to be self-determining.  Fundamental needs arise in situations or conditions in which the agency 
(or the potential for agency) of an individual is acutely endangered.  They are fundamental in 
that such needs must be met for an individual to develop, maintain, or re-establish agency.  
Examples of fundamental needs include the need for bodily integrity, shelter, and nutrition, as 
well as the perhaps less obvious need for social inclusion and emotional attachments’ (Miller 
2012, 4). 
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whether in our attempts to enhance humans we might ‘...inadvertently 
impoverish them by reducing what I call their fragility’ (Parens 1995, 143).  By 
‘fragility’ Parens means that ‘...we are creatures subject to change and to 
chance...whose forms are largely determined by the genetic hand dealt us by 
nature...’ (Parens 1995, 143).  In particular, Parens argues that reducing human 
fragility through enhancement technologies would have a knock on effect on 
three important aspects of human nature: (1) our experience of some forms of 
the beautiful; (2) our relationships of care and the shared recognition and 
acceptance of human neediness; and (3) human diversity across the lifespan 
(Parens 1995, 145).145 
However, whilst one of the goals of the transhumant project is to bring an 
increased resilience and reduction in our susceptibility to harm, it seems far-
fetched to believe that a trans- or even posthuman could achieve absolute 
invulnerability to physical and environmental harm.  In regards to immortality, for 
instance, it is one thing to claim that enhancement technologies could 
eventually reach a point whereby an individual could live indefinitely and, 
another, to claim that this life would be completely indestructible (Watson 2009, 
444).  Moreover, as noted by Mark Coeckelbergh, unless posthumans were to 
exist as completely isolated and atomized individuals, without any possibility of 
inter-posthuman interaction, they would remain vulnerable and susceptible to 
the influence of their environment and the interactions between each other 
(Coeckelbergh 2011).  Hence, so long as they remain relational beings, who 
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 In regards to the first aspect, Parens writes that, ‘one of the easiest ways to begin 
appreciating what is valuable about fragility is to think about the pleasure we take in our 
experience of some forms of the beautiful...The intensity of one sort of pleasure we receive from 
beholding flowers depends decisively on their transience, on the fact that they undergo change.  
Crucial ingredients in our pleasure are our anticipation of the blossoming and our anxiety about, 
and memory of, its passing’ (Parens 1995, 143). 
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can be affected by the actions of others and their environment, then they would 
remain vulnerable.  Parens also recognises this and notes that genetic 
technology would never entirely rid human life of fragility: ‘Even if human beings 
were to become uniformly beautiful, marvellously tempered, hugely healthy, and 
massively smart, there still would be plenty of change and chance for everyone 
to be subject to’ (Parens 1995, 143).146 Whilst posthumans may come to be 
immune to most of the ailments that affect current humans, the process of 
enhancement may even lead to further risks, including existential risks from 
nanotechnology, digital viruses, ecological destruction or nuclear threat. It may 
be more sensible to consider vulnerability to be transformed rather than 
lessened or eradicated.   
Posthuman Dignity and Dehumanization 
 
Bostom identifies two main fears that we may face in a posthuman future, the 
first of which is ‘that the state of being posthuman might in itself be degrading, 
so that by becoming posthuman we might be harming ourselves’ (Bostrom 
2005a, 204). In other words, being a posthuman (and perhaps also the act of 
becoming one) is dehumanizing, rather than ‘super-humanizing’.  This first 
proposed fear hinges on what we mean by ‘dehumanization’ and if this is 
necessarily a bad thing.  We, therefore, need to first establish whether or not 
human enhancement, and a state of being posthuman, is itself dehumanizing 
and undermines human dignity.  As noted by the Social Psychologist Nick 
Haslam, there are degrees of dehumanizing behaviour and so ‘dehumanization-
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See also: ‘Suppose the strong transhumanism project is realised. We are no longer thus 
vulnerable: immortality is a real prospect. Nevertheless, conceptual caution must be exercised 
here?  Even transhumanists will be susceptible in the manner that Hobbes noted. Even the 
strongest are vulnerable in their sleep. But the kind of vulnerability transhumanism seeks to 
overcome is of the internal kind (not Hobbes's external threats)’ (McNamee and Edwards 2006, 
515). 
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related phenomena vary not only in their explicitness but also in whether they 
involve an absolute denial of humanness...’ (Haslam 2014, 38-9).  Extreme 
violations of dignity and dehumanizing acts (such as rape, ritual humiliation or 
torture) are often one of the clearest ways of illustrating what treating someone 
with dignity in fact is (and is not).  But there are also more elusive, subtle 
instances of dehumanization and a denial of humanness, such as failure to 
clothe and wash a patient or mimic a person’s stutter.147 The claim that a state 
of posthumanity would be dehumanizing and so posthumans would be robotic 
or uncaring, would seem to fall into the former, more explicit category.   
One way of answering the question is to determine whether or not radical 
human enhancement would challenge the two essential components of 
‘humanization’ – human identity and human community.  Both these 
components are necessary for an individual to feel, and be treated as, fully 
human (Kelman 1973).  As noted in the previous chapter, dehumanization not 
only acts to reduce the human to the non-human, but also strips away an 
individual’s connection with other human beings.  This also links to the idea that 
a universal dignity must be, at least to an extent, grounded in our shared 
common life and morally considerable relationships.  A lack of either a sense of 
human identity or community will often lead to a decrease in perceived moral 
and social status and, consequently, increases the risk of the individual’s 
welfare and life being treated as of less significance.  An important part of 
promoting human dignity, and avoiding dehumanization, therefore, is to reaffirm 
the perceived humanity of the individual or group by promoting their worth and 
good treatment, and prohibiting other degrading acts.  To decide whether being 
or becoming posthuman would be dehumanising we seemingly, therefore, need 
                                                          
147
 This more subtle form has been labelled ‘infrahumanization’ in the psychological literature, to 
distinguish it from the more extreme forms of dehumanization (see Haslam 2014). 
226 
 
to first have a strong sense of what it means to be human, and to be part of a 
human community.   
Similarly, Lesley Meltzer Henry has categorised dehumanizing acts as 
challenging our sense of the dignity of our shared humanity or, as he labels it, 
‘collective virtue as dignity’.  As he explains: ‘A central feature of this notion of 
dignity is that it is iconographic. It views each person as an icon of all humans. 
When an individual acts or is treated in a manner perceived as degrading or 
dehumanizing, not only is that person’s virtue as dignity diminished; so too, is 
our collective virtue as dignity. Prohibitions on cannibalism and baby selling, for 
example, exist because even if individuals consent to such acts, the acts 
themselves offend our idea of a dignified society; they threaten our collective 
virtue as dignity’ (Henry 2010, 60).  So long as posthumans are able to partake 
in this shared sense of humanity, there seems scope for them to be included in 
this iconographic view of collective dignity.  Conversely if becoming posthuman 
would also entail a detachment or isolation from this common humanity, then 
we would have reason to believe that they would no longer be able to be 
included within a shared human dignity. 
Leon Kass is a prominent advocate of the first criticism of the human 
enhancement project, and has argued that achieving technological and 
pharmacological mastery of our own natures would be dehumanizing; in his 
emphatic words: ‘...Homogenization, mediocrity, pacification, drug-induced 
contentment, debasement of taste, souls without loves and longings – these are 
the inevitable results of making the essence of human nature the last project of 
technical mastery.  In his moment of triumph, Promethan man will become a 
contented cow’ (Kass 2002, 48).  The fear for Kass, and others writing in a 
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similar vein, is that human enhancement technologies will take away what gives 
shape and meaning to human lives.  This seems to broach both the identity and 
community aspect of dehumanization.   Yet as Bostrom points out, although the 
individuals Kass describes certainly seem to be dehumanized and undignified, 
they are also not posthuman in the sense that they are envisaged to become by 
the proponents of human enhancement.  Nevertheless, even if Kass’ initial 
position is overstated, this is not to say that fears of a ‘dehumanized’ future are 
entirely unwarranted.  In either case, a proponent of radical human 
enhancement may also question if the potential for dehumanization is an 
appropriate method to assess future posthumans – does it matter if 
posthumans, who by definition are radically different to current human beings, 
have some or all of their human qualities removed?  Moreover, are the qualities 
of humanity worth saving?  One of the main reasons to pursue enhancement is, 
after all, to improve upon human nature and its deficiencies.   
Posthuman Dignity as a Harm to Human Dignity 
 
Bostrom’s second fear focuses on the possibility ‘...that posthumans might pose 
a threat to ‘ordinary’ humans’ (Bostrom 2005a, 204).  This fear can be 
interpreted in a number of ways:  When we speak of threat, we could be 
referring to actual physical harm that unenhanced humans could be subjected 
to (perhaps through experimentation).  This seems a reasonable conjecture to 
draw, considering the arguments often made for the use of animals for often 
trivial human needs, such as cosmetic experimentation, which outweigh the 
considerable (often fatal) contribution of the animal.  It may also refer to a socio-
economic threat and the social inequality that would accompany a society of the 
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enhanced and unenhanced, as we witness the power differential today between 
the wealthy and poor.   
On another level, and one that strikes at the heart of discussion of human 
dignity, posthumans could threaten the moral status of humans, what Thomas 
Douglas has termed a sort of ‘meta-harm’ (Douglas 2013a, 485).  The 
dehumanization and denial of the full moral status of races, ethnicities, genders, 
sexualities, as well as species throughout different periods of history is well 
documented – as noted by Gustav Jahoda, ‘history abounds with instances of 
differences being regarded as signs of a lack of full humanity, or at least as 
deficiencies...’ (Jahoda 2014, 13).  Yet as the civil rights movements of the 
twentieth century countered racist and sexist (as well as speciest) attitudes, it is 
interesting to consider whether future ‘posthumans’ may likewise be accorded a 
full moral status and humanity.  Consequently, an alternative vision has been 
offered by Bostom in which ‘full moral status and full humanity’ may in fact be 
extended to future posthumans (as well as primates and human-animal 
chimeras), without ‘causing any compensating shrinkage in another direction’ 
(Bostrom 2005a, 210).  In this way, Bostrom proposes that by promoting 
posthuman dignity ‘we promote a more inclusive and humane ethics, one that 
will embrace future technologically modified people as well as humans of the 
contemporary kind’ (Bostrom 2005a, 213).  The possibility that posthumans 
could in fact have a greater moral status, and so the potential to also endanger 
the moral standing of current humans, will be explored at greater length in the 
following chapter. 
  
229 
 
Posthuman Dignity and Human Nature 
 
An alternative way to assess whether human enhancement could be 
dehumanizing is to look to what we consider the fundamental aspects of human 
nature, and how these would be affected by becoming posthuman.  Thomas H. 
Murray has identified three different ways to view the relationship between 
human nature and the ethics of human enhancement: (1) ‘human nature as raw 
material’, (2) ‘human nature as contours of the given’, and (3) ‘human nature as 
normative guide’ (Murray 2007).  The first account harks back to the core idea 
from Pico della Mirandola’s Oration; that human nature has a plasticity and so is 
not fixed.148 The one exception being that it is human nature to have no fixed 
nature (a view which perhaps borders on the contradictory).  So long as we 
have the means available, therefore, we have free reign in our own self-
creation.  For Pico, it was the freedom inherent in human nature which forms 
the essence of our dignity and, consequently, to restrict this freedom is to attack 
or challenge the dignity of Man.  It is certainly this interpretation of human 
nature, and the restlessness with our current limited natures, that drives much 
of the pro-human enhancement debate. 
Charles Rubin has criticised this emphasis on personal freedom or, as he puts 
it, ‘libertarian relativism’, on the grounds that the transhumanist vision of dignity 
‘fragments our sense of self and splinters the human race into a multitude of 
isolated self-overcomers’ (Rubin 2008, 165).  In other words, in its drive for 
personal morphological freedom, the enhancement project challenges the 
relational, human community aspect of our natures.  As he notes, ‘that is a 
significant departure from the old understanding of dignity, aristocratic or 
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 This view has been particularly influential amongst proponents of enhancement; see for 
example, Gregory Stock: ‘Remaking ourselves is the ultimate expression and realization of our 
humanity’ (Stock 2003, 197). 
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democratic, which expressed and embodied dignity in actual public and private 
relations’, in contrast, the transhumanists seek a dignity that is ‘characterized 
[by] no real persons or relationships...’ (Rubin 2008, 165).149 
Murray’s second form – ‘human nature as contours of the given’ – looks at the 
type of beings we already are, rather than at the potential we have to become.  
As he explains: ‘This view acknowledges that we are creatures of a particular 
kind—embodied, finite, capable of great courage and abiding love; capable also 
of cowardice, treachery, and indifference.  Our natures, always complex and 
often morally ambiguous, tell us something about the boundaries of what is 
possible and desirable’ (Murray 2007, 503).  For example, if we are by nature 
social creatures, and we rely on this aspect for our flourishing, then any 
enhancements designed to isolate us from the wider community would be 
considered dehumanizing.  This approach, therefore, does not view human 
nature as open to limitless manipulation, but accepts that there are limits to how 
far we can push self-creation, before we lose our human ‘essence’ (as well as 
acknowledging both the positive and negative aspects of our natures).  Whilst 
there may be an elasticity to human nature, this approach recognises that there 
is wisdom in being cautious about any attempts to improve upon human nature.  
In this respect, unlike the first form, it is a non-idealistic view of human nature, 
which acknowledges both the frailty and limitations of our natures, with ‘some 
supposed “enhancements”...out of bounds’ whilst ‘others fit well within the 
contours of our given nature’ (Murray 2007, 503).  
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 Rubin continues, arguing that ‘...human dignity...is relational, unlike the isolating exercise of 
the will that characterizes the new transhumanist dignity...while human dignity requires a 
moment of freedom with respect to our ability to make moral choices, that moment is mediated 
through real relations, institutions, customs and mores, and we may judge such things by their 
success or failure at promoting proper regard for one another’ (Rubin 2008, 168-9). 
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One prominent exponent of this view is Kass, who has objected to radical 
human enhancement on the grounds that it would be dehumanizing, arguing 
that we should have a ‘...particular regard and respect for the special gift that is 
our own given nature’ (Kass 2003, 1).  For Kass, each species has a ‘given 
species-specified nature’, and we should have a greater appreciation and 
respect for this (Kass 2003, 19-20).  As he acknowledges, the term ‘given’ has 
at least two senses, the first refers to the bestowing of a gift, whilst the second 
refers to something fixed or definitely stated (such as mathematical proof or 
physical laws).  For Kass, therefore, human nature seems to fall under both 
categories – it is something that is both fixed, for example, human mortality (if 
not also natural lifespan),  as well as a ‘special gift’ that should be appreciated 
and respected.  As finite, fallible beings, we must be cautious when it comes to 
remoulding our given natures and not give into hubristic temptations.  As noted 
by O’Mathúna, for Kass, ‘part of human dignity is to recognize this given human 
nature, accept it, and work within its bounds. This includes accepting our 
limitations, such as those in knowledge and wisdom’ (O’Mathúna 2013, 110-11).  
For Bostrom, and other enthusiasts of human enhancement, such a viewpoint 
smacks of defeatism, and a lack of ambition to help change people’s situations 
for the better.  Moreover, as we have seen in Chapter 6, there is a more 
fundamental issue with appealing to the concept of species essentialism, or in 
Kass’ words a ‘given species-specified nature’, for it goes against the grain of 
much of modern evolutionary theory, in which species boundaries are thought 
to be fluid and not fixed; in which case, it seems precarious to base normative 
action around a supposed given human nature. 
Following on from accepting and working within the given nature of humankind, 
is Murray’s third account – that human nature may in fact act as a guide to how 
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we ought to proceed with enhancement technologies.  As he explains: ‘our 
natures establish the contours within which humans flourish or flounder’, and 
within our ‘...biologically given nature, human beings create relationships, 
practices, and institutions that give structure to their interactions and meaning to 
their aspirations.  Understanding the relationship between social practices, 
institutions, and human flourishing allows us to consider other reasons for 
taking the ethics of enhancement seriously’ (Murray 2007, 505).  Murray cites at 
length Kass’ report for the President’s Council on Bioethics (2003) on the ethics 
of human enhancement as an example of this approach.  Kass is fully aware 
that many of the so-called ‘gifts’ of nature include disease, suffering and death, 
as well as many of the darker sides of human nature.150 He, therefore, 
acknowledges that, ‘the mere “giftedness” of things cannot tell us which gifts are 
to be accepted as is, which are to be improved through use or training, which 
are to be housebroken through self-command or medication, and which 
opposed like the plague’ (The President’s Council on Bioethics 2003, 289).  
Nevertheless, Kass insists that the given aspect of human nature can still be 
used as a normative guide:  
Only if there is something precious in our given human nature—beyond 
the fact of its giftedness—can what is given guide us in resisting efforts 
that would degrade it. When it comes to human biotechnical engineering 
beyond therapy, only if there is something inherently good or dignified 
about, say, natural procreation, the human life cycle (with its rhythm of 
rise and fall), and human erotic longing and striving; only if there is 
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 On this point, Bostrom and Kass also agree.  As Bostrom highlights, species-specific natures 
also include ‘a rich source of much of the thoroughly unrespectable’ and are often a bad guide 
for what is right (Bostrom 2005, 205). 
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something inherently good or dignified about the ways in which we 
engage the world as spectators and appreciators, as teachers and 
learners, leaders and followers, agents and makers, lovers and friends, 
parents and children, citizens and worshippers, and as seekers of our 
own special excellence and flourishing in whatever arena to which we 
are called—only then can we begin to see why those aspects of our 
nature need to be defended against our deliberate redesign (The 
President’s Council on Bioethics 2003, 289-90). 
The exact argument is not entirely clear, however the main thrust seems to be 
that if, and only if, there is something precious, dignified or inherently good in 
our ‘given’ human nature (for example natural human procreation, the ways we 
engage with the world, or the human life-course), can we use human nature as 
a normative guide to avoid degrading and dehumanizing acts.  It follows, 
therefore, that if certain biotechnological enhancements challenge these 
precious features of human nature, we have reason to defend them, as well as 
use them as a guide as to what it is acceptable to alter.   
Whilst the idea of the ‘given’ is an interesting prism through which to view the 
ethics of human enhancement, it is not without its conceptual difficulties.  
Murray criticises this approach on the grounds that it ‘looks inward’ at human 
nature and, in the process, fails because ‘not all that is natural is good, and not 
all unnatural enhancements are bad’ (Murray 2007, 505).  However, as we have 
mentioned, Kass does argue that one can still accept that not everything that is 
natural or ‘given’ is good, but still hold, without contradiction, that there are still 
some given parts of human nature which are worth promoting, and which 
remain a useful guide to what we should value, and be wary of changing 
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through radical enhancement technologies.  Kass does not propose that human 
nature is an unambiguous or infallible normative guide.   
One philosopher who has developed a defence of the concept of the ‘given’ is 
Michael Sandel.  In particular, Sandel introduces the idea of the ‘giftedness of 
life’151 and the fundamental problem, as he sees it, with the human 
enhancement project’s drive for mastery or ‘hyperagency’ over it.152 As he 
outlines, to acknowledge the giftedness of life is ‘to recognize that our talents 
and powers are not wholly our own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts 
we expend to develop and to exercise them. It is also to recognize that not 
everything in the world is open to any use we may desire or devise. An 
appreciation of the giftedness of life constrains the Promethean project and 
conduces to a certain humility’ (Sandel 2004).153  One area in particular that 
Sandel identifies as important to being ‘open to the unbidden’ is parenthood, 
and our current inability to choose (to any significant degree) the capacities and 
characteristics of our children (see also Bérubé 1996).  The hubristic drive for 
parents to dictate the genetic characteristics of their children, Sandel argues, 
‘...would disfigure the relation between parent and child, and deprive the parent 
of the humility and enlarged human sympathies that an openness to the 
unbidden can cultivate’ (Sandel 2004).  However, as pointed out by Frances 
Kamm, whether it is a bad thing to eliminate the current social practice of 
parenthood being open to the unbidden of their child’s nature, depends largely 
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 See Hauskeller (2011, 62-70) for an extended analysis of the differences between the ‘given’ 
and ‘giftedness of life’, and their link to gratitude. 
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 See Kamm (2009) for an extended analysis of Sandel’s paper. 
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 As Sandel explains in more detail: ‘Why, after all, do the successful owe anything to the 
least-advantaged members of society? The best answer to this question leans heavily on the 
notion of giftedness. The natural talents that enable the successful to flourish are not their own 
doing but, rather, their good fortune—a result of the genetic lottery. If our genetic endowments 
are gifts, rather than achievements for which we can claim credit, it is a mistake and a conceit to 
assume that we are entitled to the full measure of the bounty they reap in a market economy. 
We therefore have an obligation to share this bounty with those who, through no fault of their 
own, lack comparable gifts’ (Sandel 2004). 
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upon what would replace it – if it was an even more valuable social practice 
then we seemingly do not have a problem (Kamm 2009, 101).   
Moreover, Kamm insists that a desire for mastery does not necessarily motivate 
proponents of human enhancement.  One could pursue incremental 
improvements without being motivated by a drive for mastery or hyperagency.  
But, as pointed out by Michael Hauskeller, it seems that ‘Kamm misunderstands 
the point of Sandel’s argument...Sandel is in fact not trying to answer the 
question whether or not it is morally permissible to pursue human 
enhancement.  Rather, he questions whether it really is a good idea to do so...it 
is not so much a question of being good or bad in the moral sense, but rather of 
what makes a good human life.  By losing the sense of giftedness we do not 
become bad: we become impoverished, we lose something that is important, 
perhaps even essential for a good human life.  For that, the actual motives 
people have for promoting and seeking human enhancement are largely 
irrelevant.  I need not be motivated by a drive to mastery in order to fall victim to 
it’ (Hauskeller 2011, 76-7).  
Once we are able to control, diminish and enhance our characteristics and 
capacities, Sandel reasons that we would no longer be able to accept our 
talents as ‘gifts for which we are indebted’ but would see them instead as 
‘achievements for which we are responsible’ (Sandel 2004).  One result of this, 
Sandel argues, is that parents will ultimately become responsible for any 
perceived deficiencies in their children, athletes will be responsible for ensuring 
they have enhanced themselves sufficiently to win, and likewise we can 
envisage a scenario whereby pilots will be responsible for ensuring they have 
enhanced themselves to minimise error and guarantee passenger safety.  The 
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argument goes that if we are able to control a particular characteristic, but fail 
to, (for example, if a child is born with a disability that could have otherwise be 
avoided, or I could have taken a cognitive enhancement to avoid an accident 
but fail to), then we will feel, and be held, responsible, and so become culpable 
(both morally and legally).154  Consequently, Sandel reasons that responsibility 
would expand to ‘daunting proportions’ for the ‘more we become masters of our 
genetic endowments, the greater the burden we bear for the talents we have 
and the way we perform’ (Sandel 2004).  Ultimately, for Sandel, this would in 
turn ‘transform three key features of our moral landscape: humility, 
responsibility, and solidarity’ (Sandel 2004).  All three features, as we have 
seen, are also important components of a universal human dignity; a dignity 
which is not grounded on individual attributes and abilities, but one which is 
characterised by our morally significant relationships and identity as human 
beings.155 
However, Buchanan queries whether even in cases of extreme enhancement, 
such as radical life extension, the sense of the ‘giftedness of life’ would be lost.  
Rather, he suggests that there would still be ample occasion for enhanced 
individuals to feel an appreciation for the giftedness of life: ‘the good fortune of 
having met one’s soul mate, of having had the opportunity to be part of an 
important social movement because one was born at the right 
time...opportunities for a sense of “giftedness” would not be lacking in a world 
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 William Saletan, writing in The New York Times, picks up Sandel on his criticism of 
increased responsibility due to the availability of enhancement by arguing that ‘given a choice 
between a world of fate and blamelessness and a world of freedom and responsibility’, Saletan 
would take the latter, which might be too daunting for the humans of today, ‘but not for the 
humans of tomorrow’ (Saletan 2007). 
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 As O’Mathúna explains: ‘When dignity is acknowledged as inherent, there is an acceptance 
of its givenness and its boundaries. We are not self-made. We did not generate our genetic 
heritage. We were given much by those who helped us in our formative years. Our parents or 
primary care-givers were central, so were the friends, neighbours, relatives, teachers, coaches, 
doctors, nurses and myriads of others who helped us become who we are today. This should 
lead to a sense of gratitude and humility’ (O’Mathúna 2009, 155). 
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replete with biomedical enhancements’ (Buchanan 2011, 80-1).  Hauskeller has 
challenged this claim on the grounds that it is possible that a) posthumans may 
reach a point where, by all intents and purposes, they have complete control 
over their environment and of themselves (which is, after all, one of the ultimate 
goals for many transhumanists), and, b) the fact that enhancement may disrupt 
our current, human, sense of the giftedness of life, so that enhancement may 
still make us less inclined to appreciate giftedness (Hauskeller 2011, 78-9).  In 
particular, Hauskeller wonders whether in the transhumanists’ drive for ever 
better minds, bodies, lives, environments and so on, they would ultimately have 
a listless dissatisfaction with life, and its apparent gifts.  In this way, an 
appreciation of the giftedness of life has to also include an appreciation of what 
is good in life now, and not how it might be in the future.156   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned primarily with how conceptions of posthuman 
dignity sit with contemporary theories of human dignity, especially conceptions 
which envisage it as a universal feature of humankind, shared equally between 
all its constituent members.  As we have seen, Bostrom’s conception of 
posthuman dignity, especially in the form of dignity as a quality, which differs in 
degree between individuals and can be increased or diminished through radical 
biomedical and biotechnological enhancement, certainly seems antithetical in 
nature to a universal human dignity.  It is difficult, therefore, to agree with 
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 Although Danaher has queried if this might just be the outcome for those ‘wedded to techno-
utopiaism’, and not for those who are not so driven by the goals of the enhancement project.  As 
he writes, ‘it seems to me that Hauskeller’s argument is guilty of an implausible overstatement.  
Even if we grant that it is dangerous to make the better the enemy of the good, is it really likely 
that everyone will start doing this?  Maybe techno-utopians like Bostrom would succumb to this 
listless dissatisfaction, but what about the rest of us?  The pursuit of enhanced agency is not 
necessarily guided or wedded to techno-utopianism’ (Danaher 2013, 236). 
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Bostrom that the two are ultimately ‘compatible and complementary’ (Bostrom 
2005a, 213).  As has been argued in this and previous chapters, it is the 
appreciation of our interconnectedness and reliance on others, as well as our 
shared vulnerability and humanity which form some of the main foundations for 
a universal human dignity.  To the extent that radically enhanced individuals can 
share in these relationships, then we would have reason to believe that human 
dignity could be extended to them too.   
In contrast to the transhumanists’ contention that human nature should be 
improved upon, critics such as Kass have argued for the importance of 
embodied human life for human dignity, and suggest that how these biomedical 
and technological interventions will affect the human life-course will be 
fundamental in judging their merits (or lack of).  Human dignity, for Kass, 
involves embracing, ‘...the worthiness of embodied human life...our natural 
desires and passions, our natural origins and attachments, our sentiments and 
aversions, our loves and longings’ (Kass 2002, 17-18).  For Kass, the human 
life-course is inseparable from many of the most positive aspects of our natures.  
The pursuit of radical life extension, for instance, in Kass’ eyes would have a 
detrimental effect and disrupt ‘many of the best things in human life’, including, 
‘engagement, seriousness, a taste for beauty, the possibility of virtue, the ties 
born of procreation, [and] the quest for meaning’ (Kass 2003, 25).  Instead, 
Kass proposes that human flourishing is not achieved through ‘...a life lived with 
an ageless body or untroubled soul, but rather a life lived in rhythmed time, 
mindful of time’s limits, appreciative of each season and filled first of all with 
those intimate human relations that are ours only because we are born, age, 
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replace ourselves, decline, and die...’ (Kass 2003, 27).157  For Kass, human 
dignity is not grounded solely on our intrinsic capacities, nor our desire to 
continually improve upon them, but instead by a recognition of our limitations, 
the social relations we partake in, and the significance of the human life course 
from birth to grave.  A similar point is raised by Thomas H. Murray when he 
suggests that ‘...our moral evaluation of putative biomedical enhancements 
must grapple with the meaning and value of the social practices and institutions 
affected by them.  Genuflecting in the direction of unfettered individual choice 
will not be an ethically adequate or wise response’ (Murray 2007, 513).  Rather, 
an ethics of human enhancement should, for Murray, recognise that ‘...our 
nature shapes the contours of our moral world’, whose flourishing is dependent 
on acknowledging that we are ‘...embodied creatures whose lives and 
flourishing are deeply intertwined with one another’ (Murray 2007, 513-4). 
Indeed, the difficulty is that the main themes of transhumanism can often feel 
entirely detached and antithetical to many of the tenets which characterise a 
universal human dignity, be that the significance of our mutual interdependence, 
our caring relationships, or the role of compassionate care.  Whilst a universal 
human dignity accepts the need to work with and attempt to protect all humans, 
regardless of their intrinsic capacities or characteristics, the human 
enhancement project often has much ‘bolder’ plans to overhaul and replace 
human nature entirely.  The pursuit of radical human enhancement does seem 
to challenge the two key components that are required for full ‘humanization’ – a 
sense of human identity and human community.  In the drive for mastery of our 
own natures and our environment, there does appear to be a real danger of 
                                                          
157
 Like Kass, human dignity for Rolston III results from a shared human nature and the culture 
in which humans develop (Rolston III 2008, 130). 
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losing an appreciation of the significance of our current shared humanity, and 
the morally significant relationships that arise from it, as well as further 
endangering those already so often on the margin of moral consideration. 
  
241 
 
Chapter 10  Human Dignity and Enhancing Moral Status 
 
Introduction 
 
More often than not, the history of ethical thought has been concerned with 
justifying the superior moral status of humans over that of other non-human 
animals.158 However, in recent decades, there has been a notable reaction to 
this sentiment (as we have seen in Chapter 6).  Moreover, in some cases, the 
ethical literature has been occupied with demonstrating the moral superiority of 
some humans over other humans.  Indeed, the vast literature on the ethics of 
personhood, whereby any human beings with insufficient cognitive capacity are 
denied full moral status (FMS), is one of the most prominent examples of this 
(McMahan 2008, 2003; Rachels 1990; and Tooley 1983).   
However, as the possibility of increasing physical and cognitive capacities (as 
well as perhaps more valuable or profound relationships) through biomedical 
and technological enhancement becomes ever more tenable, so has increasing 
attention been paid to the possibility that these radically enhanced beings might 
also have a correspondingly superior moral status or a ‘supra-moral status’ 
(Douglas 2013a, 474; McMahan 2009).  This recent interest in the possibility of 
an enhanced moral status is perhaps not to be unexpected, for as Thomas 
Douglas notes, ‘...it would be a surprising good fortune for humanity if the 
threshold for maximal moral status lay just below the level of mental capacity 
typical of ordinary adult humans' (Douglas 2013a, 480-1).  These writers have 
begun to question why humans should have the highest moral status, and 
                                                          
158
 One of the most notorious examples of this has often been attributed to the ethics of 
Descartes (see Harrison 1992 for a discussion of this).  Similarly, as noted by Garrett, ‘...the 
standing of animals and our moral duties merited barely a mention until the middle of the 
eighteenth century–and even until very recently these matters were still peripheral' (Garrett 
2011, 66-7). 
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whether a moral status higher than personhood may in fact exist (Agar 2013a; 
Douglas 2013a; and McMahan 2009).   
Indeed for those who argue that moral status is tied to intrinsic capacities, such 
as intelligence, language use or ethical reasoning, then it seems a natural next 
step to ask if posthuman beings were created, with vastly superior capacities 
than those currently possessed by humans, would they still have the same 
moral status currently enjoyed by humans, or would their moral status be as 
superior to ours as ours currently is to non-human animals?  If radical human 
enhancement did lead to the creation of individuals with superior moral status or 
‘post-personhood’, would this be a harm to ordinary persons?  Consequently, 
the possibility of enhancing moral status has been met with a number of 
objections, including:  
1. Ordinary persons’ (i.e. those who have not been radically enhanced) 
current moral status and dignity could be jeopardised. 
2. It could undermine the ‘Moral Equality Assumption’ – the idea that all with 
the requisite capacities sufficient for personhood enjoy the same moral 
status. 
3. Persons’ immunity to permissible harm might be decreased, and 
consequently may be sacrificed for the interests of post-persons. 
4. Those already on the margins of moral considerability would 
consequently be pushed further aside.  
This chapter will seek to address in turn all these objections to the possibility of 
enhancing moral status. 
Whilst highly speculative, considerations of the potential for higher degrees of 
moral status have significant consequences for how we characterise the moral 
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status of contemporary humans, as well as those already on the margins of 
moral considerability.  Jeff McMahan, for instance, has argued that if we insist 
that humans would retain the same moral status as that of radically enhanced 
posthumans, then we would have an even harder time maintaining the equality 
in moral status said to exist between ‘normal’ functioning adult humans and the 
severely cognitively limited.  For, as he explains, if ‘we would have the same 
status as supra-persons and the cognitively limited have the same status that 
we have, it follows that the moral status of supra-persons would be no higher 
than that of the cognitively limited, despite the fact that the differences of 
psychological capacity between the members of the two groups would be more 
than twice as great as those between ourselves and higher animals' (McMahan 
2009, 600).  McMahan seems to be presenting an example of a reductio ad 
absurdum, as the possibility of a posthuman having the same level of moral 
status as a severely cognitively disabled human, despite their vast differences 
in cognitive ability is, for McMahan, clearly false.  As always, the extent to which 
this situation would be absurd depends largely both on precisely how much the 
posthuman’s cognitive capacities are superior to the individual with severe 
cognitive disabilities, and on how much weight cognitive capacities should have 
in the assessment of moral status. 
Importantly for our discussion, the possibility of enhancing moral status also 
poses a significant challenge to a universal human dignity, especially in regards 
to the idea that it conveys an absolute worth – to be ‘beyond price’.  Those with 
a dignity are commonly thought to already have the highest moral status.  Yet, if 
dignity is intrinsically tied up with FMS, would enhancing moral status also 
radically alter a universal human dignity?  This chapter will examine the close 
relationship between a universal human dignity and FMS, and the implications 
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for dignity if moral status is able to be enhanced.  Whilst they are close 
concepts, this chapter will draw out both the similarities as well as where they 
diverge.   
As highlighted by Nicholas Agar, there are two fundamental ways in which an 
individual can be morally enhanced: they could undergo either moral disposition 
enhancements or moral status enhancements (Agar 2013a, 67).  The former 
refers to the possibility of improving upon the agent’s moral character or virtue, 
as well as their actions.  One example of this is Persson and Savulescu’s belief 
that we ought to enhance the moral character of humanity by improving 
dispositions such as altruism, gratitude or a sense of justice, and consequently 
suppress immoral ones, so that individuals do behave in the morally ‘correct’ 
way (Persson and Savulescu 2008).  Similarly, Douglas has argued that we 
may be able to enhance our moral dispositions by suppressing or dampening 
some of our ‘counter-moral’ emotions, such as racist tendencies or aggression 
(Douglas 2008, 231).  In contrast, the aim of moral status enhancement is ‘not 
to increase the moral value of our actions or characters’, but instead to increase 
‘a being’s entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment’ as well as reduce 
‘its eligibility for certain forms of harmful treatment...’ (Agar 2013a, 67).  This 
chapter will focus on moral status enhancement, as opposed to moral 
disposition enhancement, for moral status seems closer allied to what a 
universal human dignity fundamentally represents.  It is not ultimately to do with 
individuals or groups acting with or without dignity (although no doubt this still 
has something to do with human dignity), but instead concerns the idea that 
humans have a certain status which is an inherent and inalienable value or 
worth shared equally amongst all (or most) human beings, which ought to be 
recognised and respected by others – a so-called ‘minimum core’. 
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Dignity and Moral Status 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, there is often thought to be a close 
link between dignity and moral status, and the resulting demand for each 
individual to be treated with respect. Some commentators seem to think they 
are, more-or-less, synonymous (Sandler and Basl 2010),159 and as we have 
seen in Chapter 9, Bostrom’s first formulation of dignity is one connected to 
moral status and the right to be treated with a basic level of respect.   This sets 
up dignity as a threshold concept, with all individuals entitled to the right to be 
treated with a basic level of respect (provided one reaches the required moral 
status to be accorded a dignity).  As we have seen, for some, this level is set at 
the level of FMS, and not a lower moral standing.  In contrast, Bostrom’s 
second formulation – that dignity is the quality of being morally worthy, 
honourable, noble and excellent – suggests dignity is a scalar concept that 
varies from individual to individual.  Just as one can be more excellent or 
honourable, so too can we have more or less dignity.  It follows, therefore, that 
humans possess this form of dignity to varying degrees and amounts (Bostrom 
2005a, 209).  Whilst the previous chapter focused on Bostrom’s second 
formulation of dignity, this chapter will focus on the former – that is, dignity as a 
moral status. 
In particular, a universal human dignity shares many characteristics of full moral 
status or personhood, including the idea that all members are inviolable and 
have a high and equal moral worth.  DeGrazia has referred to human dignity as 
an alleged ‘supreme moral status’, which proposes that humans have a higher 
                                                          
159
 As noted by Marcus Düwell ‘...there is a wide range of possible ways of conceiving of the 
relation between 'moral status' and 'dignity’, and at its most basic the two terms are more-or-
less synonymous’ (Düwell 2013, 95).   
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moral status than non-human animals (DeGrazia 2007, 310).  This would seem 
to imply that if dignity in its current form is already ‘supreme’ then it would also 
be unassailable, and unable to be improved upon.  To confer someone a 
dignity, therefore, would imply that they have a high (if not the highest) moral 
status.160  What then, precisely, is the relationship between moral status and 
dignity?  To what extent is dignity and moral status the same thing and in what 
ways are they different?  Clearly a being could have a lower level of moral 
status, and not have a dignity.  Due to its capacity to feel pain we might, for 
instance, accord a fish or spider a moral status, without assigning it a dignity as 
well.  As highlighted by Marcus Düwell ‘what should be noted is that if a theory 
involves the existence of a 'lesser' moral status than dignity, such a status 
cannot be understood as 'a bit of dignity'...A lesser status than dignity could still 
be a moral status, but not the status of dignity’ (Düwell 2013, 95).161  A universal 
human dignity is a non-scalar concept, and so does not admit of degrees – if 
two individuals have a dignity, they possess it equally.   
However, could a being with a lower moral status also have a dignity?  This is a 
much more complex question to answer, as bestowing something a dignity, as 
we have highlighted, is seemingly to assign it a very high moral status anyway.  
How then could a being have both a dignity and a lower moral status?  An 
answer to this depends on how wide we are willing to cast the net of moral 
concern.  A universal human dignity, as its name suggests, is intended to be an 
inclusive concept, with some of those often on the margins of moral concern 
brought into the fold.  However, it is not clear if this extends to all members of 
                                                          
160
 For instance, see Toscano: ‘…the notion of human dignity should be understood as a high 
moral status consisting of a set of rights that guarantees a high degree of inviolability and 
respect' (Toscano 2011, 5). 
161
 See also: ‘animals may have a worth of their own, but theirs is not equivalent to human 
dignity’ (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 333). 
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the species Homo sapiens; whether, for example, foetuses, the irreversibly 
comatose, or even the dead have a dignity.  Moreover, as we have seen in 
Chapter 8, if dignity is fundamentally a relational concept, this leaves it open to 
the extent that non-human animals can also have a dignity. 
On the other hand, do individuals with a high moral status necessarily have a 
dignity? We might say, for example, that an extra-terrestrial being could have 
FMS, but we might hesitate to accord them a dignity as well, especially if dignity 
is rooted within the significance of human relationships and the extra-terrestrial 
is incapable of participating within this framework.  For this reason, FMS and 
dignity are theoretically not synonymous and it appears, at least prima facie, 
possible to possess one without the other.  However, in the vast majority of 
cases it seems sensible to agree that an individual with FMS is likely to also 
have a dignity. 
However, to fully address these questions, it is necessary to outline precisely 
what we mean when we refer to a being as having a moral status.  At a basic 
level, a being has a moral status ‘...if and only if it or its interests morally matter 
to some degree for the entity’s own sake, such that it can be wronged’ 
(Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013; see also Dwyer 2011, 9).  In other words, a 
being has a moral status only if there is something about them which means 
that their interests matter in their own right; that they have, in DeGrazia’s words, 
an ‘...independent moral importance’ (DeGrazia 2007, 315), and are not merely 
important instrumentally to someone else.  If, for instance, as we have seen in 
Chapter 6, sentience and the capacity to experience pain and pleasure are of 
moral significance, then all those beings that have this capacity would also have 
a moral status which ought to be accorded a certain level of respect.  In 
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contrast, rocks, the dead, or any other nonliving matter, would not have a moral 
status, as they seemingly lack any form of interests (although of course other 
beings might indeed find them of great interest).  As DeGrazia explains, in 
regards to the wrongness of cruelty towards a horse: ‘it is something about the 
horse that makes it wrong to abuse her, not merely something about the horse’s 
relationship to certain persons such as the horse’s ‘owner’ or to other persons 
such as those who care about animals. The horse can suffer and therefore can 
be harmed in a way that she experiences. So we owe it to the horse not to 
abuse her. From this it follows that the horse has moral status’ (DeGrazia 
2012a, 136).  Notice by this account, moral status is considered asymmetrical, 
in that whilst the horse, by virtue of its moral status, can make moral claims on 
us (for example, we should not cause it unnecessary suffering), due to her lack 
of cognitive capacity she is unable to make moral claims on herself, so she 
lacks moral responsibility. 
In contrast, as Wasserman has highlighted, a more controversial claim is that 
for a being to have moral status they must be able to act symmetrically, that is, 
‘a being must be able to have moral claims made on it (and hence be capable 
of responsibility) as well as being able to make moral claims on others’.  
However the problem, as he notes, is that this strict requirement would not only 
exclude all non-human animals, but a ‘...symmetry condition would [also] 
exclude any human being lacking the capacity to have moral claims made on 
them—not only individuals with radical cognitive impairments, but infants and 
young children as well’ (Wasserman 2013a).  Hence this form of moral status 
would run contrary to the idea of a universal human dignity.  Rather, a universal 
human dignity appears to be an asymmetrical concept in so far as some 
individuals who have a dignity can lay moral claims on others, whilst not having 
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to reciprocate this moral responsibility (at least in any meaningful way).  For 
instance, the expectation that a nurse should treat their patient with care and 
dignity, is not dependent upon whether or not the patient is able to reciprocate 
(because, for instance, they are in a permanent vegetative state or severely 
cognitively disabled).  Rather, the nurse ought to treat their patient with care 
and dignity by virtue of the fact that the individual counts morally in their own 
right. 
If part of the fundamental requirement for something to have a moral status is 
that it matters morally in its own right, one may question whether moral status 
need be restricted to individuals.  Could certain groups or even abstract 
concepts such as care, love or dignity have a moral status as well?  However, 
as noted above, there is also a requirement that there is some form of interest 
that matters morally and needs respect.  In this respect, it is difficult to see how 
an abstract concept, such as love or dignity could itself have a moral status 
(although their possession might be indicative or constitutive of a being which 
does have a moral status).  This is not to say that certain groups (be that along 
social, racial, species or gender lines) might have a moral status (for a 
discussion of this see Shockley 2013; also Sheehy 2006). 
Enhancing Moral Status 
 
However, moral status not only refers to a being who counts morally in their 
own right (what is sometimes referred to as moral standing) but also acts as a 
comparative notion.  Just as one can have different levels or ranks of social 
status so, some commentators argue, we can have different degrees of moral 
status.  Whilst two beings may both have moral status, one of them might still 
count for more morally, as they might have a higher moral status than the other 
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(see Agar 2013a, 67; Buchanan 2009a, 346).  For instance, whilst we might 
argue that a horse does have a moral status, we might not accept that it should 
be considered equal in importance to the moral status of a human – we might 
argue, for instance, that the human’s greater cognitive capacities, their more 
valuable personal relationships, or their more sophisticated interests, ought to 
count for more than the horse’s.  In this way, there appears, prima facie, to be 
at least two different levels of moral status – what is often thought of as a 
maximal or FMS (also referred to as ‘personhood’) and a lesser moral status 
below that.  But, as we will see, there are myriad ways to conceive of this, with 
some envisaging one or more of these levels as a sliding scale, or a mixture of 
the two.   
The fear then is that the creation of beings with higher moral status could 
decrease the value of our own moral status.  As Douglas notes, one reason for 
this is that moral status ‘...is a partly positional good: its value depends in part 
on one’s relative, rather than absolute, endowment of it’ (Douglas 2013a, 483).  
Again this is one other respect in which a universal human dignity differs from 
moral status, for a universal human dignity is not a comparative notion (two 
individuals do not have different degrees of dignity), but is rather shared out 
equally amongst all constitutive members.   
Importantly, human beings (or at least ‘normal’ functioning children and adults), 
are thought to have full moral status.  As highlighted by Jaworska and 
Tannenbaum, FMS is commonly thought to involve ‘...a very stringent moral 
presumption against interfering with the being in various ways — destroying the 
being, experimenting upon it, directly causing its suffering, etc.’, moreover, 
some philosophers also include as part of FMS ‘...a strong, but not necessarily 
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stringent, reason to aid’ as well as ‘a strong reason to treat fairly’ (Jaworska and 
Tannenbaum 2013).  One of the reasons some philosophers are hesitant to 
include these further aspects as necessary for FMS is the fact that a reason to 
aid or treat fairly is very open ended, and could either amount to a very broad or 
narrow duty to others, depending upon how one interprets it.  We might also 
add to this list the fact that a being with FMS, like a being with dignity, is also 
commonly thought to have a high level of value or moral worth – it is because of 
this that their interests have the weight or significance they do, which may 
override the interests of beings with a lower moral status, where there is a 
conflict of interest.  Moreover, significantly for our discussion, FMS is commonly 
thought to be a threshold or non-scalar concept in that once an individual meets 
the criteria for FMS, like dignity, it is shared equally amongst all constituent 
members and cannot be exceeded – it is, in other words, a maximal status. 
As we will see, how we characterise and understand the relationship between 
our moral status and the moral status of these enhanced beings depends 
fundamentally on what model of moral status we adopt – a threshold or 
interests model, or some form of hybrid model.  How we understand what moral 
status is has a fundamental bearing on whether or not radical human 
enhancement would lead to future post-persons or ‘supra-persons’.   
Threshold Views – Buchanan’s Account of Moral Status 
 
Whilst the threshold view of moral status has a long history, particularly within 
the Kantian tradition of so-called ‘respect-based’ accounts, it was Alan 
Buchanan who first seriously defended the threshold view against the potential 
threat posed from the possibility of moral status enhancement and the 
subsequent emergence of ‘postpersons’ (Buchanan 2009a).  In particular, whilst 
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Buchanan accepts the distinct possibility that radical enhancement of human 
capacities could lead to ‘posthuman’ beings (in that because of their radically 
enhanced capacities it makes little sense to label them as merely human), he 
does not think that this would inevitably also lead to an increase in their moral 
status – they would not also become post-persons.  The reason for this is that 
moral status is, in Buchanan’s eyes, a threshold concept, whereby all 
individuals who have the relevant cognitive capacities necessary for FMS, have 
FMS, regardless of the degree to which they possess the status conferring 
capacity, or how well they exercise them.  As Jaworska and Tannenbaum 
explain: ‘…if capacity C grounds FMS, then any being that has C, regardless of 
how well it can exercise this capacity, has as much moral status as any other 
being that has C and this status is full’ (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013).  This 
is also referred to as a ‘respect-based’ account of moral status because those 
with the requisite cognitive capacities, by virtue of their possession, are due a 
level of respect and their interests accorded a certain moral weight or 
significance.  In essence, then, the threshold view is the belief that FMS is a 
non-scalar concept, whereby all those who have the characteristics we 
associate with personhood (be that intelligence, moral reasoning or language 
use) have FMS, regardless of how well they exercise or possess these 
capacities.   
In contrast, the threshold view can still accept that there may in fact be a scale 
of moral considerability below the threshold for FMS, whereby some creatures 
have a higher or lower moral status relative to each other.  Those below the 
threshold are often thought to have a moral status in proportion to the degree to 
which they possess the status conferring capacity.  In contrast, those above the 
threshold have the same moral status, despite still possessing the same 
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capacity to different degrees.  As Buchanan explains ‘on the respect-based 
view, it makes sense to say that even though the characteristics that constitute 
the capacity that confers moral status admit of degree, once one has the 
capacity, having those characteristics to a higher degree is morally irrelevant’ 
(Buchanan 2009a, 361).  Yet Buchanan does little more that suggest, rather 
than demonstrate, why this is the case.  As Wasserman notes: ‘the challenge of 
justifying the range feature of moral status is closely related to the challenge of 
justifying the threshold—why should differences above the threshold be morally 
insignificant when the differences marked by the threshold are so significant?’ 
(Wasserman 2013a). 
Moral Equality Assumption (MEA) 
 
One reason for Buchanan’s resistance to introducing a distinction between 
persons and post-persons is because it would challenge what he refers to as 
the ‘Moral Equality Assumption’ (MEA), the belief that, ‘all who have the 
characteristics that are sufficient for being a person have the same moral status’ 
(Buchanan 2009a, 347).  Buchanan’s fear is that a demarcation between 
persons and post-persons will inevitably erode this moral equality and, in the 
process, would diminish the moral status and rights currently enjoyed by 
persons.  As he highlights ‘...a world in which there were persons and post-
persons would be a world in which the Moral Equality Assumption would be 
false...’ (Buchanan 2009a, 359).  The MEA is based on the widely held view that 
once an individual has reached the minimum level of the relevant capacity (for 
example, intelligence, moral reasoning or autonomy) for FMS then their moral 
status does not continue to rise, but remains the same as all the other agents 
with FMS, regardless of how much they exceed the minimum level.  So long as 
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the individual has the requisite capacity, their ability to exercise this capacity is 
irrelevant to their moral status (although it may still lead to further rights).  Whilst 
intelligence might be a requirement for FMS, we do not, for instance, normally 
think a more intelligent adult human also has a correspondingly higher moral 
status. The threshold view, as understood by Buchanan, entails that 
personhood is the highest possible form of moral status; it is a fixed threshold 
which does not rise, regardless of the degree or intensity of capacities 
possessed by the individual in question. 
Significantly, all ‘normal’ functioning adult humans (as well as most infants)162 
are said to rest above this threshold, and hence have FMS.  An advantage of 
the threshold view, then, is that it seems relatively morally egalitarian, with the 
most cognitively able humans sharing an equal moral status to those with much 
more limited capacities.163  By maintaining the MEA, we also protect the moral 
status of current humans.  In contrast, a morally individualistic account would 
accept that an individual’s moral status should always be directly in proportion 
to the degree to which they possess the status conferring capacity.  It is clear, 
therefore, that there are strong affinities between a universal human dignity and 
the threshold account of moral status.  In particular, they are both non-scalar 
concepts to denote high moral worth, which are shared out equally amongst all 
constituent members.  A form of the MEA seems to underpin a universal human 
dignity, in so far as all of the constituent members have dignity to the same 
degree.  However, as we will see, the characteristics Buchanan proposes as 
central to the MEA (namely the capacity to give and take reasons) are quite 
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 There is disagreement as to which infants might be excluded, for example, those with severe 
cognitive disabilities, which limits their potential to develop the relevant status conferring 
capacities. 
163
 As noted by Wasserman, ‘the term “range concept” comes from Rawls; his example is of 
points within a circle, all of which are equally “inside” despite varying distances from the 
circumference’ (Wasserman 2013a). 
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different in type and scope to the characteristics that ground a universal human 
dignity.  
Marginal Cases 
 
Despite its egalitarian undertones, one serious obstacle for the threshold 
account is its difficulty in dealing with marginal cases, and defining precisely 
where the boundaries of moral concern lie.  As noted by DeGrazia, one issue 
confronting proponents of the threshold model is that ‘many human beings do 
not meet the threshold these theorists suggest as the basis for moral status, yet 
it seems problematic to regard these human beings as lacking moral status.  
This well-known problem of non-paradigm humans should not be ignored’ 
(DeGrazia 2012b, 146).  Indeed, the threshold account often attempts to draw a 
sharp divide between those who do and do not have FMS, despite the fact that 
the status conferring capacities themselves come in degrees.  This can have 
serious ramifications for those who slip out of this threshold, despite the fact 
that the difference between the individual just below the threshold and that 
above might only be slight.  The threshold account, therefore, is in danger of 
drawing arbitrary lines, where a more nuanced or multi-criteria account might be 
best.  Buchanan acknowledges this potential problem, but insists that 
‘proponents of the respect-based view can admit that there may be a fuzzy 
lower boundary for this threshold: that it may be difficult to judge whether some 
human beings (for example, very young children or cognitively impaired adults) 
have the capacity for mutual accountability.  Nonetheless, the respect-based 
view can identify uncontroversial cases of individuals possessing the capacity in 
question’ (Buchanan 2009a, 359-60).  Yet one may reply that it is no great 
achievement for a moral theory to be able to establish uncontroversial cases of 
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FMS.  It is rather a moral theory’s ability to guide in controversial or marginal 
cases which is often of most use.  Interestingly, whilst Buchanan acknowledges 
a fuzzy lower boundary, he doesn’t think there is a corresponding ‘fuzzy’ upper 
limit as well – personhood effectively goes on ad infinitum. 
A further problem for the threshold account is in explaining how a property 
which itself comes in degrees can confer a threshold of FMS.  In the words of 
Wasserman:  
The difficulty presented by a threshold is that it imposes a moral 
discontinuity over psychologically continuous attributes. In contrast to the 
possession of a soul or a divine spark, practical rationality and moral 
accountability, and most other individual attributes claimed by 
contemporary accounts to ground moral status, appear to come in 
degrees. Looking at the development of an infant, for example, the 
acquisition of these attributes appears to be gradual, even if the rate of 
growth is uneven. And yet our judgment of moral status appears 
categorical—an individual either has full moral status or lacks it. 
(Wasserman 2013a).   
One may respond that a universal human dignity suffers from a similar fate, in 
that the significance of the relations between individuals varies, and so it is not 
clear how they can be thought to ground an equality of moral worth.  This is a 
fundamental problem for all threshold accounts, and as we will see, has 
persuaded some to adopt an interests approach instead. 
In any case, because FMS is for Buchanan a threshold concept, and hence all 
those on or above the threshold have an equality of moral status, he therefore 
doubts that there could be such a thing as an enhanced moral status or ‘post-
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personhood’.  Whilst posthumans might be considered more virtuous or 
admirable, this does not necessarily entail that they must also be more morally 
significant or have a higher moral worth. As he explains, ‘merely augmenting 
the characteristics that make a being a person doesn’t seem to be the sort of 
thing that could confer higher moral status...the result presumably would be an 
enhanced person, not a new kind of being with a higher moral status than that 
of person[hood].  After all, some human persons are better than others at 
practical reasoning, are morally better, or are better able to envision their future 
existence, but that doesn’t mean they have a higher moral status’ (Buchanan 
2009a, 359).  Yet, quite how an ‘enhanced person’ is qualitatively different from 
a ‘post-person’ is not clear.  Buchanan’s argument seems to be that because 
we currently consider FMS to be a threshold concept, whereby individuals with 
different levels of cognitive capacities (for example, intelligence) can share a 
common moral status, a being with vastly superior cognitive capacities would, 
therefore, also still have the same moral status.  Yet, just because the threshold 
might obtain in cases where the differences between individuals are not that 
great, it does not necessarily follow that it would still obtain in instances where 
there is a vast difference between the two.  Indeed, if a being was created with 
vastly superior intelligence, this might be a different story, and we would 
struggle to justify why their moral status should remain equal to a being with a 
much lower set of cognitive capacities.   
In particular, for Buchanan, the full moral status conferring capacity in question 
is to be accountable for reasons which, he explains, is an individual’s ability 
‘...to give reasons for what they do or refrain from doing and are able to engage 
with others in a “give and take” of practical reasons that includes a conception 
of good reasons (and better reasons)’, it is, furthermore, a ‘...capacity to take 
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responsibility for reasons—to feel a responsibility to justify what one does to 
others by citing reasons against the background assumption that reasons can 
be good or bad, better or worse...’ (Buchanan 2012, 140).  This is a demanding 
symmetrical account, whereby one must also be responsible or accountable for 
their moral decisions.  This would seem to exclude many of those we would 
normally consider having FMS, including young children, or the cognitively 
disabled. 
Furthermore, even if the capacity to ‘give and take’ reasons might be an 
important component of FMS, it is certainly not normally considered to be the 
only relevant capacity.  Buchanan does not seem to offer an explanation for 
why the ability to give and take reasons is the basis of FMS, beyond his own gut 
feeling or ‘intuition’ (Buchanan 2012, 140).164  As noted by DeGrazia, his claim 
is ‘...somewhat arbitrary and perhaps ad hoc...temporal self-awareness, 
agency, the capacity for symbolic thought, and moral agency in a broader sense 
than simply accountability for reasons.  These criteria seem no less plausible 
than Buchanan’s for undergirding our moral status’, furthermore, DeGrazia 
suggests that post-persons ‘...may have equal justification for picking out a 
property such as excellence or reliability in moral agency as the basis for a 
moral status higher than that possessed by persons’ (DeGrazia 2012b, 145).  
Therefore, if we use a different measure, be that intelligence or moral reasoning 
(both of which conceivably could be enhanced, and do not seem to have an 
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 See: ‘My intuition—and that is all I can say that it is—is that any being that has the capacity 
to ‘give and take’ reasons, where this includes having a notion of good and better reasons and a 
sense of responsibility for justifying one’s actions to others, has an especially high moral status 
and that having this capacity to a higher degree—that is, excelling at giving and taking 
reasons—does not give one a higher moral status.  The point is that, once a being is amenable 
to the ‘give and take’ of reasons where this includes evaluating reasons and acknowledging a 
burden of justifying one’s conduct to others, that is sufficient for higher moral status’ (Buchanan 
2012, 140).   
259 
 
upper limit), the possibility of enhanced moral status might be more obvious.  
The number of qualities which can be claimed to be of significance for judging 
moral status is perhaps either indicative of the complexity of the issue, or the 
arbitrariness of the concept. 
In contrast to Buchanan’s quite restrictive and demanding account of FMS, in 
Chapter 8 we have seen how a form of FMS, or dignity, could be grounded on 
the significance of the relational ties between individuals and groups, including 
(but by no means exclusively), our shared vulnerability and dependence, as well 
as the capacity to engage and be part of caring relationships.   These attributes 
allow the circle of moral concern to be broadened and are more reflective of 
what a universal dignity should be.  As noted by Wasserman, ‘these accounts 
seek to recognize the full and equal moral status of all, or almost all, human 
beings, including children, and of adults with significant cognitive and 
psychological disabilities’ (Wasserman 2013a).  Indeed, all of these capacities, 
in principle, could also include posthumans, nor do they necessarily exclude 
non-human animals (although of course the account is weighted more in our 
favour).  
Nevertheless, the relational account suffers from a similar stumbling block to the 
threshold account, in that there is still a ‘fuzzy’ boundary of where the threshold 
should lie; ‘...these alternative attributes do not resolve, but merely relocate, the 
problem of accounting for the threshold and range features of full moral status’ 
(Wasserman 2013a).  Indeed, it is not clear quite how wide the circle of moral 
concern ought to be expanded, and whether a universal human dignity should 
still exclude some humans (for example foetuses or the irreversibly comatose).  
Moreover, could the capacity to care or value, for instance, be enhanced to 
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such a degree that it would lead to a correspondingly higher dignity?  There 
seems little in principle to prevent the conclusion that radical enhancement 
could lead to more sophisticated, complex, and profound relationships, which 
itself would lead to a higher form of ‘posthuman dignity’.  However, in the 
process, it might lose all sense of the human element, devoid of any form of 
relatable human framework, and consequently human dignity would lose its 
original meaning.  Whether this is ultimately misfortunate would depend upon 
what replaced it, and what would be lost. 
Differences of Degree and Differences of Kind 
 
Part of the problem in establishing whether or not enhancing capacities to such 
a radical degree could lead to a higher moral status is deciding whether it is 
possible to merely augment existing capacities, or if this would require the 
emergence of entirely new abilities.  Buchanan believes only differences in kind 
can bestow a higher moral status, as ‘it does not seem plausible to say that it 
would consist simply of higher levels of the same characteristics that now 
constitute the threshold the respect-based view employs’ (Buchanan 2009a, 
363). Buchanan is correct in that we do not normally consider people with 
higher degrees of cognitive capacity (be that intelligence, language ability or 
general knowledge) to have a higher moral standing.  Be that as it may, we can 
also hold the view, without fear of contradiction, that a being with vastly superior 
cognitive capacities might have a correspondingly higher moral status. 
Yet, even if Buchanan is correct that enhancement of existing capacities could 
not lead to a higher moral status, this is not to say that post-personhood might 
still be achieved by the creation of entirely new capacities.  Indeed, McMahan 
has suggested that it is possible that biotechnological enhancement could in 
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fact lead to ‘...new, emergent capacities in posthumans that would plausibly 
ground a higher degree of inviolability’.  As he notes, ‘all the psychological 
capacities that we have that are reasonable candidates for the basis of our 
higher inviolability—selfconsciousness, the ability to act on the basis of reasons, 
and so on—seem to be emergent properties that have arisen from the 
combined enhancement of capacities found in animals’ (McMahan 2009, 603). 
Buchanan also argues that it is a difference in kind, rather than degree, which is 
of significance in justifying the current threshold for FMS.  In this case, he 
argues that the difference between those with the capacity for accountability for 
reasons, and those without it ‘...is of a profoundly different sort than differences 
among beings as to how well they can exercise the capacity’ (Buchanan 2012, 
140).  A similar sentiment has been promoted by Thomas Douglas, who has 
argued that on the threshold account of moral status, ‘...persons have greater 
moral status than lower beings not because they possess the same capacities 
to a greater degree, but because they possess entirely new capacities. They 
are not just better at performing the mental tasks that lower beings perform; 
they can do entirely different things, such as engaging in moral reasoning’, he 
therefore suggests that posthumans would ‘...need to possess a new and 
qualitatively different mental capacity in order to enjoy supra-personal moral 
status’ (Douglas 2013a, 481).   
Yet, many of the capacities which are commonly cited as fundamental to FMS – 
including intelligence, sociability, language use, even moral reasoning – can be 
witnessed in varying degrees amongst certain non-human animals.  As we have 
seen in Chapter 7, these capacities are by no means unique to humans.  For 
this reason, DeGrazia has responded that ‘it is not self-evident that a huge 
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difference in degree of some relevant property cannot underlie different levels of 
moral status...’ (DeGrazia 2012b, 145).  It follows, therefore, that there is no 
reason in principle why a being with greatly enhanced existing capacities (for 
instance, a vastly superior ability for moral reasoning) could not also have a 
moral status higher than personhood.   
Therefore, in direct contrast to Buchanan, DeGrazia proposes that radical 
human enhancement of existing capacities and abilities could in fact lead to the 
creation of beings with such advanced capacities as to be rightly characterised 
as ‘post-persons’ (DeGrazia 2012a, 135).  For DeGrazia, if we are to follow 
Buchanan’s argument that accountability for reasons is sufficient for 
personhood, and we judge that non-human animals have a lesser moral status 
because they possess this capacity to a much smaller degree, we should be 
willing to accept that possessing higher degrees of this capacity should also 
lead to a correspondingly higher moral status.  In this way, if we are to preserve 
the thresold account, DeGrazia argues that we must first adapt it to allow for the 
possibility of a moral status higher than that of personhood (DeGrazia 2012a, 
136-138).  DeGrazia, therefore, proposes a comparative claim for the existence 
of a moral status higher than personhood: 
...post-persons have about as much justification in believing that they 
have higher moral status than persons as persons have in believing that 
they have higher moral status than animals (DeGrazia 2012a, 138).165 
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 Which can of course also mean that they would have as little justification to do so as we 
have now.  Although DeGrazia believes the Respect Model to have substantial conceptual 
problems, he does acknowledge that it does have ‘several strengths’: ‘It protects the Moral 
Equality Assumption which few would want to abandon; it enjoys the backing of a powerful 
tradition in moral philosophy and it squares very well with most people’s intuitions about 
appropriate treatment of persons and animals’ (DeGrazia 2012a, 137). 
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Buchanan responds by criticising DeGrazia’s claim that animals have the 
capacity to be accountable for reasons (even to a mild degree).  As he 
understands the concept, no animals currently have this capacity.  It is, 
therefore, in his eyes a difference in kind, rather than degree, between the two 
species, which justifies this higher moral status.  Seemingly this impasse can 
only be resolved by undertaking an empirical study of whether or not animals do 
in fact have the capacity to be accountable for reasons. 
A similar position to DeGrazia has been taken by Agar, who adopts an inductive 
argument for the existence of moral statuses superior to personhood.  Simply 
put, Agar’s idea is that: ‘the observed existence of many moral statuses up to 
and including persons provides moderately strong inductive support for the 
possibility of post-persons’ (Agar 2013b, 81).  In other words the fact that, for 
many, there are a range of moral statuses up to and including FMS is indicative 
that there may also be further moral statuses beyond that.  However, Agar goes 
further than DeGrazia and claims that there is no upper limit to moral status 
(Agar 2013a, 70).  In particular, he distinguishes between bounded and 
unbounded capacities.  The former refers to those attributes that appear to have 
an upper limit to the improvement someone can make to them.  The example 
he gives is of the capacity to speak the English language, in which he argues 
that there does not seem to be an infinite degree to which one could be better at 
exercising this capacity (although one might retort that it is possible that there is 
in fact no limit to language ability, but we just have no way of knowing if this is 
the case).  In contrast, an unbounded capacity is one in which there is no 
foreseeable limit to the degree to which one could exercise this capacity.  The 
example Agar gives is in mathematics, in which ‘there is no reason to believe 
that the limits of mathematics must be tied to the limits of the understanding of 
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humans or of any other being’.  Similarly, Agar suggests that ‘knowledge of 
practical reasoning seems more like knowledge about mathematics than it is 
like knowledge of the English language...It is something that can be improved’ 
(Agar 2013a, 70).166 Whilst post-persons may also not have perfect moral 
judgement, they would nevertheless have a much better understanding than the 
unenhanced and, like those with great mathematical knowledge, we would be 
justified in deferring to their better judgement (Agar 2013a, 70). 
Wasserman takes issue with Agar’s claim that we would have to defer our 
judgement to moral experts as he claims that ‘...their epistemic and moral 
authority would rest to some extent on their capacity to explain the grounds of 
their moral judgements to us’, but, ‘such deference [to moral experts] may be 
harder to justify the less we can understand the grounds for expert judgement.  
If moral reasoning was like mathematical reasoning, the grounds that 
posthumans had for claiming higher moral status might well remain inaccessible 
to mere human beings.  Our consent would be more problematic for being 
uninformed’ (Wasserman 2013b, 78-9).  Yet as we will see in the next section, 
this epistemic problem is not necessarily a reason to stop future posthuman 
beings making moral judgements on our behalf.  Just as we do not expect to 
have to explain to animals (nor for them to understand) the reasoning behind 
our moral judgements (including their lower moral status), so too posthumans 
might be justified in their moral judgements without having to ensure they are 
comprehendible to the unenhanced.  Indeed, accounts such as universal 
human dignity, that accord a form of FMS to ‘marginal cases’ (for example to 
young infants or the severely cognitively disabled), realise that these individuals 
may not be able to comprehend fully why they have FMS.  Hence, the ability to 
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 as well as ‘...logical reasoning, the power of abstraction, memory, or any other of the abilities 
that jointly constitute practical reasoning’ (Agar 2013a, 70). 
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comprehend the reasons for bestowing FMS seems to be a sufficient, but not 
necessary, condition for possessing FMS. 
The Epistemic Problem of What Might Confer Post-person Status 
 
One issue, which also pervades the entire human enhancement debate, is not 
knowing what a posthuman state would actually be like.  In particular, for the 
purposes of our discussion, there is an epistemic problem of which property (if 
any) might actually confer postperson moral status – what Agar refers to as the 
‘inexpressibility problem’ (Agar 2013a, 67). This epistemic gap might seem to 
be a logical necessity, as our limited nature should prevent us from 
comprehending what capacity it would take to become truly post-persons.167  If 
we could comprehend what the moral status of a post-personhood would be, 
then we ought to also have this higher moral status.  In the same way that non-
human animals are presumed to be unable to comprehend the reasons for their 
lower moral status, as otherwise we would find it increasingly difficult to justify 
their current lower moral status.168 Agar argues that this inescapable cognitive 
limitation ‘restricts us to indirect, non-constructive ways to demonstrate the 
possibility of enhancing moral status’ (Agar 2012, 145).169   
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 This epistemic gap has led Agar to conclude that ‘...constructive accounts of moral status 
enhancement are doomed to fail.  This is because criteria for moral statuses superior to 
personhood are likely to be at least partly constituted by a complex cognitive capacity...We are 
not post-persons and therefore find it impossible to fully grasp criteria for post-personhood...If 
post-personhood is partly constituted by complex cognitive capacities that we mere persons 
lack, then it’s to be expected that they will lie beyond our comprehension.  Having the capacity 
to exercise them will be constitutive of truly understanding why they enhance status.  I suspect 
that this inescapable (by mere persons) cognitive limitation restricts us to indirect, non-
constructive ways to demonstrate the possibility of enhancing moral status’ (Agar 2012, 145).   
168
 As Agar explains: ‘we are necessarily clueless in respect of moral statuses superior to our 
own.  If mice understood practical reasons sufficiently well to truly understand why persons 
have a moral status superior to their own then they would be capable of the feats of practical 
reason constitutive of personhood—they would be persons’ (Agar 2013b, 81).  
169
 One may suggest that what is needed is almost a theological approach, whereby knowledge 
of vastly superior beings can only be known indirectly. Conversely, this epistemic gap has been 
taken by Buchanan as evidence of the validity of the threshold view, as the difficulty of 
imagining what a higher threshold would be like is indicative of the fact that there is no higher 
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In contrast to Agar’s insistence that we cannot know what a post-person 
conferring capacity would be, Jeff McMahan has offered an example of a 
potential qualitatively new kind of capacity which could lead to its possessor 
having a higher moral status: an ability for a post-person to ‘actually experience 
other individuals’ mental states while simultaneously reflecting on those 
experiences in a self-conscious manner from their own point of view’ (McMahan 
2009, 604).  Again this is arguably nothing more than an, albeit radical, increase 
in an already existing capacity for empathy, and is not obvious that this should 
automatically lead its possessor to have a higher moral status.  Interestingly, 
the character Will Graham, in the Thomas Harris novel Red Dragon (1981), is 
an FBI profiler who has a greatly heightened ability for empathy,170 which allows 
him to experience the mental states of others (albeit the mental states of serial 
murderers and psychopaths).  However, it is highly unlikely that we would 
conclude the character, as a result, has a higher moral status as well.  Indeed, 
his special talent in many ways is seen as a handicap, which drives him close to 
insanity.  Although one may respond that Graham failed to satisfy McMahan’s 
second criterion, as he was unable to simultaneously reflect on these 
experiences from his own point of view (he was rather, presumably, entirely 
consumed by another individual’s experiences). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
moral status than personhood (Buchanan 2009a, 363).  However, it is important to point out that 
even if we, as unenhanced beings, cannot comprehend or justify what in fact would be the 
criteria for a being to be accorded supra-moral status, this does not mean such an account 
could not be offered, nor does it negate the idea that a higher threshold might also exist – albeit 
one beyond our comprehension.  As Douglas highlights: ‘our inability to call such a capacity to 
mind would not rule out the possibility that one could exist' (Douglas 2013a, 483). 
170
 ‘“What he has in addition is pure empathy and projection,’ Dr. Bloom said. ‘He can assume 
your point of view or mine – and maybe some other points of view that scare and sicken him.  
It's an uncomfortable gift, Jack”’ (Harris 1981, 170). 
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Inviolability, Dignity and Enhanced Moral Status 
 
A central tenet of the threshold account is that those who possess FMS are also 
inviolable.  The inviolability aspect of FMS is not the claim that persons cannot 
be violated, but that they ought not to be.  Indeed, as highlighted in Chapter 8, a 
major aspect of dignity is not only to make claims about how an individual 
should be treated (for example, with respect or care), but also the prohibition of 
certain degrading and dehumanizing acts, including humiliation or callousness.  
A universal human dignity, in particular, recognises the vulnerability and 
susceptibility to harm of all humans, and the importance to guard against this.   
From the threshold point of view, one major aspect of inviolability is that 
persons are protected from being sacrificed for the sake of other persons, even 
for a number of persons.171  Indeed, McMahan has insisted that the most 
important dimension of violability is ‘...the extent to which an individual may 
justifiably be sacrificed for the sake of others’ (McMahan 2009, 601).  
Significantly, like FMS, inviolability is considered to be shared equally between 
all persons – in other words, all above the threshold are equally inviolable (or 
equally violable). Likewise, the ‘minimum core’ of the modern account of human 
dignity has often conceived it as both inherent in all individuals, and inviolable 
(European Convention 2000; United Nations 1976a, 1948; and Basic Law 
1949).  That is, whilst dignity can be challenged and flagrantly violated (be that 
                                                          
171
 Although this view does not hold for some types of utilitarianism, as noted by Buchanan: ‘For 
a utilitarian there are no differences in moral status properly speaking; there is only a gradation, 
a continuum of beings with lesser and greater capacities for well-being and harm, and 
sacrificing some beings for the sake of others further along the continuum is always in principle 
not only permissible, but even required. On this view, if biomedical enhancements produced 
beings with greater capacity for well-being than persons, then persons could be justifiably 
sacrificed for their sake. For reasons already noted, this utilitarian view is more properly 
characterized as a rejection of the idea of moral status than as a noncontractualist interpretation 
of it’ (Buchanan 2009a, 367). 
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through humiliation or physical violence), it cannot be taken away or completely 
lost by the individual in question (see Chapter 8).  In the same way, a person 
would still have FMS, regardless of whether or not others acknowledged this.   
However, one major concern voiced against the rise of future post-persons, is 
the knock-on effect this might have for the moral status and inviolability of the 
unenhanced.172  This form of harm is different to such threats as increased 
susceptibility to physical or mental distress but instead is, as Douglas explains, 
a second-order harm or ‘...a kind of meta-harm’, which is ‘the harm of being 
made more susceptible to being permissibly harmed—more liable to harm’ 
(Douglas 2013b, 75). In this way, the creation of post-persons would have a 
detrimental effect on the moral status of the unenhanced, leading to a reduction 
in their immunity to permissible harm.  This is particularly pertinent if we reflect 
on the fact that moral status is not entirely a static concept, but is a comparative 
notion which is susceptible to change.  Hence, if a moral status higher than 
personhood did exist, personhood would no longer be a full or maximal moral 
status and, consequently, it would lose some of its significance or moral force.  
Consequently, persons would become more violable to harm than those with a 
higher moral status. 
Buchanan seems to accept this may be a worry for many.  Nevertheless he 
challenges the idea that posthumans would become more inviolable on the 
grounds that personhood is already thought to confer immunity to harm and as, 
in his eyes, it is not possible to have a moral status higher than personhood, it 
follows that the creation of radically enhanced beings would not affect humans’ 
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 Discussion has moved from looking at the supposed privilege of being human, to how we 
can protect the moral status of humans (Savulescu 2009, 216). 
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current moral status.  In other words, Buchanan argues that posthumans would 
remain as inviolable as the unenhanced (Buchanan 2009a, 364).173 
A similar relaxed attitude to the emergence of radically enhanced beings is 
shared by Julian Savulescu who reassures that ‘if being a person grounds a 
right to life, then our lives are not in jeopardy if there are people smarter than 
us…As humans, we now believe that all human cultures, regardless of their 
sophistication, age, intelligence, creative complexity, deserve protection.  
Human culture would be like this in a moral post-human world.  What we must 
ensure is that the post-human world is sufficiently moral.  We do have much to 
fear from immoral post-humans.  But then again, we have much to fear today 
from immoral humans with great technological powers’ (Savulescu 2009, 238-
9).  One might suggest that this is quite a naive position to take, not least 
because we often do not accept that all human cultures, or at least certain 
aspects of culture, deserve protection, be that practices of female genital 
mutilation, or in the harrowing recent actions performed under the duress of the 
group ‘Islamic State’ in the Middle East or ‘Boko Haram’ in Central and Western 
Africa.  In these instances, as well as others, we actively try to prevent such 
social practices.  In the same way, radically enhanced future societies, even if 
highly moral, might consider many of our current widely accepted social and 
cultural practices to be morally abhorrent or not worthy of respect or protection.  
One might respond that if posthumans had been enhanced so as to act morally, 
then we would be unjustified in our criticism of their actions, and should defer to 
their moral expertise.  Indeed, if we hold that comprehension is important for 
FMS, as Buchanan does, this would make it increasingly hard to accept his 
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 As he explains: ‘...inviolability, properly understood, is a threshold concept. On this view, 
meeting the requirements for being a person confers inviolability and that is what counts; having 
the characteristics that confer personhood to a higher degree does not confer greater 
inviolability’ (Buchanan 2009a, 364). 
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belief that unenhanced humans would retain FMS in a posthuman world, as this 
epistemic gap in our moral knowledge would entail that we would no longer be 
able to comprehend why a given action was, or was not, morally correct. 
Degrees of Inviolability 
 
In contrast to Buchanan and Savulescu, Jeff McMahan has warned that radical 
human enhancement could lead to a situation where there is a second 
threshold of moral considerability, over and above that of personhood, in which 
a (‘normal’ functioning) post-person ‘...would be inviolable to a higher degree 
than any unenhanced person’.  McMahan suggests that just as there is a moral 
threshold separating humans from other non-human animals, so there might be 
a corresponding gap in moral considerability between the enhanced and 
unenhanced (McMahan 2009, 602). 
In particular, McMahan has questioned the stance that all (unenhanced) 
persons are equally inviolable, labelling it a feature of ‘commonsense morality’ 
(by which he presumably means a form of layman’s ethics or a widely accepted 
point of view).  For McMahan whilst in principle persons are inviolable, in reality, 
they may still be permissibly sacrificed in exceptional circumstances (for 
example, in order to save a large number of persons or a being with a higher 
inviolability): ‘...most people do not really believe that we are literally inviolable.  
Most people—or at least the great majority of people whose moral views are not 
dictated by ancient religious texts—are not moral absolutists.  They accept that 
all substantive moral principles may be overridden in conditions of extremity’ 
(McMahan 2009, 598).  For McMahan, there is in reality nothing like absolute 
inviolability for individuals, even for persons.  Rather, adult humans may be 
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considered to have no more than a very high immunity to permissible harm.174  
Presumably then post-persons would have an extremely high degree of 
inviolability (if not absolute) and, consequently, their interests may take 
precedence over that of mere persons.  McMahan is in danger of contradicting 
himself here, as he has already claimed that ‘commonsense morality’ supports 
the view that all persons are equally inviolable, but then in the same breath 
claims that in reality most people do not hold this view.175  Nevertheless, we 
may accept that many would likely agree with the idea that a single person may 
sometimes be permissibly sacrificed for the greater good, including to save the 
lives of other persons, although there is considerable disagreement about what 
would be considered sufficient to override this inviolability.  In this way, FMS 
does not bestow the individual with complete inviolability, but only a very high 
immunity to permissible harm.  If this is correct, then the danger for current 
humans is that the creation of superior beings would lower again this immunity 
to harm.176 
Nevertheless, even if we agree that inviolability should be shared out equally 
amongst all constituent members, and we do decide that both humans and 
posthumans would have equal inviolability in so-called ‘tie breaker’ scenarios (in 
which we have to make a decision between the survival of two or more 
individuals), we may instead look to other factors, such as interests, to 
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 As McMahan argues: ‘What most people really believe, therefore, is that all individuals are 
morally violable, but to greatly varying degrees...Normal adult human beings...are almost 
universally regarded as having an extremely low degree of violability.  The sacrifice of an 
innocent person can be morally permissible only if it is necessary to prevent a substantially 
greater harm to many other people.  Commonsense morality seems to assign foetuses an 
intermediate degree of violability, yet attributes to cognitively limited human beings beyond the 
fetal stage a low degree of violability comparable or identical to our own’ (McMahan 2009, 599). 
175
 Conversely, a strict Kantian or deontologist (as well as many religious positions) would insist 
that it is always morally wrong to sacrifice a person, even if doing so would lead to a benefit for 
more people.   
176
 Indeed, Buchanan’s fear is that ‘if the inviolability of persons is not absolute...then surely 
there can be circumstances in which it would be permissible to sacrifice mere persons for the 
sake of post-persons, in tragic choice situations’ (Buchanan 2009a, 364-5). 
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determine the outcome.  As noted by Douglas, this is particularly pertinent in 
cases involving posthumans, as they would presumably often have greatly 
enhanced interests on claims of continued survival (Douglas 2013a, 485).  
However, if this is the case, then one may question whether both individuals 
can be considered equally inviolable in the first place.   
Interests Model 
 
Indeed, DeGrazia believes the respect-based model, even if we accept the idea 
that there is a second threshold of moral status above our own, is still 
unpalatable.  Rather, he proposes that it would be wiser to ‘...drop the idea of 
levels of moral status [and], accept that all sentient beings have moral status...’.  
In its place, DeGrazia proposes what he calls an ‘interests model’, and ‘allow 
that some differences in interests and capacities justify some significant 
differences in how we should treat beings of different kinds’ (DeGrazia 2012a, 
136).  In this way, DeGrazia insists that, whilst all sentient beings have the same 
moral status, some individuals are still owed more due to their stronger 
interests.  The thought seems to be that all sentient beings deserve to have 
their interests considered equally, even though we may later decide that they 
require different treatment, due to differences between their interests or 
capacities.  As DeGrazia quite justifiably notes, ‘we human persons can’t have 
moral status that is both superior and unsurpassable’ (DeGrazia 2012b, 146-7).  
For DeGrazia there are many morally significant differences between 
individuals, which do not entail a corresponding difference in moral status.  For 
instance, he uses the example of a developed capacity for autonomous 
decision-making, which varies between competent adult humans and young 
children, yet we do not believe this difference should also equate to a difference 
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in moral status.  Similarly, the fact that this capacity is less developed in other 
non-human animals, is not a reason to accord them a correspondingly lower 
moral status.  DeGrazia goes so far as to claim that ‘...no morally important 
difference between persons and animals—or between post-persons and 
persons—amounts to a difference in moral status’, there are thus no levels of 
moral status amongst sentient beings, and any differences in moral treatment 
are due to ‘...differences in interests, capacities and circumstances...’ (DeGrazia 
2012a, 139).  DeGrazia is well aware that his account goes against the 
‘mainstream’ consensus of moral status. 
DeGrazia argues that this model would still entail that, in so-called ‘lifeboat 
scenarios’, we would still be justified in saving the life of a human over that of a 
non-human.  However, this would not be because the human has a higher 
moral status, but because the human will suffer a greater harm in losing their 
life (for example, because they have greater interests in continued survival or 
they will lose more if they are killed) (DeGrazia 2012a, 139).  Whilst the 
interests model may sound egalitarian at first glance, in practice, when we have 
to decide between individuals (such as when we have to decide who to save), 
as with the threshold account, the being with the higher morally relevant 
capacity or interest will still win out.  In other words, it appears that the result will 
likely play out the same as the threshold account, even if the methods or criteria 
used to get there are different.   
For this reason, one may question the point of assigning every sentient being 
equal moral status.  If it is differences in interest and capacities that determine 
or justify differences in treatment, then is this not just ‘moral status’ by a 
different name?  Indeed, even if posthumans would have the same moral status 
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as animals, they would still have vastly superior interests and capacities, and 
therefore, would deserve better treatment, and would win out in ‘lifeboat 
situations’.  It is difficult, therefore, to see how this is different in any meaningful 
way to arguing for different levels of moral status.  For this reason, despite 
DeGrazia’s claims to the contrary, the interests account seems to be a moral 
individualistic account of moral status, whereby moral status is on a continuum, 
so ‘...if capacity C grounds moral status, then any being who has C has some 
status; the better it can exercise this capacity, the higher its degree of moral 
status’ (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013).  In this case, the capacity ‘C’ in 
question are the individual’s interests, and it is not difficult to see how in most 
cases the human, and in turn, the posthuman, would have the greater interest, 
and so the correspondingly higher moral considerability.177 
This sliding scale approach to moral considerability also presents a potential 
problem for a universal human dignity, as it draws no distinct line between the 
special worth of humans and the rest of sentient life.  As we have seen, dignity 
is thought to be a threshold, rather than a gradient or sliding scale (all those 
with a dignity are thought to have it equally – one does not have ‘a bit’ of 
dignity), with all those above the threshold entitled to a particularly high moral 
worth and respect.  Therefore, if we adopt the interests model, which holds that 
an individual’s treatment in any given situation is dependent upon the strength 
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 As we saw in the beginning of the chapter, moral status is usually thought of as a 
comparative concept, yet if all sentient beings have the same status then it seems a misnomer 
to call it a ‘status’.  A threshold is built into the idea of ‘moral status’ – for something to have a 
status is to give it a more definite distinction from those that do not, in comparison to a gradient 
or a sliding scale of moral considerability.  Indeed, DeGrazia’s account seems closer to the idea 
of moral standing, in that all sentient beings count morally in their own right.  For this reason, 
Buchanan is correct to state that ‘...the interest-based view is not so much an account of moral 
status as a debunking of the notion and a proposal to replace it with the idea of variable moral 
considerability’ (Buchanan 2009a, 368). 
275 
 
of their interests, we would be hard pressed to explain why we should still 
accept the idea of a universal human dignity.   
Nevertheless, there are still certain affinities between human dignity and an 
interests-based account, not least the focus on the inclusivity of moral concern.  
In contrast to the threshold account of moral status, which tends to focus on 
those individuals who clearly do merit FMS rather than what Buchanan refers to 
as the ‘fuzzy’ lower boundary of moral concern, both the interests and dignity 
accounts are concerned as much with the plight of those marginal cases.  A 
similar sentiment has been proposed by Silvers, who suggest that the idea of 
‘inclusiveness’, rather than moral status, is a better method for ascertaining 
moral worth, as he argues:  
Unlike moral status, valuing inclusiveness proceeds on the assumption 
that every kind of entity possesses prima facie considerability.  We are 
directed by this value to ask about every kind of individual not, passively, 
whether it rises over the threshold of moral concern, but instead, actively, 
whether we can devise a way of collaboratively engaging with it as an 
expression of moral concern.  The burden of engaging our moral 
attention thus lies not with others’ impressing their worthiness on us in 
virtue of their possessing certain properties, but with each or us attending 
to the possibility of casting others as potential partners in collaborative 
enterprises, and to the challenge of devising innovative ways of 
cooperating with different kinds of individuals (Silvers 2012, 1021).   
For Silvers, moral status accounts are wrong-headed, in that they focus on the 
individual’s possession of certain morally relevant properties, and whether or 
not these capacities meet a given threshold.  Instead, rather than fixate on the 
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agent’s inherent abilities, we should focus on whether or not it is possible to 
incorporate the individual within the moral fold.  Such an account seems close 
to what a universal human dignity is: it is not overtly capacity driven, as we 
ought not to determine an individual’s moral considerability purely on the basis 
of their cognitive faculties or abilities, but rather acknowledge that we are all 
embodied ‘fellow human beings’ who share a common life, and are all prone 
and susceptible to similar shocks and ills (Mulhall 2002, 18). 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the close relationship between two forms of 
threshold account: a universal human dignity and full moral status (FMS) which, 
despite the close affinities between the two, has seldom been explored.  Both 
dignity and FMS are commonly thought to be threshold or non-scalar concepts, 
in that once an individual meets the criteria for FMS or dignity, it is shared 
equally amongst all constituent members and cannot be exceeded – it is a 
maximal status.   
At a fundamental level, both FMS and dignity are reflective of an individual’s 
high level of value and moral worth.  Their interests have a weight or 
significance, which may override the interests of beings with a lower moral 
considerability, where there is a conflict of interest.  Indeed, both concepts 
involve a strict requirement against the individual being unnecessarily harmed 
(be that by causing unnecessary suffering, restricting autonomy or sacrificing in 
so-called ‘lifeboat scenarios’), as well as often a strong requirement to aid 
where appropriate.  In both instances the threshold account is concerned with 
the idea that most humans have a high moral worth, which has a 
correspondingly high (if not the highest) degree of inviolability, which ought to 
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be recognised and respected by others.  It is, moreover, shared equally 
amongst all (or most) human beings – these three key strands form, as we saw 
in Chapter 8, a so-called ‘minimum core’ of human dignity.  
As there are close affinities between human dignity and the threshold account 
of moral status, this similarity also means that they share several key 
weaknesses.  In particular, both accounts suffer from vagueness as to which 
individuals below and above the threshold are worthy of FMS.  Indeed, one 
serious obstacle for both threshold accounts is their difficulty in dealing with 
marginal cases, and defining precisely where the boundaries of moral concern 
rest.  The threshold account, therefore, is in danger of drawing arbitrary lines, 
where a more nuanced interests based or multi-criteria account might be best.  
Similarly, it is not clear quite how wide the circle of moral concern should be 
expanded, and whether a universal human dignity should still exclude some 
humans (for example foetuses, anencephalic infants or the irreversibly 
comatose), as well as include some non-humans (this will be explored further in 
the next chapter).   
The aim of moral status enhancement is to increase these three key strands 
(moral worth, inviolability and respect), and so enhance an individual’s interests 
and entitlement to beneficial treatment and increase their immunity to 
permissible harm.  Moral status enhancement, if possible, is commonly thought 
to be achievable by enhancing the capacities, interests or abilities of the 
individual in question.  An answer to whether it is possible to enhance moral 
status, therefore, rests on which of these characteristics we believe underpin 
moral status, and if they are capable of being radically enhanced.  Most 
capacities cited as central to moral status – be that intelligence, moral 
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reasoning or accountability for reasons – do appear to be capable of being 
enhanced (they are ‘unbounded capacities’ to use Agar’s expression), and we 
would struggle to justify why an individual with such an enhanced set of status 
conferring capacities should remain equal to a being with a much lower set. 
Similarly, the relational features it has been argued in Chapter 8 as central to 
grounding a universal human dignity, including our shared vulnerability and 
dependence, as well as the capacity to engage in caring relationships, seem in 
principle to be capable of being enhanced to such a degree that it would lead to 
a correspondingly higher moral status.  There seems little in principle to prevent 
the conclusion that radical enhancement could lead to more complex, valuable 
and profound relationships, which itself would lead to a higher form of dignity – 
what might be termed a ‘posthuman’ or more accurately ‘post-person’ form of 
dignity.  Indeed, the complexity of human relationships might seem simplistic in 
comparison to the depth of complexity of posthuman social practices.  As we 
have highlighted, in the process, these radically enhanced relationships might 
become unrecognisably human, and so lose all sense of the human element, 
and consequently would lose its original meaning.  We could no longer refer to 
this as a ‘human dignity’.  As highlighted in Chapter 8, the term ‘human’ is a 
thick evaluative concept, which has both descriptive content, as well as a rich 
evaluative element.  There are then certain social practices, from naming our 
young to not eating our dead,178 which are reflective of what it means to be 
human.  Whether the loss or diminishment of a distinctively human form of 
dignity is ultimately misfortunate depends upon what replaced it, and what 
would be lost.   
                                                          
178
 Although in some cultures this may be exactly what is required for a respectful treatment of 
the dead (see for example Vilaca 2000). 
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Hence, in contrast to Buchanan,179 this chapter has suggested that, whilst of 
course highly speculative, it does seem plausible that under the threshold 
account of moral status, radical human enhancement could lead to the creation 
of such advanced capacities, abilities, relationships and interests, that their 
recipients would justifiably be referred to as post-persons.  There seems little 
reason to maintain that FMS should need to always remain obtainable by 
(unenhanced) humans.   
Nevertheless, we can agree with Buchanan that this would have severe 
consequences for the moral status (as well as the dignity) of the unenhanced.  
Moral status enhancement would inevitably challenge the moral equality 
assumption of the threshold account – the idea that all with the requisite 
capacities sufficient for FMS enjoy the same moral status.  This is particularly 
pertinent if we reflect on the fact that moral status is not entirely a static 
concept, but is a comparative notion which is susceptible to change.  Hence, if a 
moral status higher than the current threshold did exist, then it would no longer 
be a full or maximal moral status and, consequently, it would lose all or some of 
its significance and moral force.  Those with a dignity are commonly thought to 
already have an absolute worth – to be beyond price.  Yet, if post-persons were 
created, then it becomes difficult to maintain this high moral status for those 
who were not radically enhanced.  Indeed, all sentient beings, and even 
persons, would become more susceptible to permissible harm than those with a 
higher moral status, as well as suffer a decrease in their moral worth and 
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 Buchanan summaries his position, writing: ‘I have argued that whether we adopt an interest-
based or a respect-based view makes a great deal of difference to the answer to the question, 
‘Could biomedical enhancements eventually produce beings with a higher moral status than that 
of persons?’ If one adopts the interest-based view, then it is hard to rule out the possibility that 
the answer is ‘yes’, whereas from the perspective of the respect-based view the answer 
appears to be ‘no’ and the very possibility that an affirmative answer assumes seems 
unimaginable’ (Buchanan 2009a, 368). 
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respect due to them.  Moreover, those already on the margins of moral 
considerability would consequently be pushed further aside.  This is a particular 
worry for a universal human dignity, which like the interests based account, 
prides itself on its inclusivity. 
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Chapter 11  Dignity and Human-animal Chimeras 
 
Introduction 
 
That appeals to human dignity have been raised against the creation of human-
animal chimeras is of little surprise.  Human dignity and the creation of chimeras 
occupy similar conceptual terrain and bring into focus similar issues, from the 
significance of species membership and the blurring of species boundaries, to 
the role of embodied life, the importance of certain cognitive capacities, and our 
social relations, as well as our sense of our own selves and humanity.  In 
particular it is the potential, through biotechnological intervention, to instil a 
certain humanness or humanity into non-human animals that has stirred up the 
imagination and, in certain quarters, provoked a profound unease, or even 
disgust,180 at the idea of dissolving the current biological divide between human 
and non-human (Greely et al. 2007, 32-33). 
This theme is by no means a recent one. The idea of the chimera itself 
originates from the Iliad, to describe a goddess with the fire breathing head of a 
lion, tail of a serpent, and body of a goat.  More recently, the crossover between 
human and animal was famously played out in Kafka’s The Metamorphosis 
(1915) as well as H. G. Wells’ novel The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896) in 
which the rogue surgeon, through a series of cruel experiments, transforms 
animals secretly brought onto the island into grotesque human-like creatures.  
As the protagonist of the tale, Edward Prendick, notes after witnessing the 
result, ‘...seeing the creature there in a perfectly animal attitude, with the light 
                                                          
180
 As we find in H. G. Wells’ account of the grotesque result of human-animal experimentation: 
‘It was a limbless thing with a horrible face that writhed along the ground in a serpentine 
fashion.  It was immensely strong and in infuriating pain, and it travelled rapidly in a rolling way 
like a porpoise swimming...’ (Wells 2005, 77). 
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gleaming it its eyes, and its imperfectly human face distorted with terror, I 
realized again the fact of its humanity’ (Wells 2005, 94).  Such fanciful and 
emotive examples have led some commentators to question the wisdom of 
using the word ‘chimera’, which has connotations of Frankenstein type 
monsters, to describe often benign or subtle interspecies mixing.181 As 
Jonathan D. Moreno notes, ‘...the word chimera is more exotic than it is 
descriptive.  The word’s very strangeness imparts a distracting mystery to the 
animal models to which it applies...Words like these can be setbacks for 
science in the public mind...’ (Moreno 2014, 381).   
Indeed, the term ‘chimera’ is often used to describe a range of different animal-
human (and animal-animal) mixing and has no definitive definition within the 
biological sciences.  It can refer to interspecies or intraspecies mixing on the 
genetic, cellular or whole organ level (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 109).  Chimeras 
can be created both prenatally in which, for example, human stem cells are 
transferred into animal embryos or foetuses, as well as by postnatal methods 
whereby human genes, stem cells, tissues, or organs are introduced into 
animals (Loike 2013, 282; de Melo-Martín 2008, 331-2).  These distinctions are 
important to make as whilst transferring small amounts of animal tissue, for 
instance pig heart valves into humans, has not raised significant public or moral 
concern, the transfer of material on the genetic or cellular level, and during the 
early stages of development, does instil unease amongst many. Therefore, only 
certain types of human-animal mixing illicit such negative responses.  Such 
tampering can strike closer to what we identify with what it is to be human.182  
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 Although one safety concern is that ‘chimeras risk the transmission of unknown viruses, 
oncogenes, or diseases between species’ (Loike 2013, 283-4). 
182
 There seems to be a point at which the amount of human material transferred into an animal 
would start to raise concerns about the potential humanity of the recipient.  As noted by 
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Despite the focus on biotechnological intervention it is worth noting that 
chimeras also occur in nature, for example, the cells of a foetus migrate to the 
mother during pregnancy, mosquitoes transfer cells between their prey, and a 
bone marrow transplant can change the recipient’s blood type to the donor’s 
type.  Hence, appeals to the unnaturalness of the creation of human-animal 
chimeras need to demonstrate why human intervention in traversing species 
barriers are fundamentally wrong, whilst occurrences of this in nature are 
acceptable (see Smajdor 2015; Streiffer 2015; Sandler 2012; and Karpowicz et 
al. 2005 for discussions of this).  The first laboratory chimeras were created in 
the 1960s when scientists discovered that a mouse could be successfully 
created by combining early stage embryos (blastocyst) from several different 
mice, which are then implanted into surrogate mice and brought to term.  Since 
then, scientists have also created intraspecies chimeras of rats, rabbits, sheep, 
cattle, and most recently, monkeys (Sample 2012).  Today, one of the most 
commonly created laboratory chimera is the intraspecies mouse chimera, with 
the modified embryos implanted into surrogate mice and brought to term.   
Distinction between Hybrids and Chimeras 
 
Although the terms hybrid and chimera are sometimes used interchangeably, 
they actually refer to two different methods of interspecies mixing.  A hybrid 
animal is normally created when the egg cell from one species is fertilized by 
the sperm of another species.  In this way, every cell in a hybrid contains the 
same genetic information of its two parents (Loike 2013, 282).  Hybrids can be 
created outside of the laboratory, and some forms are relatively common in the 
wild, including the mule (which is the sterile offspring of a male donkey and a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Moreno‘...how many human cells can a chimera or hybrid organism have before its membership 
in the human species is “uncertain”?’ (Moreno 2014, 384). 
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female horse), whilst a more exotic creature is the liger (the offspring of a male 
lion and a female tiger).  In contrast, an interspecies chimera is comprised of 
cells of different species (rather than each cell containing the same genetic 
material from two different species) (Sandler 2012, 131-2).  Moreover, it is 
possible to have both a chimera and hybrid version of the same species-mix of 
an animal, for instance, to have a goat-sheep (or ‘geep’) hybrid (the offspring of  
a sheep and a goat), and an artificially created goat-sheep chimera (produced 
by combining the embryos of a sheep and a goat).183 
Human-animal Chimeras 
 
Human-animal chimeras can be created either by transferring human material 
into non-humans, or vice versa (a process referred to as xenotransplantation) 
(Greely et al. 2007, 28).  The first successfully created human-animal chimeras 
were reported in 2003, as researchers in China extracted stem cells from hybrid 
early stage embryos, created by fusing human cells with rabbit eggs (Dennis 
2003).  Similarly, after a lengthy legal battle, the creation of animal-human 
embryos (cytoplasmic hybrids),184 by inserting human DNA into empty animal 
cells, was approved in the UK in 2007 by The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (Sample 2007).  The first human-animal hybrids to be 
created from this approved research were produced by inserting human DNA 
from a skin cell into a hollowed-out cow egg.  The embryo was considered to be 
‘99.9% human and 0.1% other animal’, which was allowed (or, as was more the 
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 One important point noted by Huyan is that: ‘...what does “animal or human gene” or “animal 
or human cell” actually mean?  In the light of the evolutionary conservation of many signalling 
pathways, “human or animal genes or cells” can refer only to the fact that these units have a 
human or animal origin.  But from this it does not follow that an animal gene or cell, once put 
into a human, behaves as an independent unit of “animal agency” or vice versa’ (Hyun 2007 et 
al., 160). 
184
 Other possible types of animal-human hybrids are: hybrid embryos; human chimera 
embryos; animal chimera embryos; and transgenic human embryos (see Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority 2007, 10). 
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case, failed to continue) to grow for three days, until it had 32 cells.  
Significantly, all the genetic material in the cell nucleus is human, with the 0.1% 
animal DNA present outside the nucleus in the mitochondria.  The researchers 
also insisted that ‘the embryos would never be implanted into a woman and that 
the only reason they used cow eggs was due to the scarcity of human eggs’ 
(Jha 2008).  The embryos can then be harvested for stem cells, with such 
research hoped to cure, or at least alleviate, currently incurable diseases, 
including neurological conditions such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Motor 
Neurone Disease.  Despite these caveats, the research still drew criticism from 
some (notably religious) quarters, being labelled by (the now disgraced) 
Cardinal Keith O'Brien as a ‘monstrous attack on human rights, human dignity 
and human life’ (Jha 2008).  Similarly, Bishop Elio Sgreccia, president of the 
Pontifical Academy for Life, declared that ‘human dignity is compromised and 
offended’ by these ‘monstrosities’ that will (or more accurately could) be created 
by these future experiments.  The bishop continued that ‘the creation of an 
animal-human being represents a natural border that has been violated, the 
most grave of violation’, and we should instead maintain a ‘respect for human 
nature’ (Zenit 2007).   
Interestingly, such vitriolic attacks were directed at what were only a group of a 
few cells with 0.1% added animal genetic material.  However, instead of an 
artificially created human-animal chimera being only 0.1% animal what if it was, 
for instance, 50% or higher?  Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act (Great Britain. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008), it is 
prohibited to use an embryo beyond 14 days, as well as to insert either a hybrid 
embryo (embryos which are created by mixing human sperm and animal eggs 
or human eggs and animal sperm) or a cytoplasmic hybrid into a woman or 
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animal.  Such limitations are designed in part, presumably, to prevent a 
potential ‘hybrid baby’ from being created.  Indeed, the possibility of breaking 
the species barrier between humans and other animals has been offered by 
Richard Dawkins, for instance, as one of the great future challenges to our 
commonly shared political and ethical outlook.  Dawkins suggests a ‘successful 
hybridization between a human and a chimpanzee’ (what is sometimes referred 
to as a ‘humanzee’, ‘chuman’, or ‘manpanzee’) would be widely considered to 
be one of the most ‘immoral scientific experiment[s]’ imaginable.  Dawkins 
boldly asserts that the creation of a human-animal chimera in a laboratory, with 
roughly equal human and animal cells and successfully raised to adulthood, 
‘would change everything’ (Dawkins 2009).  Clearly, the future scenario that 
Dawkins imagines is far removed from the reality of what the research scientists 
are currently undertaking.  Nevertheless, as with the ethics of human 
enhancement, these relatively benign experiments have naturally led to an 
examination of where such research may eventually lead, and the ethical and 
social implications of such research.  Consequently, this chapter focuses on 
the, as yet hypothetical, case of the creation of a human-animal chimera, one 
that would have certain human-like characteristics and ways of being, which 
would be suggestive of being on the border of being human.   
There are a number of prominent arguments for and against the creation of 
human-animal chimeras or hybrids, from the integrity of species and the role of 
the unnatural (see Loike 2013; Sandler 2012; and Karpowicz et al. 2005), to 
repugnance and moral disgust (see Youngner 2014; Karpowicz et al. 2005; 
Franklin 2003; Robert and Baylis 2003; Streiffer 2003; and Kass 1998).  
However, this chapter will focus on the role of dignity.  
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Capacities Account of Human Dignity 
 
As we have seen, there is little consensus regarding what human dignity in fact 
is, and there is no such thing as the ‘human dignity argument’ in the sense that 
there is one accepted form.  Rather references to ‘human dignity’ often act as a 
holding term to refer to instances where it is perceived that something 
fundamental to being human has been challenged or violated, but is difficult to 
articulate why this is the case.  For this reason, as noted by de Melo-Martin, 
‘...critics and proponents of the human dignity argument do not have a similar 
understanding of how chimera research poses a threat to human dignity' and, 
consequently, both sides of the debate have often appealed to human dignity to 
support their own claims (de Melo-Martín 2008, 343).  Nevertheless, rather than 
appeal to the significance of species membership,185 one of the most common 
approaches to human dignity (especially in regards to human-animal chimeras) 
is one which focuses upon certain morally valuable cognitive capacities, such 
as moral reasoning, autonomous choice, or rationality, which are thought to 
confer or ground our unique worth and dignity (Karpowicz et al. 2005; Cohen 
2003). The significance of being human, therefore, is often presented as being 
ground on the possession of a bundle or cluster of certain higher-level cognitive 
capacities (see Chapter 7). 
This focus on cognitive capacities is perhaps to be expected, considering the 
concern that accompanies talk of transferring a large number of human neural 
cells into non-human animals.  In particular, it is the possibility of transferring 
human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) or neural stem cells (NSCs) into the 
                                                          
185
 As Sandler explains: ‘The alternative to a species membership approach to moral status is a 
capacities- and relationships-oriented approach: that is, individuals have moral status by virtue 
of the capacities that they possess and their historical relationships with other entities’ (Sandler 
2012, 163). 
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brains of non-human animals, especially primates at the embryonic stage (what 
is termed human-to-nonhuman primate (H-NHP) neural grafting), that has 
garnered the most serious concern (de Melo-Martín 2008, 331-2; Greene et al. 
2005, 385-6; and Karpowicz et al. 2005, 108-9).  The reason for this is the 
obvious link between neural stem cells and the capacities we associate with 
being human.  The concern is that neural grafting could transfer higher level, 
human-like capacities and cognitive abilities that are also closely associated 
with moral status, including language, greater intelligence, and heightened 
awareness of self and others, to non-human animals.  The scientist Irving 
Weissman, for instance, suggested that it may be possible to create mice with 
human brains ('human neuron mice'), by transferring human neurons into the 
brains of embryonic mice (see Greely et al. 2007).  Although at present this is 
an entirely hypothetical concern, as it is not known whether such a feat is 
possible.186  It is, therefore, certain types of transfer between human and 
animals which feed concerns of what it means to be human.  These concerns 
have led to the recommendation of the prohibition of the transfer or introduction 
of human stem cells into non-human embryos (Streiffer 2015). 
It follows, therefore, that on the capacities approach to human dignity, the 
creation of human-animal chimeras are an affront to dignity if the experiments, 
or chimeras themselves, in some way obstruct, diminish or destroy those 
capacities.187 Some find the idea of transferring human-like capacities and 
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 See, for instance: ‘Overall, we think it unlikely that the grafting of human cells into healthy 
adult NHPs will result in significant changes in morally relevant mental capacities’ (Greene 
2005, 386); ‘Nonetheless, at this point no evidence exists to suggest that a human brain could 
ever develop in a nonhuman creature. We do not know whether transferring neural stem cells 
into a prenatal nonhuman animal would create an entity with very complex emotional and 
psychological capacities’ (de Melo-Martín 2008, 344n). 
187
 Streiffer, for instance, posits that if those with human dignity are ‘uniquely valuable and 
worthy of respect’, because they possess morally valuable dignity-grounding capacities, then 
this would lead naturally to ‘...a presumption against interfering with the development, 
maintenance, or exercise of her dignity-grounding capacities’.  Furthermore, there might also be 
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characteristics into animals particularly disturbing.  Whilst we perhaps find 
nothing abhorrent in creating trans- or posthumans with dignity conferring 
capacities, there is something specifically about creating highly cognitive 
functioning human-animal chimeras that we find wrong. 
A common concern is that a chimera may be created with, but be unable to 
exercise, these capacities. In this case, dignity would be violated because the 
chimera’s brain would be encased or ‘trapped’ in an animal body, which would 
diminish its ability to function (Fost 2006, 17; Karpowicz et al. 2005, 120).  
Whilst this is a legitimate worry, it would also imply that if a chimera could in fact 
freely exercise these dignity conferring capacities, then it would not seemingly 
be contrary to dignity.  Indeed, one may question if neural transfer is necessarily 
such a bad thing, if it leads an animal to experience things they otherwise would 
not be able to.  After all, many of the capacities which may be transferred, be 
that intelligence, moral reasoning, the ability to appreciate art and culture, or 
language, are also the capacities many authors feel are valuable to possess (as 
well as to enhance).  
However, neural transfer is not the only type of chimera research which may be 
considered disturbing or challenges our sense of what it is to be human.  There 
are many other types of non-neural animal chimera that may be just as 
controversial.  John Loike gives one hypothetical case in which a cow is 
genetically engineered (through embryonic stem cell technology) to grow a 
human uterus.  This modified cow could then be used as a surrogate mother for 
women who cannot, or even do not want to, carry their own children.  As Loike 
notes, ‘in these reproductive-medical scenarios, there will be no enhancement 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a corresponding ‘...positive duty to support the development, maintenance, and exercise of her 
dignity-grounding capacities’ (Streiffer 2015). 
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of cognitive capacity in the human organs and may be viewed, bioethically, as 
being no different than creating a sheep with a human liver, [or] pancreas...’ 
(Loike 2013, 294-5).  Yet, for many, the former case is vastly more unsettling 
than the latter.  Perhaps this is due, at least in part, to the fact that to gestate 
human foetuses within cow uteruses touches on something significant about 
being human, namely motherhood.188  However, the capacities account of 
human dignity struggles to explain why such cases are so unnerving.  After all, 
the cow’s cognitive capacities have not been affected at all, as it is a non-neural 
transfer, and presumably the child born of the process would be just as healthy 
as if it had been born of a woman.  Rather, such a hypothetical case highlights 
that certain key aspects of being human, including the idea of ‘motherhood’ are 
not reducible to a cognitive capacity, but instead reflect the importance of 
certain relationships, obligations and duties of care between humans. 
Technically as the cow is only a surrogate mother, the child created will still 
have a human mother.  Yet, there are other cases of potential reproductive 
chimeric research, where the chimera itself would become the parent.  For 
instance, a chimera may be created in which stem cells ‘are used to generate 
animals that produce functional human sperm or eggs’ (Loike 2013, 284).  If the 
animals successfully mated, and the offspring was brought to term, then the 
offspring would be human, yet be created by two animals.  In such cases it 
would no longer be true to say, as Eva Feder Kittay has, that ‘...we are all some 
mother’s child’ (Kittay 2009, 625).  Our idea of what it means to be a mother, 
and the significance of motherhood, would be altered.  As noted by 
Wasserman, ‘with the growth of assisted reproduction and the advent of genetic 
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engineering, the grounds for distinguishing beings born of women from beings 
produced by the laboratory will be increasingly eroded’ (Wasserman 2003, 14). 
Human-animal Chimeras and a Relational Account of Human Dignity 
 
Such instances of non-neural chimera experimentation highlight the limitations 
of the cognitive account of human dignity.  Indeed it fails to fully capture what 
we mean when we say that someone has been treated with or without dignity.  
When, for instance, a hospital patient is said to be treated without dignity, 
through neglect or mistreatment by nursing staff, we do not think that their 
dignity has been violated simply because the hospital staff failed to 
acknowledge the patient’s autonomy or respect their capacity for language 
(although no doubt these are still important features).  If someone did think like 
this, then we might be inclined to consider them insensitive or unsympathetic to 
the patient’s plight – similar to Bernard Williams’ ‘one thought too many’, in 
which the motivating thought behind a man saving his wife is not because she is 
his wife, but '...that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is 
permissible to save one's wife' (Williams 1981, 18).  To explain why the patient 
was not treated with dignity by appealing to the capacities they do or do not 
possess seems wrongheaded.  The patient, after all, may have advanced 
dementia, have a severe learning disability, or be a young infant.  In either case, 
their capacity for autonomy, language, moral reasoning or whatever, is minimal, 
yet we still feel it deeply disturbing for them to suffer neglect or abuse.  Indeed, 
it might even be considered to be a more acute case of dignity violation when 
the victim is particularly vulnerable and susceptible to harm, as increased 
vulnerability is often thought to entail that we should prioritise their interests 
(see Chapter 8).  In this way, the capacities account of human dignity suffers 
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from an explanatory gap, and labours to fully explain why such cases are 
wrong, for it provides only limited explanation as to why someone’s dignity is 
thought to be infringed or violated. Such criticism highlights the limitations of the 
capacities account of human dignity, which struggles to differentiate itself from 
the personhood account of moral status (DeGrazia 2007, 312).189 
The deficiencies of the cognitive capacities account of human dignity, therefore, 
leaves the door open for an alternative approach, one which focuses instead on 
the social or relational nature of dignity.  Dignity, on this view, is not some 
property or quality, which supervenes on an individual’s cognitive capacities, but 
is rooted in the often complex social relations between individuals or groups.  It 
is to be treated with or without dignity, rather than to have or possess a dignity.  
A violation of a hospital patient’s dignity is due not only to failing to acknowledge 
or respect the individual’s capacities, but also has something to do with what it 
means for a position of trust to be abused, what it is for someone in a 
vulnerable state to be neglected by those whose responsibility it was, and the 
ways in which we think it is appropriate to treat one another. 
One may reply that qualities such as empathy, care, or sociability nevertheless 
are all still capacities and so the relational approach is still ultimately a 
capacities account of human dignity, albeit with a different set of capacities at its 
heart.  To an extent this is correct, if no one possessed a capacity or need for 
care, for instance, then it would make little sense to say that an individual could 
be treated without dignity if they are denied fundamental care.  Karpowicz et al., 
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 A similar idea has been presented by Kass: ‘The account of human dignity we seek goes 
beyond the said dignity of "persons," to reflect and embrace the worthiness of embodied human 
life, and therewith of our natural desires and passions, our natural origins and attachments, our 
sentiments and aversions, our loves and longings.  What we need is a defense of the dignity of 
what Tolstoy called "real life," life as ordinarily lived, everyday life in its concreteness' (Kass 
2002, 17-18). 
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for instance, present a bundle capacity view of human dignity, which marries 
both cognitive and social capacities together (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 120).190 
However, not all people do possess a capacity for care or empathising with 
others in emotionally complex ways, including young infants (at least in any 
meaningful sense).  Yet they still require and are entitled to constant care, and 
are thought worthy of our sympathy.  Significantly the relational account of 
human dignity, unlike the cognitive capacities account, does not require all 
individuals to possess, or even have the potential to possess, a certain set of 
capacities to be thought worthy of being treated with a high moral worth and 
dignity.  A patient with severe dementia may still be treated with respect and 
dignity, despite lacking certain key cognitive faculties.  Like an ethics of care, 
the relational account of human dignity acknowledges that relationships 
between individuals are often unequal, and so more easily accommodates so-
called marginal cases into the moral fold.  It is, therefore, a more inclusive 
account of moral concern than the traditional capacities account, as it allows for 
a wider range of individuals to be accorded a high moral worth and dignity. 
Stephen Mulhall argues that the exclusion of the significance of our moral 
relations is a systemic issue for contemporary ethics. For instance, in regards to 
the common use of thought-experiments in ethics, far from being a useful 
device to examine moral problems, tend to abstract and simplify difficult cases 
to the point where we seem to be talking of something else entirely.  Instead, for 
Mulhall, something ‘...has the moral significance it has for us, precisely because 
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 ‘The notion [of human dignity] also encompasses such capacities as those for engaging in 
sophisticated forms of communication and language, participating in interweaving social 
relations, developing a secular or religious world-view, and displaying sympathy and empathy in 
emotionally complex ways...human dignity is a multi-faceted notion that is characterized by a 
family of unique and valuable capacities generally found in human beings.  No one of these 
capacities is definitive of human dignity, but taken together, they set out a paradigm case of 
what it is to have human dignity’ (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 120).  
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of its place in that complex web...’, it is, therefore, not possible to abstract and 
examine the case in isolation from its context (Mulhall 2002, 16-18).  Similarly, 
in regards to the capacities account, we may argue that in its attempt to 
separate the morally salient points (for example, intelligence, language use), 
from any supposedly morally non-relevant context (species membership, 
gender, or family) it, in the process, changes the subject of what one was 
originally examining.  For instance, when examining the impact of reproductive 
chimera research on the concept of motherhood, appeals to the mother’s or 
child’s capacities alone would not fully capture the significance we feel this 
special relationship holds. 
Mulhall, in particular, targets Jeff McMahan’s thought experiment regarding the 
insertion of genes into a canine foetus, in order to create higher level cognitive 
capacities (self‐consciousness, rationality, and autonomy), which eventually 
bestow the dog a form of personhood (McMahan 2002, 319).  Such a 
hypothetical case is, importantly for our purpose, directly analogous to the 
creation of a human-animal chimera with higher level cognitive capacities.  
Mulhall takes issue, amongst other things, with McMahan’s assertion that the 
enhanced dog ‘...could [still] have a life that would be well worth living even in a 
society in which it would be a freak, would have no acceptable mate, and so 
on’.  McMahan asks the reader to, ‘...put those contingent problems aside...’ 
whilst considering the case (McMahan 2002, 319-20).  For Mulhall the idea that 
all those challenges faced by the enhanced dog are merely ‘contingent’ 
problems, which can be extracted to create a clearer moral picture are, in actual 
fact, central to the issue at hand.  As he says, ‘...would a human being, deprived 
of any acceptable mate and regarded as a freak by his fellows, be faced with 
merely contingent problems that would leave his capacity to conceive of himself 
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as a person essentially unaffected?’.  Instead, he argues that ’...the forms of 
embodied common life open to distinctively human creatures provide the 
context within which our notion of personhood has the sense it has’ (Mulhall 
2002, 16-18). 
The question of whether human-animal chimeras or hybrids would have a 
dignity, then, becomes less of an issue about the capacities they must have, 
and more about how they would sit within our complex social environments and 
the meaning or significance such relations would have.  Would, for instance, the 
burial of a human-animal chimera be performed in the same spirit as burying a 
family pet, or would it have the significance attached to the funeral of a close 
relative?  Would it be considered as undignified to assign a chimera a number, 
rather than a name, as it would be to do so for a fellow human?  David 
DeGrazia, for the majority of his paper on chimeras and dignity, for instance, 
concentrates on the role of capacities for assigning different levels of moral 
status between humans and animals, and the arguments used by proponents of 
the capacities account of human dignity (particularly Cohen 2003).  He only 
touches on the issue of what life would actually be like for a chimera, and what 
kind of social relations it would have to deal with, in the final lines of the article.  
In the process DeGrazia suggests that we may have reason to reconsider the 
creation of human-animal chimeras concluding that, ‘we should not intentionally 
bring into the world any borderline or paradigm person who is unlikely to enjoy 
the social supports that such a being deserves...’ (DeGrazia 2007, 326).   
As several writers have noted since DeGrazia’s paper, the type of social 
environment that human-animal chimeras or hybrids would be brought up in 
should be of serious concern for determining whether or not we should bring 
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such creatures into being in the first place.  Whilst the new cognitive capacities 
may enable the creature to experience things which they would otherwise not 
have been able to (which perhaps is prima facie a good thing), this would be of 
little comfort to the chimera if they are deeply unhappy in their new life.191  For 
instance, de Melo-Martín argues that it is likely not to be the chimera’s body 
itself which prevents it from ‘wanting to think and act like a human’, that is, ‘to 
do the kinds of things that humans can do, have relationships with humans, be 
educated, own property, and so forth’, but instead it would be the social 
restrictions which are likely to be put in place.  She claims that ‘we are unlikely 
to allow them to develop and function in a social environment that would be 
adequate to their capacities’ (de Melo-Martín 2008, 341-2).  Whilst de Melo-
Martín probably understates the importance of human embodiment to lead a 
human-like life, the emphasis on the social context that the chimera would have 
to contend with in order to lead a fully satisfactory and meaningful existence is 
important.192   
One common way of framing the debate regarding the significance of being 
human is in terms of sharing an embodied ‘common life’ (Mulhall 2002, 16-18); 
the idea that there is a common thread of humanity, which links individuals to 
one another.  Proponents appeal to the connectedness between human lives, 
and belonging to communities with shared practices and cultural meanings.  A 
common life can be construed narrowly, for instance, in relation to our 
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 Here is the Milleian debate between whether it is better to be a pig satisfied, or a Socrates 
unsatisfied. 
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 A similar sentiment has been proposed by Jones and Galvin, albeit one in regards to human 
cloning: ‘What has become apparent is that human dignity is more likely to be undermined by 
society and individuals within society than by the processes of cloning itself.  It is our attitudes, 
responses and motives that are crucial.  Human dignity is unlikely to be threatened if we treat 
others (including cloned individuals) as equals and as beings of dignity...Any downgrading of 
human clones that may occur would be imposed throughout their lives, by other human beings, 
rather than through their inception by cloning’ (Jones and Galvin 2007, 762). The idea itself 
echoes the social model of disability whereby a perceived disability is influenced more by the 
environment we find ourselves in, than by the physical impairment itself (see Barnes 2012). 
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immediate family and friends, or more broadly still to our local community or 
country.  However, the idea of a common human life, in the sense that perhaps 
Mulhall takes it, is to be taken holistically and appeals to the idea that there is a 
common or shared form of life between all (or at least most) people – a so-
called common humanity.  The idea that being human, and the ‘distinctive form 
of common life’ between humans, carries moral weight has been labelled by 
Wasserman as the ‘humanist’ position (Wasserman et al. 2013a).  However, the 
significance is not considered to stem simply from the biological fact of 
belonging to the species Homo sapiens, but rather from the shared social 
practices and meanings that result from this shared species membership.  Cora 
Diamond argues that in the same way that we have both a biological (for 
example, brain stem death) and non-biological (the cultural responses towards 
it) conception of death, we also have a biological and non-biological conception 
of human being (Diamond 1991, 62).193  Part of the non-biological notion of 
being human, for instance, entails that we give each other names, rather than a 
number, and that we bury our dead, rather than eat them (except in extreme 
cases of survival, or during ceremonies of special significance).  It is, therefore, 
a qualified form of specieisism (see Chapter 6). 
Dignity and Ubuntu 
 
One attempt to theorize the moral significance of the relations between humans, 
and the belief in a universal bond that connects all humanity in a shared 
‘common life’, is through the sub-Saharan concept of ubuntu, which has been 
popularised by Desmond Tutu (Tutu 1999).194  In essence, this is the idea that 
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 This distinction also plays out to an extent between the genotype and phenotype of an 
organism. 
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 ‘When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, so-and-so has 
ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and 
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we only become fully human, or live a genuinely human life, through 
harmonious communal relations with others.  It can loosely be translated into 
English as ‘friendship’ or ‘love’ (Metz 2010, 83-4).  It follows, as Thaddeus Metz 
explains, that ‘an act is right just insofar as it is a way of living harmoniously or 
prizing communal relationships, ones in which people identify with each other 
and exhibit solidarity with one another’ and, consequently, is wrong ‘insofar as it 
fails to honor relationships in which people share a way of life and care for one 
another’s quality of life, and especially to the extent that it esteems division and 
ill will...’ (Metz 2010, 84).  In this way, ‘...Africans would characterize an 
individual who does not relate positively to others as lacking ubuntu, lacking 
humanness’.  Metz highlights that ‘those who fail to relate properly are 
sometimes [even] described as animals’ (Metz 2010, 83).  The concept of 
ubuntu, therefore, appears to set up a sharp dividing line between humans and 
other animals, for a human being has dignity only in so far as they have a 
capacity for communal relationships, and to identify with and feel a sense of 
solidarity with other humans (Metz 2010, 93).  
However, Metz leaves no room for those individuals who are unable to 
participate fully in these ‘friendly’ relationships of solidarity.  As he admits, this 
conception of dignity ‘...limits the scope of those who have human rights. There 
are some human beings who are incapable of engaging in friendly relationships, 
e.g., the severely retarded...[and] any such beings lack dignity and hence lack 
human rights, which might seem counterintuitive’ (Metz 2010, 95).  Surprisingly, 
Metz does not see this as a disadvantage to his conception of human dignity, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
compassionate. You share what you have. . . . Harmony, friendliness, community are great 
goods. Social harmony is for us the summum bonum—the greatest good. Anything that 
subverts or undermines this soughtafter good is to be avoided like the plague. Anger, 
resentment, lust for revenge, even success through aggressive competitiveness, are corrosive 
of this good’ (Tutu 1999, 31; 35).  
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because the rival Kantian conception of dignity also has the same consequence 
(see Chapter 4).  Yet one may question how much someone is actually 
displaying a sense of human solidarity, if they refuse to accept the dignity of 
those, for instance, with severe cognitive disabilities.  One way in which Metz’s 
conception of dignity contrasts with a universal human dignity then is its failure 
to deal with the problem of marginal cases.  Tellingly, Metz leaves a footnote to 
explain that he has also ‘set aside the empirical issue of whether higher animals 
such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and elephants are capable of communal 
relationships in the relevant sense’ (Metz 2010, 97n), yet surely this is the crux 
of the issue, for if they are capable of communal relationships in the relevant 
sense, then it becomes increasingly tricky to accord humans a unique worth or 
dignity. 
Richard Rorty has challenged the normative force of a universal human 
solidarity.  Whilst, like Diamond and Mulhall, he rejects the idea that moral 
concern should only be determined by whether a being has certain types of 
capacities, he does not consequently endorse the idea of a universal human 
solidarity.  Rather, Rorty argues that appeals to being a ‘fellow human’ has less 
moral force than to say that one is, for instance, a ‘fellow American’ or ‘fellow 
Catholic’.  In other words, to be a certain type of human being carries more 
normative weight than to just be a human being.  According to Rorty '...our 
sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed 
are thought of as "one of us," where "us" means something smaller and more 
local than the human race.  That is why "because she is a human being" is a 
weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action' (Rorty 1989, 191).  There 
is certainly a sense in which our circle of moral concern shifts focus depending 
upon what is being attended to, from family members, to our local communities, 
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or our country.  Nevertheless, many would disagree with Rorty’s main assertion; 
after all, appeals to being a ‘fellow human’ are often thought to be quite 
powerful, and are often invoked by those who are in most need of protection or 
aid.  Moreover, one may suggest that the introduction of chimeras, or even 
posthumans, would give a much clearer sense of what a ‘fellow human’ would 
be. 
Rorty’s position seems to share a similar implication to the capacities account of 
moral status (despite approaching the issue from quite a different angle), in that 
so-called marginal or borderline cases are given little protection, due to the fact 
that people will often fail to consider them as ‘one of us’.  This implication 
seems unavoidable, if the idea of being a fellow human lacks normative force.  
However, interestingly, Rorty argues that there is such a thing as moral 
progress, and we should continue to widen the border of moral concern towards 
‘the direction of greater human solidarity...[and] the ability to see more and more 
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly different from ourselves as 
included in the range of "us.”’ (Rorty 1989, 192).195  It becomes an open 
question then as to whether or not human-animal chimeras would be included 
within this global sense of solidarity.  Yet, Rorty seems to be contradicting 
himself here, as he appears to ultimately be aiming for a universal human 
solidarity, which would in fact imply that being a ‘fellow human’ does, or rather, 
ought to carry greater normative force. 
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 As Rorty continues: 'The right way to take the slogan "We have obligations to human beings 
simply as such" is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to expand our sense of "us" 
as far as we can...This is a process which we should try to keep going.  We should stay on the 
lookout for marginalized people – people whom we still instinctively think of as "they" rather than 
"us."  We should try to notice our similarities with them' (Rorty 1989, 196). 
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Moral Confusion 
 
As we have seen, the relational account of human dignity shifts the emphasis 
away from individual capacities, to look instead at the significance and meaning 
behind our relations and social practices, both between fellow human beings as 
well as the relations between humans and non-human animals.  To what extent, 
then, would the creation of human-animal chimeras disrupt, or even 
complement, this complex network of social relations?  Would a human-animal 
chimera be able to, for instance, display ubuntu and an appreciation of human 
solidarity?  Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis’ article was one of the first 
to focus on the ethics of chimeras, as well as the wider impact they may have 
for society.  In particular, their objection to the creation of human-animal 
chimeras and hybrids centres on the potential for these novel beings to 
introduce moral confusion into many areas of our lives.  For Robert and Baylis, 
moral confusion appears to be something which is highly undesirable, and 
should be avoided at all costs.  Amongst other things, they mention that 
chimeras would challenge and bring confusion to the following two areas: i) that 
chimeras would challenge full moral status; and ii) our moral obligations to 
chimeras would also be uncertain, and their introduction would blur our existing 
relationships between human beings and non-human animals (Robert and 
Baylis 2003, 2; 8-9).  The remainder of this chapter will examine these two 
claims in turn. 
As noted by Hilary Bok, presumably Robert and Baylis do not (or at least should 
not) believe any type of human-animal chimera would cause moral confusion.196 
The insertion of a few human cells into a mouse or a human with a pig heart 
                                                          
196
 Although they do refer to ‘…any crossing of species boundaries involving human beings’ 
(Robert and Baylis 2003, 10. Emphasis added). 
302 
 
valve, for instance, does not cause any confusion as to the species or moral 
status of the host.  Therefore, it would seem to have to be a certain type of 
chimera to instil confusion, one that has certain human-like characteristics, traits 
or ways of beings, which would be suggestive of being on the border of being 
human.  The human-animal chimeras Robert and Baylis should have their 
sights on then are at present entirely hypothetical (Bok 2003, 26). 
i) Chimeras would challenge full moral status 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 10, whilst human dignity and full moral status 
(FMS) are closely related, they also pick out different features as being morally 
salient.197  Moral status, in particular, tends to rely on the possession of certain 
morally relevant cognitive capacities.  It is an odd claim then by Robert and 
Baylis to insist that ‘humanness’ is a necessary condition for FMS (although 
some would agree that it might be sufficient) (Robert and Baylis 2003, 10).198  
‘Humanness’ is a vague and highly disputed notion and, as we have seen, mere 
species membership, including belonging to the species Homo sapiens, is not 
normally considered to be a necessary condition for FMS. On a more charitable 
interpretation, perhaps Robert and Baylis mean that humanness is closely 
associated with the characteristics and capacities we feel are most relevant to 
FMS, from rationality, language use, moral reasoning, or autonomy.  Yet just 
because these characteristics are associated with being human, it is not the 
same as insisting that one must be human in order to have FMS.  To claim 
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 For example, both are considered to be non-scalar concepts, which do not admit of degrees, 
and convey a high sense of moral worth.  However, the two concepts are not synonymous, and 
it appears at least prima facie possible to possess one without the other.   
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 As they write: ‘...the creation of novel beings that are part human and part nonhuman animal 
is sufficiently threatening to the social order that for many this is sufficient reason to prohibit any 
crossing of species boundaries involving human beings.  To do otherwise is to have to confront 
the possibility that humanness is neither necessary nor sufficient for personhood (the term 
typically used to denote a being with full moral standing, for which many—if not most—believe 
that humanness is at least a necessary condition)’ (Robert and Baylis 2003, 10). 
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otherwise is to fall into the unjustified speciesist trap of not treating morally like 
cases alike (see Chapter 6).  One may, for instance, come across an 
extraterrestrial with all the capacities necessary for FMS and, in such a case, 
we would be inclined to assign a high degree of moral concern to the being, 
despite it clearly not being human.  In this way, a human-animal chimera can be 
accorded a FMS, without us having to first determine whether or not it is fully 
human.  Moreover, this should not be considered a morally confusing 
conclusion to reach, for FMS and personhood do not need to follow along strict 
species lines.  The creation of human-animal chimeras or hybrids with high 
level, human-like capacities, therefore, should not disrupt or confuse our idea of 
FMS (at least in the way Roberts and Baylis describe). 
Robert and Baylis make a further unusual claim regarding the nature of moral 
status.  They set up a dual framework, whereby the moral status of humans is 
categorical or absolute and determined by simply being human.  In contrast, the 
moral status of animals is determined by ‘...features other than species 
membership’, including ‘the intention with which the animal came into being’ as 
well as being ‘contingent on the will of regnant human beings’ (Robert and 
Baylis 2003, 9).  On the first reading one may be struck by the authors’ 
apparent lack of knowledge of the available literature of the ethics of moral 
status.  After all, moral status is not thought to be split by two different rules, 
depending upon whether or not the individual in question is human.  Rather, 
moral status picks out the morally relevant features that cut across species 
barriers, be that the capacity to experience pleasure or pain, to have interests, 
or whatever.  Yet, perhaps Roberts and Baylis’ dual framework, however 
unintentionally, describes how the distinction between human and animal often 
plays out in our day-to-day discourse and explains our treatment, attitudes and 
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behaviour towards other animals (albeit without any theoretical grounding as to 
why this ought to be the case).  As we will see in regards to the role of pets in 
our lives, there is a very real sense in which animals with similar capacities are 
thought of, and treated, in very different ways.  Yet, this perhaps is best not 
thought of as a difference of moral status, but instead indicative of the power of 
our social and cultural relations to shape our moral responsibilities towards 
each other. 
On another interpretation of the first concern, chimeras may challenge the value 
of FMS merely from existing in the first place.  In the same way that rare metals 
or minerals are valued so highly, because of their scarcity, so the argument 
goes, our FMS conferring capacities would be devalued if we could engineer 
these in a laboratory or transfer to non-human animals.  The more individuals 
who have these capacities, the less valuable they become.  However, if this 
were a serious issue, then it would follow that human procreation is wrong for 
increasing the number of individuals with (the potential for) dignity conferring 
capacities (Baylis and Fenton 2007, 202; DeGrazia 2007, 326).199  Similarly, 
properly understood this is not an argument against the creation of chimeras, 
but any entity, be that robotic, computer programme, biological or synthetic, 
which would possess the relevant capacities for FMS.  Indeed, if possessing 
moral status conferring capacities is prima facie a good thing, then an argument 
could be made that it is in fact good to increase the number of individuals who 
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 As DeGrazia argues: ‘. . . no one’s dignity or moral status would be threatened by the 
prospect of increasing the number of individuals with full moral status. Imagine that, incredibly, 
several living members of Homo floresiensis or another hominid species were discovered on an 
island; they would be borderline or paradigm persons. There is no intelligible reason for thinking 
this discovery would threaten the moral status of Homo sapiens persons any more than the 
constant increase in our species’ population threatens our dignity. So the transformation of a 
rodent into a more personlike chimera or, more realistically, a Great Ape into a more humanlike 
person would not threaten human dignity’ (DeGrazia 2007, 326). 
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possess them, regardless of whether they are non-human animals, chimeras, 
hybrids, robots, posthumans, or computers.   
A more serious objection to chimera research is that the process itself, by 
transferring cognitive capacities, would raise the moral status of the host 
(perhaps to the same level as an adult human), and so would require that we 
treat the research subject quite differently after the procedure, in ways that were 
appropriate to its new moral status.  One could not continue to treat the subject 
as if it had not been enhanced (Streiffer 2015, 2005, 348; DeGrazia 2007, 326).  
As noted by Streiffer, this is a novel problem for scientific research which 
‘...normally presupposes a fixed moral status for the subject’ (Streiffer 2005, 
348). 
ii) Our moral obligations towards chimeras would be unsure, and so 
would confuse the current social divide between human beings and 
non-human animals  
 
Robert and Baylis argue that the result of this confusion regarding the moral 
status of chimeras and hybrids will also lead to our moral obligations to these 
novel creatures being unsure.  Moreover, the introduction of chimeras will 
confuse our existing relationships with non-human animals, which will threaten 
to breakdown the ‘social [and moral] dividing line between human beings and 
non humans’, which currently support ‘...countless social institutions, structures, 
and practices...’ (Robert and Baylis 2003, 8-10).200  As they highlight: 
                                                          
200
 Robert and Baylis also acknowledge the fluidity of species boundaries and the multitude of 
different definitions, but highlight that people still very much consider ‘species identities and 
boundaries’ to be ‘fixed and in fact make everyday moral decisions on the basis of this belief’ 
(Robert and Baylis 2003, 6).  They make a parallel to race: ‘There is here an analogy to the 
recent debate around the concept of race.  It is argued that race is a biologically meaningless 
category, and yet this in no way undermines the reality that fixed races exist independently as 
social constructs and they continue to function, for good or, more likely, ill, as a moral category’ 
(Robert and Baylis 2003, 6). 
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...if we breach the clear (but fragile) moral demarcation line between 
human and nonhuman animals, the ramifications are considerable, not 
only in terms of sorting out our obligations to these new beings but also 
in terms of having to revisit some of our current patterns of behaviour 
toward certain human and nonhuman animals.  As others have 
observed, the separateness of humanity is precarious and easily lost; 
hence the need for tightly guarded boundaries (Robert and Baylis 2003, 
9). 
This is perhaps a surprising conclusion to reach, considering they identify the 
multitude of different relationships we have towards animals (these include use 
of animals for food, labour, research, sport, companionship, investment, and 
education) (Robert and Baylis 2003, 9).  For instance, our behaviour towards 
the rat is markedly fickle, depending on whether or not a given person considers 
them to be a pet to be cared for, or a pest to be exterminated.  Moreover, they 
highlight that our moral obligations to our fellow humans also remain uncertain.  
Far from being an unusual phenomenon, moral confusion seems to be a 
familiar presence throughout our moral deliberations.  It, therefore, seems to be 
an insufficient criterion to judge the merits (or lack of) of the creation of 
chimeras.201  
The concept of a ‘pet’ is a powerful example of the complexity, fluidity, and 
importance of social meaning and practices for our moral relations with other 
animals, as well as the sometimes arbitrariness of capacities for moral 
consideration.  There is, after all, nothing physically different (at least in any 
                                                          
201
 One further criticism levelled at Robert and Baylis’ position is the lack of empirical evidence 
that people actually think chimeras would introduce moral confusion, with sociological surveys 
finding that people are generally more concerned with tampering with nature and playing God 
(Streiffer 2015; see also Rollin 2003 for the same criticism). 
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significant way) between a stray dog, or a family pet, yet there are significant 
beliefs, actions and obligations that we would think entirely appropriate to the 
latter, that we would not to the former.  As noted by Raimond Gaita, nothing 
objective about our pets will settle the issue of whether or not saying ‘a dog is a 
member of the family’ is mere sentimentality (Gaita 2004, 37).202  Much of this 
depends on the extent to which an animal can participate in human forms of 
life.203 The moral significance of our actions towards animals are not determined 
merely by the capacities they possess, but by the relations we stand to them.  
As Diamond highlights, ‘there is not a class of beings, pets, whose nature, 
whose capacities, are such that we owe it to them to treat them in these ways’ 
(Diamond 1978, 469).  Indeed, we act in ways with our pets which would be 
considered inappropriate or bizarre to do with wild or undomesticated animals.  
We name our pets, have a duty of care towards them, as well as a duty not to 
eat them.  As noted by Diamond, those people who do eat their pets do, ‘...not 
have pets in the same sense of that term' (Diamond 1978, 469). 
Raimond Gaita discusses an instance when they had to put down the family cat, 
Tosca, as well as the time when they buried their pet dog Orloff.  In the first 
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 As Gaita explains: ‘…we do not think of behaving towards goldfish or insects in the way we 
behave towards our cats and dogs, but I suspect it is not their objective differences in 
themselves that matter to us so much as the relations those features make possible for us.  
Even then, the features themselves never fully explain the relations they make possible.  Gypsy 
is a member of the family.  Some people baulk at the description, thinking that it should be put 
in inverted commas under pain of sentimentality.  Others do not.  Nothing objective about 
German shepherds will settle the matter’ (Gaita 2004, 37). 
203
 Gaita writes at length about how animals can, and cannot, share in our common life: ‘As with 
human beings, respect for an animal’s dignity goes together with expectations of it that are 
naturally called moral.  We expect Gypsy not to bite the guests, let alone any of the 
family...those instincts of a pack animal (humanised, I would say) under that discipline, enabling 
her to participate to some degree in a human form of life’ (Gaita 2004, 41-2).  See also: ‘...I 
experience the kind of perceptual flux that occurs when I see now one side and then the other 
of an ambiguous drawing.  In all sorts of ways she is part of the family, participating intelligently 
and with complex feeling in our lives.  But then she does something—chase a cat, for 
example...whose nature is so deeply instinctual that she appears wholly animal...The occasion 
for such perceptual shifts—from seeing her as one of us, a member of the family, to seeing her 
as wholly other in her animal nature—are not always dramatic.  The sight of her sniffing another 
dog’s urine could do it...’ (Gaita 2004, 64). 
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case, Gaita describes how he put Tosca out of his misery with a blow from a 
shovel.  Gaita reflects that, in our desire to ensure an animal avoids 
unnecessary suffering, we can fail to acknowledge what such an 
unceremonious death actually means, and the potential to dishonour the victim: 
‘To see the difference one need only reflect on how desperate the 
circumstances would have to be before one would consider killing a human 
being by crashing a shovel onto her head...Again, this is not because she might 
suffer pain, mental or physical—but because it would be an assault on her 
dignity’ (Gaita 2004, 35). 
In contrast to the wretched end of Tosca’s life, the burial of their dog Orloff 
involved several of the aspects we would reserve for the burial of our own kind.  
Indeed, one other distinguishing aspect of our respect towards our pets, and 
how close they often are to being considered ‘one of us’, is to give them an 
appropriate burial, rather than, for instance, to leave their corpse at the side of 
the road.  However, Gaita is keen to point out the limits we normally feel 
appropriate to this ceremony, for instance he notes that, ‘...no words were said 
over his [Orloff’s] grave, no marker was placed on it and remembrance candles 
were lit on the anniversary of his death.  That we did as much as we did was an 
expression of the degree to which Orloff had become ‘one of us’, part of the 
family.  That we limited it to what we did marked his distance from us...’ (Gaita 
2004, 85).  Such examples are merely designed to highlight the complexity and 
uncertainty in our relationships with other animals, and that this moral confusion 
is not necessarily a bad thing, and certainly not prohibitive to the creation of 
human-animal chimeras.  Rather, it remains an open question to the extent that 
human dignity applies to animals, as well as the possibility of chimeras fitting 
into our existing relationships, and perhaps creating new ones. 
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Fellow Creature 
 
Whilst Diamond, Mulhall, and others, have been keen to reintroduce the notion 
of being human as of moral importance, this is not to say that they are 
dismissive of the boundaries of moral concern for other animals.  One reason 
presented by Diamond and Mulhall for why we should treat other animals well, if 
not because of the capacities they possess, is because we should recognise 
them as a ‘fellow creature’ (Mulhall 2009, 2002; Diamond 1978).204 Like 
Diamond’s concept of ‘human’, a fellow creature is meant in a non-biological 
sense, and is presented as the idea that another ‘being [is] in a certain 
boat...which may be sought as company’ (Diamond 1978, 468).  To recognise 
another animal as a ‘fellow creature’ is to acknowledge that we both share, on 
some level, similar needs and are prone to similar vulnerabilities.  As noted by 
Diamond this concept of a fellow creature (like our concept of a pet) is complex, 
as well as malleable and open to change.  It can refer to a wide range of 
relationships we have with animals, from feeding birds in winter, or giving a 
hunted animal a sporting chance (Diamond 1978, 474).   
Nevertheless, Diamond argues that the idea of a ‘fellow creature’ does not have 
the normative force of a ‘fellow human’.  Therefore, for her, it is compatible to 
think of an animal as both a ‘fellow creature’ and still be justified or compelled to 
think of them as something that can be eaten.  The thought behind this seems 
to be that we can think of an animal as both food and as a fellow creature if we 
treat the animal well and with respect, so, for instance, we do not factory farm or 
                                                          
204
 George Orwell wrote from his experience in the Spanish Civil War: ‘I had come here to shoot 
at “Fascists”, but a man who is holding up his trousers is not a “Fascist”, he is visibly a fellow-
creature, similar to yourself, and you you do not feel like shooting at him’.  Diamond notes that 
here ‘the notion of enemy (‘Fascist’) and fellow creature are there in a kind of tension...’ (cited in 
Diamond 1978, 477).  See also Mulhall (2009, 69 - 94) for an extended discussion of the idea of 
a ‘fellow creature’. 
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cause unnecessary suffering.  Hence, Diamond argues, some of our current 
modes of thinking towards animals, including the idea of vermin and factory or 
intensive farming, are counter to the idea of thinking of animals as fellow 
creatures.   
Such examples highlight the fact that our relationships with current animals are 
far from clear cut, and admit of many nuances.  No doubt the introduction of 
human-animal chimeras would cloud this picture further.  Yet, there is little 
reason to think that chimeras could not fit in with this view of a fellow creature.  
Indeed, moral confusion is not necessarily a bad thing. If the introduction of 
higher level human-animal chimeras would make us reconsider many current 
practices towards animals, this would imply that our original beliefs, from their 
moral status to appropriate forms of treatment, were in fact incorrect (Bok 2003, 
26).  As pointed out by Paul B. Thompson, contrary to Robert and Baylis, the 
moral boundary between animals and humans is not clear cut anyway, so it is 
not clear why the fact that chimeras may create more moral confusion is 
necessarily a bad thing (Thompson 2003).  As noted by Daniel B. McGee, ‘our 
task is to struggle with ambiguity, a feature of all truly significant moral 
deliberations’ (McGee 2003, 12). 
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen in Chapter 7, implicit within accounts of human dignity is the 
idea that being human, or human ways of being, are of particular moral 
importance or significance (what has been called the ‘Standard Belief’ 
(Wertheimer 1974, 107-8) or ‘Standard Attitude’ (Egonsson 1998, 47)).  Hence, 
violations of human dignity are often thought of as violations of what is 
fundamental to being human, or our humanity.  If there was nothing of import to 
311 
 
being human, then claims of a particular human moral worth or dignity would be 
groundless.  Therefore, underpinning appeals to human dignity is the idea that 
being human has a strong normative pull.  One of the most common 
interpretations of the Standard Attitude is that humans have this special 
significance because they typically have certain properties or capacities 
(including rationality, autonomy, moral reasoning or language use) that are 
worthy of special consideration, and also ground our dignity.  According to the 
capacities account, therefore, the creation of human-animal chimeras are an 
affront to human dignity if the experiments, or chimeras themselves, in some 
way offend, diminish or destroy those capacities.  
In particular, it is the potential, through biotechnological intervention, to instil a 
certain humanness or humanity into non-human animals that is often presented 
as the greatest threat to what it means to be human, as well as raising concerns 
for the resulting chimera’s own welfare (Greely et al. 2007, 36).  Ronald L. 
Sandler corroborates this idea when he argues that the reason why many are 
concerned about human enhancement and interspecies mixing is ‘…because it 
might result in changes to human nature and the human form of life...’, which 
are often thought central to human dignity (Sandler 2012, 8).205  The resulting 
human-animal chimera or hybrid, it is feared, would have a monstrous mixture 
of human and non-human capacities and characteristics.  
Yet, the capacities account of human dignity suffers from an explanatory gap.  
Human ways of life, or ways of being, are not merely constitutive of the 
                                                          
205
 According to Sandler, a ‘species form of life’ ‘...refers to how individuals of the biological 
group typically strive to make their way in the world. For example, it concerns what sorts of 
things they consume and how they acquire it; how they reproduce; how (and when and 
whether) they move; how they avoid predators; and how they repair themselves when 
damaged.  It is straightforward to distinguish a group of organisms on this basis’ (Sandler 2012, 
6).  Although Sandler specifically does not endorse a species membership account of moral 
status, endorsing instead a capacities based approach (see Sandler 2012, 166-7). 
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possession of certain capacities.  This idea of humanness need not be 
understood simply as a bundle of cognitive capacities, nor as a purely biological 
category, but as a result of shared social practices, meanings, and ways of 
being with others.  The role of care, burial or motherhood are all examples of 
the complexity and importance of our social relations and practices for 
identifying what it is to be human, as well as the sometimes arbitrariness of 
capacities for moral consideration.  Indeed, the capacity account struggles to 
explain the unease which accompanies cases of chimera research which do not 
involve the transfer of neural material or the creation of cognitive capacities, 
such as around instances of reproduction.206   
The capacities account also fails to fully capture what we mean when we say 
that someone has been treated with or without dignity.  As an explanation of the 
wrongness of a nurse abusing a patient with advanced dementia, mocking an 
individual with a stutter, or assigning a prisoner of war a number rather than a 
name, the capacities account will not do.  Higher level capacities are too 
demanding for many humans to possess them, especially the most vulnerable, 
yet, we still feel strongly that they can be victims of dignity violation.  The 
capacities account of human dignity, therefore, struggles to distinguish itself 
from personhood accounts of moral status, where certain levels of cognitive 
capacity do take precedence.  No doubt the role of cognitive capacities should 
still be a vital part of assessing the ethics of chimera research.  The creation of 
chimeras with human-like brains, or human-like cognitive capacities, is certainly 
                                                          
206
 As noted by Greely et al.: ‘Distinctive humanness does not just reside in the brain and the 
gonads. Although a chimpanzee with a human gall bladder or a human appendix would not be 
likely to raise grave concerns, a chimpanzee with a human face, a human skull or human hands 
and feet might. In addition to concerns about human brain functions and human gametes, giving 
non-human animals, in whole or in part, the outward physical appearance of humans, could be 
deeply unsettling. Whether that is a moral argument or prudential one, such experiments should 
be undertaken, if at all, only for the most powerful reasons’ (Greely et al. 2007, 36). 
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a serious issue to address.  Mice with language capabilities, or a human-level of 
self-consciousness no doubt would be hugely troubling (see for instance 
Greene et al. 2005).  Yet, contra Karpowicz et al. (2005) or Cohen (2003), 
human dignity should not primarily be grounded on cognitive capacities. 
Therefore, this chapter has introduced an alternative to the capacities approach 
to human dignity in order to examine the moral significance of the creation of 
human-animal chimeras.  Rather than attempt to supervene dignity over the 
possession of certain cognitive capacities, the relational account shifts the 
emphasis to look instead at the significance and meaning behind our relations 
and social practices, both between fellow human beings, as well as between 
humans and non-human animals.  It more easily accommodates so-called 
marginal cases, as well as bringing the focus back towards the role of ‘being 
human’ and human ways of being (as opposed to possessing certain 
capacities) as of moral importance.   
The question of whether or not human-animal chimeras or hybrids would have a 
dignity, then, becomes less of an issue about the capacities they must have, 
and more about how they would sit within our complex social environments, and 
the meaning or significance such relations would have.   Would, for instance, 
the burial of a chimera have the significance attached to the funeral of a 
relative, or instead the family pet?  What would it mean for a human to be born 
of a human-animal chimera mother?  Would it be considered as abhorrent for a 
nurse to abuse a chimera in their care, as it is to do to a patient with dementia?  
This chapter has not attempted to answer such questions, but only to highlight 
the types or directions of questions that need be asked, if we are to fully 
appreciate what it is to say that chimera research would, or would not, violate 
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human dignity.  Borrowing from Wittgenstein, Diamond encapsulates this idea 
when she suggests that, ‘what it is that we are talking about is shown in how we 
talk about it, and in how that talk enters our lives, the shape—the ‘fact’—that life 
containing such talk has’ (Diamond 1991, 60).  It remains an open question to 
the extent that human dignity applies to animals, as well as the possibility of 
chimeras comfortably fitting into our existing relationships.  However, the only 
way to answer such questions is by looking at the meaning such relations have.  
As was highlighted, even if the introduction of human-animal chimeras does 
disrupt some of our current social practices and would cause moral confusion, 
this is not necessarily a good reason to halt such research.  Indeed, if a 
universal human dignity strives for equality of moral concern, then it seems 
wrongheaded to deny dignity to creatures which would share so much in 
common with us. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has focused upon one of the most common, as well as controversial, 
conceptions of dignity in contemporary ethics – what we have termed a 
‘universal human dignity’.207  A universal dignity is often couched as having a 
hard kernel or minimum core of two distinct, but related parts.  The first of these 
is that every human being possesses or is a source of an intrinsic and inviolable 
high worth or value.  The second component insists that this worth should be 
recognized, respected and protected by others.  This conception of human 
dignity has been the cornerstone of international universal human rights since 
the drafting of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and 
continues to pervade and influence many walks of life to this day, from 
healthcare to scientific research.   
Yet, despite this ubiquity, as we have seen, both components of the minimum 
core of a universal human dignity remain highly contested, as well as 
understudied and under analysed.  This thesis, therefore, has provided a 
thorough examination of the arguments put forward for, and against, the 
possibility of a universal human dignity.  In particular, much of this thesis has 
been occupied with examining the ground or reasons proposed for why all 
humans have an equal, inherent, and inviolable dignity. Uniquely, to address 
such questions, this thesis has utilized and brought together developments from 
a range of related fields of ethical theory, including animal ethics, an ethics of 
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 This definition is one of many different formulations.  As argued by Dupré: ‘we should shift 
‘...the focus of attention in seeking to understand dignity away from a search for a single 
definition to an awareness of dignity’s context contingent and constructed—even ‘under 
construction’—nature…’.  However, she notes that, ‘rather than being an obstacle to 
understanding…the unfinished nature of human dignity is a crucial sign of its dynamism and 
usefulness’ (Dupré 2013, 121). 
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care, as well as the burgeoning literature on the ethics of human enhancement 
and biotechnology, within the final section, to explore theories of moral status 
and personhood, as well as to study the boundaries of where the human lies.   
Ultimately it has been argued, throughout this thesis, that the commonly used 
capacities account of human dignity cannot adequately justify attributing a 
dignity to all human beings.  Moreover, it fails to fully capture what we mean 
when we say that someone has been treated with or without dignity.  Indeed, a 
capacities driven account struggles to explain many instances where we feel a 
violation of dignity has taken place, especially against the most vulnerable who, 
despite their limited capacities, we still feel strongly that they can be victims of 
dignity violation, from the ill treatment of a patient with advanced dementia, to 
assigning a prisoner of war a number rather than a name.  Thus, if we are to 
continue to promote the idea of a universal human dignity (that is a dignity for all 
human beings, or at least for a larger range of human beings than the 
capacities account allows for) this must eventually be grounded in something 
beyond the possession of certain cognitive capacities. 
The Importance of Being Human 
 
It has been argued that central to discussion of the ground of human dignity 
concerns the role and importance (if any) of being human in our moral lives.  
Indeed, as a universal human dignity promotes the idea that human beings 
have a particularly high worth or moral status, it implies that there is something 
special or peculiar to humans that non-human beings seemingly must lack.208  If 
there was nothing of significance to being a human, then it would seem to be 
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 In the words of George Kateb: ‘The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is 
the greatest type of beings...’ (Kateb 2011, 3-4), 
317 
 
entirely baseless or arbitrary to claim that humans have a special worth or 
dignity.  This is why appeals against apparent violations of human dignity are 
often thought of as violations of what is fundamental to being human and of our 
humanity.  As we have seen in the final chapter, in regards to chimera and 
hybrid research, it is the potential to instil a certain humanness or humanity into 
non-human animals, to blur the boundaries between species, and to disrupt 
certain distinct human forms of life and ways of being, that is often presented as 
a grave threat to human dignity. Underpinning appeals to human dignity is the 
idea that being human, then, has a strong moral or normative pull.209 
Dignity and Speciesism 
 
However, as has been shown, the significance of being human is also a highly 
contested concept in ethics, and there remains a great disparity between 
common public attitudes and contemporary ethics as to the role and importance 
of being human.  Is human dignity then a gross example of widespread 
speciesism (in other words an unjustified prejudice); or instead, an acceptable, 
or even inescapable, preference for our own kind? It has been highlighted that 
an answer to such a question itself rests on deciding whether membership in 
the human species is itself morally relevant, or if it is nothing more than a 
biological (and so non-moral) category.  Singer, for instance, argues that 
species membership itself is not morally relevant, and we should instead adopt 
cross-species criteria for moral considerability, namely sentience and the ability 
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 Cora Diamond, for instance, argues that being a human and leading a human life has a 
major role to play in our moral deliberations (Diamond 1991, 54-9). On this point there is sharp 
disagreement.  McMahan, for instance, insists that unlike a sense of nationality: ‘...membership 
in a species is not a focus of collective identity. Being human does not significantly differentiate 
us from anything else; it therefore fails to engage our pride or enhance our sense of identity. 
Just as no one's sense of identity is enlarged by the recognition that one is an animal rather 
than a plant, so no one's sense of identity is importantly shaped by an awareness of being 
human rather than being, for example, a rabbit’ (McMahan 2002, 221). 
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to suffer and feel pain.210 We should, therefore, take the interests of non-
humans in not suffering as seriously as we do that of humans, in so far as the 
suffering of a non-human is equivalent to the suffering of a human (Singer 1995, 
15).  To do otherwise, in the eyes of Singer, is to be speciesist, in other words, 
to have an unjustified bias or prejudice in favour of one’s own species. 
In contrast, for the proponents of the importance of being human, whilst there is 
still a strong requirement to take the moral considerability of animals into 
account (which includes the importance of not inflicting pain or suffering on 
them), there is still a difference – and for many a considerable difference – 
between the suffering of a human and of an animal, even if both cases of pain 
are experienced in equal duration and intensity.  Sentience alone, it is argued, 
should not be considered sufficient for prioritising moral considerability, but 
should instead be grounded in a range of other morally worthy capacities.  As 
was highlighted in Chapter 6, even Singer has acknowledged that, in the case 
of killing, there are distinct differences between humans and animals that 
warrant privileging the life of the former over the latter.  Human life (or at least 
healthy adult human life), because of certain characteristics, is considered to be 
richer and more valuable than an animal’s life, and so should be given priority 
(Singer 1995, 19; see also Frey 1988). 
In contrast, for others, mere species membership is sufficient to entitle one to a 
high moral status and dignity, and justification for the possession of this high 
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 This is a view shared by James Rachels, who proposes a form of moral individualism: 
‘Appealing to the traditional doctrine of human dignity, we might explain this by saying that 
human life has an inherent worth that non-human life does not have.  Moral individualism, on 
the other hand, would require a different approach.  According to moral individualism, it is not 
good enough simply to observe that chimps are not members of the preferred group—that they 
are not human.  Instead we would have to look at specific chimpanzees, and specific humans, 
and ask what characteristics they have that are relevant to the judgement that one, but not the 
other, may be used...the answer would have to be in terms of their individual characteristics’ 
(Rachels 1990, 174). 
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worth need go no further than that (Egonsson 1998; Wertheimer 1974).211 As 
was shown in Chapter 6, this is an unqualified speciest account, in which 
species membership itself is thought to be morally relevant.  Others, like Singer, 
Rachels and McMahan, criticise this short justificatory chain, and insist that 
further reasons are necessary for why all humans are thought to have such a 
high moral status.  However, when we speak of the significance of being 
human, we are not necessarily referring exclusively to being a member of the 
species Homo sapiens.  For many the significance of being human is not merely 
tied to membership in the human species.  A milder form of speciesism, what 
we have termed qualified speciesism, instead argues that species membership 
by itself is not morally relevant, but is correlated or associated with other morally 
commendable characteristics which are.  It is this weaker, and more palatable, 
form of speciesism which was focused on throughout, as it suffers less from an 
explanatory gap as to how being a member of a biological species confers 
moral status, for it provides further reasons to justify this high moral status. 
Marginal Cases and the Limitations of the Capacities Account 
 
Nevertheless, it has been shown throughout this thesis that many of the 
traditional arguments put forward to ground a universal human dignity fail to 
adequately do so.  In particular, as has become apparent, one of the most 
fundamental and persistent problems for a universal human dignity, especially a 
capacity-driven account, is the fact that every human being possesses status 
conferring capacities to varying degrees and, in some cases, does not possess 
them at all.  Moreover, as shown in the second section, it is notoriously difficult 
                                                          
211
 As McCrudden notes: ‘The power of the concept of human dignity is unquestionable. It 
appears to present a simple command to all of us: that we (individually and collectively) should 
value the human person, simply because he or she is human’ (McCrudden 2013, 1). 
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to find a morally significant characteristic, capacity or feature which is shared by 
all humans, but no other non-humans.  As is pointed out with growing 
frequency, some animals possess certain cognitive capacities at least 
equivalent to that of some humans.  The difficulty with the capacities account, 
therefore, arises when we try to make the move from claiming that some 
humans have morally relevant characteristics, to the conclusion that, therefore, 
all humans should be treated as if they had a moral status over and above that 
of all other animals.  Indeed, some human beings, such as foetuses or infants, 
have only the potential to develop status conferring capacities (such as 
rationality, moral reasoning or autonomy).  Other humans, by contrast, such as 
the severely cognitively disabled, neither have the requisite faculties now, nor 
the future capacity to develop them.  Still others, such as those suffering from 
advanced forms of dementia, may have previously had the requisite cognitive 
capacities but unfortunately no longer do.  A big stumbling block for a 
capacities-driven account of universal human dignity, therefore, is to defend it 
against the problems thrown up by so-called ‘marginal cases’. 
Relational Dignity 
 
Yet, if the possession of certain capacities does not ground a universal human 
dignity, then what does?  Rather than attempt to supervene dignity over the 
possession of certain cognitive capacities, or believe dignity to be an objective 
ontological property of human beings, it has been argued that an alternative 
approach, therefore, should look instead at the significance and meaning 
behind our relations and social practices.  The relational account more readily 
accommodates so-called marginal cases, as well as bringing the focus back 
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towards the role of ‘being human’ and human ways of being (as opposed to 
possessing certain capacities) as of moral importance.  There are certain 
relationships we have with other individuals which result from being members of 
the same species, and so marginal humans are members of the moral 
community in ways that animals with similar capacities cannot be.  As John 
Benson explains: ‘...to think of oneself as human is not to think of the biological 
classification one falls into, but to think of oneself as a point in a network of 
overlapping relations, actual and possible, with other individuals’ (Benson 1978, 
536). Similarly, Eva Kittay argues that our worth and moral status is the result of 
a social matrix.  In regards to an anencephalic infant, for instance, Kittay writes 
that:  
…this infant is someone’s child, and with that social relationship comes a 
series of appropriate emotional and moral responses—ones that 
differentiate this birth from either a tumor or a plant. It is morally (and 
emotionally) appropriate to care for one’s child for the child’s own sake. It 
is the practices that define parenthood, and not simply the intrinsic 
properties of the product of the pregnancy… (Kittay 2005, 111-2).212 
Dignity, on this view, is both made and challenged in the social realm.   For 
Elizabeth Anderson, as was highlighted in Chapter 6, dignity is largely to do with 
making both other humans, as well as animals, decent for human society, so 
that we are able to live with and relate to one another within our common life 
(Anderson 2004, 283). 
                                                          
212
 As Wasserman explains: ‘On this approach, it is not the mere biological fact of species 
membership that obliges third-parties to treat the severely-disabled children and siblings of 
other human beings with respect. Those third-parties are caught up in the same matrix of social 
relationships, which also determines their duties to others’ (Wasserman et al. 2013a, fn13). 
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Indeed, it has been suggested throughout that an insistence on the need to 
identify morally significant capacities possessed by all human beings to justify a 
universal human dignity is wrongheaded.  Whilst citing all these various 
capacities and abilities helps to build a fuller picture of what it is to be human, 
the capacities driven-account, nevertheless, still fails to get to the heart of what 
we mean by the significance of being human.  The relational approach, in 
contrast, looks beyond a limited range of cognitive capacities, and considers 
instead a broader set of features that are thought to be representative of the 
significance of being human.  These alternative relational accounts look instead 
at the socially constructed concept of the human being, one which is rooted in 
our language and shared social practices, and seem to be more closely allied to 
what we mean when we speak of our shared humanity.  Many writers instead 
have spoken of the role and importance of species loyalty, social bondedness 
or a shared common life (see for instance Luban 2009; Anderson 2004; Gaita 
2004; Mulhall 2002; Kittay 1999; Diamond 1991, 1978; and Benson 1978).213 
Such an account of the significance of being human seems a more natural 
home for a universal human dignity.  A universal human dignity, like the South 
African idea of ubuntu, seems to be an appeal to human solidarity214 – to see 
beyond local, personal or regional difference, and accept the moral worth of all 
(or at least most) humans. 
The term ‘human being’, on the relational account, is a so-called thick 
evaluative or normative concept, that is, one which has both a descriptive and 
                                                          
213
 Such a sentiment is encapsulated in John Donne's famous lines: ‘No Man is an Iland, intire 
of it selfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed 
away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor 
of thy friends or of thine owne were; any mans death diminishes me, because I am involved in 
Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee' (Donne 
1987). 
214
 As Richard Rorty explains: ‘The traditional philosophical way of spelling out what we mean 
by "human solidarity" is to say that there is something within each of us – our essential humanity 
– which resonates to the presence of this same thing in other human beings’ (Rorty 1989, 189). 
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an evaluative element.  When we say something is ‘human’ we are not only 
giving a biological description, but a normative account of how the individual 
should and should not be treated.  There are certain social practices which 
partially constitute what it means to be a human.  As Wasserman explains, on 
this account: 
We…learn the appropriate ways of acting toward fellow human beings in 
learning the very concept: for example, human beings are to be named, 
and not eaten even when they are dead. We do not conclude that human 
beings must be treated this way; the recognition that they must is already 
part of the meaning of the concept (Diamond 1978; Gleeson 2008)…This 
thick, normative concept of human being is not a biological one, and 
need not have the same extension as the class of Homo sapiens 
(Wasserman 2013a).   
Some proponents of the relational or social bondedness model of moral 
considerability argue, therefore, that shared species membership presents a 
special loyalty between our fellow humans which, unlike racism or sexism, is a 
justified bias or partiality in favour of our own kind (Williams 2006).215   
Yet, why do, or rather should, humans feel a sense of solidarity with other 
humans?  Diamond argues that the ground of this sense of solidarity does not 
have to be ground on any group of properties, but imaginatively, and perceiving 
others to have a common human fate.  We can thus share a feeling of human 
solidarity or bondedness with so-called marginal human cases.  Diamond gives 
two examples of when we might be touched by an ‘imaginative sense of shared 
                                                          
215
 See also: ‘the mere fact that a being is ‘of human born’ provides a strong reason for 
according it the same status as other humans. This has sometimes been characterized as 
prejudice, called speciesism. But it is not prejudice to hold that our own relation to these beings 
gives us reason to accept the requirement that our actions be justifiable to them’ (Scanlon 1998, 
185). 
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humanity’ and ‘our human bondedness to each other...’ (Diamond 1991, 55).  In 
the first instance, a fellow human is moved by the response they witness of a 
severely cognitively disabled individual’s reaction to music.  The second case 
concerns the outrage at witnessing a child mocking a severely cognitively 
disabled individual who, because of their condition, could not understand that 
they were being ridiculed.  In both cases, Diamond argues that they touch on 
the role of having a shared human fate.216 In the same vein, for writers such as 
Eva Feder Kittay and Mary Midgley, the appropriate analogy for species 
membership is not with racism, nationalism or sexism, but with the family (see 
Kittay 2005, 124, 151-2; Midgley 1984, 104-5).  In the same way that a parent 
would not be criticised for prioritising some of the needs and interests of their 
own children (regardless of the child’s intrinsic properties) so we have a special 
moral obligation to prioritise the needs and interests of another human over that 
of a non-human.  
Dignity and Care 
 
In particular, it has been argued that it is the relationship between dignity and 
care which presents one of the strongest examples of the significance behind 
our social relations and practices.217  It is also a fertile area of enquiry which 
would benefit from further exploration.  As opposed to a negative approach to 
human dignity (dignity defined and explained by its absence, as we see in 
cases of humiliation, dehumanization and so on), care ethics presents a positive 
                                                          
216
 As Diamond explains in more detail, having a shared human fate means that ‘a human being 
is someone who has a human life to lead, as do I, someone whose fate is a human fate, as is 
mine...If it is possible for that sense of shared humanity to be expressed in actions, they have 
also most strikingly the power to express the refusal of solidarity, e.g., in the denial of decent 
burial...’ (Diamond 1991, 59). 
217
 A similar stance has been taken by Nussbaum, who has argued that, ‘…bodily need, 
including the need for care, is a feature of our rationality and our sociability; it is one aspect of 
our dignity, then, rather than something to be contrasted with it' (Nussbaum 2006b, 160). 
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formulation to what dignity in fact is and what we mean when we speak of 
respecting the dignity of others.  Indeed, it is of little surprise that in the wake of 
scandals of poor patient care in the UK the importance of upholding patient 
dignity within healthcare has become an increasing theme in recent years 
(Department of Health 2015; Nursing and Midwifery Council 2015; and General 
Medical Council 2013).  To care for another individual is to acknowledge that 
they have a worth which ought to be acknowledged, respected and upheld.  The 
patient with dementia, for example, who is given help to wash and dress is not 
only shown a personal level of dignity and respect, but following Anderson, is 
also kept decent for human society.  To treat someone with care, respect and 
dignity is then also a form of social inclusion (and likewise, to treat someone 
without these a form of social exclusion).  To care for another enables them to 
uphold and maintain their self-respect, sense of self-worth, and ultimately their 
place within a human community.  As Sarah Clark Miller argues: 
The manner in which a person meets another’s need either contributes to 
or detracts from the dignity of that individual.  Although dignity is inherent 
in every human being, dignifying care draws forth the dignity of the 
individual, establishing the social solidity of her equal moral worth.  In 
contrast, negligent forms of care can damage a person’s dignity, 
hindering social recognition of the individual’s equal moral standing 
(Miller 2012, 8). 
In this way, a universal human dignity is presented, at heart, as a relational 
concept, which is often realised most clearly through our caring relationships. 
The Limits of Human Dignity 
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As has been argued, a universal human dignity ought to be grounded in 
features of our common life that are coextensive, but not necessarily tied to the 
biological category Homo sapiens.  As Wasserman notes, for many humanists, 
‘humanity’ is not ‘strictly [a] biological concept, but a linguistic or cultural one, 
based in part on affinities in appearance, behaviour, and experience. The 
concept of humanity, and the classification of an individual as human, can only 
be understood in terms of a network of social practices or “forms of life”’ 
(Wasserman et al. 2013a, fn12).  If this is the case, and the boundaries of the 
‘thick concept’ of being human are unclear, then one may ask how elastic the 
concept of human dignity in fact is – in other words, how universal is a universal 
human dignity?  Does dignity extend to such marginal cases as embryos and 
foetuses or the irreversibly comatose, can it also stretch to some non-human 
animals who share in our common life, or even to future posthumans, chimeras, 
or artificial intelligences? This thesis has not gone so far as to attempt to 
answer such questions, not least because such debates remain highly 
contentious and speculative.  Rather, it has had the more modest aim of merely 
highlighting the type of questions that need to be asked and answered, if we are 
to understand where the boundaries of a universal human dignity lie.  It has 
been argued that the question of whether an individual has a dignity becomes 
less to do with the capacities they must possess, and more about how they do, 
or could, sit within our common life, and the meaning or significance such 
relations would have.   As was argued in the final chapter, therefore, the key to 
understanding the limits of human dignity is related to establishing whether the 
significance we would attach to the death and burial of a posthuman would be 
as profound as the death and burial of the unenhanced, or whether it would be 
considered as abhorrent to eat a human-animal chimera, as it would to eat our 
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own dead.  Whilst there are no obvious answers to such questions, it has been 
suggested that, if a universal human dignity strives for equality of moral 
concern, then it seems wrongheaded to deny dignity to creatures which would 
do, or could, share so much with us.   
Conversely, there are some acts, including some in the pursuit of radical human 
enhancement, which seem entirely detached and antithetical to many of the 
core tenets of a universal human dignity.  To ignore the significance of our 
mutual interdependence, or deny the importance of compassionate care, for 
example, does seem to profoundly challenge the two key components that has 
been argued are required for full ‘humanization’ – a sense of human identity and 
human community.  In such instances, where the individual is so 
unrecognisably human, it makes little sense to speak of them as partaking in a 
distinctively human common life.  However, whether the loss or diminishment of 
this distinctively human form of dignity is ultimately regrettable depends upon 
what replaced it, and what we feel would be lost. 
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